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DISQUIETING DISCRETION: RACE, GEOGRAPHY & THE
COLORADO DEATH PENALTY IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
BY MEG BEARDSLEY, SAM KAMIN, JUSTIN MARCEAU & SCOTT
PHILLIPSt
ABSTRACT
This Article demonstrates through original statistical research that
prosecutors in Colorado were more likely to seek the death penalty
against minority defendants than against white defendants. Moreover,
defendants in Colorado's Eighteenth Judicial District were more likely to
face a death prosecution than defendants elsewhere in the state. Our em-
pirical analysis demonstrates that even when one controls for the differ-
ential rates at which different groups commit statutorily death-eligible
murders, non-white defendants and defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial
District were still more likely than others to face a death penalty prosecu-
tion. Even when the heinousness of the crime is accounted for, the race
of the accused and the place of the crime are statistically significant pre-
dictors of whether prosecutors will seek the death penalty. We discuss
the implications of this disparate impact on the constitutionality of Colo-
rado's death penalty regime, concluding that the Colorado statute does
not meet the dictates of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION: THE DEATH PENALTY IN COLORADO TODAY
The death penalty has taken center stage in Colorado politics in re-
cent years. In the past, debate over capital punishment tended to focus on
moral or theological issues.' Today, however, the discussion is largely
about the practical application of the death penalty.
A number of facts about Colorado's death penalty stand out. One
immediate and inescapable initial observation is that the use of the death
penalty is in steep decline in Colorado, to the point that it is now virtual-
ly nonexistent. To describe the penalty's use in Colorado as rare is an
extreme understatement. Since 1967, only one person has been executed
during a period in which more than 8,100 homicides have been commit-
2
ted. At present, there are only three men on Colorado's death row, aris-
ing from just two criminal incidents: one man convicted of a multiple
murder of four people that occurred in 19933 and two men convicted of
involvement in a double murder that occurred in 2005.4 All three of these
men are African-American and were very young-under 21 years old-
at the time of the crimes. All are from the same county, and in fact, all
attended the same high school in Aurora, Colorado.
When Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper issued a temporary
reprieve to Nathan Dunlap in 2014, forestalling indefinitely his execu-
tion, the Governor quoted a Colorado judge who had said to him: "[The
death penalty] is simply the result of happenstance, the district attorney's
choice, the jurisdiction in which the case is filed, perhaps the race or
1. See generally, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 51-57 (Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen trans., Univ. of Toronto
Press 2008) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 168-197 (Robert Heward,
Wellington St., Strand 1917) (1830); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 88-89,
at 47-48 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hacket Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 32-34 (G.D.H. Cole trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1762),
Hugo Adam Bedau, Capital Punishment, in MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 148, 148, 167-69 (T.
Regan ed., Random House 1980).
2. Gary Davis was executed in 1997 for a murder he and his wife committed in 1986. See
People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 167 (Colo. 1990). Homicide rates are provided by DisasterCent-
er.com using data from FBI Annual Crime Reports, which shows 8,117 murders committed in the
years 1967 through 2013. Colorado Crime Rates 1967-2013, DISASTERCENTER.COM,
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/cocrime.htm (last visited April 9, 2015).
3. See People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 733 (Colo. 1999).
4. See People v. Ray, 252 P.3d 1042, 1044 (Colo. 2011); People v. Owens, 228 P.3d 969,
970 (Colo. 2010).
5. Ivan Moreno, Personal Stories Grip Lawmakers On Death Penalty, CBS DENVER, (Mar.
17, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2013/03/17/personal-stories-grip-lawmakers-on-
death-penalty.
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economic circumstance of the defendant."6 Citing a recent study of the
Colorado death penalty conducted by authors of this Article (the Colora-
do Narrowing Study),7 the Governor added that, since the time that Dun-
lap had been sentenced in 1996, "we now have the benefit of information
that exposes an inequitable system."8
Indeed, we do. This Article demonstrates that the imposition of the
death penalty in Colorado depends to an alarming extent on the race and
geographic location of the defendant. Moreover, we use empirical data
and statistical analysis to definitively rebut the argument that these racial
and geographic disparities within Colorado's death penalty system are
simply the result of racial or geographic disparities in homicide commis-
sion. This study demonstrates that both the race of the defendant and the
geographic location of the crime are statistically significant predictors of
whether a death penalty prosecution will be pursued against a statutorily
eligible defendant. In conjunction with the Colorado Narrowing Study,9
we demonstrate two critical failures in the Colorado death penalty sys-
tem: (1) the system does not sufficiently narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants at the stage of statutory definition;o and (2) there is a
statistically significant disparity between death prosecutions against
whites and non-whites, and among judicial districts.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ments has been construed as imposing a variety of procedural require-
ments on the lawful imposition of a death sentence.'1 Beginning in 1972,
in the groundbreaking Furman v. Georgia1 2 decision, the Court an-
nounced its concern, as a constitutional matter, with arbitrariness in the
death sentencing procedures of the states.13 Although Furman was a plu-
rality decision producing ten separate opinions from the Court's nine
Justices, Justice Stewart provided perhaps the most memorable summary
of the Court's reasoning in striking down the death penalty in the United
States; he explained that when the death penalty is imposed on only a
"random handful" of the defendants who are statutorily eligible for the
punishment, then the death penalty is "cruel and unusual in the same way
6. OFFICE OF THE Gov., STATE OF COLO., Exec. Order D2013-006, at 2 (May 22, 2013)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251650380954.
7. Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are
Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1069 (2013). We refer to this study as the Colorado
Narrowing Study.
8. OFFICE OF THE Gov., STATE OF COLO., supra note 6, at 2-3.
9. See Marceau et al., supra note 7.
10. This is the finding of the Colorado Narrowing Study. See id at 1113; Sam Kamin & Justin
Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 1014-16 (2015).
11. For a more thorough summary of the background Eighth Amendment law, see Marceau et
al., supra note 7, at 1075-76.
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
13. See id at 243-48 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."1 4 That is, for Justice
Stewart-as well as Justices Douglas and White15-the infrequency with
which the death penalty was imposed was sufficient reason to invalidate
the punishment on constitutional grounds.
Even more relevant for present purposes, the decision to invalidate
the capital punishment systems at issue in Furman rested in large part on
a fear that too much discretion in the hands of prosecutors and juries
would lead to the arbitrary and racially disparate application of the death
penalty. Justice Douglas explicitly linked the constitutional problem of
arbitrariness to the death penalty's racially disparate application. Douglas
observed, "It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty in-
flicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by
reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudic-
es."l6 Douglas went on to say that death penalty systems that did not
sufficiently narrow death eligibility through statutory criteria "are preg-
nant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compati-
ble with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."1 7
In short, the Furman Court was concerned that the rarity of death
sentences relative to statutory eligibility raised the specter of racial dis-
crimination. In light of the fact that the death penalty in Colorado is
14. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Although Furman was only a plurality the Court
itself has subsequently grappled with the precedential value of the decision on multiple occasions. A
dissent by Justice Scalia provides a summary of the Court's subsequent reatment of Furman:
In Furman, we overturned the sentences of two men convicted and sentenced to death in
state courts for murder and one man so convicted and sentenced for rape, under statutes
that gave the jury complete discretion to impose death for those crimes, with no standards
as to the factors it should deem relevant. The brief per curiam gave no reasons for the
Court's decision, other than to say that "the imposition and carrying out of the death penal-
ty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." To uncover the reasons underlying the decision in Furman, one
must turn to the opinions of the five Justices forming the majority, each of whom wrote
separately and none of whom joined any other's opinion. Of these opinions, [Justice Bren-
nan's and Justice Marshall's] rested on the broadest possible ground-that the death penal-
ty was cruel and unusual punishment in all circumstances. A third, that of Justice Douglas,
rested on a narrower ground-that the discretionary capital sentencing systems under
which the petitioners had been sentenced were operated in a manner that discriminated
against racial minorities and unpopular groups. The critical opinions, however, in light of
the subsequent development of our jurisprudence, were those of Justices Stewart and
White.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-58 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), over-
ruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
15. Id. at 254-56 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 311 (White, J., concurring). See James S.
Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (describing the opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White as the
controlling holdings in Furman).
16. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 256-57.
18. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1073 n.9 ("Scholars have observed that the Court's con-
clusion that the death penalty was unconstitutional in Furman was based in large part on the low
death sentencing ratios-that is, the low percentage of defendants who were eligible for the death
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imposed in only a small fraction of the cases in which it is statutorily
available,19 the next question is whether, as Justice Douglas predicted,
the broad definition of death eligibility has, in fact, created a death penal-
ty system that is tainted by racially disparate application. Previous schol-
ars have suggested that low death sentencing rates can be expected to
produce a death sentencing system that is racially disproportionate.20
This Article provides data and analysis to confirm this hypothesis. Colo-
rado's death penalty, because it fails to provide a meaningful mechanism
for narrowing in the legislative definition, opens the door to disparate
impact.
In 1986, in a discussion of the role of race in capital jury sentencing,
the United States Supreme Court made an observation that is equally
applicable to exercises of prosecutorial discretion at the death penalty
charging stage. In Turner v. Murray,21 the Court noted that, while issues
of race can theoretically enter into any case, there are exceptional con-
cerns in a death penalty case because of the vast amount of discretion
involved:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice
to operate but remain undetected. . . .
... [T]he risk of racial bias at sentencing hearings is of an entirely
different order, because the decisions that sentencing jurors must
make involve far more subjective judgments than when they are de-
ciding guilt or innocence.22
penalty that were actually sentenced to death."); see, e.g., Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The
California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1287 ("The
Court's determination in Furman that the death penalty was being applied to a 'random handful' was
grounded in empirical data concerning death sentence ratios at the time." (footnote omitted)); id at
1288 ("In Furman, the Justices' conclusion that the death penalty was imposed only infrequently
derived from their understanding that only 15-20% of convicted murderers who were death-eligible
were being sentenced to death."); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARV. L. REV. 355, 415 (1995) ("[T]he class of the death-eligible should not be tremendously great-
er than, say, five or ten percent of all murderers. What was intolerable at the time of Furman and
what remains intolerable today is that the ratio of death-eligibility to offenses-resulting-in-death is
much closer to ninety-to-one than five or ten-to-one.").
19. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
20. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1115; see, e.g., Chelsea Creo Sharon, Note, The "Most
Deserving" of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in
Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 247 n.138 (2011) ("In particular, the
Baldus group's study of racial discrimination in Georgia, relied upon by the petitioner in McCleskey
v. Kemp, reached this conclusion. The study found that, among cases with nearly universal death
sentencing, there was only a 2% difference between death-sentence rates for black and white de-
fendants with white victims. Among less aggravated cases, where death sentences were imposed
only 41% of the time, this racial variation rose to 26%."(citation omitted)).
21. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
22. Id. at 35, 38 n.12.
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The same risk of undetected, perhaps even unconscious, racial bias23 is
not restricted to jury decision making; the death penalty charging deci-
sions being made by Colorado prosecutors have a strong racially dispar-
ate impact.
II. PRIOR STUDIES ON RACE, GENDER, AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Furman, numerous
empirical studies have been designed to assess how, and whether, the
race of murder defendants and victims affects the likelihood that a death
sentence will be imposed.24 In 1990, for example, the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) conducted a review of studies of the administration of
23. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006); Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact
of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 822
(2012) ("[T]here are compelling reasons to believe that prosecutors unwittingly display implicit
racial bias at a variety of decision points.").
24. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE G. WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 140-88 (1990) [hereinafter BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL
JUSTICE]; David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capi-
tal Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411,
1421 (2004) [hereinafter Baldus & Woodworth, Reflections] (discussing the apparent decline, post-
Furman, of race-of-defendant discrimination in exercises of prosecutorial discretion); David C.
Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 590 (2002)
[hereinafter Baldus et al., Nebraska Experience]; David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and
the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1763-64, 1767 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al.,
Findings from Philadelphia] (examining death prosecutions in Philadelphia between 1983 and 1993
and finding that, after controlling for the severity of the crime and the defendant's criminal back-
ground, the rate at which death-eligible black defendants were sentenced to death was 38% higher
than the rate for other eligible defendants; finding also that death sentences were most likely to be
imposed in cases involving black defendants and nonblack victims, and least likely to be imposed in
cases involving nonblack defendants and black victims); David C. Baldus, Charles A. Pulaski, Jr. &
George Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A
Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133, 147 (1986) [hereinafter Baldus et al.,
Challenge] (including data from Colorado); John J. Donohue Ill, An Empirical Evaluation of the
Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic
Disparities?, II J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637 (2014); Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by
Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 13-14 (2004); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet,
The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for Calfornia Homicides: 1990-
1999, The Empirical Analysis, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2005); Glenn L. Pierce & Mi-
chael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 67
(2002); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death
Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1991); John J. Donohue, Capital Punishment in Connecti-
cut, 1973-2007: A Comprehensive Evaluation from 4686 Murders to One Execution 1 (June 8,
2013) [hereinafter Donohue, Capital Punishment in Connecticut] (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1095&context=john donohue (analyz-
ing murders in Connecticut from 1973 to 2007); ISAAC UNAH & JOHN CHARLES BOGER, RACE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: 1993-1997, at 2 (2001),
available at http://www.unc.edu/-jcboger/NCDeathPenaltyReport2001.pdf; see also David C. Bal-
dus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal
Overview, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 501, 501 (James R. Acker et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter Baldus & Woodworth, AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT] (providing another good overview of the multiple studies documenting the race ef-
fect).
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the death penalty in various states to determine whether the race of the
victim and the defendant were affecting capital sentencing.25 The GAO
survey found that 82% of the studies selected as worthy of review had
shown that the race of the victim affected charging or sentencing deci-
sions or both.26 According to GAO's review, although "legally relevant
variables, such as aggravating circumstances, were influential ... [they]
did not explain fully the racial disparities researchers found."27
The GAO's conclusion is corroborated by research conducted in ju-
risdictions throughout he country, nearly all of which have documented
strong race-of-victim correlations and some of which have also demon-
strated race-of-defendant correlations with death prosecution and sen-
tencing.28 The first comprehensive empirical study of Colorado's death
penalty was published in 2003 and was authored by Professor Michael
Radelet; the research covered the period from 1859 to 1972.29 In a subse-
quent article, Professor Radelet, Stephanie Hindson, and Hillary Potter
continued that analysis, considering death penalty prosecutions for
crimes that occurred from 1980 through 1999.30 Radelet, Hindson, and
Potter examined "all cases where the death penalty was imposed, 1972-
2005, and ... all cases where the death penalty was sought, 1980-
1999."' The data revealed that Colorado death penalty prosecutions
were extremely rare, having been sought only 110 times between 1980
and the end of 1999.32 Radelet, Hindson, and Potter found that:
the odds of [a death prosecution] were much higher for those sus-
pected of killing whites than for those suspected of killing blacks or
Hispanics, and much higher for those suspected of killing white
women than for other homicide suspects in the 110 cases where the
death penalty was sought between 1980 and 1999. 3
25. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON
THE JUDICIARY, GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN
OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 1 (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING]; see also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: A STATISTICAL SURVEY (1988-2000),
at 30-32 (2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2000/09/13/
dpsurvey final.pdf(last visited July 23, 2015) (concluding that, between 1995 and 2000, 48% of
death cases charging white defendants were resolved by plea, while 25% of death cases charging
black defendants were resolved by plea-a 23 percentage point difference).
26. DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, supra note 25, at 5.
27. Id. at 6.
28. See supra note 24.
29. Michael L. Radelet, Capital Punishment in Colorado: 1859-1972, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
885 (2003).
30. Stephanie Hindson, Hillary Potter & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Gender, Region and
Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980-1999, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 549 (2006).
31. Id. at 552.
32. Id. at 567.
33. Id at 553. Hindson, Potter, and Radelet identified Colorado cases in which the death
penalty was sought and compared this "death-prosecuted" pool of murders to the general pool of
homicides in Colorado for the period 1980-1999. These researchers demonstrated that, statistically
speaking, the odds of a death prosecution were greater in cases involving white murder victims
(especially female victims) than in cases involving minority murder victims. Id. at 577-78. "While
non-Hispanic white victims accounted for 54 percent of all homicide victims from 1980 to 1999,
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Our work picks up where the Radelet studies left off. Our analysis
of the race and geographic location of defendants found guilty of the
most serious murders in Colorado involves two steps. First, it is neces-
sary to identify the most aggravated murders-those for which death is a
valid punishment under Colorado's capital statute.34 This task was taken
up by two of the authors of this article, along with another researcher in
the Colorado Narrowing Study, through an in-depth study of all conclud-
ed murder cases that had been filed in the Colorado district courts over a
twelve-year period (January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2010).35 The
Colorado Narrowing Study required the researchers to examine the facts
of each murder case during this period in order to determine which cases
were statutorily eligible for prosecution under the Colorado Death Penal-
ty Statute.36 In particular, the study identified a pool of Colorado aggra-
vated murders in which the death penalty was sought or legally could
have been sought-those cases in which a jury's finding of first-degree
murder and aggravating factors would have been upheld on appeal.37
These murders are referred to herein as "statutorily death-eligible"-they
are murders for which the death penalty was permitted as a matter of law
under the Colorado first-degree murder and death penalty statutes. Hav-
ing identified the statutorily death-eligible cases, we then compared these
cases to those in which death was actually sought to determine what per-
centage of statutorily death-eligible cases were actually prosecuted as
such.
Stated differently, the primary purpose of the Colorado Narrowing
Study was to assess whether or not Colorado's statutory death penalty
scheme fulfills the constitutional task assigned to it by the Supreme
Court in such cases as Furman v. Georgia,39 Gregg v. Georgia,40 and
Zant v. Stevens.41 In those cases the Court repeatedly required the states
they account for 81.8 percent of victims in cases where the death penalty was sought." Id. at 578
(emphasis omitted). The researchers found that the death penalty was "pursued against those who
kill white women at almost twice the rate as their rate of homicide victimization." Id. at 577. These
researchers suggested that future efforts should focus on particular characteristics of the murders in
those cases where the death penalty was sought ("death prosecutions") and those in which prosecu-
tors sought alternative lesser penalties, such as life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 582. The
researchers explained their focus on the victim's attributes (race, gender, and ethnicity) as follows:
"Because the vast majority of research on the relationship between race and death sentencing con-
ducted over the past three decades has found that death sentencing is correlated with the victim's
race and ethnicity, and not the defendant's, we focus herein primarily on victim attributes." Id. at
552.
34. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2012).
35. See infra Part Ill. For additional study parameters, see Marceau, et al., supra note 7, at
1098-1108.
36. See infra Part Ill. See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2012).
37. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1072.
38. We use the phrase "statutorily death-eligible" for precision. Prior scholarship has demon-
strated the confusion surrounding the terms "eligibility" and "narrowing" in the death penalty con-
text. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 10, at 1002-04.
39. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
40. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
41. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
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to establish a statutory basis for narrowing the few cases in which the
death penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.42
The Colorado Narrowing Study produced a number of notable find-
ings. First, it showed that over 91% of murders during the study period
either were or could have been prosecuted as first-degree murders.43 Se-
cond, and even more significantly, the data showed that in over 90% of
all cases that were or could have been charged as first-degree murder,
one or more aggravating factors was present. That is to say, the study
demonstrated that more than nine out of ten first-degree murderers were
statutorily death-eligible." Finally, because the Supreme Court in Fur-
man had focused on the risk of disparate treatment that occurs when a
death sentence rate is less than 15%-20%,45 the study calculated Colora-
do's death sentencing rate for the period and determined it to be just "3
of 539, or 0.56%."4
On the basis of these data, the study concluded that Colorado's stat-
utory sentencing scheme "has failed to produce legislative standards ca-
pable of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible offenders."47 On
the basis of these findings alone- the fact that nearly every murderer in
Colorado could have been charged with first-degree murder and that
nearly every first-degree murderer could have been sentenced to death -
the Colorado Narrowing Study concluded that Colorado's capital sen-
tencing regime was not meeting its Eighth Amendment obligations.
In response, proponents of the death penalty have asserted that the
findings of the Colorado Narrowing Study are largely irrelevant to the
question of the Colorado capital statute's constitutionality. Statutory nar-
rowing, they argue, is unnecessary, because the prosecutors themselves
take great care to ensure that he death penalty system in the state oper-
42. Zant, 462 U.S. at 862-63; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97; Furman, 408 U.S. at 299-301,
304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Marceau et al, supra note 7 at 1072 ("[T]he Supreme Court
has emphasized that a State's capital sentencing statute must serve the 'constitutionally necessary
function ... [of] circumscrib[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty' such that only
the very worst are eligible for the law's ultimate punishment." (alterations in original) (quoting Zant,
462 U.S. at 878)).
43. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1109.
44. Id at 1110 (finding that in approximately 90% of first-degree murder convictions, a
finding of at least one aggravating factor would have been upheld on appeal).
45. Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for
Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1283, 1288 (1997) ("In Furman, the Justices' conclusion that he death
penalty was imposed only infrequently derived from their understanding that only 15-20% of con-
victed murderers who were death-eligible were being sentenced to death.").
46. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1112. It bears noting that one Colorado District Court
found that, following an extensive review of these results, the prosecution effectively concurred and
had no objection to the court's reliance on these statistical findings. See People v. Montour, No.
02CR782, at 2 (Douglas County District Court of Colorado May 2, 2013) ("The prosecution found
that the aggravating-factor rate was 88.49%, and the death-sentence rate was 0.57%.") (on file with
author); id., at 2 n.5 ("The Court will use the defense's statistics ... to resolve this motion on the
merits, because the parties' statistics are similar, and because the prosecution stipulated to the de-
fense's numbers for purposes of this motion.").
47. Id.atlll3.
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ates in a fair, rational, and non-arbitrary manner. Illustrative are the
comments of Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney George Brauchler,
who addressed the role of prosecutorial discretion in death prosecutions
during a March 19, 2013 hearing, held before the Colorado General As-
sembly's House Committee on the Judiciary on House Bill 13-1264,
which concerned a proposed repeal of Colorado's death penalty.4 8 When
asked whether the dearth of defendants on death row-in contrast with
the "thousands" of murder convictions that had been obtained in Colora-
do-constituted evidence that the death penalty was being imposed arbi-
trarily and capriciously, Mr. Brauchler responded, "No . . . . In fact, what
it is, it's the exercise of discretion. . . . [T]he fact that we don't pursue
[the death penalty] on a greater percentage of murder cases only shows
you the amount of discretion that these District Attorneys exercise in
seeking it." 4 9 Mr. Brauchler further stated:
It's false to say that every first degree murder case could arguably be
the death penalty. . . . In fact, it requires more than existence of an
aggravating factor. . . . [O]ne of the hallmarks of a free people and
the best criminal justice system in the country is something that's
called prosecutorial discretion. And it is because we have 22 sepa-
rately-elected District Attorneys throughout this state, by the popula-
tions, over which they will impose laws of this State.50
The fact that the death penalty was frequently available but rarely used
was, in Brauchler's view, a demonstration of the success of Colorado's
death penalty system rather than evidence of its infirmity. Brauchler rea-
soned that although there was a great disparity between those eligible for
the penalty and those who receive it, this was evidence merely of the
careful use of discretion by the state's prosecuting attorneys.
At the same legislative hearing, some attempted to excuse the ra-
cially disparate operation of Colorado's death penalty by noting that non-
whites commit more of the violent crime in our state and that, as a result,
"African American[s] tend to be just easier to convict."5 ' Fourth Judicial
District Attorney Dan May explained that the racial disparities in the
capital punishment system are all "outside of the criminal justice area"
because "when you really look at how many people commit robberies,
how many are in prison, how many commit murders, how many in pris-
on, they parallel quite a bit." 52 The debate about Colorado's death penal-
ty, then, has been shaped by an intuition-often explicit-that racial mi-
48. Proposal of Repeal of the Death Penalty: Hearing on H.B.13-1264 Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 69th Reg. Sess. 260-61 (Colo. 2013) (statement of George Brauchler, Dist.
Att'y, 18th Judicial District).
49. Id. at 260-61.
50. Id at 248-49.
51. Id. at 302 (question posed by Rep. Jovan Melton, discussing race and the death penalty
with Dan May, Dist. Att'y, 4th Judicial District); see also id. at 273-74 (discussion with George
Brauchler, Dist. Att'y, 18th Judicial District).
52. Id. at 303 (testimony of Dan May, Dist. Att'y, 4th Judicial District).
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norities commit more (and more heinous) offenses than their white coun-
terparts. In this Article we examine whether the "more" and "worse"
arguments that have been advanced by legislators and district attorneys
can account for the impact of race and geographic location on the admin-
istration of the Colorado death penalty.
At the outset, it is important to note that there are insurmountable
constitutional problems with a capital sentencing regime that leaves to
prosecutors the task of ensuring a non-arbitrary, Eighth Amendment-
compliant death penalty regime.53 Prosecutorial discretion alone can nev-
er satisfy the Eighth Amendment requirements of statutory narrowing-
that narrowing must be done by statute, either in the definition of first-
degree murder or in the enumeration of statutory aggravating factors.
That is, no matter how carefully prosecutors exercise their discretion
about when to seek the death penalty, their exercise of discretion cannot
substitute for the legislative narrowing required by the Constitution or
save an otherwise unconstitutional capital statute. But this Article sets
that larger constitutional issue to the side. Assuming arguendo that pros-
ecutorial discretion could cure the problem of arbitrariness suggested by
the Colorado Narrowing Study (and it cannot), this Article seeks to ex-
amine the data and expose the realities of prosecutorial discretion in Col-
orado. This Article examines the results of the broad discretion afforded
prosecutors under Colorado's capital statute.
If prosecutors were, in fact, using their discretion to prevent the ar-
bitrary imposition of the death penalty, one would expect that only the
most heinous murderers would face death penalty prosecution. One
would also expect that neither race nor geography would be statistically
relevant predictors of whether a death sentence is sought. Such care and
thoughtfulness is certainly consistent with the narrative provided by
prosecutors in Colorado. Repeatedly, prosecutors have claimed that the
vast discretion afforded to them under Colorado's sentencing statue is a
force of good-that discretion ensures that only the worst are sentenced
to death. A careful study of the data, however, reveals a very different
picture. The severity of the defendant's crime is not the most important
factor in determining whether someone will be sentenced to death in
Colorado. Instead, as this Article's original statistical research demon-
strates, prosecutors were more likely to seek the death penalty against
minority defendants than against white defendants. Moreover, defendants
in Colorado's Eighteenth Judicial District were more likely to face a
53. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 10, at 992-94.
54. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983); Kamin & Marceau, supra note 10, at
993-94.
55. See, e.g., George Brauchler, Death Penalty Is a Tool ofJustice, DENVER POST, March 31,
2013, http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_22895409/death-penalty-is-tool-justice ("[O]ur elected
prosecutors prudently exercise discretion as to which few murder cases truly warrant the pursuit of
the death penalty."); supra note 48-52 and accompanying text.
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death prosecution than defendants across the remainder of the state. Our
look at the data shows that even if we control for the differential rates at
which different groups commit statutorily death-eligible murders, non-
white defendants and defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District are
more likely than others to face a death penalty prosecution.56
III. METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
The Colorado Narrowing Study analyzed hundreds of murder con-
victions obtained during a twelve-year time period. From this extensive
data pool, the Colorado Narrowing Study identified 524 cases which,
based on their specific facts, could have been prosecuted as death penalty
cases under the Colorado Death Penalty Statute based on a first-degree
murder finding and the factual existence of one or more statutory aggra-
vating factors58 but in which the death penalty was not actually sought.59
In addition to the 524 statutorily death-eligible cases in which the prose-
cution exercised its discretion and did not seek the death penalty, there
were 22 cases in which the death penalty was actually sought by the
prosecution during the twelve-year period of the Colorado Narrowing
Study (death prosecutions).6 0 These 22 death prosecutions, when added
56. See infra Part IV.
57. For a detailed description of the methodology, see Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1098-
1108. The requirement for a conviction ensures that cases are not utilized in which the defendant
was actually innocent. This requirement, dubbed the "controlling fact finder" rule, is standard prac-
tice in empirical murder studies. The exclusion of cases under the controlling fact finder rule, like
the requirement that the death prosecution not be legally barred, best prevents misattribution of a
non-death penalty outcome to mere prosecutorial discretion or the possibility that the case was
simply a factually weak one. See David Baldus et al., Empirical Studies of Race and Geographic
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key Methodological
Issues, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 153, 165-66 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds.,
2009). Such a case is
properly excluded from any analysis of death sentencing outcomes. However, if on the
basis of credible evidence, the prosecution viewed such a case as death-eligible, as evi-
denced by the advancement of the case to trial with the government seeking a death sen-
tence, it would be appropriate to include the case in the sample of death-eligible cases
that is used to model prosecutorial decision making.
Id. at 166. In other words, a prosecutor's decision to seek death tells us something about the prose-
cutor's exercise of discretion, even when the defendant was factually innocent or even when the
prosecution was later barred on legal grounds.
58. Once a first-degree murder prosecution is commenced, the only additional requirement
placed upon the prosecution to trigger a death penalty prosecution is the filing of a Notice of Intent
and filing of a Notice of Statutory Aggravating Factors. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(3)(a)
(2012); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b). The statute includes a list of seventeen aggravating factors that
may be alleged, and an allegation of any one of them is sufficient to commence the death penalty
prosecution. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1.3-1201(5) (2012). A death sentence may not be imposed
unless a unanimous jury (or a judge if jury is waived) finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least
one of the aggravating factors was present. Id § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(I). This finding is necessary, but
not alone sufficient, for imposition of a death penalty. See id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(ll)-(Ill).
59. See Marceau et al., supra 7, at note 195.
60. The death-prosecuted cases are catalogued in Appendix I below. Seventeen of these
twenty-two death prosecutions resulted in a first-degree murder conviction. In five cases (Jimenez,
Wilkinson, Sweeney, Melina, and Perez), the defendants were acquitted at trial of the first-degree
murder charge. See Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1101 n.163. In two of the remaining seventeen
cases (Vasquez and Hagos), the death penalty was legally barred after the prosecution filed its notice
of intent to seek death. See id. at 1105 n. 179. As Baldus explained, such cases are useful indicators
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to the 524 cases in which death was not sought, form a larger pool of 546
statutorily death-eligible murders that either were prosecuted for death at
the outset of the case, or could have been under the Colorado statute.
These 546 cases are the focus of this Article.6 1
By taking a closer look at the pool of offenders who, under the Col-
orado statute, are statutorily eligible for a death penalty prosecution, we
are able for the first time to make comparisons between the de-
mographics of the large number of statutorily death-eligible Colorado
murders and the much smaller number of killings actually selected for
death penalty prosecution. As will be seen, this descriptive comparison
reveals disturbing disparities in the operation of the Colorado death pen-
alty system. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to identify or
isolate the causes of this disparity,62 which is left for future research, the
existence of such disparity is undeniable.
IV. THE COLORADO DEATH PENALTY: RARE AND UNFAIR
A. Race, Place, and the Disparate Use ofDiscretion
As previously noted, all three inmates on Colorado's death row are
African-Americans convicted in the Eighteenth Judicial District (the
of prosecutorial discretion occurring at the outset of the case, even if they are not as useful in ex-
plaining system outcomes. See David Baldus et al., Empirical Studies of Race and Geographic
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Primer on the Key Methodological
Issues, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 153, 165-66 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds.,
2009). Because the Colorado Narrowing Study focused on constitutional "narrowing," it excludes all
seven of these death prosecutions. See, e.g., Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1110 (reporting "539
cases in which we found one or more aggravating factors, including the death-noticed cases for
which the prosecution actually sought (and was legally permitted to seek) the death penalty"). This
was an extremely conservative approach that would tend to ultimately favor a finding that the statute
was constitutional, by not "penalizing" the system for failing to produce death sentences in cases in
which the defendants were actually innocent or the death prosecution legally barred. Even with this
conservative approach, the Colorado Narrowing Study conclusively demonstrated the unconstitu-
tionality of the Colorado Death Penalty Statute. See id. at 1113.
61. An alternative approach is to include only the seventeen death prosecutions that resulted
in first-degree murder convictions, because in each of the 524 statutorily death-eligible cases in
which death was not sought, the defendant was actually convicted of first-degree murder. At first
blush, this methodology appears to offer the elegance of comparing two sets of convicted murder
cases, rather than comparing one set of convicted murders (the 524 non-death prosecuted cases) and
another set of murder cases that includes both convicted and acquitted defendants (the set of twenty-
two death prosecutions, including the five death-prosecuted "acquittal" cases). The problem with the
alternative approach is that it underreports the cases in which a prosecutor exercised her discretion to
seek death. Because ultimately our goal was to examine the impact of prosecutorial decision making
at the very early stages of the process and to evaluate the race and place effect of prosecutorial
discretion, we opted for the inclusive approach (using all twenty-two death prosecutions). Inclusion
of all twenty-two death prosecutions is warranted when our focus is on prosecutorial charging deci-
sions. When reporting on system outcomes, we appropriately take into account the five acquittals
and the two legally barred cases. It is nonetheless important to note that the substantive findings are
the same under either approach.
62. We recognize that such disparities might be the result of implicit biases as opposed to
explicit showings of racial discrimination. "Implicit biases are discriminatory biases based on im-
plicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes," and "they can produce behavior that diverges from a person's
avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles." Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006).
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Eighteenth Judicial District is comprised of four counties: Arapahoe,
Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln). This fact makes a discussion of race and
place inescapable. Indeed, if we are to have a real discussion about the
death penalty in Colorado in the twenty-first century, then it is important
to know whether prosecutorial discretion contributed to such an unusual
and disquieting pattern of death sentencing. To investigate, we use con-
ventional statistical methods to examine the relationship between race,
place, and the decision to seek death in Colorado between 1999 and
2010.
Focusing initially on place, Table 1: Panel A reveals that prosecu-
tors sought death against 11.7% of the death-eligible defendants in the
Eighteenth Judicial District, while prosecutors in the state's remaining
judicial districts sought death against only 3.1% of the death-eligible
defendants.63 Put simply, statutorily death eligible defendants in the
Eighteenth Judicial District were nearly four times more likely to face
death than were similar defendants elsewhere.
Race also matters.6 Table 1: Panel B demonstrates that prosecutors
throughout Colorado sought death against 5.6% of eligible minority de-
fendants (20/358), compared to just 1.1% of eligible white defendants
(2/1 88).65 Thus, Colorado prosecutors were about five times more likely
to seek death against minority defendants than they were to seek it
against whites. Disaggregating minority defendants into distinct
race/ethnic groups in Panel C shows that each group was treated more
punitively than white defendants: prosecutors sought death against 4.8%
(7/146) of eligible black defendants, 5.8% (11/190) of eligible Latino
defendants, and 9.1% (2/22) of eligible "other" defendants (Asian and
66Native American).
Given the independent effects of place and race, we also examined
potential interaction effects: are there particularly pronounced disparities
among certain groups in certain places? Table 1: Panel D provides an
affirmative answer: from among statutorily death eligible defendants,
prosecutors sought death against 15.9% of minority defendants in the
Eighteenth Judicial District (7/44), compared to 4.1% of minority de-
fendants outside the Eighteenth Judicial District (13/314), 1.2% of white
defendants outside the Eighteenth Judicial District (2/172), and 0% of
white defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District (0/16). Table 1: Pan-
el E demonstrates that prosecutors outside the Eighteenth Judicial Dis-
63. The relationship is statistically significant at p 5 .01. Statewide, prosecutors ought the
death penalty for 4.0% (22/546) of the statutorily death-eligible murders. See Table 1: Panel A.
64. We use the term "minorities" to describe both racial and ethnic minorities and the term
"whites" to describe non-Hispanic whites. We use the term "race" to connote both racial and ethnic
minorities.
65. The relationship is statistically significant at p 5 .01.
66. The relationship is statistically significant at p : .05. "Other" defendants are not included
in the test of statistical significance because the expected cell count is too small.
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trict were about four times more likely to seek death against minority
defendants than against white defendants (4.1% versus 1.1%), and strik-
ingly, prosecutors in the Eighteenth Judicial District were about fourteen
times more likely to seek death against minority defendants than against
white defendants (15.9% versus 1.1%).67 The disparities found at the
intersection of place and race suggest that prosecutorial discretion is not
a reliable force for ensuring the even-handed administration of the death
penalty in Colorado.
Table 1. Place, Race, and the Distribution of Possible and Actual Death Prosecutions
Panel A. Place
Potential Death Prosecutions Actual Death Prosecutions Likelihood of
Number Percentage of Number Percentage of Actual Death
Statewide Total Statewide Total Prosecution
18th Judicial 60 11% 7 32% 11.7%
District




Potential Death Prosecutions Actual Death Prosecutions Likelihood of
Number Percentage of Number Percentage of Actual Death
Statewide Total Statewide Total Prosecution
Minority 358 66% 20 91% 5.6%
White 188 34% 2 9% 1.1%
Total 546 22
Panel C. Race Disaggregated
White 188 34% 2 9% 1.1%
African American 146 27% 7 32% 4.8%
Latino 190 35% 11 50% 5.8%
Other (Asian, 22 4% 2 9% 9.1%
Native American)
Total 546 22
Panel D. The Intersection of Place and Race
Potential Death Prosecutions Actual Death Prosecutions Likelihood of
Number Percentage of Number Percentage of Actual Death
Statewide Total Statewide Total Prosecution
Minority in 18th 44 8% 7 32% 15.9%
JD
Minority Outside 314 58% 13 59% 4.1%
18th JD
White Outside 172 31% 2 9% 1.2%
18th JD
White in 18th JD 16 3% 0 0% 0%
Total 546 22
67. The relationship is statistically significant at p < .01.
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Panel E. The Intersection ofPlace and Race - White Defendants Statewide as a Baseline
Potential Death Prosecutions Actual Death Prosecutions Likelihood of
Number Percentage of Number Percentage of Actual Death
Statewide Total Statewide Total Prosecution
Minority in 18th 44 8% 7 32% 15.9%
JD
Minority Outside 314 58% 13 59% 4.1%
18th JD
White Statewide 188 34% 2 9% 1.1%
Total 546 22
B. Exploring Legitimate Explanations
1. The "More" Argument
According to some prosecutors, minorities are more likely to face
death in Colorado because they commit more murders, or worse murders,
than whites.68 The question of "more"-if more is interpreted to mean
raw numbers-is the wrong question, however. The correct question is
one of proportions: Did prosecutors pursue death disproportionately
against minority defendants? To avoid confusion, we examine both raw
numbers and proportions. As Table 1: Panel B demonstrates, minorities
were convicted of more statutorily death-eligible murders than whites:
358 versus 188. But the raw numbers do not tell the entire story. Given
the fact that minorities were convicted of 66% of the death-eligible mur-
ders (358/546), and whites were convicted of 34% of the death-eligible
murders (188/546), one would expect the distribution of death prosecu-
tions to be roughly similar if the system were colorblind. Yet, 91%
(20/22) of the death prosecutions were brought against minority defend-
ants while only 9% (2/22) of the death prosecutions were brought against
white defendants.69 The same logic holds true for place in Table 1: Panel
A. The Eighteenth Judicial District had far fewer statutorily death eligi-
ble cases (60/546) and fewer actual death prosecutions (7/22) than the
rest of the state. Yet, the Eighteenth Judicial District accounted for a dis-
proportionate share of death prosecutions: the Eighteenth Judicial District
was the site of 11% of the potential death prosecutions7 0 but 32% of the
actual death prosecutions.71 As previously mentioned, the Eighteenth
68. See, e.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text.
69. The relationship is statistically significant at p < .01.
70. In the Eighteenth Judicial District, there were seven death prosecutions and fifty-three
statutorily death-eligible murder convictions that were not prosecuted for the death penalty. Six of
the seven death prosecutions resulted in a first-degree murder conviction; if only convictions are
used in both the numerator and denominator, the result is essentially the same (59/541 = 10.9%).
71. The relationship is statistically significant at p ! .01. There were seven death prosecutions
in the Eighteenth Judicial District during the study period, out of a total of twenty-two statewide
death prosecutions. However, only six of the seven Eighteenth Judicial District death prosecutions,
and eleven of the fifteen death prosecutions across the remainder of the state, resulted in a conviction
for first-degree murder. Thus, the Eighteenth Judicial District was responsible for six of the seven-
teen statewide death prosecutions that resulted in a conviction, i.e., 35%.
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Judicial District was also the site of 100% of the state's death sentenc-
72es.
2. The "Worse" Argument
Evaluating the "worse" argument-that the death penalty is used
disproportionately against certain groups because those groups commit
worse crimes-requires a different approach. To begin, we must deter-
mine which murders are the "worst." Prior studies have used different
metrics of heinousness, such as the number of statutory aggravators pre-
sent in each case, or non-statutory factors that evince heinousness, or
73
determining whether the victim was tortured prior to death. We use an
approach that is both simple and objective: in each case we inquire
whether the defendant killed multiple victims-defined as killing multi-
ple victims in a single criminal incident or killing multiple victims across
multiple criminal incidents. Using multiple killings as a proxy for the
worst murders is particularly relevant because each inmate currently on
Colorado's death row is linked to more than one death-suggesting that
prosecutors and juries agree that multiple killings are indicative of the
worst of the worst. Moreover, as a general matter, it seems incontestable
74that killing more than one person is worse than killing just one person.
Focusing on place, the data indicate that 22% of the death-eligible
defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District killed multiple victims,
compared to 12% of the defendants across the rest of the state.5 So by
this metric, killings in the Eighteenth Judicial District were in fact worse
than those committed elsewhere. And not surprisingly, statewide, prose-
cutors were more apt to seek death against defendants who killed multi-
ple victims than a single victim-10% versus 3%.76
But this empirical pattern also raises a key question: Does the high-
er concentration of especially heinous murders in the Eighteenth Judicial
72. One might wonder whether the disproportionate pursuit of death in the Eighteenth Judicial
District is a response to disproportionate violence. But the data suggest that the Eighteenth Judicial
District is not exceptional. From 1999 to 2008, the Eighteenth Judicial District comprised 16% to
18% of the state population compared to 13% of the murder victims in statutorily death-eligible
cases in which a conviction entered. See Historical Census Population, COLO. DEP'T OF LOCAL
AFFAIRS, https://dola.colorado.gov/demog webapps/hcpParameters.jsf (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
In this calculation, we focus on the period from 1999 to 2008 because we had a sufficiently robust
data set for those years.
73. See, e.g., Scott Phillips, Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punish-
ment: The Rosenthal Era, 50 Hous. L. REV. 131, 147-48 (2012) [hereinafter Phillips, Continued
Racial Disparities]; Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45
Hous. L. REV. 807, 824-26 (2008) [hereinafter Phillips, Racial Disparities]; Donohue, Capital
Punishment in Connecticut, supra note 24, at 11.
74. We were precluded from using other methods, such as counting the total number of ag-
gravating factors in a case, because the prior research-the Colorado Narrowing Study-did not
analyze how many aggravating factors were present in each case, but rather it considered whether
any aggravating factor was present in each case.
75. The relationship is statistically significant at p < .05.
76. The relationship is statistically significant at p 5 .01.
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District explain the geographical disparity identified above? Perhaps
prosecutors were more likely to seek the death penalty in the Eighteenth
Judicial District simply because defendants in that district were more
likely to kill multiple victims. To answer the question, we used logistic
regression to examine the relationship between judicial district and the
decision to seek death both before and after controlling for the heinous-
ness of the murders, what we call the reduced model and the full model.n
If the higher concentration of especially heinous murders explains the
geographical disparity, then the disproportional use of the death penalty
in the Eighteenth Judicial District will subside substantially and become
statistically non-significant in the full model; in short, the effect will dis-
appear when the heinousness of the crime is taken into account. Table 2:
Model 1A demonstrates that the odds of the prosecutor seeking death are
4.1 times higher in the Eighteenth Judicial District than the rest of the
state before controlling for the heinousness of the murders.78 Table 2:
Model lB demonstrates that the odds of the prosecutor seeking death are
3.7 times higher in the Eighteenth Judicial District than the rest of the
state after controlling for the heinousness of the murders.79 Thus, when
the heinousness of the crime is taken into account the odds ratio does
drop slightly but remains large and statistically significant-the geogra-
phy effect does not disappear. The fact that prosecutors were more likely
to seek the death penalty in the Eighteenth Judicial District simply can-
not be explained away by the fact that more heinous murders occurred in
the Eighteenth Judicial District than occurred elsewhere.
77. Logistic regression is the appropriate multivariate statistical model because the dependent
variable is dichotomous: whether or not the prosecutor sought death.
78. The odds ratio is the odds for one group relative to the odds for another group. Odds are
calculated as follows: the number of times an event did occur divided by the number of times an
event did not occur (the number of times the prosecutor did seek death divided by the number of
times the prosecutor did not seek death). The odds for defendants in the Eighteenth Judicial District
are 7/53 (.132075). The odds for defendants across the rest of the state are 15/471 (.031847). Thus,
the odds ratio is 4.1 (.132075/.031847). The odds ratio is interpreted as follows: the odds of a prose-
cutor seeking the death penalty are 4.1 times higher in the Eighteenth Judicial District than the rest
of the state before controlling for the heinousness of the murders. The relationship is statistically
significant at p < .01. After controlling for the heinousness of the murders, the logistic regression
model adjusts the odds ratio for the Eighteenth Judicial District upward (the true geographical dis-
parity is larger than the original estimate) or downward (the true geographical disparity is smaller
than the original estimate). An odds ratio of one denotes no relationship (the odds of the event hap-
pening are the same for both groups). Here, the odds ratio is adjusted downward, because the true
geographical disparity is slightly smaller than the original estimate. Nevertheless, the odds ratio
remains large and statistically significant. The authors have the logistic regression model on file and
are willing to share it with future researchers upon request.
79. The relationship is statistically significant at p 5 .01.
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Table 2. Odds Ratios from the Logistic Regression of Seek Death on Place and Race (n= 546)
Model Model Model Model
IA IB 2A 2B 3 4A 4B
(R) (F) (R) (F) (R) (F)
18th JD 4.1*** 3.7*** 3.6***
Minority Defendant 5.5** 5.8** 5.7**
Minority Defendant in 17.6*** 18.1***
18th JD
Minority Defendant Out- 4.0* 4.2*
side 18th JD
Heinousness (Multiple 2.9** 3.4*** 3.2** 3.4**
Victims)
P values: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests)
We use the same approach to determine whether the impact of race
holds up after controlling for the heinousness of the murders. It is cer-
tainly possible that minority defendants are more likely to be prosecuted
in capital cases because they commit more aggravated homicides than do
white defendants. But the facts belie this theory: 13% of minority de-
fendants killed multiple victims compared to 14% of white defendants
(this is not statistically significant). In other words, minority group mem-
bers in our study were actually less likely to kill multiple victims than
were whites. Thus, controlling for the heinousness of the murders in a
logistic regression model will necessarily increase-not decrease-the
impact of race on case selection; prosecutors were substantially more
likely to seek the death penalty against minority defendants despite the
fact that such defendants were slightly less likely to commit the worst
murders. Table 2: Models 2A and 2B, illustrates the point: the odds ratio
for minority defendant increases from 5.5 in the reduced model to 5.8 in
the full model.80 So the odds of a prosecutor seeking death are 5.8 times
higher against minority defendants than against white defendants after
taking the heinousness of the murders into account.
Model 3 confirms that the findings remain unchanged if all the pre-
dictors-race, geography, and heinousness-are included in the model
simultaneously (the impact of race remains statistically significant after
controlling for both place and heinousness; the impact of place remains
statistically significant after controlling for both race and heinousness).
Finally, we extend the analysis to consider the interplay of race and
place. The combined influence, evinced in Models 4A and 4B, is potent:
even after controlling for the heinousness of the murders, the odds of the
prosecution seeking death against a minority defendant are 4.2 times
80. Both odds ratios are statistically significant at p 5 .05.
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higher outside the Eighteenth Judicial District and 18.1 times higher
within it, compared to white defendants statewide. 8
We now have an answer to the question that drove our analysis: Do
prosecutorial decisions to seek death have a disproportionate impact on
defendants of particular races and in certain geographic locations? The
results are unequivocal. During the time period under consideration,
among statutorily death eligible defendants, prosecutors statewide were
more likely to seek the death penalty against minority defendants than
against white defendants. Moreover, prosecutors in the Eighteenth Judi-
cial District were more likely to seek the death penalty than were prose-
cutors elsewhere. Finally, the intersection of race and place is particular-
ly fateful-remarkably, statutorily death-eligible minority defendants in
the Eighteenth Judicial District were fourteen times more likely to face a
death prosecution than their white counterparts statewide (15.9% versus
1.1%). Moreover, we have shown that these differences cannot be ex-
plained by differences in the number or seriousness of the killings com-
mitted by minorities. Race and place are statistically significant predic-
tors of whether the death penalty will be sought Colorado.
CONCLUSION
In Colorado, it is "exceedingly rare"82 for a prosecutor to seek death
or for a condemned prisoner to be executed. The contraction in the use of
the death penalty has been steady for over three decades, ever since the
return of the death penalty to Colorado in 1979. Indeed, there has been
only one execution in the state since the 1960s. As was noted in the Col-
orado Narrowing Study, the very rarity of the death penalty is cause for
concern; a jurisdiction in which very few of the defendants statutorily
eligible for the death penalty actually receive that penalty is constitution-
ally suspect for that reason alone. Colorado imposes the death penalty on
fewer of its death-eligible defendants than any other state that has been
81. The former odds ratio is statistically significant at p .10 and the latter is statistically
significant at p < .01. We created additional logistic regression models to ensure that the substantive
findings were robust. Specifically, we controlled for the presence of a female victim and the pres-
ence of a child victim, and changed the measure of heinousness from whether the defendant killed
multiple victims (a dichotomous indicator) to a count of the number of victims. Statewide, of the
seventy-three defendants who killed multiple victims, sixty-one killed two victims, ten killed three
victims, and two killed four victims. The findings for place, race, and the interaction of place and
race were the same regardless of model specification. Thus, we present the most parsimonious
models (doing so is particularly important because of limited variation in the dependent variable;
death was only sought against 22 of the 546 death-eligible defendants). The additional models are
available upon request.
82. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (considering the extreme rarity of a penalty
when determining whether that penalty has become unconstitutional). In Graham, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole upon a juve-
nile offender who did not murder violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. at 82. The Court relied in part upon Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which it had
abolished the death penalty for persons with intellectual disability based in part upon the rarity of
that practice. Id. at 65.
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investigated.83 Many Colorado killers are eligible for the death penalty-
Colorado has an extraordinarily broad first-degree murder statute and
over 90% of first-degree murderers are statutorily eligible for the death
penalty84-but an increasingly small number of them face that ultimate
punishment.
Colorado's system is thus based on a capital statute that vests ex-
traordinary discretion in the hands of prosecutors. We now know that this
essentially unfettered discretion has been exercised in ways that should
trouble anyone interested in the even-handed application of justice. We
have demonstrated that the location of a murder and the color of the kill-
er's skin have far more to do with whether the death penalty is sought
than whether a defendant's crime is among the worst of the worst, as
measured by examining whether the defendant has killed multiple vic-
tims.
One understandable reaction to the data reported in this study might
be to suggest that prosecutors should target more white men or women
for death penalty prosecutions or that prosecutors outside the Eighteenth
Judicial District should seek death more often. In that way, the reasoning
goes, the administration of the death penalty would be rendered slightly
less unfair. But, of course, this would miss the point and would constitute
the very targeting and arbitrariness that any system of justice should ab-
hor. Defendants should be selected for death based on desert, not accord-
ing to a quota system that operates on the basis of race, geography, or
any other factor extraneous to the defendant's moral culpability.
It is true that implicit bias is everywhere-in our hiring decisions,
our social relationships, and throughout our criminal justice system. We
need a criminal justice system, of course, and we have no choice but to
tolerate some discrimination there even as we work to minimize it. But
such discrimination in the exercise of a capital sentencing regime is sig-
nificantly more problematic. This Article demonstrates that, in addition
to being used infrequently, the death penalty is being applied dispropor-
tionately against certain groups in ways that have nothing to do with the
seriousness of the offense. This infrequency, and the penalty's arbitrary
application across racial and geographic lines compel the conclusion that
the death penalty in Colorado is not constitutionally tolerable.
83. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 10, at 1015.
84. Marceau et al., supra note 7, at 1110.
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APPENDIX I. DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTIONS, CASES FILED JANUARY 1,
1999 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 201085
No. County Judicial Case Number Defendant Defendant Gender of
District Race/Ethnicity Victim
1 Denver 2 1999CR189 Omar Ramirez Hispanic F, M
2 Denver 2 1999CR2325 Cong Than Asian F, M
3 El Paso 4 1999CR3818 Anthony Albert Black M
4 Denver 2 1999CR2029 Donta Paige Black F
5 Denver 2 1999CR2738 Abraham -Hagos Black M
6 Teller 4 2000CRI78 Anthony Jimenez Hispanic F
7 Adams 17 2000CRI675 Manuel Melina Hispanic M
8 Adams 17 2000CR634 John Sweeney Hispanic M
9 Adams 17 2000CR638 Jesse Wilkinson White M
10 Morgan 13 2000CR200 Cruz Palomo Hispanic F
11 Adams 17 2000CRI491 Leandro Lopez Hispanic M
12 Arapahoe 18 2001CRI744 Edward Brown Black M
13 Lincoln* 18 2002CR95 Edward Montour Hispanic/Native M
American
14 Adams 17 2002CR2231 Jimmy Vasquez Hispanic F
15 Weld 19 2002CR457 Allen Bergerud White F, M
16 Rio Grande 12 2005CR65 Michael Medina Hispanic child
17 Lincoln 18 2005CR73 David Bueno Hispanic M
18 Lincoln* 18 2005CR74 Alejandro Perez Hispanic M
19 El Paso 4 2006CR5870 Marco Lee Black M
20 Douglas 18 2006CR636 Jose Rubi-Nava Hispanic F
21 Arapahoe 18 2006CR705 Sir Mario Owens Black F, M
22 Arapahoe 18 2006CR697 Robert Ray Black F, M
*Venue was changed to a different county for trial. This is the venue in which the case
was commenced.
85. The following five death prosecutions were commenced after 2010, and as such were beyond the
scope of the Colorado Narrowing Study. They are included here only for thoroughness. As of this
writing, there are two ongoing death penalty trials in Colorado: In Denver County, a black man
(Dexter Lewis) is charged with killing five women and one man (Denver Cnty., No. 2012CR4743),
and in Arapahoe County, a white man (James Holmes) has been convicted of killing twelve men and
women (Arapahoe Cnty, No. 2012CR1522). In 2015, two white defendants (Cassandra Rieb (fe-
male) and Brendan Johnson (male)) in Logan County pleaded guilty for the killing of Johnson's
grandparents (Logan Cnty., Nos. 2014CR98, 2014CR99), and in 2012, a white man (Josiah Sher)
pleaded guilty in a double homicide in Douglas County that left one man and one woman dead
(Douglas Cnty., No. 201 ICRIO6).
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ABSTRACT
The FCC's net neutrality rules sought to limit interference by
broadband service providers in markets for Internet-based content and
applications. But to do so, the Commission significantly reduced the
amount of innovation possible in the broadband service market. Within
limits, broadband providers may offer different plans that vary the quan-
tity of service available to customers, as well as the quality of that ser-
vice. But they generally cannot vary the service itself: with limited ex-
ceptions, broadband providers must offer customers access to all lawful
Internet traffic, or none at all.
This Article explores the way in which this all-or-nothing homoge-
nization of the American broadband product differs from innovative ex-
periments taking place in other countries. In various parts of the world,
customers are offered several alternatives to the unlimited Internet mod-
el, including social media plans, feature phone partnerships, bundled
apps, and free premium content. It also examines the positive role that
vertical agreements may play when promoting innovation and competi-
tion within a market.
Undoubtedly, the FCC can and should intervene to stop anticompet-
itive practices, including anticompetitive vertical foreclosure. But these
determinations should be made on a case-by-case basis based on proof of
market power and consumer harm. This approach would allow wireless
providers to experiment with new and different Internet business models
without risking an unnecessary regulatory esponse.
t Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This paper was funded in part
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INTRODUCTION
Through its ongoing net neutrality efforts, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission seeks to limit interference by broadband service pro-
viders in markets for Internet-based content and applications. But to do
so, the Commission has significantly reduced the amount of innovation
possible in the broadband service market. Net neutrality permits broad-
band providers to offer different plans that vary the quantity of service
available to customers, as well as the quality of that service (within cer-
tain parameters). But they generally cannot vary the service itself: with
limited exceptions, broadband providers must offer customers access to
all lawful Internet traffic, or none at all, and on relatively equal terms.
This all-or-nothing homogenization of the broadband product places
America increasingly at odds with the rest of the world. This is especial-
ly true with regard to mobile networks. In various parts of the world,
customers are offered a variety of alternatives to the unlimited-Internet
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model that may or may not violate American net neutrality norms. These
alternative models include voice-plus plans with social-media functional-
ity; cross-promotional agreements in which wireless providers and con-
tent providers work together to sell additional services; and premium
service plans that give wireless customers preferred or exclusive access
to certain online content.
The diverse array of wireless innovations happening globally illu-
minates the tradeoffs inherent in the Commission's ongoing net neutrali-
ty efforts. To protect Internet content and application providers (often
called "edge providers" because they provide service at the edge of the
network), the Commission generally requires broadband providers to
grant access to all lawful Internet endpoints at all times from all devices.
Conventional wisdom suggests this arrangement benefits consumers as
well. But in international markets, consumer demand and carrier innova-
tion are challenging that wisdom by introducing competitive and popular
alternatives to the traditional net-neutral model. As Christopher Yoo and
others have noted, consumers are increasingly accessing the Internet
through multiple devices, which suggests less need for every device to
provide the same comprehensive service.' Internationally, companies are
using that flexibility to develop alternative service bundles that appeal to
a broad base of consumers. But the long shadow of the Commission's net
neutrality proceeding may limit the ability of Americans to share in the
global revolution currently taking place for mobile services.
MetroPCS offers a prime example of this chilling effect. In early
2011, MetroPCS was in a bind. It was a small player in a highly competi-
tive market, with neither the scale nor the margins to compete effectively
against industry giants such as Verizon and AT&T.2 As the industry be-
gan the capital-intensive transition to 4G networks, MetroPCS launched
an innovative new pricing policy to gain share and escape its fifth-place
market position.3 The company offered a base plan of unlimited voice,
text, and web-browsing services for only $40 per month.4 As an added
bonus, the plan also included free access to YouTube, courtesy of an
arrangement with Google whereby the search giant helped optimize
YouTube content for MetroPCS's capacity-constrained networks.5 For an
1. E.g., CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET 122-23 (2012).
2. See Thomas W. Hazlett, FCC Net Neutrality Rules and Efficiency, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29,
2011, 1:57 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f75fd638-5990-1 le0-baa8-00l44feab49a.html.
3. See id.
4. Ryan Kim, MetroPCS LTE Plans to Charge More for VoIP & Streaming, GIGAOM (Jan.
4, 2011, 9:26 AM), http://gigaom.com/2011/01/04/metropcs-te-plans-charge-more-for-skype-and-
streaming.
5. Hazlett, supra note 2. In a letter to the Commission, MetroPCS explained that because of
the limited broadband throughput of its I xRTT CDMA (2G and 3G) networks that most customers
relied upon, it could offer web services such as HTML browsing, but advanced broadband services
such as multimedia did not work well. Letter from Carl W. Northrop of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
Walker LLP, to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n 5, 11 (Feb. 14, 2011),
available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021029361 [hereinafter Northrop Letter].
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additional $10 or $20 per month, customers could receive additional ser-
vices, including turn-by-turn navigation and data access.6 While these
plans were more restrictive than the broadband plans of the larger carri-
ers (in the sense that customers could not access non-YouTube streaming
video and other bandwidth-intensive services), they were only one-third
the cost.' Through these plans, MetroPCS sought to bring mobile Internet
use to its core market of customers unable or unwilling to pay large car-
rier rates-thus fulfilling its marketing promise of providing "[w]ireless
for [a]ll."g
But rather than cheering this creative attempt to narrow the mobile-
digital divide, many consumer groups condemned MetroPCS for violat-
ing net neutrality, despite the fact the first iteration of the Commission's
rules had not yet taken effect and would not do so for another eleven
months.9 Net neutrality supporters accused MetroPCS of "restrict[ing]
consumer choice and innovation in a developing mobile market, all for
the sake of further padding its bottom line."10 In a letter to then-
Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski, a coalition of groups such as
the Center for Media Justice, Free Press, Media Access Project, and the
New America Foundation urged the Commission to "investigate
MetroPCS's behavior, and act to remedy its disparate treatment of mo-
bile broadband services.""
From an antitrust perspective, this demand for regulatory interven-
tion seemed puzzling. At the time, MetroPCS had approximately eight
million subscribers, a customer base "less than one-tenth the size" of
industry leader Verizon Wireless.12 The company had no market power
and was in'no position to extract super-competitive profits or otherwise
harm consumers.13 As Thomas Hazlett notes, its customers were mostly
And the company's limited spectrum posed similar challenges for the 4G LTE network that it had
recently launched. Id at 6-7. Because YouTube content was a "competitive necessity" to keep pace
with larger carriers, MetroPCS worked with Google to compress its content to consume less band-
width when accessed over the company's networks. Id. at 6, 11-12.
6. Kim, supra note 4.
7. See Hazlett, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., MetroPCS Introduces Wireless For A ll(SM) Nationwide Service Plans with No
Hidden Taxes or Regulatory Fees, Bus. WIRE (Jan. 19, 2010, 5:51 PM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100112005629/en/MetroPCS-Introduces-Wireless-SM-
Nationwide-Service-Plans.
9. See Preserving the Open Internet, 76 Fed. Reg. 59192, 59192 (Dec. 1, 2011) (codified at
47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 8). The Commission originally released the Open Internet order in December 2010,
but due in part to interagency review, the final rule did not take effect until November 2011. Id.
These rules were codified in part as Preserving the Open Internet, 47 C.F.R. § 8 (2015).
10. Press Release, Free Press, Free Press Urges FCC to Investigate MetroPCS 4G Service
Plans (Jan. 4, 2011) (quoting a statement by M. Chris Riley, Policy Counsel for Free Press), availa-
ble at http://www.freepress.net/press-release/2011/1/4/free-press-urges-fcc-investigate-metropcs-4g-
service-plans.
11. Letter from M. Chris Riley et al., Counsel, Free Press, to Julius Genachowski, Chairman,
Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n 5 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/
files/profiles/attachments/metropcs_letterNAF_et-al.pdf.
12. Hazlett, supra note 2.
13. Id.
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price-sensitive "cord-cutters" who had little use for the bells and whistles
of larger carrier plans, especially at higher price points.14 MetroPCS's
plan was poised to bring wireless web browsing and YouTube access to
this market segment. But instead it found itself facing the threat of agen-
cy action because its plan did not match net neutrality proponents' pre-
conceived notions of what the wireless broadband experience should be.
So MetroPCS's pricing experiment ended, not with a bang, but with
a whimper. The company formally disputed the notion that its plans vio-
lated the pending net neutrality rule.15 But, perhaps uninterested in being
the test case for the Commission's newly minted rules, the company ul-
timately shifted to a higher-priced data plan that did not treat streaming
video and other data-intensive applications differently.16 In the mean-
time, MetroPCS joined Verizon's lawsuit challenging the Commission's
net neutrality rules in court.17 Ultimately, competitive pressures led the
company to merge with fellow upstart T-Mobile, thus reducing the num-
ber of national facilities-based wireless providers from five to four.'8
The MetroPCS case illustrates the chilling effect that even the
Commission's "light touch" wireless net neutrality rules could have on
broadband innovation. Meanwhile, outside the United States, broadband
companies are increasingly innovating with regard to the bundles they
provide to consumers, especially in the wireless sector. This Article ex-
amines some of the diverse business models emerging in international
markets, discusses the nascent attempts to bring some of these innova-
tions to the United States, and analyzes how these models might fare
under a new net neutrality regime. Part I offers a brief summary of the
Commission's recent net neutrality decisions. Part II offers a non-
exhaustive glance at various international offerings in the wireless
broadband marketplace that differ from the traditional net-neutral model.
Part III uses these consumer-friendly alternative models to critically as-
sess the Commission's net neutrality efforts. While the Commission may
well be correct that broadband providers have incentives to interfere an-
ticompetitively in upstream markets for Internet content and applications,
its remedy should allow room for consumer-friendly innovations that
would allow American consumers to share in the global revolution cur-
rently taking place for mobile broadband services.
14. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See Northrop Letter, supra note 5, at 11-20.
16. See Adi Robertson, MetroPCS Adds $70 a Month Pricing Tier for Unlimited LTE Data,
Caps $60 Plan at 5GB, VERGE (Apr. 3, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://www.theverge.com/2012/4/3/2922425/metropcs-4g-lte-unlimited-data-pricing-change.
17. Stacey Higginbotham, MetroPCS Joins Verizon in Suing FCC over Net Neutrality,
GIGAOM (Jan. 25, 2011, 12:14 PM), http://gigaom.com/2011/01/25/metropcs-joins-verizon-in-suing-
fcc-over-net-neutrality.
18. See David Goldman, T-Mobile and MetroPCS to Merge, CNN MONEY (Oct. 3, 2012,
12:25 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/03/technology/mobile/t-mobile-metropcs-merger.
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I. NET NEUTRALITY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
At the core of the net neutrality debate is the principle that Internet
service providers should not favor certain Internet content and applica-
tions over others.19 Rather, proponents argue broadband providers should
grant consumers access to all lawful Internet content and should route all
data packets to customers in a similar fashion, regardless of the identity
of the sender or the nature of the content inside.20 Professor Tim Wu
coined the term in a 2003 article, in which he argued that such a rule was
necessary to guard against the risk that broadband providers could lever-
age their control over the Internet access market to distort upstream mar-
kets for Internet content (such as online video).21 Since then, the concept
has been the subject of substantial debate among academics, engineers,
policymakers, and industry participants.
The Commission first adopted rules codifying net neutrality princi-
ples in December 2010.22 The proceeding focused primarily upon fixed
broadband providers such as Verizon and Comcast, which provide high-
speed wire-based Internet access to residential and business customers.
These providers were subject to three basic requirements. The first dealt
with transparency: broadband providers were required to "publicly dis-
close accurate information regarding the network management practices,
performance, and commercial terms" of their services "sufficient for
consumers to make informed choices" among providers.23 Second, fixed
broadband providers "shall not block lawful content, applications, ser-
vices, or non-harmful devices."24 The Commission's order clarified that
"[t]he phrase 'content, applications, services' refers to all traffic trans-
mitted to or from end users of a broadband Internet access service, in-
cluding traffic that may not fit cleanly into any of these categories."25
The third and final rule required that fixed providers "shall not un-
reasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a
consumer's broadband Internet access service."2 6 Although the Commis-
sion did not provide a definition of "unreasonable discrimination," it
noted that such practices would include "discrimination that harms an
actual or potential competitor[,] . . . impairs free expression[,]" or "inhib-
it[s] end users from accessing the content, applications, services, or de-
19. See, e.g., Net Neutrality, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, https://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/net-
neutrality (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
20. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145 (2003) (defining a "neutral network" as one "that does not favor one appli-
cation (say, the world wide web), over others (say, email)").
21. See id
22. See Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 FCC Red. 17905 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 Rules], vacated in part, Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
23. Id. para. 54; see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2015).
24. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 63; see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.5(a) (2015).
25. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 64.
26. Id. para. 68; see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.7 (2015).
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vices of their choice" online.2 7 The Commission explicitly cited "pay-
for-priority" agreements, whereby an edge provider such as Netflix
would pay for preferential treatment over the network, as an example of
a practice that would likely be considered unreasonable, because it would
give the provider a competitive advantage over its rivals when delivering
28its product to consumers.
The Commission imposed somewhat less onerous rules on wireless
broadband providers such as Verizon Wireless and Sprint. The Commis-
sion recognized mobile broadband was a less mature technology than its
fixed counterpart.29 It noted that "[t]he mobile ecosystem is experiencing
very rapid innovation and change" and is "rapidly evolving."30 Moreo-
ver, the wireless marketplace is more competitive than fixed broadband,
with consumers able to choose from a wide range of nationwide and re-
gional wireless providers.3' Finally, the Commission noted that because
wireless providers depend upon spectrum for communication, they face
"operational constraints that fixed broadband networks do not typically
encounter," which suggest wireless providers may need greater flexibil-
ity when managing network traffic.32 But at the same time, the Commis-
sion reiterated that "[t]here is one Internet, which should remain open for
consumers and innovators alike, although it may be accessed through
different technologies and services."33 Moreover, the Commission's ra-
tionale for ordering the rules is "for the most part as applicable to mobile
broadband as they are to fixed broadband."34
In recognition of the differences between mobile and fixed broad-
band service, the Commission applied a modified version of its Open
Internet rules to wireless providers. Like fixed broadband providers,
wireless broadband companies were bound by the obligation to make
their network practices transparent.35 But the Commission applied its no-
blocking rule less stringently. Under the rules, wireless broadband com-
panies "shall not block consumers from accessing lawful websites."36
The Commission found wireless web browsing was sufficiently "well-
developed" to justify regulation.37 Consumers "expect to be able to ac-
cess any lawful website through their broadband service, whether fixed
or mobile."38 Because mobile applications are a less mature technology,
the Commission recognized that downloading and running an application
27. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 75.
28. Id. para. 76.
29. Id. para. 94.
30. Id
31. Id. paras. 94-95.
32. Id. para. 95.
33. Id. para. 93.
34. Id
35. Id. para. 97; see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2015).
36. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 99; see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.5(b) (2015).
37. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 100.
38. Id.
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may present network management issues.3 9 But the Commission also
recognized that mobile broadband providers had incentives to interfere
with apps that competed against the carrier's own services. Therefore,
the rules also prohibited providers from "block[ing] applications that
compete with the provider's voice or video telephony services."40 The
Commission explained that it intended to "proceed incrementally" with
the wireless market and would "closely monitor developments in the
mobile broadband market" to determine whether more regulations are
required to admonish "any provider behavior that runs counter to general
open Internet principles."4 '
In January 2014, the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit in Verizon v. FCC42 invalidated the Commission's net neu-
trality rules, based on a nuance in the Communications Act.43 Section
153(51) of the Act prohibits the Commission from imposing common
carriage obligations on services that are not considered "telecommunica-
tions services" under Title II of the Act.44 The Commission had previous-
ly determined broadband Internet access should be classified as an "in-
formation service" governed by Title I of the Act, rather than as "tele-
communications services" govemed by Title II. 45 The court held that
because the net neutrality rules required broadband networks "to serve
the public indiscriminately" without fee, they amounted to common car-
riage and thus were barred by Section 153(51) from being applied to
non-Title II services.46
But the Verizon decision left the door open for the Commission to
regulate some broadband network practices, in two ways. First, the court
held that Section 706 of the Communications Act gave the Commission
some jurisdiction to regulate broadband networks, including the power
"to promulgate rules governing broadband providers' treatment of Inter-
net traffic."47 The court found that the Commission's findings that
broadband providers might interfere with Internet traffic and that net
neutrality rules would promote Internet innovation were "reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence."4 8 Therefore, the Commission could
use Section 706 to impose restrictions on broadband networks to promote
39. Both the fixed and mobile broadband rules were subject to exceptions for "reasonable
network management," meaning a practice that is "appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate
network management purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technolo-
gy of the broadband Internet access service." Id. para. 82; see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 8.5, 8.7 (2015).
40. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 99; see also 47 C.F.R. § 8.5(b) (2015).
41. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, paras. 104-05.
42. 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
43. Id at 628.
44. Id. at 650 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2012)).
45. See Nat'I Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977-78
(2005).
46. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 655-56 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. at 628.
48. Id.
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net neutrality, so long as the regulations do not amount to common car-
riage.
Alternatively, the court suggested that the Commission could re-
classify broadband networks as Title II telecommunications services ra-
ther than Title I information services.49 The Verizon decision hinged up-
on Section 153(51)'s language prohibiting the Commission from impos-
ing common carrier obligations on companies that are not common carri-
ers. Reclassification would subject broadband providers to the common
carriage regime originally developed to discipline the Bell Telephone
monopoly in the 1930s. Although a more significant regulatory step, this
reclassification would formally label broadband providers as "common
carriers" and thus render Section 153(51) inapplicable.o
The Commission initially chose the former path. In mid-2014, it
promulgated a notice of proposed rulemaking to preserve the Open Inter-
net under Section 706 through rules consistent with the Verizon deci-
sion.s' For fixed broadband providers, the Commission proposed re-
enacting the 2010 no-blocking rule verbatim, while allowing broadband
providers to engage in individualized bargaining with edge providers
who seek more than a minimum level of access to consumers.5 2 In lieu of
the problematic unreasonable discrimination rule, the Commission pro-
posed a rule prohibiting "commercially unreasonable" practices,53 as
determined by a multifactor test including the impact of the challenged
practice on present and future competition, consumers, speech and civic
engagement; technical characteristics; good faith negotiation; and indus-
try practices.54 This standard, which would be applied on a case-by-case
basis, was consistent with the Verizon court's holding that any re-
strictions leave "substantial room for individualized bargaining and dis-
crimination in terms.,5 5 For wireless providers, the Commission effec-
tively proposed re-enacting its 2010 rules with minimal changes: wire-
less providers would be prohibited from blocking lawful websites or
"applications that compete with the . . . providers' . . . voice or video
49. Id at 650 ("Given the Commission's still-binding decision to classify broadband providers
not as providers of 'telecommunications services' but instead as providers of 'information services,'
such treatment would run afoul of Section 153(51)." (citation omitted)); see also id. ("[G]iven the
manner in which the Commission has chosen to classify broadband providers, the regulations cannot
stand.").
50. But see Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommuni-
cations, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2012) (noting that the 2010 rules imposed greater restrictions
than traditionally required under Title II common carriage regime).
51. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Red. 5561, para. 24 (proposed May
15, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 NPRM].
52. Id. paras. 94-95.
53. Id. para. 116.
54. Id. paras. 122-35 (outlining the proposed multifactor test and its rationale).
55. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 652 (quoting Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 548
(D.C. Cir. 2012)).
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telephony services,"5 6 but would be exempt from the "commercial rea-
sonableness rule."
But these proposed rules were heavily criticized by net neutrality
proponents because they permitted broadband providers to differentiate
among different types of traffic. Consistent with the Verizon court's
mandate, the proposed rules would have allowed broadband providers to
enter paid prioritization agreements, whereby an Internet content or ap-
plication provider could pay for its packets to be delivered at a guaran-
teed minimum speed or to be given priority in the event of network con-
gestion.57 Proponents argued that this raised the possibility of dividing
the Internet into "fast lanes" for those who could afford prioritization and
"slow lanes" for everyone else.58 Comedian John Oliver implored view-
ers of his HBO show "Last Week Tonight" to complain to the Commis-
sion, which prompted enough comments to crash the Commission's
servers.59 Ultimately, the Commission received a record 3.7 million
comments on its proposed rules, most of which argued the rules did not
go far enough to protect the Open Internet.60 And as the comment period
closed, President Obama released his own statement criticizing the
Commission's proposed rules and calling upon the agency to adopt more
stringent net neutrality restrictions by taking the alternative road implied
by the Verizon decision: reclassifying broadband providers as Title II
*61common carriers.
Responding to this criticism, the Commission changed course and
in February 2015 enacted binding regulations that placed greater re-
strictions on broadband providers than either its 2010 rules or its 2014
proposed rules.6 2 The final rules prohibit three specific practices that the
Commission has deemed a threat to the Open Internet:
Blocking: Broadband providers "shall not block lawful
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices,
subject to reasonable network management."63
56. 2014 NPRM, supra note 51, para. 105.
57. Id. paras. 95-96.
58. See, e.g., Public Knowledge, Benton Found.,& Access Sonoma Broadband, Comments on
Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet 34-35 (July 15, 2014), available at
https://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/blog/PublicKnowledgeNNNPRMcomments
201 4FINAL.pdf.
59. Soraya Nadia McDonald, John Oliver's Net Neutrality Rant May Have Caused FCC Site
Crash, WASH. POST, June 4, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/moming-
mix/wp/2014/06/04/john-olivers-net-neutrality-rant-may-have-caused-fcc-site-crash.
60. Protecting and Preserving the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015
Rules],
61. Presidential Statement on Internet Neutrality, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 841 (Nov.
10, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/Il/10/statement-
president-net-neutrality.
62. See 2015 Rules, supra note 60.
63. Id. para. 15.
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* Throttling: Broadband providers "shall not impair or
degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis of Internet
content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful
device, subject to reasonable network management."64
* Paid Prioritization: broadband providers "shall not en-
gage in paid prioritization," defined as "directly or indi-
rectly favor[ing] some traffic over others, including
through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, priori-
tization, resource reservation, or other forms of preferen-
tial traffic management, either (a) in exchange for con-
sideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third party or
(b) to benefit an affiliated entity."6 5
The order supplements these bright-line prohibitions with a "catch-all"
standard, under which broadband providers shall not "unreasonably in-
terfere with or unreasonably disadvantage (i) end users' ability to select,
access, and use broadband Internet access service or (ii) edge providers'
ability to make lawful content, applications, services, or devices availa-
ble to end users."66 This standard allows the Commission to investigate
practices that may threaten the Open Internet but do not fall within the
specific prohibitions described above. Importantly, the Commission ap-
plied the rules to fixed and wireless broadband providers alike, thus re-
versing its earlier policy of applying a lighter touch in the wireless
space.67 To establish its authority to enact such far-reaching rules and to
avoid the pitfall of the Verizon decision, the Commission reclassified
broadband providers as Title II telecommunications carriers.68
Through net neutrality, the Commission sought to prohibit broad-
band providers from erecting barriers to innovation among edge provid-
ers. As the Commission explained, the framework is intended "to protect
and promote the 'virtuous cycle' that drives innovation and investment
on the Internet."6 9 The Commission explained that an Open Internet ena-
bles "innovations at the edges of the network [which] enhance consumer
demand, leading to expanded investments in broadband infrastructure
that, in turn, spark new innovations at the edge."70 Without such rules,
broadband providers may "act as gatekeepers standing between edge
providers and consumers" and "reduce the rate of innovation at the edge
and, in turn, the likely rate of improvements to network infrastructure."7 1
64. Id. para. 16.
65. Id. para. 18.
66. Id. para. 21.
67. Id. para. 25.
68. Id. para. 331.
69. Id. para. 2.
70. Id. para. 7.
71. Id. para. 20 (quoting 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 14).
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But to promote innovation by Internet-based edge providers, the
rules inhibit innovation by the broadband providers that bring the Inter-
net to consumers. The 2010 rules were explicit about the Commission's
desire to prevent broadband providers from changing their business
models:
These rules are generally consistent with, and should not require sig-
nificant changes to, broadband providers' current practices, and are
also consistent with the common understanding of broadband Internet
access service as a service that enables one to go where one wants on
the Internet and communicate with anyone else online.
72
Numerous commentators have faulted the Commission for biasing
the market in favor of existing models, arguing it is myopic to sacrifice
potential advancements that we might otherwise achieve from network
diversity. Professor Christopher Yoo had long suggested that network
differentiation, rather than network neutrality, may be the best approach
to increasing consumer welfare.73 In comments filed in the 2010 proceed-
ing, Yoo noted the Internet is an incredibly complex phenomenon that
exhibits growing heterogeneity among users, meaning a one-size-fits-all
access model is unlikely to meet customer needs.74 As the market be-
comes saturated, providers must be free to innovate to deliver increasing
value to this disparate array of consumers.7 5 Yoo highlighted the wireless
broadband market in particular, which faces unique physical characteris-
tics that may demand greater flexibility.76 Companies often test new
business models without a firm and clear understanding of the model's
benefits. Instead, they rely on a trial-and-error process to identify better
methods of delivering value to consumers. Given this framework, Yoo
and others advocated for a more flexible model that would allow broad-
band providers to experiment with different business models and would
intervene only in the event that a particular model caused actual consum-
er harm.78
The Verizon court found the Commission's conclusion that net neu-
trality promotes innovation was reasonable and supported by the evi-
dence.79 But as the MetroPCS anecdote suggests, these restrictions fore-
close many potential avenues for innovation within the broadband indus-
72. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 43.
73. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25-26 (2005).
74. CHRISTOPER S. Yoo, PRESERVING THE OPEN INTERNET: BROADBAND INDUSTRY
PRACTICES 13, 21-22 (comments before the FCC regarding 24 FCC Rcd. 13064 (proposed Oct. 22,
2009)), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs.
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id. at 13-26 (noting, for example, that the physics of wave propagation, the need for
congestion management, and the heterogeneity of mobile devices suggest the need for greater flexi-
bility when regulating the mobile access market).
77. Id. at 33.
78. Id. at 42-43.
79. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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try. In international markets, which are not bound by these rules and
where heterogeneous demand is perhaps more easily observed, providers
are engaging in precisely the type of experimentation Yoo suggests: test-
ing a wide range of potential business models through a trial and error
process to determine empirically which models best deliver the most
value to consumers. The next section of this Article offers a nonexhaus-
tive glimpse into this increasingly rich and diverse market for broadband
access services.
II. BROADBAND PRICING INNOVATION
A. Innovation Within the Confines ofNet Neutrality
Within the United States, firms have taken advantage of opportuni-
ties to offer innovative solutions that likely do not violate the Commis-
sion's net neutrality rules, though at times their efforts to do so have
drawn criticism from net neutrality proponents. Notably, the rules do not
impose a completely homogenous product on all providers. Rather, the
Commission prohibited practices that "unreasonably interfere with or
unreasonably disadvantage the ability of consumers to reach the Internet
content, services, and applications of their choosing or of edge providers
to access consumers using the Internet."80 It is unclear precisely how
much flexibility this reasonableness tandard affords to broadband pro-
viders, although the Commission offered a multi-factor test including
whether the practice allows end-user control, whether the practice is use-
agnostic, the effect the practice has on innovation and broadband de-
ployment, and whether it has negative competitive effects.8' Firms are
increasingly experimenting with different models that likely do not run
afoul of the Commission's restrictions.
For example, some American broadband providers have introduced
usage-based pricing plans, which charge on the basis of the amount of
82
data a customer consumes each month. One may describe such plans as
varying the quantity of broadband service. Usage-based pricing models
are most robust in the wireless sector, where tiered service plans are the
norm. 8 Most firms offer an array of plans, each of which offers a specif-
ic amount of data (usually in gigabytes) per month for a fixed rate.84
These plans typically involve some penalty for exceeding monthly plan
limits, such as an overage charge or (less commonly) a degradation of
network speed. Some fixed broadband providers offer similar pricing
plans, either imposing a single monthly limit on all consumers with an
80. 2015 Rules, supra note 60, para. 135 (emphasis added).
81. Id. paras. 138-40, 142, 144.
82. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy's Next Frontier: Usage-Based Broadband
Pricing, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 4 (2013).
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overage charge for exceeding the limit, or offering consumers a choice
among various tiers of monthly limits. Because fixed broadband net-
works have more capacity than wireless networks, plan limits tend to be
much higher than wireless tiers. For example, Comcast is currently test-
ing a 300 gigabyte limit in several markets,8 6 while Time Warner Cable
has experimented with lower tiers alongside its traditional unlimited-data
plan.87
Many consumer groups have criticized usage-based pricing." The
Commission has historically endorsed this form of experimentation. For
example, in the 2010 rules, it explained:
[P]rohibiting tiered or usage-based pricing and requiring all sub-
scribers to pay the same amount for broadband service, regardless of
the performance or usage of the service, would force lighter end users
of the network to subsidize heavier end users. It would also foreclose
practices that may appropriately align incentives to encourage effi-
cient use of networks. . .. The framework we adopt today does not
prevent broadband providers from asking subscribers who use the
network less to pay less, and subscribers who use the network more
to pay more.89
The 2015 order is somewhat less charitable. In it, the Commission re-
served judgment on whether usage-based pricing was reasonable, noting
some commenters' assertions that monthly limits can be used anticom-
petitively.90 But tiered pricing seems likely to meet the Commission's
standard, at least in the absence of evidence of actual anticompetitive
effects. It enhances end-user control by charging customers based upon
the data they actually use, without interfering with the consumer's ability
to reach the Internet content of his or her choice.
In addition to varying the quantity of broadband service, American
providers are also experimenting with speed-based pricing tiers, which
one may describe as varying the quality of the broadband product. Rather
than paying for a fixed amount of gigabytes monthly, the customer
chooses among different maximum download and upload rates.91 For
86. See What XFINITY Internet Data Usage Plans Will Comcast Be Launching?, COMCAST,
http://customer.comcast.com/help-and-support/internet/data-usage-what-are-the-different-plans-
launching (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
87. Jeff Simmermon, Launching an Optional Usage-Based Broadband Pricing Plan in South-
ern Texas, TIME WARNER CABLE (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.twcableuntangled.com/2012/02/launching-an-optional-usage-based-pricing-plan-in-
southem-texas-2.
88. See, e.g., ANDREW ODLYZKO ET AL., KNOW YOUR LIMITS: CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF
DATA CAPS AND USAGE BASED BILLING IN INTERNET ACCESS SERVICE 48-53 (2012), available at
https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/UBP%20paper/20FINAL.pdf (criticizing usage-based
pricing).
89. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 72.
90. 2015 Rules, supra note 60, para. 153.
91. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, We Should Promote Broadband Pricing Innovation,
COMPUTERWORLD (June 18, 2013, 9:17 AM),
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example, Comcast's "Performance Starter" Internet service offers up to
six megabits per second (Mbps) download speed.9 2 But customers can
upgrade to premium plans offering download speeds of 25, 105, 150, or
more megabits per second.93 Some broadband providers offer unlimited
monthly data at various speeds, while others offer plans that vary both
maximum speed and monthly data limits. 94 Like tiered service plans,
tiered speed plans help differentiate customers in use-agnostic ways and
therefore are likely to be considered reasonable network management
practices.
While the net neutrality rules allow providers to vary the quantity
and quality of the broadband service, there is an important dimension of
innovation that the rules foreclose: varying the nature of the service it-
self. The Commission's conception of net neutrality generally requires
providers to offer all users the opportunity to reach the entire Internet,
which may be costly and may not fit the needs of consumers interested in
visiting only a handful of the Internet's myriad destinations. International
providers are increasingly innovating along this dimension as well, offer-
ing a wide range of services to customers uninterested in overpaying for
access they would not use.
B. Voice-Plus and Social Media Plans
One increasingly common model internationally is a "voice-plus"
plan that offers traditional voice service (or voice and texting services)
along with access to selected online content or apps. A variant of this
model is the "social media plan," which couples traditional service with
access to popular social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter.
Other plans pair traditional voice service with basic Internet functionali-
ty, such as email access.
Voice-plus plans can serve two different segments of the market.
First, they expand the array of services available to customers who would
like to engage in some activities online but are unwilling or unable to pay
for access to the entire Internet. Second, they serve as introductory-level
plans to give customers reluctant about mobile broadband a low-cost
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9240126/We_should promotebroadbandpricing innovat
ion; Michael Weinberg, Price Discrimination and Data Caps Are Not the Same Thing, ALL THINGS
D (Apr. 8, 2013, 3:26 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20130408/price-discrimination-and-data-caps-are-
not-the-same-thing.
92. Shop: XFINITY Internet, COMCAST, http://www.comcast.com/intemet-service.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2014).
93. Id.
94. For example, in some markets, Comcast offers several tiers of service at different speeds,
but in other markets, each tier is subject to a soft monthly data cap and an overage charge for ex-
ceeding the plan. See Teff Baumgartner, Comcast, TWC Try on Data Caps, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
Aug. 5, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 19139706; What XFINITY Internet Data Usage Plans Will
Comcast Be Launching?, supra note 86. By comparison, Verizon offers multiple speed tiers with
unlimited monthly consumption at each tier. See Verizon FiOS Internet Plans, VERIZON,
http://www.verizon.com/home/fios-fastest-internet/fastest-internet-plans/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
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opportunity to sample the benefits of online access. As customers get
more comfortable with using their phones to access Internet content, the
provider can try to upsell them to plans with more comprehensive access
to Internet content and applications.
1. Social Media Plans
Starting in 2010, Turkey's Turkcell offered a free Facebook promo-
tion in which all Turkcell customers were given access to a text-only
version of Facebook on their phones, free of charge.9 5 In 2012 the com-
pany launched a similar "Twitter Zero" promotion.9 6 In both campaigns,
once the promotional period ended the company replaced the free,
stripped-down service with a paid package that included unlimited Face-
book or Twitter access for a set fee.97 Currently, Turkcell customers can
add unlimited Twitter use to a basic voice plan for 3 TL/month, unlim-
ited Facebook access for 4 TL/month, or unlimited Twitter and Face-
book, plus 20 megabytes of data, for 5 TL/month.98
According to company representatives, the goal of these campaigns
was to get existing customers more comfortable with the idea of using
mobile data.99 Turkcell gambled that giving technophobes free or low-
cost opportunities to sample mobile broadband would erode their appre-
hension and drive more of them to adopt plans that include some form of
broadband access. And it seems to have worked. Although it is difficult
to determine what proportion of the population would have adopted mo-
bile social media even without the promotion, Turkcell reported the free
Facebook offer helped spark an 820% increase in mobile Facebook use
in 2010.1oo By the end of the year, 6.5 million Turkcell customers were
accessing Facebook on their phones each month.'01 And Twitter Zero led
to a 340% increase in mobile Twitter use.10 2 These translated into signifi-
cant upselling opportunities for the company. Turkcell sold 30,000 social
media packages in the first week the add-on was available, and 600,000
in the first four months.'0 3 Turkcell reported this promotion increased
average revenue per customer by nine percent.
Nor is Turkcell alone in leveraging the popularity of social media to
expand its revenue base. In early 2013, Facebook announced it had
struck similar deals with eighteen wireless-service providers in fourteen
95. TURKCELL ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 26 (2010), available at http://yatirimci-2010-
eng.turkcell.com.tr/downloads/Turkcell-EN-FR-201 0.pdf.
96. @TurkcellNews, TURKCELL News, TWITTER (June 26, 2012, 5:22 AM),
https://twitter.com/TurkcellNews/status/217578634221862912.
97. See OPENET, REAL WORLD EXAMPLES OF INNOVATIVE DATA CENTRIC OFFERS 4 (2013).
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countries, including partners in Portugal, Ireland, India, Bulgaria, Azer-
baijan, and Indonesia, to secure free or discounted data plans for Face-
book users.0 5 Similar programs have proven wildly popular in Latin
America, where wireless provider Claro brought free Facebook access to
66.5 million subscribers, 48.5 million of whom access the site each
day.106 Twitter-based promotions are also popular, the most recent of
which was recently announced by Ucell in Uzbekistan.'0 7
2. Email
Wireless providers have long bundled traditional services with
email access. For example, in 2007 Safaricom Kenya partnered with
Google to offer Google's Gmail service to Safaricom mobile phone users
in conjunction with its rollout of 3G services across the country.08 The
company credits the partnership with raising the number of people in
Kenya with mobile Internet access from 2.7 million to 4.4 million that
109
year.
C. "Feature Phone Access" Partnerships
One related area of innovation is in wireless carrier partnerships
with edge providers to make stripped-down versions of their products
available on an ongoing basis for feature-phone customers. Although
smartphones dominate the postpaid market in the United States and Eu-
rope, worldwide they command only twenty-five to thirty percent of the
total market."10 Particularly in the developing world, most customers
have previous-generation "feature phones," which lack much of the
computing power and flexibility of smartphones and are, therefore, lim-
ited in their ability to access Internet content and applications."' Most
lack data plans, and if they have Internet access at all, it is through a pro-
tocol developed nations abandoned several years ago.' 12 To bring the
105. See Facebook Offering Mobile Deal in 14 Countries, CNBC Reports, ARKA TELECOM
(Feb. 26, 2013, 11:45 AM),
http://telecom.arka.am/en/news/intemet/facebookofferingmobile d alin_14_countriescnbc_rep
orts.
106. Brazil: Claro Partners with Facebook, IT DIG. (S. AM.), Aug. 2, 2013, available at 2013
WLNR 19138975.
107. See Ucell Activated New Service Twitter Zero, Uz DAILY (Apr. 5, 2013),
http://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-22618.htm.
108. Joyce Joan Wangui, Kenya: Safaricom, Google in Internet Partnership, ALL AFRICA
(Nov. 21, 2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/200711210365.html.
109. See id.
110. Kevin Fitchard, Ericsson: Global Smartphone Penetration Will Reach 60% in 2019,
GlGAOM (Nov. 11, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://gigaom.com/2013/11/l/ericsson-global-smartphone-
penetration-will-reach-60-in-2019.
111. See, e.g., Nicole Lee, The 411: Feature Phones vs. Smartphones, CNET (Mar. 1, 2010,
5:14 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/the-411-feature-phones-vs-smartphones.
112. Christopher Mims, Facebook s Plan to Find Its Next Billion Users: Convince Them the
Internet and Facebook Are the Same, QUARTZ (Sept. 24, 2012), http://qz.com/5180/facebooks-plan-
to-find-its-next-billion-users-convince-them-the-intemet-and-facebook-are-the-same. Th  abandoned
protocol is known as Wireless Application Protocol or WAP. See id. Feature phones with WAP
browsers can access websites that are specifically tailored to use the protocol. See id. In the US and
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Internet to these consumers, wireless companies are partnering with edge
providers to design code that would extend their products to feature
phone users on limited-capacity networks."3
1. Facebook Zero
Facebook was one of the first edge providers to move into this
space. In 2010, the company launched Facebook Zero-
0.facebook.com-which offered a basic version of the company's ubiq-
uitous social networking service.114 The service was primarily text-based
and lacks photos, graphics, and other features of the general service."5
Facebook negotiated with fifty wireless carriers around the world to al-
low feature phones on their networks to access the service without
charge.116 The company followed this in July 2011 with Facebook for
Everyone, a Java app designed to run on eighty percent of all mobile
phones in existence."7 The company updated Facebook Zero in 2012
with Facebook by Fonetwish, a program developed in conjunction with
Malaysian company U2opia Mobile that can create a Facebook graphic
interface on even the most basic devices.
The service proved popular, particularly in Africa, where most con-
sumers are on prepaid plans and are attracted to services that do not debit
one's prepaid account."'9 In the first eighteen months after launching the
service in Africa, Facebook saw a 114% increase in the number of Afri-
cans using the service.120 It is also popular in the Philippines, Vietnam,
and Latin America.12 1 Six of the top ten countries with the most Face-
book users are in the developing world, and five of those offer a free
Facebook Zero service through at least one prominent wireless carrier.122
Europe WAP has largely disappeared, because mobile browsers now support HTML, CSS, and
Javascript, thus obviating the need to use the separate WAP protocol. See id.
113. See id.
114. Robin Wauters, Facebook Launches Zero, a Text-Only Mobile Site for Carriers,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 16, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/16/facebook-launches-zero-a-text-
only-mobile-site-for-carriers.
115. See id.
116. Matt Hicks, Fast and Free Facebook Mobile Access with .facebook.com, FACEBOOK
(May 18, 2010, 3:20 PM), https://www.facebook.com/blog/blog.php?post=391295167130.





122. Id. The exception is Mexico, which lacks Facebook Zero access but nonetheless has a
sizeable Facebook population, partly as the result of significant direct investment by the company.
Id.
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2. Google Free Zone
Perhaps not to be outdone, Google launched its own stripped-down
bundle of services for feature phones in 2012.123 Google Free Zone offers
feature phone users access to Gmail, the Google Plus social network ap-
plication, and Google search results. 124 Like Facebook Zero, the service
is free to the customer as a result of agreements with participating wire-
less carriers.125 If a customer clicks on links within any of the programs
(including the results of a Google search), the customer receives a warn-
ing that he or she is leaving the free zone and may incur additional
charges.126
The service launched in the Philippines in late 2012 as a partnership
with wireless provider Globe.127 Since then, the company has partnered
with providers in several other countries, including India's Airtel, Sri
Lanka's Dialog, and Thailand's AIS.1 28 The service also launched in
South Africa in partnership with Telekom Mobile/8ta, though at the end
of its trial run in May 2013, the program was terminated.129
Neither Facebook nor Google has disclosed the conditions under
which it is making these services available in the developing world. A
Facebook spokesperson recently hinted that the company does not pay
for the data Facebook Zero users consume.13 0 This implies that the com-
panies are making the services available for free and convincing partici-
pating wireless partners of the wisdom of extending a form of Internet
access to customers who are not yet connected. For wireless providers,
these arrangements provide an inexpensive way to offer additional ser-
vices to feature phone customers and perhaps entice them to migrate to
more profitable smartphone plans. For edge providers, it is an investment
in penetrating their brands further into the developing world, where fu-
ture growth may be found. Each company is positioning itself to be the
first point of contact between the consumer and the digital world.
123. Geoff Duncan, Is Google 'Free Zone' Internet Altruistic Service for Emerging Economies
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Feb. 19, 2105); Prashant Reddy, Poke Me: Why Consumers, Not Companies, Should Be Kings of
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Many net neutrality proponents have criticized these initiatives as
watered-down, "walled garden" experiences that are pale imitations of
true Internet access.31 Professor Susan Crawford argues, "'[fjor poorer
people, Internet access will equal Facebook. That's not the Internet-
that's being fodder for someone else's ad-targeting business' ....
'That's entrenching and amplifying existing inequalities and contributing
to poverty of imagination-a crucial limitation on human life."' 3 2 But
among users in the developing world, for whom some connectivity is
better than none, the services are popular and have few critics.' 33
D. Co-Marketing and Cross-Promotional Agreements
In more developed markets, wireless providers are also signing
agreements with edge providers to use the wireless platform as a promo-
tional tool for Internet-based services. And, contrary to the concerns
about anticompetitive behavior that gave rise to the Commission's net
neutrality order, many of these partnerships are with app developers
whose products supplant raditional wireless revenue sources: voice and
text messaging. The subsections below provide a representative sample
of such agreements.
1. VolP Partnerships
TELUS, Canada's third-largest wireless provider, has signed a stra-
tegic partnership with Microsoft to promote Voice-over-Internet-Protocol
(VoIP) provider Skype on many of its network's smartphones.'34 The
Skype app runs on both Wi-Fi and the wireless network, and although
use on the latter incurs data charges, TELUS customers receive unlimited
Skype-to-Skype voice calls and instant messages. 13 TELUS allows cus-
tomers the option to purchase Skype credit and have the charge turn up
on their monthly TELUS bills.13 The companies celebrated the 2011
launch of their partnership by offering a special, new, Skype-friendly
version of the Optimus Black handset, which came with Skype prein-
stalled and sixty minutes of Skype international calling free.' 37
In February 2013, Internet-based VolP and messaging provider
Viber announced it wished to enter into revenue-sharing agreements with
131. See David Talbot, Facebook and Google Create Walled Gardens for Web Newcomers
Overseas, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/512316/facebook-and-google-create-walled-gardens-for-
web-newcomers-overseas.
132. See Talbot, supra note 130.
133. Id.
134. See Press Release, TELUS Co., TELUS and Skype Sign Agreement to Offer the Best
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wireless providers.13' The 175-million-user service struck an agreement
with Axis, an Indonesian wireless provider, which allows Axis customers
to use Viber at a discounted rate without Viber use counting against the
customers' monthly data or voice limits.1 39
2. WhatsApp
Wireless providers are also bundling traditional services with access
to the popular WhatsApp program. WhatsApp is a cross-platform instant-
messaging subscription service for smartphones that offers users unlim-
ited messaging for $0.99 each year.140 Though not popular in the United
States, WhatsApp boasts over 300 million active users worldwide'4' and
claims to process 50 billion messages each day.14 2
The service is a substitute for traditional text-messaging services,
which have historically been a significant profit center for wireless pro-
viders.14 3 Despite this fact, some wireless firms have been eager to capi-
talize on the app (which is the most popular paid app in over 100 coun-
tries)'4 to attract market share and boost revenue, particularly in more
competitive markets. In September 2012, the Hong Kong wireless com-
pany 3HK started bundling WhatsApp in plans that did not have full In-
ternet access, for $1 per month-revenue that the firm is sharing with
WhatsApp.14 5 This partnership helped WhatsApp achieve over fifty per-
cent penetration of the Hong Kong wireless market-over three million
users. 146 Shortly thereafter, Malaysian provider Digi held a promotion
allowing customers five consecutive days of unlimited WhatsApp ac-
138. Mike Dano, Viber: We Want to Share Revenues with Wireless Carriers, FIERCEMOBILEIT
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.fiercemobilecontent.com/story/viber-we-want-share-revenues-wireless-
carriers/2013-02-26.
139. Axis Launches Viber Package, TELECOMPAPER (Sept. 6, 2013, 2:09 PM),
http://www.telecompaper.com/news/axis-launches-viber-package--965242.
140. Francis Bea, Rumor: Google Negotiating $1 Billion Acquisition of WhatsApp, DIGITAL
TRENDS (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/google-acquiring-whatsapp/.
141. Liz Gannes, The Quiet Mobile Giant: With 300M Active Users, WhatsApp Adds Voice
Messaging, ALL THINGS D (Aug. 6, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20130806/the-quiet-
mobile-giant-with-300m-active-users-whatsapp-adds-voice.
142. Tyler Lee, WhatsApp Processes More Than 50 Billion Messages a Day, Might Have
Overtaken SMS, UBERGIZMO (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.ubergizmo.com/2014/01/whatsapp-
processes-more-than-50-billion-messages-a-day-might-have-overtaken-sms/.
143. See Brian X. Chen, Apps Redirect Text Messages, and Profits, from Cellular Providers,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at Bl.
144. Bea, supra note 140.
145. Id.; Press Release, 3 Hong Kong, 3 Hong Kong Partners with WhatsApp to "Free the
World" with the First Ever "WhatsApp Roaming Pass" (Sept. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.three.com.hk/website/appmanager/three/home?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=P20047039121
9567710594&lang=eng&pageid=003 I c0912.
146. See Gannes, upra note 141; Alan Yu, Facebook s WhatsApp Blasted for Failing to Pro-
tect Users' Rights, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 22, 2015), http://www.scmp.com/tech/social-
gadgets/article/1 824929/facebooks-whatsapp-blasted-failing-protect-users-rights.
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cess,14 7 and SingTel of Singapore recently began bundling WhatsApp
with its tiered pricing plans.148
As noted above, these joint ventures may surprise regulators who
might have expected broadband providers to block such services. But it
is consistent with the evolution of the wireless broadband industry in the
developed world from traditional voice and text services to data. Even in
the United States postpaid market, voice and text messaging are often
treated as unlimited throw-ins to packages that are priced based on total
data consumed each month. From this perspective, wireless providers
and app developers have aligned interests to entice consumers to con-
sume more data.
The TELUS-Skype deal also shows that app developers can be a
source of supplemental revenue for carriers. In addition to cross-
marketing, TELUS provides billing services for the VoIP provider, pre-
sumably for a fee. These back-office service agreements are the natural
outgrowth of another traditional revenue source for telecommunications
providers, which have long provided fee-based billing and collection
services for text-soliciting charities, 1-900 numbers, and other entities
that use the telecommunications network to make money.
3. Opera
Norway's Opera Software has also forged partnerships with wire-
less carriers worldwide to enhance the customer's mobile Internet expe-
rience while growing market share for the company's products. The
company is most famous for its Opera Mini web browser, an app that
uses cloud-based compression technology to reduce the amount of data a
consumer uses when surfing the web on his or her mobile device.149
Opera claims its techniques can compress webpages by up to ninety per-
cent, which both reduces the customer's data usage and alleviates con-
gestion on a carrier's wireless network.150 For this reason, the company
has successfully partnered with 130 mobile operators worldwide to in-
troduce co-branded versions of the Opera Mini browser and other Opera
services to over 250 million customers.15 1
One noteworthy service available through the Opera Mini browser
is the Opera Web Pass, which allows consumers to purchase mobile In-
ternet access in amounts other than those offered by traditional monthly
147. DiGi Partners with WhatsApp, MALAYSIAN WIRELESS (Oct. 22, 2012),
http://www.malaysianwireless.com/2012/10/digi-partners-with-whatsapp.
148. SingTel Partners with WhatsApp, Rolls-Out Plans for Prepaid Customers, SING. Gov'T
NEWS, Aug. 6, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 19347009.
149. See Opera Mini, OPERA SOFTWARE, http://www.operasoftware.com/products/opera-mini
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or prepaid plans.152 Customers of participating carriers can use Opera
Software to purchase short-term access for weekly, daily, hourly, or even
three-minute intervals, each at a different price. Opera allows the cus-
tomer to purchase full Internet access or to purchase access only to spe-
cific sites such as Facebook or Twitter.'5 And in a throwback to dial-up
era marketing plans here in the United States, the Opera Sponsored Web
Pass helps operators partner with companies to grant customers a free
web pass after viewing a short advertisement by a sponsoring compa-
155ny.
E. Premium Content and Carrier Upselling
To gain an advantage on competitors, many wireless providers
around the world have also forged partnerships with edge providers to
offer their subscribers exclusive or preferred access to attractive content.
For example, from 2011 until 2013 French telecommunications provider
Orange offered Swapables, a premium data package that allowed top-tier
customers free access to one or two subscription-based services from a
wide menu of popular content including Sky Sports TV, the Deezer mu-
sic service, and the Times newspaper.'56 Orange fixed the value of this
service at £20 per month.'57 The company noted that these additional
services increased customer loyalty: customers with an active Deezer
connection, for example, were half as likely as others to terminate their
plans.'58 T-Mobile also allows its customers in the Netherlands discount-
ed Deezer services with a subscription,159 and in Canada, TELUS has
bundled some of its plans with streaming service Rdio free of charge.'6 0
In Denmark, access to premium content has become a significant
plane of competition among mobile providers. Strand Consult's Roslyn
Layton notes it is the only country in the world in which every major
mobile operator offers a package that includes music: incumbent TDC
offers its own Play service, while wireless company 3 offers Deezer, and
152. Opera Web Pass, OPERA SOFTWARE, http://www.operasoftware.com/products/web-pass
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Telia offers Spotify.161 Service provider Telmore has gone even further:
in addition to offering a streaming music service free with all wireless
packages, Telmore offers a plan with premium content including digital
movies, television, newspapers, and magazines, for £33 per month.162
Strand estimates the included content would cost £127 monthly if or-
dered a la carte.'63
In the United States, companies are experimenting with such part-
nerships on a much smaller scale. For example, AT&T has partnered
with airport Wi-Fi provider Boingo to allow certain AT&T subscribers
IGB of access each month on Boingo hotspots.'1 And in mid-2013, Ver-
izon Wireless paid $1 billion to allow its subscribers to watch National
Football League games on Verizon-network phones through 2017.165
Neither would seem to raise net neutrality problems. But as noted above,
MetroPCS's aborted partnership with YouTube raised significant red
flags, in part because YouTube was the only streaming video that cus-
tomers could access under the plan.
Carriers themselves have also begun to expand into upstream mar-
kets for services sold as add-ons to broadband. On the fixed broadband
side, cable providers in the United States and Canada are increasingly
marketing home-security monitoring systems, long a mainstay of inde-
pendent companies that used the telephone network to watch people's
homes. On the wireless side, AT&T offers a Smart Limits parental-
control service for $4.99 per month that monitors kids' online use and
sets limits regarding when they can go online, for how long, and where
they can go on the Web.1 66
F. Equipment Subsidies
Finally, many broadband companies abroad have contracted with
providers to influence their customers' online use in exchange for finan-
cial assistance in constructing and maintaining the network. Perhaps
most famously, Clearwire signed a strategic alliance with Bell Canada in
2005 in conjunction with Clearwire's rollout of wireless broadband ser-
161. Roslyn Layton, Apple iTunes Downloading vs. Spotify Streaming: Which Will Prevail in
the Playlist Economy?, TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/apple-itunes-vs-spotify-streaming.
162. The Mother of No Frill MNOs, Denmark's Telmore, Sets a New Standard for Bundled
Mobile Traffic and Content. A package of Premium Content Worth 6127 Goes for 611/month.,
STRAND CONSULT, http://strandreports.com/sw6174.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
163. Id.
164. OPENET, supra note 97, at 11.
165. Mike Ozanian, Verizon and NFL Score with New $1 Billion Wireless Deal, FORBES (July
25, 2013, 11:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2013/07/25/verizon-and-nfl-score-
with-new-I -billion-mobile-deal/.
166. AT&T Smart Limits, AT&T, http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jspsid=KB92823 (last
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vice in the United States.1 67 Bell Canada invested $100 million in Clear-
wire, much of which was used to deploy network architecture.68 In ex-
change, Clearwire named Bell Canada its exclusive strategic partner for
VoIP and other IP services in the United States. It was unclear what
precisely this agreement required from Clearwire; rival VoIP provider
Vonage alleged in 2005 that Clearwire was interfering with customer use
of Vonage services over the Clearwire network, but no official action
was ever taken.170 If in fact the arrangement required Clearwire to give
Bell Canada preferential treatment over other VolP providers on its net-
work, the Commission may have investigated whether the agreement
violated the net neutrality rules. But it was never tested, because the two
companies terminated their strategic alliance by 2008, three years before
the rules took effect.'7 '
G. Innovation Within the United States
Wireless carriers within the American market have also begun ex-
ploring alternative business models that might deliver Internet-based
content and applications to consumers in different and potentially more
efficient ways. In late 2013, Verizon had floated the possibility of enter-
ing into "toll-free data" agreements with providers of popular Internet
content.172 Under such agreements, a particular edge provider would pay
a fee to the carrier, which would allow the carrier's customers to access
the edge provider's services without incurring data charges toward the
customer's monthly data allotment.173 In January 2014 AT&T formally
launched a similar program, known as "Sponsored Data." 74 The compa-
ny developed a program with which any interested edge provider could
have its traffic "zero-rated" on the AT&T network, meaning customers
could download the provider's content without incurring data charges.75
Instead, the program allows AT&T to bill the edge provider for the cost
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of the customer's data.1 76 These agreements are valuable to carriers seek-
ing to develop the other side of the two-sided market for broadband ac-
cess. And they can be valuable for participating Internet edge providers
as well, as a way to differentiate their content from that of their rivals
online. 1
77
Seattle-based startup Syntonic Wireless seeks to develop more
comprehensive alternative methods of enabling the delivery of mobile
content to consumers. The company has developed proprietary technolo-
gy known as the Connected Services Platform to provide application-
specific bandwidth to mobile devices. In August 2014, the company
leveraged that technology, in conjunction with AT&T Wireless, to
launch the Freeway app, "a one-stop shop for AT&T mobile customers
to access free or premium mobile content without incurring data charg-
es." 79 Companies ranging from large edge providers like Expedia to
small startups like BBA Studios are using Freeway to deliver content to
loyal customer bases and to find new customers by allowing them to
sample that content without cost.80
Syntonic has also launched On-Ramp Educational Services, a ser-
vice designed to bring increased connectivity to school districts.'8 '
Through On-Ramp, school districts can distribute 4G-enabled laptops to
students, which are specially calibrated to access only curriculum-
approved applications and content.'82 Using On-Ramp, a school district
can leverage mobile broadband to improve the educational experience
both in the classroom and at students' homes, while avoiding the costs
and security risks of unauthorized personal use of district-provided de-
vices.183 The service launched with Highline School District in Washing-
ton State in September 2014.184
Going forward, the company envisions using its technology to de-
liver Internet-based content to a wide range of devices that can be con-
176. See Daniel Lyons, Rethink Possible When It Comes to Wireless Pricing Plans,
TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM (Jan. 20, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/rethink-possible-comes-wireless-pricing-plans.
177. See id
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14-28 (Sept. 3, 2014)) [hereinafter Greenbaum, Syntonic Reply Comments], available at
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521827783; Press Release, Syntonic Wireless, Syntonic
Wireless(TM) Introduces Sponsored Content Store (July 10, 2014), available at
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/syntonic-wirelesstm-introduces-sponsored-content-store-2014-
07-10.
179. Greenbaum, Syntonic Reply Comments, supra note 178, at 9.
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nected to a wireless network but are not covered by data plans, or which
the provider would want exempted from the consumer's data plan.185
These may include streaming entertainment or navigation content to
wireless-enabled automobiles; monitoring a medical patient's health and
vital signs remotely, around the clock; and helping employers manage
bring-your-own-device policies by providing a suite of workplace-
specific applications that an employee could access on a personal mobile
device without incurring charges on his or her monthly data plan.' 86
As part of its ongoing efforts to distinguish itself from its competi-
tion, T-Mobile has targeted American consumers interested in receiving
streaming music.'87 T-Mobile's Simple Choice Plan not only offers un-
limited talk and text along with a monthly allotment of data, but also
includes unlimited streaming from selected Internet-based streaming
audio services such as Pandora and iHeartRadio.'8 8 The top-tier Simple
Choice Plan also includes a subscription to Rhapsody's unRadio service
for devices compatible with the service.189 The zero-rating and bundling
of certain streaming audio content mirrors the partnerships T-Mobile and
others have entered into in European wireless markets to differentiate
themselves from their competition.
Sprint has also announced plans to offer a differentiated wireless
broadband access plan. In a press release, the company indicated it will
soon test-market social media and other voice-plus plans under its Virgin
Mobile brand, which will offer customers unlimited talk and text, plus
access to a limited suite of mobile broadband services, such as Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, or Pinterest.'9 0 The press release suggests a desire to
import the alternative access models that Turkcell and others have used
effectively to reach those consumers who are interested in accessing
some Internet services on mobile devices, but who are unwilling or una-
ble to buy a traditional full-access wireless data package.
III. REGULATING VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
Given the growing number of business models cropping up world-
wide, and the tentative exploration of alternative models by American
companies, it is important to consider how these plans will fare under the
Commission's new net neutrality rules. As noted above, the rules explic-
185. See SYNTONIC, http://www.syntonicwireless.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
186. See id.
187. See Thomas Gryta, T-Mobile Will Waive Data Fees for Music Services, WALL ST. J. (June
18, 2014, 9:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/t-mobile-will-waive-data-fees-for-music-service-
1403142678.
188. The Simple Choice Plan, T-MOBILE, http://www.t-mobile.com/cell-phone-
plans/individual.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
189. Id.
190. Ryan Knutson, Sprint Will Sell a $12 Wireless Plan that Only Connects to Facebook or
Twitter, WALL ST. J. BLOG (July 30, 2014, 9:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/07/30/sprint-
tries-a-facebook-only-wireless-plan.
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itly favor the traditional broadband model.191 The Commission seems
willing to entertain the notion that some innovation is permissible within
the broadband space, cabined by its awkward and amorphous "no unrea-
sonable interference/disadvantage" standard.192 But it has also empha-
sized the need to "protect" and "preserve" the Open Internet, rhetoric that
suggests a bias toward the status quo.
A. Applying Net Neutrality to Alternative Business Models
Of the alternative business models discussed in Part II above, the
ones that seem most at risk under the Open Internet rules are those in-
volving only partial web access, such as voice-plus or social media plans.
In the 2010 rules, the Commission suggested a company offering access
to only a portion of the Internet would be suspected of trying to evade the
rules:
A key factor in determining whether a service is used to evade the
scope of the rules is whether the service is used as a substitute for
broadband Internet access service. For example, an Internet access
service that provides access to a substantial subset of Internet end-
points based on end users preference to avoid certain content, appli-
cations, or services; Internet access services that allow some uses of
the Internet (such as access to the World Wide Web) but not others
(such as e-mail); or a "Best of the Web" Internet access service that
provides access to 100 top websites could not be used to evade the
open Internet rules applicable to "broadband Internet access ser-
vice."I94
It is likely that this analysis remains relevant today, given that the Com-
mission explained that the record "overwhelmingly supports the . . . re-
adopting of the original [2010] rule" and that it therefore intends the ex-
isting rule to be "[s]imilar to the 2010 no-blocking rule."' 95 Throughout
the order, the Commission repeatedly emphasized the importance of al-
lowing consumers to reach all lawful Internet content,196 and importantly,
the duty now applies fully to wireless as well as fixed broadband provid-
ers. 197 Under this rule, the Commission could reasonably find plans such
as those proposed by Sprint, which provide access to a select number of
online services, effectively block consumers from reaching other web-
sites that are not included within the limited package.
Chile has expressly interpreted its net neutrality rules in just this
fashion. Chile famously enacted the world's first net neutrality rule in
191. See supra Part l.A.
192. See supra text accompanying note 66.
193. See, e.g., 2015 Rules, supra note 60, paras. 74, 102.
194. 2010 Rules, supra note 22, para. 47 (footnote omitted).
195. 2015 Rules, supra note 60, paras. 112, 113.
196. See, e.g., id. para. 111.
197. Id. para. 117.
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2010.198 Subtel, the nation's telecommunications regulator, ruled that
promotional plans coupling traditional voice service with access to se-
lected online content, violate the law and mandated that broadband pro-
viders cannot "arbitrarily block, interfere with, discriminate, hinder, or
restrict the right of any Internet user to use, send, receive, or offer any
content, application, or legal service through the Internet."l99 Subtel's
concern is that by granting free access to Facebook, wireless providers
are handicapping a hypothetical future competitor to the social media
giant, which consumers would not be able to reach for free unless this
new competitor struck a similar deal with carriers.20
Similarly, it is unclear whether sponsored data and other zero-rated
data agreements survive the Commission's "no unreasonable interfer-
ence/disadvantage" standard. The 2015 order explicitly refused to decide
the issue. As with usage-based pricing, the Commission noted that the
201
record reflected "mixed views" about the desirability of the practice.
On the one hand, the Commission noted, zero-rated data can "increase
choice and lower costs for consumers" by offering them free content
above and beyond their monthly data allotments.202 It also creates a point
of differentiation among edge providers, allowing a way by which one
edge service can distinguish itself from its competition.203 On the other
hand, the Commission explained, zero-rating certain data can distort
competition in favor of those who can afford to pay their customers' data
charges and may disadvantage less-well-funded edge providers.204
Many net neutrality advocates have been less ambivalent, arguing
that such agreements should be barred.205 Shortly after Sprint announced
its future plans, Free Press decried the fact that the alternative business
model "'helps lock in the existing choices and not let the new ones grow
more organically' . . . . 'That's just not the way the Internet has
worked."' 2 06 Similarly, Public Knowledge described T-Mobile's stream-
ing music plans as, "the latest example of ISPs using data caps to under-
198. Chile: First Country to Legislate Net Neutrality, GLOBAL VOICES (Sept. 4, 2010, 2:49
PM), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/09/04/chile-first-country-to-legislate-net-neutrality.
199. Daniel Lyons, In Chile, Net Neutrality Widens the Digital Divide,
TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM (June 2, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/chile-net-neutrality-widens-digital-divide (quoting
a translation of Chile's net neutrality law, Law No. 20.453, Augusto 26, 2010 (Chile), available at
http://bcn.cl/1087) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mine net neutrality. . . . [T]his type of gatekeeping interference by ISPs is
exactly what net neutrality rules should be designed to prevent."207 And
both have condemned sponsored data as "a [l]ose-[1]ose for [c]ustomers
and [a]pp [m]akers"208 and a "tremendous loss for all of us." 20 9 These
commenters and others have pressed the Commission to enact more
stringent rules on wireless broadband providers. If their efforts are suc-
cessful, these agreements may also be restricted or prohibited outright.
More promisingly, the 2015 rules seem to create a space for exper-
imentation with targeted services and specialized devices such as Syn-
tonic's On-Ramp Educational Service and its proposed business-oriented
solutions. As the "Internet of Things"210 expands to include more wired
devices, an increasing portion of the nation's wireless networks will be
dedicated to devices that need only limited connectivity. The Commis-
sion explained that it will not apply its content-based net neutrality rules
to "services offered by broadband providers that share capacity with
broadband Internet access service over providers' last-mile facilities" but
that fall outside the Commission's definition of "broadband Internet ac-
cess service."211 Included on this list of so-called "non-BIAS services"
are facilities-based VolP service and IP-based cable programming, which
many broadband providers offer as separate businesses and which few
have thought should be subject to net neutrality rules.212 The rules help-
fully offer a non-exhaustive list of other excluded services, including
Internet connectivity bundled with e-readers, connected heart monitors
and energy sensors, and "services that provide schools with curriculum-
approved applications and content."213 Although these app-specific offer-
ings are not explicitly subject to the Open Internet rules, the Commission
has retained jurisdiction to review complaints that such offerings are
"providing a functional equivalent of broadband Internet access service"
or are otherwise undermining Open Internet principles.214
At a minimum, the Commission's new rules cast doubt upon the le-
gality of numerous alternative wireless broadband business models that
are currently available and popular in international markets. The amor-
phous "no unreasonable interference/disadvantage" standard potentially
sweeps broadly to encompass a wide range of possible broadband busi-
207. Michael Weinberg, T-Mobile Uses Data Caps to Manipulate Competition Online, Under-
mine Net Neutrality, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (June 19, 2014), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-
blog/blogs/t-mobile-uses-data-caps-to-manipulate-competition-online-undermine-net-neut.
208. Press Release, Free Press, AT&T Sponsored Data Scheme is a Lose-Lose for Customers
and App Makers (Jan. 6, 2014), available at http://www.freepress.net/press-release/105490/att-
sponsored-data-scheme-lose-lose-customers-and-app-makers.
209. Weinberg, supra note 207.
210. See Internet of Things, WHATIS.COM, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Intemet-of-
Things (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
211. 2015 Rules, supra note 60, para. 207.
212. Id. para. 208.
213. Id.
214. Id. para. 210.
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ness models. As innovators such as Syntonic have noted, the shadow of
regulation can discourage companies from testing new ideas. Even if the
rules ultimately bar only voice-plus plans, the net effect would be to limit
consumer choice and deprive the American market of options that are
proving popular internationally.
Underlying the net neutrality initiative is the implication consumers
are better served by a legal regime in which all Internet connections
reach all Internet endpoints.215 But developments in the wireless market-
place suggest this implication may be fallacious. The proliferation of
Internet-connected devices means consumers have multiple ways of
reaching the Internet, and do not necessarily need every device to access
every Internet endpoint at all times. Moreover, as an increasing amount
of our daily activities migrate online, different customers are likely to
demand different services from their network providers. Allowing
broadband providers to tailor offerings to customers' particular prefer-
ences can be more efficient than forcing them into one-size-fits-all plans
that are ill-suited to their needs. In an increasingly diverse Internet eco-
system, innovative new broadband models can potentially enhance con-
sumer welfare. Before enforcing rules that would retard these innova-
tions, the Commission should consider carefully the rationale for reduc-
ing opportunities for experimentation in this space.
B. Ambiguous Effects of Vertical Agreements
At its base, net neutrality stems from concerns about vertical fore-
closure. The Commission and its supporters fear that broadband provid-
ers will use control of broadband networks to disrupt competition in up-
stream markets for Internet content and applications. The Commission's
response was to adopt a strict rule that prohibits the ability of broadband
providers to change their business models in ways that make only part of
the Web available to consumers.
As the Verizon court noted, the Commission raised a legitimate
concern. Firms sometimes have incentives to engage in anticompetitive
vertical foreclosure.216 A vertically integrated firm, for example, may
leverage market power in one segment to improve its position in another
217segment. Many commentators suggest these motives were present in
the Madison River case, which the Commission cited to support its net
neutrality order. Madison River Communications paid a $15,000 fine to
the Commission in 2005 to settle allegations that it blocked third-party
VolP services from operating on its network, allegedly because these
215. See YOO, supra note 1, at 122-23.
216. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
217. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight ofan Antitrust Dispute. An Insti-
tutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 41 (2009).
483
DENVER UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW
VoIP services competed against Madison River's traditional telephone
- 218service.
But these instances are likely the exception rather than the rule. Un-
der the principle of internalization of complementary externalities (ICE),
a firm that is free from rate regulation will usually deal fairly with inde-
pendent companies in complementary upstream markets, because failure
to do so will reduce the value of the firm's product.219 In more concrete
terms, a customer will likely pay more for a broadband service that
reaches all Internet content and applications than one that reaches only
part of the Web-which means broadband providers have incentives to
allow open access to all Internet content and applications. The ICE prin-
ciple does not mean broadband companies will never block certain Inter-
net content or applications, but it suggests if they do limit access, there is
usually a procompetitive rationale for doing so.220
There are many ways a vertical agreement can be procompetitive.
For example, Brent Skorup and Adam Thierer highlight Apple's
(in)famous control over its ecosystem.221 Apple exercises significant
control over which apps may be made available for the iPhone and iPad,
in stark contrast to its primary rival, Android.222 Despite this control,
which limits consumer choice and arguably distorts competition in the
app market, a sizeable share of the market continues to favor Apple's
walled garden over more open systems.223 Skorup and Thierer argue the
reason, in part, is Apple's selectivity reduces the consumer's costs of
information and excessive searching. Apple-oriented consumers rely
on the company to sift the wheat from the chaff among application de-
velopers, and value the fact the iOS operating system is well integrated
with the suite of apps that Apple promotes.22 5
Vertical agreements can also promote competition among compa-
nies. Prior to 2011, AT&T was the exclusive U.S. provider of Apple's
popular iPhone, which provided the company with a competitive ad-
vantage over Verizon Wireless and other competitors.226 But the Com-
mission never foreclosed these contracts despite some calls to do so, per-
haps because this vertical agreement was a net positive for consumers. It
woke up a sleepy smartphone market, as AT&T advertised the product
218. Madison River Commc'ns, LLC and Affiliated Companies, 20 FCC Red. 4295, 4297
(2005).
219. Nuechterlein, supra note 217, at 41.
220. Id.
221. Brent Skorup & Adam Thierer, Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical





226. Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Mobile
Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services, 26 FCC Rcd. 9664, 9753 (2011).
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for which it paid so dearly, and Verizon responded to the competitive
threat by helping develop and market the rival Android platform as an
Apple alternative.
At a minimum, one can say that vertical agreements have ambigu-
ous effects on consumer welfare.227 One significant empirical study ex-
plains that according to the data, "efficiency considerations overwhelm
anticompetitive motives in most contexts" and even in natural monopo-
lies or oligopolistic markets, "the evidence of anticompetitive harm is not
strong."228 Therefore, "under most circumstances, profit-maximizing
vertical-integration decisions are efficient, not just from the firms' but
also from the consumers' point of view." 229 Antitrust scholar Herbert
Hovenkamp similarly notes that in most cases, vertical integration "is
either competitively neutral or affirmatively desirable because it pro-
motes efficiency."230 He further explained "tying," an agreement that
requires customers to purchase one product in order to get access to an-
other, more popular product, is "rarely competitively harmful" in the
view of "most economists and others interested in antitrust law." 231 Ty-
ing, of course, is the type of vertical agreement most common in broad-
band markets.
In the case studies above, one can see several related potentially
procompetitive justifications for wireless broadband carriers' efforts to
engage in non-net-neutral practices.
C. Operational Efficiencies and Promoting Competition
Vertical agreements may allow companies to share resources and
leverage one another's strengths, which can achieve greater operational
efficiencies and reduce costs. In the information economy, these effi-
ciency gains could come in either the broadband or edge provider mar-
ket. Many co-marketing agreements analyzed above were signed because
each party helped the other achieve a goal more efficiently. For example,
TELUS offers Skype a platform to operate its service, free marketing and
outreach to reach an installed base of potential Skype customers, and
back-office billing support, an area in which TELUS has significant ex-
pertise.232 In exchange, Skype allows TELUS to grow both its customer
base and average revenue per user. Skype integration is an advantage
TELUS can advertise over Rogers Communications and other Canadian
227. See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L
J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 643-47 (2005).
228. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The
Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 677 (2007).
229. Id. at 680.
230. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3B ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 756a, at 9 (3d ed. 2008).
231. Herbert Hovenkamp, Clayton Act (1914), in MAJOR ACTS OF CONGRESS 123, 125 (Brian
K. Landsberg ed., 2004).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
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providers, and existing TELUS customers who use Skype may be enticed
to migrate to larger and more expensive data plans.
Significantly, many co-marketing agreements can promote greater
competition within broadband markets by allowing smaller broadband
providers who lack the scale and infrastructure to compete against en-
trenched incumbent providers, by changing the rules of the game. As
noted above, Orange leveraged bundled services to boost its market share
in the United Kingdom by offering a wireless plan with premium content
for one low price, below the cost of the two services separately, setting
its brand apart from its competitors.2 3 3 T-Mobile is attempting a similar
strategy in the United States, holding itself out as the "un-carrier" in part
by bundling its plans with unlimited streaming music. 23 4
This bundling can also promote greater competition among edge
providers by providing a useful avenue for a start-up Internet company to
shake up the online status quo. Orange's inclusion of Deezer as a
Swapable option coincided with Deezer's launch into the United King-
dom.235 Although popular in its native France, Deezer faced an uphill
battle gaining traction in the British online streaming market, which was
dominated by market leader Spotify.2 36 The partnership was thus lucra-
tive for Deezer, which received built-in delivery over the Orange net-
work, easy access to Orange's installed customer base, and low-cost
marketing in conjunction with the Swapables offer. Thus the Orange-
Deezer partnership offered both a way for Orange to expand its presence
in the wireless market and for Deezer to make a splash in the streaming
music market.
D. Product Differentiation
Vertical agreements can also improve consumer welfare through
product differentiation. Differentiation enhances the level of competition
between firms by increasing the faces upon which they may compete
against one another. Greater points of competition mean more options
available to consumers, which increases the likelihood of identifying a
business model that is more efficient than those currently in the market.
Encouraging standardization of the product, as net neutrality does, re-
moves a plane upon which firms can compete and, thus, gives an ad-
vantage to large incumbent players against upstarts that are looking for
places to distinguish themselves.
Broadband product differentiation may expand the number of pro-
viders in this capital-intensive industry by increasing the opportunities to
233. See supra text accompanying notes 156-60.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
235. See Tim Bradshaw, Deezer Takes On Spotify with Orange Deal, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 7,
2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/66bdfd5c-d939-l I eO-bd7e-00 I 44feabdcO.html#axzz3p 1nlygDb.
236. Id.
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seek investment capital from those looking for an advantage in return.237
The Clearwire deal exemplifies this: by being able to offer Bell Canada a
preferred partnership arrangement (whatever the ultimate terms of the
deal entailed), Clearwire was able to entice Bell Canada to provide it
with much-needed capital to start building its network.23 8 Without the
opportunity to offer Bell Canada an advantage, Clearwire likely would
not have received the money it needed from Bell Canada, and reduced
competition in the American wireless broadband market. This type of
angel-funding agreement would be difficult under the Commission's
conception of net neutrality.
Moreover, broadband differentiation may help narrow the digital
divide. By offering a lower-quality product at a lower price point, broad-
band providers could extend service to those who cannot afford, or oth-
erwise do not wish to buy, full broadband access at the market rate. Fa-
cebook Zero and the Google Free Zone are good examples. By reducing
the quality of the service, developers and broadband providers offered a
product that had value for low-tech customers, without risking cannibali-
zation of revenues from those already paying for more advanced ser-
vices. In the process, such programs help introduce people to the Inter-
net, making them more familiar with the perks of Internet access and
helping ensure that if they continue to decline full Internet access, it is
not because of lack of familiarity with the product.
Finally, differentiation allows companies to cater to niche markets
whose needs are imperfectly met by traditional broadband offerings. In
the United States, the net neutrality rules generally limit customers to
purchasing full Internet access or none at all. But the worldwide success
of voice-plus plans like social media plans shows there is demand inter-
nationally for products that fall between these poles. Sprint's plan to of-
fer social media plans in the United States suggests the company believes
there is pent-up demand for such a product in America as well. There
may be a large population of consumers who purchase unlimited-access
service only to reach a handful of websites or apps each month. These
consumers would be better off with a reduced-access plan that would
give them a discount in exchange for giving up the power to visit sites
that they generally will not visit anyway. Similarly, there are likely con-
sumers who choose not to purchase unlimited-access data plans at exist-
ing price points, but would be willing to pay less for limited additional
functionality such as the ability to access Facebook or Twitter. The suc-
cess of Turkcell's social media plans in Turkey suggests that this differ-
entiated model can be attractive to certain customers. If the amount these
237. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or
Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23,
64-66 (2004).
238. See supra Part II.F.
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customers are willing to pay is more than the provider's cost of providing
the service, then it is inefficient not to serve this niche market.
In other contexts, the Commission has shown a significant apprecia-
tion of the value of catering to niche markets. When it approved satellite
radio in 1997, the Commission noted one of the benefits of augmenting
local radio with satellite transmissions is that satellite radio can reach
niche audiences that local broadcasters could not.239 Individually, local
populations around the country interested in a particular genre of music
may not be numerous enough to support stations in that genre in every
town where there is interest. But satellite radio could unite these pockets
by giving them all one nationwide station dedicated to their interests-in
the meantime generating the efficiencies that make the station economi-
cal. The Commission found it was in the public interest to meet those
needs if it was economical to do so, and the same analysis should control
here.
E. Rule-of-Reason Analysis and Market Power
Because vertical agreements have ambiguous effects on overall wel-
fare, antitrust law rarely pronounces them illegal per se, and instead ana-
lyzes the effects under the rule of reason doctrine, which states only un-
reasonable agreements are actionable under antitrust law.240 Judge Ka-
vanaugh addressed this at length in a recent concurring opinion about
vertical restraints in the market for cable programming, another area
where the Commission has long feared bottleneck discrimination by
network operators.24 1 He noted that in most cases, "vertical integration 'is
either competitively neutral or affirmatively desirable because it pro-
motes efficiency."' 24 2 Such agreements "[are] ubiquitous in our economy
and virtually never pose[] a threat to competition when undertaken uni-
laterally and in competitive markets."243
Market power is an important component when analyzing the risks
of vertical foreclosure. As noted above, the ICE principle suggests that
normally, a firm that engages in anticompetitive vertical foreclosure will
devalue its product compared to its rivals. Absent market power, the firm
is likely to face significant backlash from consumers, who will desert to
rivals in search of a substitute good that is not tainted by anticompetitive
foreclosure.
239. Establishment of Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Serv., 12 FCC
Rcd. 5754, 5760 (1997).
240. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007); Skorup &
Thierer, supra note 221, at 165; see Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 143 (1984).
241. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
242. Id (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 230, 1 756a, at 9).
243. Id. at 990-91 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 230, 1 755c, at 6) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Because consumers can punish firm behavior in competitive mar-
kets, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that vertical agreements
are generally legitimate in the absence of market power.244 As Judge Ka-
vanaugh explained,
Vertical integration and vertical contracts become potentially prob-
lematic only when a firm has market power in the relevant market.
That's because, absent market power, vertical integration and vertical
contracts are procompetitive. Vertical integration and vertical con-
tracts in a competitive market encourage product innovation, lower
costs for businesses, and create efficiencies-and thus reduce prices
and lead to better goods and services for consumers.245
He concluded, "[T]his Court's case law has stated that vertical integra-
tion and vertical contracts are procompetitive, at least absent market
power."246
Viewed in this light, the Commission's insistence on prophylactic
net neutrality rules to forestall possible anticompetitive foreclosure
seems somewhat alarmist, at least in the wireless market. The Commis-
sion has repeatedly issued reports analyzing the competitiveness of the
247wireless sector. The industry is marked by four significant national
networks, and a variety of resellers and regional or local carriers that
compete vigorously for consumer attention. Interestingly, the Commis-
sion found the 2011 weighted average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a
widely used metric of industry concentration, was 2873, which suggests
248a highly concentrated market. But as the Commission explained, high
concentration does not necessarily imply market power if there are other
indicia of price and nonprice rivalry between competitors.249 Geoffrey
Manne has noted that wireless telephone prices have fallen significantly
over the last ten years, and network investment has risen each year.250
Providers continue to build and upgrade their networks and are engaged
in vigorous price competition, including T-Mobile's move in 2011 to
decouple handset sales from service contracts and offer postpaid service
on a no-contract basis. Lacking market power, wireless providers are
unlikely to be able to sustain alternative business models that are harmful
244. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898; see State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 17-19 (1997); Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1988); Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 53-59 (1977).
245. Comcast, 717 F.3d at 990 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 991.
247. Implementation of §§ 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including
Commercial Mobile Services, 28 FCC Red. 3700, 3704 (2013).
248. Id. at 3718.
249. Id. at 3759.
250. Geoffrey A. Manne et al., The Law and Economics of the FCC's Transaction Review
Process 30 (Aug. 23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2242681 (cited with author's permission).
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to consumers, as adversely affected consumers are likely to simply defect
to a competitor.
F. The Need for Greater Flexibility in Wireless Broadband Markets
As noted above, the Commission has long recognized the value of
permitting greater regulatory flexibility in wireless markets. And its orig-
inal reasons for applying a light regulatory touch in 2010 remain relevant
in today's market. First, the wireless environment is a more dynamic and
growing segment of the broadband market. Chairman Tom Wheeler has
noted that the number of LTE users has grown from 200,000 in 2010 to
over 120 million by the end of 2014.251 And the market has shown no
signs of slowing to maturity: Sandvine estimates that median mobile data
use rose by 20% in the first half of 2014 alone, from 84 to 102 mega-
bytes per month.252 Moreover, these users' online patterns are growing
more differentiated; the top 1% of users are responsible for 19% of up-
stream and 12% of downstream traffic, while the bottom half of users
together comprise less than 2% of total network volume.2 53 Given the
relatively young and dynamic nature of the marketplace, rigid net neu-
trality rules risk eliminating potentially innovative proconsumer business
models.
Second, as noted above, the wireless market remains competitive.
Unlike fixed broadband, which in most markets is dominated by two
providers, most Americans have four national wireless carriers to choose
from, plus regional and niche players. And the evidence suggests they
are actually competing for customers; the rise of no-contract plans and
promotions offering to pay off new customers' early termination fees
shows that customers wish to-and do-change wireless providers often,
and firms are responding to that demand. This suggests less need for
prophylactic rules to protect consumers, as companies lack market power
and consumers facing potentially problematic business practices can
simply defect to an alternative provider relatively easily.
Finally, wireless companies face unique capacity constraints that are
not present on fixed broadband networks. Spectrum is a limited re-
source.254 While wireless companies can research technology to use ex-
isting spectrum more efficiently, they generally cannot solve congestion
by adding more spectrum, the way that fixed broadband providers can
251. See Stephen Lawson, FCC May Put Mobile Under Same Net-Neutrality Rules as Wired
Broadband, PCWORLD (Sep. 9, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2604980/fcc-may-put-
mobile-under-same-netneutrality-rules-as-wired-broadband.html.
252. SANDVINE, INTELLIGENT BROADBAND NETWORKs: GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA
REPORT IH 2014, at 8 (2014), available at https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-
internet-phenomena/2014/lh-2014-global-intemet-phenomena-report.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2015).
253. Id. at 9.
254. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Red. 5043, 5054-55 (1987) (discussing spec-
trum scarcity).
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lay more cable. Providers must deal with interference from other wireless
devices. And while Commission studies show fairly consistent peak pe-
riods for fixed broadband traffic,255 wireless traffic patterns are less pre-
dictable than fixed traffic, which has fairly consistent peak periods.256
Together, these operational constraints suggest the need for wireless pro-
viders to have greater flexibility when engaging in network management.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's Open Internet initiative has unquestionably tar-
geted an important issue. Broadband networks are important gateways to
Internet-based content and applications, and regulators should remain
vigilant to safeguard against the risk of anticompetitive foreclosure. But
the wide range of vertical agreements occurring internationally, includ-
ing those profiled in this Article, testify to the fact that not all agreements
between broadband and edge providers are harmful to consumers. To
paraphrase Justice Blackmun, the Commission must make sure its efforts
to safeguard the public from harm do not amount to "launch[ing] a mis-
sile to kill a mouse."257
Federal Trade Commissioner Joshua Wright has rightly warned
about the potential harm of overreaching in pursuit of an Open Internet.
Commenting on the 2010'rules, Commissioner Wright explained:
What the theoretical literature and empirical evidence demon-
strates . . . is that vertical contracts, including those captured by the
Neutrality Order, are not always anticompetitive and in most cases
are procompetitive. This is a critical observation for answering the
question: "what kind of regulatory regime and legal rules governing
this behavior will best serve consumers?",
258
Commissioner Wright's emphasis on consumers provides some im-
portant guidance to the Open Internet proceeding. The Commission's
first significant pronouncement on broadband practices came in the 2005
Internet Policy Statement, a non-binding document that ultimately
launched the Open Internet proceeding. That statement was largely fo-
cused on consumer welfare, emphasizing "consumers are entitled to ac-
cess the lawful Internet content of their choice," to "run applications and
use services of their choice," and "connect their choice of legal device[]"
255. FCC, 2012 MEASURING BROADBAND AMERICA JULY REPORT: A REPORT ON CONSUMER
WIRELINE BROADBAND PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. 8 (2012), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/measuringbroadbandreport/2012/Measuring-Broadband-America.pdf.
256. See Lyons, supra note 82, at 35-36 (discussing wireless congestion unpredictability and
citing studies).
257. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
258. Joshua D. Wright, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Broadband Policy & Consumer Wel-
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to the network.259 But as the 2005 Policy Statement gave way to the 2010
rules and the current rules, the Commission's focus has shifted from the
welfare of consumers to that of edge providers. The Supreme Court has
long emphasized that antitrust law protects "competition, not competi-
tors."2 60 The protection of edge providers should not be a goal in itself,
but only if it is a tool to protect consumers from harm.
Consumer welfare has been, and should continue to be, the lodestar
guiding the Commission's efforts to preserve the Open Internet. The
Commission may be correct that there is a risk of anticompetitive fore-
closure in broadband markets. And that risk may be sufficiently large to
warrant a regulatory response. But any effort to promote the Open Inter-
net should allow for companies to experiment with innovative new ways
to bring Internet content and applications to consumers, because this
experimentation is likely to give rise to consumer-beneficial alternatives
to traditional broadband access models. The Commission should seek to
promote innovation that enhances consumers' ability to access the con-
tent and services they desire-no matter where in the Internet ecosystem
this innovation occurs.
259. FCC, FCC 05-151, APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR BROADBAND ACCESS TO THE
INTERNET OVER WIRELINE FACILITIES, para. 4 (Sept. 23, 2005) (emphasis added), available at
https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdflFCC-05-151 Al .pdf.
260. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986) (quoting Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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WHEN TARGETING BECOMES SECONDARY: A
FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING PREDICTIVE
SURVEILLANCE IN ANTITERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS
BY SHAUN B. SPENCERt
ABSTRACT
The National Security Agency's bulk data collection programs dis-
closed in 2013 suggest a new model of surveillance. This "predictive
surveillance" model will apply the emerging field of predictive analytics
to the vast datasets in the hands of third parties. Unlike traditional sur-
veillance, predictive surveillance will not begin by targeting individuals
based on particularized suspicion. Instead, predictive surveillance will
first collect and analyze all available data to find patterns that could pre-
dict future events. In light of the NSA's emphasis on data analysis and its
existing stores of telephone and Internet communications metadata, it
seems inevitable that the government will eventually advocate for predic-
tive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations. This Article contends
that the existing framework of surveillance regulation cannot adapt to
predictive surveillance because the existing framework presumes that
surveillance begins with targeting. The Article next assesses whether
predictive surveillance could comply with the Fourth Amendment. After
rejecting arguments that the Fourth Amendment should not apply to in-
formation gathered from third parties or in public spaces, the Article pro-
poses a narrow basis for authorizing predictive surveillance. The initial
data collection would be reasonable under the Supreme Court's balanc-
ing approach in domestic security investigations and under the Court's
approval of suspicionless searches in its special needs cases. This ap-
proach, however, would only uphold surveillance used for antiterrorism
investigations, rather than ordinary law enforcement purposes. Finally,
the Article proposes a new regulatory framework that postpones the as-
sessment of particularized suspicion, requires prior judicial approval of
the initial data collection and analysis, limits use of the database to anti-
terrorism investigations, and imposes substantial oversight and transpar-
ency.
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INTRODUCTION
I started work on this Article after Edward Snowden disclosed the
existence of the National Security Agency's (NSA) bulk collection of
metadata about our domestic and international telephone calls. I assumed
that, with a comprehensive archive of telephone metadata available, the
NSA was analyzing the entire database for patterns that could indicate
potential terrorist activity. Subsequent reports, however, left me feeling
vaguely disappointed in the NSA. It turned out that the NSA's searches
began with specific telephone numbers that hey believed to be associat-
ed with terrorist activity and expanded out several degrees of separation
to encompass people who had communicated with the target and people
who had communicated with those people.' I was disappointed for two
reasons. First, the NSA might be able to do far more with this vast store
of data. And second, the NSA could have accomplished these targeted
searches nearly as efficiently by seeking orders targeted at each of the
telephone numbers they believed to be associated with terrorist activity,
thus accomplishing the same goal with far less harm to privacy and the
public trust. Recent reports revealed that the NSA has found it more and
more challenging to collect the metadata. Part of the challenge has been
the lack of a protocol to exclude the cell site location data embedded in
the telephone metadata from cell phone providers.2 As a result, the per-
centage of metadata collected had fallen to less than 30% in early 2014.3
Regardless of the current practical or political limitations, the bulk
telephone metadata program and others like it point to a new model of
surveillance. This "predictive surveillance" model will apply the emerg-
ing field of predictive analytics to the vast datasets in the hands of third
parties. Unlike traditional surveillance, predictive surveillance will not
begin by targeting individuals based on particularized suspicion. Instead,
predictive surveillance will first collect and analyze all available data to
find patterns that could predict future events. In light of the NSA's em-
phasis on data analysis and its existing stores of telephone and Internet
communications metadata, one can envision a strong temptation to use
1. These are the first two "hops" in the NSA's chaining analysis. In "very few instances," the
NSA would make a third "hop." PRESIDENT'S REVIEw GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS
TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 102-03 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12rgfinal report.pdf.
2. See Ellen Nakashima, NSA Is Collecting Less than 30 Percent of US. Call Data, Officials
Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
2014/02/07/234a0e9e-8fad-1 1e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da-story.html.
3. Id. The intelligence agency's goal, however, remains 100% collection. Id.
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predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations. This Article con-
tends that existing surveillance regulation framework cannot adapt to
predictive surveillance because the existing framework presumes that
surveillance begins with targeting. The Article proposes a new regulatory
framework that postpones the assessment of particularized suspicion,
requires prior judicial approval of the initial data collection and analytics,
limits use of the analytics to antiterrorism investigations, and imposes
substantial oversight and transparency.
Part I describes the convergence of two important phenomena: the
explosion of data about all aspects of our lives and the emerging field of
predictive analytics. Viktor Mayer-Schanberger and Kenneth Cukier
describe how these phenomena have led to the rise of "Big Data" in their
recent book by the same title.4 In the age of Big Data, statisticians need
not rely on sampling datasets to analyze past behavior. Instead, with
complete datasets at their disposal, they may use a variety of new predic-
tive techniques capable of building highly accurate predictive models.
Predictive analytics are already in widespread use in the private and gov-
ernment sectors. They have been used to predict such diverse outcomes
as when a machine will fail, which manhole covers are at highest risk of
explosion, and where flu outbreaks are emerging.5
Part II contrasts traditional surveillance with predictive surveillance
and uses the NSA's recently disclosed bulk collection programs to illus-
trate the differences. Under the traditional model, law enforcement first
decides on a subject to target. For example, in the bulk telephone
metadata collection program, the NSA queried the database with a tele-
phone number associated with a foreign terrorist organization. Thus, the
process begins with particularized suspicion about a subject, and the sur-
veillance targets information about that subject. Under the predictive
surveillance model, however, the process would be quite different. The
NSA's first step would be to analyze all of the telephone metadata in
order to identify patterns associated with past terrorist activity. If mean-
ingful patterns emerged, only then would the NSA move to targeted sur-
veillance by investigating subjects whose metadata corresponded with
patterns correlated with past terrorist activity. Part II also details how the
government already uses predictive surveillance to predict high-crime
locations and detect fraud, as well as how researchers have used predic-
tive analytics to predict terrorist and insurgent activity overseas. Finally,
Part II explains how the NSA's current bulk collection programs set the
stage for predictive surveillance.
Part III explains that existing surveillance regulation framework
cannot adapt to predictive surveillance because the existing framework
4. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 7-8, 11-12, 15 (2013).
5. See infra Part I; see also MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 1-2.
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depends on assessing whether the initial targeting decision is based on
sufficient particularized suspicion. For example, in the law enforcement
context, the Fourth Amendment presumes a search in which there is
probable cause to believe the subject is involved in criminal activity.
Even in foreign intelligence investigations, which are exempt from the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the courts still consider
"whether the protections afforded to the privacy rights of targeted per-
sons are reasonable in light of' the government's interest in preventing
6foreign terrorism. The statutory limits on surveillance also begin by as-
sessing the targeting decision. The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act prohibits wiretapping absent probable cause that the target has com-
mitted or will commit a crime7 and prohibits compelled disclosure of
Internet Service Provider (ISP) records unless those records are "relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."8 Similarly, to approve
a wiretap under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a court
must find probable cause that the target is "an agent of a foreign power."9
All of the foregoing tests presume that the government has already tar-
geted someone specific.
Part III also explains why the government should not try to shoe-
horn predictive surveillance into the existing regulatory framework. First,
applying the old framework to predictive surveillance could mean that
predictive surveillance is rejected because of the lack of particularized
suspicion. If predictive surveillance has any value as an intelligence tool,
we should not let a lack of imagination about surveillance regulation
deny those potential benefits. Second, given the potential of predictive
surveillance, there is a significant risk that the government would bend or
even break the rules in the existing framework in order to reap those
benefits. In that case, predictive public surveillance would not be subject
to safeguards necessary to deal with the comprehensive datasets it re-
quires. By way of illustration, such a shoehorning appears to have taken
place with regard to the bulk collection of telephone metadata under Sec-
tion 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.'0 Because it was authorized through
a statute never designed for bulk collection, the program operated in total
secrecy-until the Snowden disclosures-with inadequate congressional
oversight, minimal judicial approval, and no meaningful opportunity for
appellate review.
Part IV considers whether the Fourth Amendment would prohibit
use of predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations. For data
6. In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2012).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
9. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012).
10. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat.
272, 287-88 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)).
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collected from private entities, such as telecommunications providers, the
government would try to justify the collection under the third-party doc-
trine. And for data collected in public spaces, such as license plate read-
ers, the government would argue that individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in public spaces. This Article argues, however,
that the courts should reject those arguments and hold that the initial data
collection constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Article next argues that this initial data collection would nev-
ertheless be reasonable under the relaxed Fourth Amendment require-
ments in domestic security investigations under the Keith case," as well
as under the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of suspicionless searches in
its special needs cases. The initial collection, however, could only sur-
vive under these theories if the program were limited to antiterrorism
investigations, as opposed to ordinary law enforcement uses.
Finally, Part V proposes the elements of a regulatory scheme for
predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investigations. First, the govern-
ment would have to seek an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court (FISC) for the initial collection. The FISC could only issue
such an order if the government made a Daubert-style showing that the
proposed statistical techniques were scientifically valid and likely to
yield a meaningful result. This examination of the collection decision
would take the place of the traditional evaluation of the targeting deci-
sion. Second, the government would have to report to the FISC on the
results of its data analysis and would have to seek an additional order
from the FISC to investigate subjects whose current data matched the
prior patterns. That is where the review of the targeting decision would
take place. Third, the government could not use the raw database for any
purpose other than the antiterrorism investigation. Fourth, the framework
would mandate the most advanced security possible against outside in-
trusion and would impose substantial penalties for internal misuse of the
data. Finally, the framework would impose substantial judicial and legis-
lative oversight as well as public transparency.
I. BIG DATA AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS
The term "predictive surveillance" envisions surveillance that gath-
ers and analyzes all available data-for example, the metadata for all
telephone calls from the major telecommunications carriers.12 Gathering
and analyzing all the data, rather than merely gathering a sample, is the
11. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
12. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS
OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 8-11 (2014), available at
https://www.pclob.gov/Library/215-Report on theTelephone RecordsProgram.pdf.
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trend that Mayer-Schdnberger and Cukier explore in their recent book,
Big Data.13
A 2012 New York Times article about Big Data described the "drift
toward data-driven discovery and decision-making" in many different
fields.14 Gary King, director of the Institute for Quantitative Social Sci-
ence, called the Big Data movement a "revolution." 5 King continued,
"[T]he march of quantification, made possible by enormous new sources
of data, will sweep through academia, business and government. There is
no area that is going to be untouched."l6
Why all the hype? Mayer-Schbnberger and Cukier use the term Big
Data as shorthand for the convergence of two important developments.
The first development is the data explosion itself. Data are multiplying at
an almost unimaginable rate,17 and new tools are emerging to convert
previously unquantifiable phenomena into digital data. In many cases,
we are able to process all of the data regarding a given phenomenon.
This data explosion provides the datasets needed for the second de-
velopment: the emerging field of predictive analytics. This methodology
predicts future behavior based on the patterns that emerge from vast da-
tasets.'8 For centuries, practical limitations made it impossible for scien-
tists to collect observations concerning every member of a population. So
statisticians devised sophisticated techniques to (1) draw representative
samples from the population, and (2) extrapolate from an analysis of the
sample to an analysis of the population. When reporting their results,
statisticians use a lower-case "n" to indicate the size of their sample and
an upper-case "N" to indicate the size of the population. As Mayer-
Schonberger and Cukier explain, in a play on these statistical abbrevia-
tions, in Big Data, n=all.19 Big Data researchers need not rely on sam-
ples. Instead, they use new analytical techniques to find patterns in ob-
servations of the entire population and then use those patterns to predict
future behavior.
Gathering "all the data" makes new predictive techniques possible.
Evidence of causation has long been the touchstone of scientific re-
search. With predictive analytics, however, causation is far less relevant.
By using predictive analytics to study large datasets with many variables,
13. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 12-13.
14. Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SRI.
15. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
16. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
17. For example, as recently as 2000, only one quarter of the world's stored information was
in digital form. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 9. The rest were stored in analog
form, "on paper, film, vinyl LP records, magnetic cassette tapes, and the like." Id. But by 2007, only
7% of the world's stored data were analog; the rest were digital. Id. at 8-9. By 2013, the digital
analog spread had widened to 98% digital versus 2% analog. Id. at 9.
18. ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY,
LIE, OR DIE 11 (2013).
19. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 26.
2015] 499
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
analysts can build extremely accurate predictive models based on strong
correlations in the data, regardless of why those correlations may exist.20
This technique can reveal correlations one might not have imagined if
one were looking for causation.
For example, predictive analytics can generate models that predict
when a given mechanical device, like a motor or a bridge, will fail. The
models are based on vast amounts of data from sensors monitoring pat-
terns in the data that the devices emit, "such as heat, vibration, stress, and
sound."21 It is far less important to know why the device may fail than it
is to know, before the fact, that it will probably fail.22 Eric Siegel's Pre-
dictive Analytics gives us many examples of what predictive analytics
can show us.2 3 "Suicide bombers do not buy life insurance."24 Crime
rises after upset losses in college football.25 "Phone card sales predict
[massacres] in the Congo."26 Mac users spend "up to 30 percent more
than [PC] users when booking" online hotel reservations.27 In these cas-
es, government and businesses use correlations to predict future behav-
ior.
Predictive analytics capitalizes on the proliferation of digital tech-
nologies and the fact that data can invariably be combined with other
data and put to new uses. Often these secondary uses yield the most val-
uable large-scale data analyses. For example, a team of Columbia Uni-
versity statisticians set out to help solve New York City's "exploding
28manhole[]" cover problem. A few hundred times a year, fires would
break out beneath manhole covers, sometimes sending the heavy cast-
iron covers several stories high. 29 Con Edison's random manhole inspec-
tions were ineffective in heading off the problem.30 The team from Co-
lumbia gathered every kind of data imaginable. Various types of incon-
sistent data existed in handwritten form dating back to the late 1800s.32
After the team had gathered all the data and written computer algorithms
to interpret the data, patterns emerged. Using data from the late 1800s
through 2008-data that were never intended to predict manhole cover
explosions-the team sorted through 106 predictors and produced a
model in which "[t]he top 10 percent of manhole [covers] on their
20. Id. at 6-7, 13-14.
21. Id. at 58.
22. Id. at 59. For a comprehensive discussion of predictive analytics, see SIEGEL, supra note
18.
23. SIEGEL, supra note 18, at 80-86.
24. Id at 85.
25. Id at 86.
26. Id.
27. Id at 81.
28. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 68.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 68-70.
32. Id at 68.
33. Id at 69.
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["watch"] list contained . .. 44 percent of [all of] the [covers] that ended
up having severe incidents" in 2009.34
Another example of unexpected uses involved the large amounts of
location data that cellular phone providers have about their subscribers.
One researcher "combined location data of prepaid cell phone subscrib-
ers in Africa with the amount of money [the subscribers] spent when they
topped off their accounts."3 5 This unexpected combination of data yield-
ed the surprising finding that slums in Africa can "act as economic
springboards" for residents' socioeconomic status.36
The next Part examines how the rise of Big Data and predictive ana-
lytics could give rise to a new surveillance model-predictive surveil-
lance-that does not require targeting specific individuals.
II. THE ROLE OF TARGETING IN TRADITIONAL SURVEILLANCE AND
PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE
A. Traditional Surveillance Begins by Targeting Based on Particularized
Suspicion
Under the traditional surveillance model, the government first de-
cides to target a particular subject based on some degree of particularized
suspicion. In some cases, that particularized suspicion may be quite high.
For example, when criminal investigators pursue a wiretap under the
Wiretap Act, they must demonstrate to a court that there is probable
cause to believe that the interception will reveal evidence of a felony
offense listed in section 2516 . Similarly, when criminal investigators
install a GPS device to track a suspect's car, they must first obtain a war-
rant based on probable cause to believe that the tracking will reveal evi-
dence of a crime.3 8
In other cases, the particularized suspicion can be significantly low-
er. For example, under the Stored Communications Act, the government
may compel an ISP to produce subscriber information based on "specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the . .. records or other information sought[] are relevant and mate-
rial to an ongoing criminal investigation."39 And when foreign intelli-
gence investigators seek a court order to intercept electronic communica-
tions under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, they need only
34. Id. at 68-70.
35. Id at 91.
36. Id
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(b) (2012).
38. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 954 (2012).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
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show probable cause to believe that "the target of the electronic surveil-
lance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."4 0
At first blush, the NSA's recently disclosed mass-surveillance pro-
grams may appear to represent this new surveillance model. At their
core, however, they employ traditional, targeting-based techniques. For
example, since 2006 the government has relied on Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act to collect metadata on telephone calls made to or
from telephone numbers in the United States.4 1 This metadata includes
the "originating and terminating telephone number," the time of the call,
and the duration of the call, but does not include the call's contents.4 2
The program stored metadata on U.S. phone calls for five years.43 Alt-
hough the program collected 'closer to 100' percent" of all call records
in 2006, as time passed the percentage of phone records collected fell
below 30% because the NSA cold not keep up with cell phone use.44
Minimization procedures drafted by the Attorney General limit the
circumstances under which the NSA can search the telephone metadata
that it collects.4 5 A search may only begin with a specific identifier, like a
telephone number, that the NSA suspects is associated with one of the
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A) (2012).
41. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 42. The bulk telephone
metadata program began in 2001, after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Id. at 37. From 2001 until
2006, the program proceeded without any legislative or judicial authorization. See id. Instead, Presi-
dent Bush issued a presidential authorization in October 2001, based on a finding of an extraordinary
emergency because of the September II terrorist attacks. Id. That authorization directed the bulk
collection of .'metadata[]' about telephone and Internet communications," as well as the collection
of the contents of international communications (later known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program).
Id. President Bush renewed the authorization every thirty to sixty days. Id. After the New York
Times reported on the previously secret Terrorist Surveillance Program in December 2005, the
administration became concerned that the bulk collection of telephone metadata would also be
exposed. Id at 40. In May 2006, the administration obtained authority from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court to conduct bulk collection of telephone metadata under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act. Id at 40, 42.
42. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *1 n.2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court noted that "[tihe sole purpose of this production is to obtain foreign
intelligence information in support of [redacted] individual authorized investigations to protect
against international terrorism and concerning various international terrorist organizations." Id. at * 1.
43. Scott Shane, N.S.A. Violated Rules on Use of Phone Logs, Intelligence Court Found in
2009, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, at A14.
44. Ellen Nakashima, NSA Is Collecting Less Than 30 Percent of U.S. Call Data, Officials
Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-is-
collecting-less-than-30-percent-of-us-call-data-officials-say/2014/02/07/234a0e9e-8fad-l I e3-b46a-
5a3d0d2130da story.html. According "to current and former U.S. officials," the NSA was unable to
keep up with expanding cellphone use for several reasons. Id. First, the NSA must "prepare its
database to handle . . . cellphone data," which contain "different data (] than land-line calls" and
often "contain geolocation data, which the NSA" may not receive. Id. And second, NSA resources
were diverted from preparing its databases during 2009 by review and compliance issues arising
from breaches documented by the FISC and from responses to congressional inquiries in the wake of
the Snowden disclosures. Id. Nevertheless, the officials indicated that the government is attempting
to restore collection to previous levels. Id.
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B), (c)(1), (g)(1) (2012).
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46
terrorist organizations under investigation. In 2012 the "NSA queried
288 unique identifiers" that, in the NSA's view, met the requisite "rea-
sonable, articulable suspicion" standard for association with a terrorist
-47organization.
The NSA uses the vast database of telephone metadata to perform
what it calls "link analysis."48 First, the NSA gathers data about the tele-
phone numbers that have been in contact with the suspected terrorist's
number-the first hop.49 Next, in most cases, the NSA adds numbers in
contact with those first hop numbers-the second hop.50 And finally, in
very few instances, the NSA adds numbers in contact with those second
hop numbers-the third hop.' If each number at issue "called or was
called by 100 phone numbers over the course of' five years, then the first
hop would produce a list of 100 phone numbers, the second hop would
"produce a list of 10,000 phone numbers," and the third hop would pro-
duce a list of 1,000,000 phone numbers.5 2
This link analysis is intended to identify networks of terror cells.
The Obama administration claims that NSA analysis of these searches
"has generated and continues to generate investigative leads for ongoing
efforts by the FBI and other agencies to identify and track terrorist opera-
tives, associates, and facilitators."54 Yet the White House's own NSA
review panel concluded that metadata "was not essential to preventing
attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using
conventional section 215 orders."
The post-Snowden modifications that President Obama proposed
for the Section 215 bulk collection program reaffirm that the Section 215
program is traditional, target-based surveillance. First, the President pro-
posed allowing the metadata to be held by a third party or by the tele-
communications companies themselves. Second, the President pro-
posed limiting the number of hops from the target's number from three to
46. PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note
1, at 98.
47. Id. at 98, 102.
48. Charlie Savage, Extended Ruling by Secret Court Backs Collection of Phone Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note
1, at 102.
50. Id. at 103.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Savage, supra note 48.
54. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 4 (2013), available at
https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-NSABulkCollection.pdf.
55. PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note
1, at 104.
56. Id. at 17; see also Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet:
Review of U.S. Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/01/17/fact-sheet-review-us-signals-intelligence.
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two.57 Third, the President directed the Attorney General to develop a
procedure with the FISC so that the database could not be queried with-
out a judicial order. These proposed reforms confirm that the program
is a traditional, targeting-based effort to identify the people with whom a
specific subject has been talking, rather than a broad, pattern-based anal-
ysis. Thus, despite the "n=all" aspect of the bulk collection, the actual
queries target specific identifiers about which the NSA has particularized
suspicion.
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has run a similar, although
less publicized, program in cooperation with AT&T. 59 The DEA's Hemi-
sphere Project searches decades of AT&T telephone records in an effort
to catch drug dealers.60 Drug dealers routinely switch phones or phone
numbers to evade investigation.61 They use so-called "'burner' phones"
to make calls to their subordinates and discard the phones before police
can track their behavior.62 The DEA uses the drug dealer's past calls
63
from his old number to identify his associates. 6 The DEA then uses the
pattern of calls from his associates to identify the drug dealer's new
number.4 The program places DEA employees in AT&T offices so that
the DEA can quickly execute subpoenas for phone records searches-
often in as little as an hour.65 The records available to the DEA include
phone numbers, time and duration of calls, and the location from which
the call was made.66 Thus, like the NSA's bulk telephone metadata pro-
gram, the Hemisphere program is a traditional, targeting-based surveil-
lance technique.
B. Predictive Surveillance Begins Without Any Targeting or Particular-
ized Suspicion
Under the predictive surveillance model, instead of targeting partic-
ular suspects, the government would instead analyze data to find patterns
that correlate with past terrorist activity. Then, based on those patterns,
the government could use traditional targeted surveillance to investigate
similar patterns in the emerging data. Although there is no indication that
the NSA has plans to use predictive surveillance in antiterrorism investi-
57. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 56.
58. Id.
59. The program is likely less publicized because the government does not engage in the
initial step of bulk collection of everyone's telephone metadata. Instead, it leaves the metadata in the
hands of AT&T and queries the data as needed. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use




63. Mike Levine, DEA Program Puts Phone Company Inside Government Offices, ABC




66. Shane & Moynihan, supra note 59.
504 [Vol. 92:3
WHEN TARGETING BECOMES SECONDARY
gations, both federal and local government agencies have used predictive
analytics in other contexts.
1. Government Has Used Predictive Analytics for Crime Preven-
tion, Regulatory Enforcement, and Fraud Detection
Police departments have turned to predictive analytics to target their
resources at specific areas at high risk for crime. For example, in Mem-
phis, police operate a program called Blue CRUSH (an acronym for
Crime Reduction Utilizing Statistical History). The program "provides
police officers with relatively precise areas of interest in terms of locality
(a few blocks) and time (a few hours during a particular day of the
week)."68 This allows the police to better target their limited resources.69
Police departments in Los Angeles, Chicago, Santa Cruz, and Vineland,
New Jersey, have used similar techniques to predict crime location.70
Police in Richmond, Virginia use predictive analytics to correlate crime
with variables like payday for large employers and the dates of large
sporting events and concerts.
New York City recently used predictive analytics to make efficient
use of city inspectional services investigators faced with an avalanche of
72
complaints about illegal apartment conversions.72 These illegal conver-
sions involve dividing apartments into many smaller units and often
cause unsafe conditions such as fire hazards. Predictive analytics
helped the city triage the overwhelming number of complaints and focus
on the ones that posed the most risk. Previously, only 13% of inspections
had found conditions severe enough to merit a vacate order.74 After using
the predictive analytics, that rate rose to 70%.7
The government also uses predictive analytics to identify likely in-
stances of fraud. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, ana-
lyzes its data to rank tax returns for audits based on the likelihood of tax
76evasion. Its system enabled the IRS to find "25 times more tax evasion,
without increasing the number of investigations." The Department of
Defense Finance and Accounting Service used data analysis to detect
67. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 158.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. SIEGEL, supra note 18, at 51.
71. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 158.
72. Id. at 186.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 188.
75. Id.
76. SIEGEL, supra note 18, at tbl.5.
77. Id.; Government: Our Work, ELDER RESEARCH, INC.,
http://datamininglab.com/solutions/industries/govemment (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) ("ERI data
miners built predictive models for a large government revenue agency to find tax refund fraud which
led to a 25-fold increase in the hit rate of fraud found per analyst hour. Based on these highly suc-
cessful results, the predictive models built by ERI were deployed ahead of schedule to all 10 fraud-
detection centers.").
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97% of known fraud cases. And the United States Postal Service uses
data analysis to rank instances of suspected contract fraud in order to
direct its internal investigations.
Similarly, a private firm called Xoom detected a criminal group's
credit card fraud scheme by analyzing all international money transfer
data.80 The firm "noticed a slightly higher than average number of Dis-
cover Card transactions originating from New Jersey. 'It saw a pattern
where there shouldn't have been a pattern."'8 ' The firm detected this
pattern by analyzing all of the data; mere sampling may have missed the
pattern.82
2. Predictive Analytics Have Successfully Predicted Terrorist and
Insurgent Activity
A leader in the predictive analytics field is the Laboratory for Com-
putational Cultural Dynamics (LCCD), part of the University of Mary-
land's Institute for Advanced Computer Studies.83 The LCCD developed
a model to predict the successors of captured terrorist leaders. The sys-
tem is called Shaping Terrorist Organisation Network Efficacy
(STONE).84 The system relies on data about individual terrorists and
connections between terrorists. The individual terrorist data include their
rank, role, and expertise at planning or executing attacks. The connec-
tions include attending the same school or training camp, involvement in
the same attack, or attending the same meeting.s Developers tested the
system on leaders removed from several terrorist groups, including al-
Qaida. The STONE system usually returned three or four possible re-
placements, and in 80% of the cases, the replacement was one of
86
STONE's suggestions.
The LCCD also created a model that can predict future attacks by a
particular terrorist group. "The analytic technologies that the University
of Maryland team applied to terrorism are similar to data mining analyt-
ics commonly used by Amazon and big box retailers to predict customer
78. SIEGEL, supra note 18, at tbl.5.
79. Id.
80. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 27-28.
81. Id. (quoting John Kunze, CEO of Xoom).
82. Id.
83. Welcome to the LCCD, LAB. FOR COMPUTATIONAL CULTURAL DYNAMICS,
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/research/LCCD/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
84. V.S. Subrahmanian, Introducing the Software That Can Predict New Leaders of Terror
Groups, THE OBSERVER (London), Sept. 15, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/I 5/al-qaida-terrorist-leader.
85. Id; see also Mark Rockwell, Who's the Next Head of Hezbollah? New Platform Has
Some Predictions, FCW (Aug. 27, 2013), http://fcw.com/artices/2013/08/27/stone-predictive-
analytics.aspx.
86. Subrahmanian, supra note 84; see also Rockwell, supra note 85.
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activity." 87 The model relies on data on 770 variables from more than 20
years of the group's activities.8 The data come from "a variety of prima-
ry sources including open-source news articles from local magazines and
newspapers, and scholarly publications on terrorism in South Asia."89
LCCD's algorithms found that there was an 88% chance of the terrorist
group LeT attacking local security forces if "between five and 24 LeT
operatives had been arrested and LeT operatives were on trial in either
India or Pakistan."90 The program generated hundreds of similar rules,
including "predictors for terrorist attacks on civilians, professional secu-
rity forces, transportation centers, security installations, and symbolic or
tourist locations."91
Predictive analytics also helped predict improvised explosive device
attacks in Iraq in the early 2000s. While working on the legal team pros-
ecuting Saddam Hussein, attorney Mike Flowers needed to ensure that
witnesses brought into the Green Zone avoided the all too common IED
attacks.92 Based on data from intelligence analysis about field reports and
past IED attacks, Flowers's team predicted the safest routes into the
Green Zone on a given day.93
The programs above involve either information already in the agen-
cy's possession or information available from public sources. Predictive
surveillance programs, in contrast, would first need to engage in large-
scale data collection in order to gather the data to be analyzed. With that
in mind, this Article turns next to how the NSA's existing bulk-data col-
lection programs hint at what true predictive surveillance programs
would look like.
3. The NSA's Bulk Collection Programs Preview the Potential of
Predictive Surveillance
The bulk collection of telephone metadata under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act suggests how the NSA might someday conduct pre-
dictive surveillance. By collecting telephone metadata for all calls origi-
nating in or terminating in the United States, the NSA has created a pro-
94
totypical Big Data dataset in which n=all. To conduct predictive sur-
veillance using this dataset, the NSA's first step would be to identify past
incidents of known terrorist activity. These need not be terrorist attacks;
they could also be instances of entry into the country, recruitment efforts,
87. Neal Ungerleider, A Computer Program That Predicts Terrorist Attacks, FAST COMPANY






92. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 185.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 26.
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meetings of known terrorist cells, or preparations for attacks. The next
step would be to analyze all of the telephone metadata in order to identi-
fy patterns that correlate with past foreign terrorist activity. If such pat-
terns emerged, the NSA could then search emerging data for similar pat-
terns. Only after finding a significant pattern in the emerging data would
the government move to targeted surveillance, most likely by tasking the
FBI to investigate potential targets whose telephone metadata formed
part of the emerging pattern.
Another NSA program, code named Co-Traveler, hints at how the
NSA could engage in predictive surveillance-although for now, this
program remains a traditional, targeting-based program. The NSA col-
lects billions of cellular phone location records per day by tapping into
the telephone links of major telecommunications providers, including
some providers in the United States.95 The NSA then uses sophisticated
analytics to find "co-travelers-unknown associates who might be travel-
ing with or meeting up with a known target."96
To find these co-travelers, the NSA uses a suite of tools called "Co-
Traveler Analytics."97 For example, one tool "examines movements on a
global scale in order to identify new suspects who might have
shared ... similar movements with a person of interest, such as passing
through the same location within a l hour window."98 Another tool uses
the "average travel velocity between pairs of travelers in order to deter-
mine whether it would be practically possible for the travelers to have
traveled together."99 Still another searches for "when targets might have
been seen in the same city as the target over a given time frame."'a
One technique in particular signals the potential of predictive sur-
veillance. The "DSD Co-Travel Analytic" analyzes location information
"to predict potential points of intersection-projecting into the future all
the individuals that may 'cross paths' with a given target. Plans are also
underway to identify targets based on suspicious behaviors such as iden-
95. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide,
Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/
04/5492873a-5cf2-l1 le3-bc56-c6ca94801 facstory.html.
96. How the NSA Is Tracking People Right Now, WASH. POST,
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/how-the-nsa-is-tracking-people-right-now/634/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2015). For a video illustrating how the NSA identifies unknown associates traveling
with the target, see Osman Malik, How the NSA Uses Cellphone Tracking to Find and 'Develop'
Targets, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/national/
2013/12/04/d9114d52-5dlf-I le3-95c2-13623eb2b0el video.html.
97. Ashkan Soltani & Barton Gellman, New Documents Show How the NSA Infers Relation-
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tifying mobiles that are turned off right before two people meet."'0 1 This
planned method is an example of a surveillance technique that is not
premised on targeting a specific individual. Instead, the analysis identi-
fies a behavioral pattern that the NSA believes may be associated with
wrongdoing and then searches the data for that pattern.
With the rise of today's surveillance society,102 the government has
vast datasets at its disposal for predictive surveillance. First, government
could collect the vast troves of data that we have shared with third par-
ties, such as GPS location from our phones and cars,'0 3 the content of our
telephone calls and emails,'0 metadata about our telephone calls and
Internet communications, 105 and mobile app activity 06 from telecommu-
nications and ISPs. Second, government could collect raw data itself by,
for example, imaging our license plates or our faces, whether from fixed
video cameras, moving police cars, or airborne drones. The groundwork
for this type of data collection already exists. Police departments across
the country have already deployed automatic license plate reading sys-
tems, and California has become the first state to adopt digital license
plates.0 7 The city of Boston recently tested "situational awareness" soft-
ware that used existing security cameras to monitor the crowds at an out-
door music festival.'0 8 Situational awareness software can monitor for
101. Id. For the NSA White Paper describing the entire suite of Co-Traveler Analytics, see
NAT'L SEC. ADMIN., SUMMARY OF DNR AND DNI CO-TRAVEL ANALYTICS (2012), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/888734/cotraveler-tracking-
redacted.pdf.
102. Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65
S.C. L. REV. 373, 390-91 (2013).
103. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, You ARE BEING TRACKED: How LICENSE PLATE READERS
ARE BEING USED TO RECORD AMERICANS' MOVEMENTS 7-11 (2013), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf (reporting on governmental
and private industry use of license plate readers); Ellen Nakashima, NSA Had Test Project to Collect
Data on Cellphone Locations, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2013, at A15 (reporting testimony by General
Keith Alexander, NSA Director, about 2010 NSA test project gathering "'samples' of cellphone
location data 'to test the ability of its systems to handle the data format, but that data was not used
for any other purpose"').
104. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 37, 40 (describing how
President Bush unilaterally authorized the NSA to collect content of international telephone calls and
emails); PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 1,
at 133-34 (describing how President Bush unilaterally authorized the NSA to conduct surveillance
on telephone and email communications of people inside the United States).
105. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 12, at 8, 37-46 (describing the
bulk telephone metadata collection program, first pursuant to Presidential authorizations, and then
pursuant to orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).
106. James Glanz et al., Spy Agencies Tap Data Streaming from Phone Apps, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2014, at Al.
107. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 103, at 12-15 (reporting on the proliferation of
governmental and private industry use of license plate readers to collect and store hundreds of mil-
lions of datapoints that include location information about Americans' vehicles); Jessica Renee
Napier, California to Pilot Electronic License Plates, GOV'T TECH.,
http://www.govtech.com/transportation/Califomia-to-Pilot-Electronic-License-Plates.html (Oct. 9,
2013) (describing legislative approval for DMV to implement electronic license plate pilot program).
108. Nestor Ramos, City Used High-Tech Tracking Software; $650,000 Spent at '13 Hub
Event, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2014, at B1, 13 (internal quotations omitted). The program was a pilot
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relatively innocuous occurrences like unattended packages and illegally
parked vehicles, or engage in facial recognition and track people as they
move through crowds. City officials indicated the pilot project involved
only the former category.1 09
Predictive surveillance promises substantial benefits but poses sub-
stantial risks to privacy. The next Part explains why existing surveillance
regulations are not calibrated to regulate predictive surveillance.
III. THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK'S INABILITY TO
REGULATE PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE
A. The Existing Regulatory Framework Presumes That Surveillance Be-
gins with Targeting
Existing surveillance laws do not address predictive surveillance.
Like the proverbial generals prepared to fight the last war, the existing
system of surveillance regulation presumes that the government is target-
ing a specific suspect.
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence begins by
evaluating the target's expectation of privacy.1 o If the target enjoys no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information at issue, then the
Fourth Amendment does not apply.' This inquiry, of course, requires
that the government select a specific target. Similarly, the Fourth
Amendment requires that a warrant issue only upon probable cause to
believe the target is involved in criminal activity or that the search will
reveal evidence of criminal activity.1 12 Even in the domestic context, the
Fourth Amendment still requires a showing of probable cause, although
that standard may be less restrictive than in the law enforcement con-
text.11 3
Like the constitutional framework, the statutes regulating surveil-
lance also presume that government's first step is to choose a target. For
example, to conduct electronic surveillance under FISA, the government
must show that "the target . .. is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power."1 4 Although FISA requires a lower showing to obtain business
records, that showing is still target specific. The government must
demonstrate "reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things
sought are relevant to an authorized investigation[,] . . . to obtain foreign
project in which IBM demonstrated surveillance software that the city was considering purchasing.
Id. The city did not disclose the project's existence; the project only came to light when an IBM
employee uploaded data about the project to a public server. Id.
109. Id.
110. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Ill. Id.
112. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979).
113. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972).
114. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012).
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intelligence information[,] . . . or to protect against international terror-
ism."ll 5
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act also requires an as-
sessment of the government's targeting decision. To intercept wire or
electronic communications, law enforcement must show probable cause
to believe that the target has committed or will commit a specified of-
fense.116 To compel an ISP to produce subscriber information, the gov-
ernment must produce "specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other infor-
mation sought . .. are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation."'17
This targeting-based approach to surveillance regulation cannot
adapt to a predictive surveillance model in which the first step is to ana-
lyze all the data for patterns that could yield individualized suspicion.
The next Part explains why the government should not attempt to fit the
square peg of predictive surveillance into the round hole of targeting-
based surveillance regulation.
B. The Perils of Shoehorning Predictive Surveillance into the Tradition-
al Regulatory Framework
1. The Risk of Rejection Without Regard for the Potential Value of
Predictive Surveillance
There are three reasons why the government should not force pre-
dictive surveillance into the traditional regulatory framework. First, a
literal application of targeting-based regulation to predictive surveillance
might result in its summary rejection, regardless of the benefits that pre-
dictive surveillance might provide. Imagine, for example, that the NSA's
bulk telephone metadata collection program were designed differently;
that it collected all telephone metadata and then analyzed that data to find
patterns associated with past terrorist activity. If successful, such a pro-
gram could provide a valuable tool in attempts to thwart future terrorist
attacks. However, a literal application of Section 215 of the Patriot Act
could foreclose such a tool entirely.
Under Section 215, the government may not obtain business rec-
ords under FISA without showing "reasonable grounds to believe that the
tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelli-
115. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2012).
117. Id. § 2703(d).
118. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
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gence activities."1 l9 If the government sought an order for all telephone
metadata records to facilitate predictive surveillance, the court could
reasonably hold that every citizen's records could not possibly be rele-
vant to an authorized investigation. Instead, the court could reason that,
until the government has a specific target in mind, there cannot be any
authorized investigation. Similarly, the court could reason that, if every
record of every telephone call were deemed relevant, then the term rele-
vant would be stretched beyond recognition. And finally, the court could
reason that Congress intended the relevance provision to limit Sec-
tion 215 orders to instances of particularized suspicion for an ongoing
investigation and did not intend the term to authorize a fishing expedi-
tion.120
2. The Risk of Authorizing a Highly Intrusive Surveillance Pro-
gram Without Adequate Safeguards
On the other hand, if the government successfully shoehorned pre-
dictive surveillance into the existing regulatory scheme, it could put pri-
vacy at substantial risk. The traditional regulatory scheme lacks the nec-
essary safeguards to guard against the unique risks of predictive surveil-
lance. The Section 215 bulk metadata collection program offers an excel-
lent illustration of how this risk could arise.
For many years, the only court to consider whether Section 215 au-
thorizes bulk collection was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
which upheld bulk collection under Section 215.12 As a result, the NSA
now has a five-year database of American citizens' telephone records.122
Yet the available evidence suggests that Congress never intended Sec-
tion 215 to authorize such vast data collection. Instead, according to Rep-
resentative James Sensenbrenner, a former Republican House member
119. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
120. These arguments were advanced by the ACLU and by former Representative, and USA
PATRIOT Act drafter, James Sensenbrenner, in ACLU v. Clapper. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 9-15, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP)); Brief Amicus
Curiae of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. in Support of Plaintiffs at 4-6, Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP)). The court in Clapper, however, rejected these arguments
and held that the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection met the "relevant to an authorized
investigation" standard. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 746-49. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court reached a similar decision. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6-7 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29,
2013).
121. See In re Application of FBI, 2013 WL 5741573, at *9-10. In the wake of the Snowden
disclosures, the Southern District of New York reached the same conclusion as the FISC and held
that the bulk telephone metadata collection met Section 215's "relevant to an authorized investiga-
tion" standard. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 746-49 (dismissing plaintiffs' complaint). The Second
Circuit, however, vacated the District Court's order and held that Section 215 does not authorize
bulk collection of telephone metadata. Clapper, 787 F.3d at 821 (holding that bulk metadata collec-
tion program violated Section 215's requirement hat the tangible items collected be "relevant" to an
"authorized investigation").
122. Shane, supra note 43.
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and the drafter of the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress intended to prevent
the government from using Section 215 to engage in bulk collection.123
For example, when Congress reauthorized Section 215 in 2006, five
years after its enactment in 2001, Congress limited its scope.24 In 2001,
Section 215 had only required that the records at issue be "sought for an
[authorized] investigation."'25 In 2006, Congress attempted to resolve
any uncertainty by amending Section 215 to require that the records be
"relevant to an authorized investigation." 26 In addition, the 2006 revi-
sions added three illustrations of records that are presumptively relevant
to an authorized investigation: records that pertain to
(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the
subject of such authorized investigation; or
(iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a
foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investiga-
tion.127
None of these examples are consistent with the notion that every Ameri-
can's telephone records are "relevant" to an ongoing investigation.
Because Congress did not intend bulk collection under Section 215,
the law lacks the institutional safeguards necessary to protect such a sen-
sitive dataset. First, given the unprecedented scope of the telephone rec-
ords database, the executive branch should not be in charge of develop-
ing its own minimization procedures. Yet under Section 215, with regard
to any nonpublic information obtained about a U.S. person, the Attorney
General is responsible for drafting the minimization procedures that will,
presumably, prevent abuse and misuse by the executive.128 And nothing
prevents the Attorney General from scaling back the minimization pro-
cedures over time. Section 215 required that the Attorney General prom-
ulgate a general set of minimization procedures by 2006 but did not pre-
vent the Attorney General from modifying those procedures from time to
-129
time.
Second, there is no meaningful review of the Attorney General's
minimization procedures. The only entity in a position to examine the
123. Brief Amicus Curiae of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., supra note 120, at 2-4.
124. Compare USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, § 106, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)), with
H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt. 1, at 61 (2001).
125. H.R. REP. No. 107-236, at 9. Representative Sensenbrenner stated in a committee report
that this meant the records had to be "relevant" to an ongoing foreign intelligence investigation. Id.
at 61.
126. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act § 106.
127. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012).
128. Section 215 requires the Attorney General to adopt procedures that "minimize the reten-
tion, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting
United States persons consistent with the [Government's] need . .. to obtain, produce, and dissemi-
nate foreign intelligence information." Id. § 1861 (g)(2)(A).
129. See id. § 1861(g)(1).
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minimization procedures is the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. However, the FISC's assessment of the minimization procedures
is merely pro forma. Section 215 does not require the FISC to review the
substance of those minimization procedures.1 30 Instead, before issuing a
Section 215 order, the FISC need only ensure that the FBI's application
"enumerat[es]" the relevant minimization procedures.131 The only FISC
opinion that has suggested that the FISC can review the minimization
procedures for statutory compliance was Judge Eagan's decision, pre-
pared and released publicly in the aftermath of the Snowden revela-
tions.132 In a pre-Snowden opinion, the FISC merely noted that the min-
imization procedures existed and were similar to procedures authorized
in earlier Section 215 orders.1 33 And in the earliest publicly disclosed
Section 215 order, the FISC did not evaluate the minimization proce-
dures at all; it simply noted their existence.1 34
Third, Section 215 immunizes bulk collection from meaningful re-
view because the only entities that can challenge the bulk collection are
the parties receiving the collection orders: the telecommunications com-
panies.135 The hundreds of millions of Americans whose records are col-
lected and potentially queried cannot dispute the collection order under
the statute.136 To date, no telecommunications company has challenged a
Section 215 order.137 Nor are such challenges in the telecommunications
companies' best interest, given that they compete for substantial gov-
ernment contracts.1 38 And even if a telecommunications company chal-
130. See id. § 1861(b)(2)(B), (c)(1).
131. Id. In the unlikely event of an appeal from a Section 215 production order, even the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review would merely assess whether the order met the
requirements of Section 215, rather than assessing whether the minimization requirements satisfied
the statutory mandate. Id. § 1861 (f)(2)(B).
132. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (stating that FISA
court "may not authorize the production [under Section 215] if the minimization procedures are
insufficient").
133. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 09-13, 2009 WL 9150914, at *1 (FISA Ct. Sept. 3, 2009) (noting that the gov-
emnment's application enumerated the minimization procedures, and the procedures were "similar to
the minimization procedures approved and adopted as binding" in an earlier Section 215 authoriza-
tion).
134. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486, at *2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 18, 2006) (ordering that use of
the bulk telephone metadata "shall occur solely according to the procedures described in the applica-
tion").
135. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f).
136. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[S]ection 215 does not
provide for any person other than a recipient of an order to challenge the orders' legality or other-
wise participate in the process.").
137. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *5 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
138. Telecommunications companies certainly have cause for concern. When Quest Communi-
cations refused the Bush Administration's request to voluntarily participate in a warrantless tele-
phone surveillance program in early 2001, the government reportedly cancelled a lucrative NSA
contract in retaliation. Ellen Nakashima & Dan Eggen, Former CEO Says U.S. Punished Phone
Firm, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2007, at AOl.
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lenged a collection order, that challenge would be conducted secretly,
under seal.139 Even the existence of the collection order is secret; recipi-
ents of collection orders are prohibited from disclosing that they have
received an order.140
Fourth, Section 215 did not require sufficient disclosure to Congress
to facilitate meaningful congressional oversight. Section 215 merely re-
quires annual reporting to the House and Senate Select Committees on
Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary Committee of (1) the number of
production orders requested, (2) the number of production orders grant-
ed, modified, or denied, and (3) the number of production orders granted,
modified, or denied, that related to library records, firearms sales, tax
returns, educational records, and medical records containing personally
identifying information.141 Section 215 also requires annual reports to
Congress as a whole of the total number of production orders requested,
granted, modified, and denied.142 But neither of these reports requires
disclosure of the massive volume of information to be collected. Just a
few production requests could yield phone records concerning hundreds
of millions of Americans.
Representative Sensenbrenner's Amicus Brief in ACLU v. Clap-
perl43 explained why these minimal reporting obligations failed to ap-
prise Congress of the scope of the bulk collection program under Sec-
tion 215. Throughout the entire program, the only report that even hinted
at the massive nature of the program was a five-page report made availa-
ble to members of Congress to read in a secure location in 2009 and
2011.'" That report was merely a summary and did not disclose any of
the FISC orders.145 "Moreover, the report was not made available to
House Members in 201 1.",146 The one sentence hinting at the scope of
collection read as follows: "The orders generally require production of
the business records (as described above) relating to substantially all of
the telephone calls handled by the companies, including both calls made
between the United States and a foreign country and calls made entirely
within the United States."47
139. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(5).
140. Id. § 1861(d). The only exceptions to this gag order are for disclosures necessary to com-
ply with the order, disclosures to an attorney to obtain legal advice concerning the order, and disclo-
sures specifically permitted by the FBI. Id.
141. Id. § 1862(b).
142. Id § 1862(c).
143. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
144. Brief Amicus Curiae of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, J . in Support of Plaintiffs,
supra note 120, at 9.
145. Id.
146. Id
147. Id. at 9 n.3 (quoting the defendant's motion to dismiss) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In sum, by forcing a mass-collection program into the traditional
model of surveillance regulation, the executive branch left the people
inadequately protected.
3. The Risk of Authorizing a Highly Intrusive Surveillance Scheme
with No Political Mandate
A third reason not to shoehorn predictive surveillance techniques in-
to existing legislative schemes is the absence of political support. Again,
the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection helps illustrate this
risk. Snowden's revelation of the Section 215 program generated sub-
stantial public outcry.148 That outcry stemmed partly from the secret na-
ture of the Section 215 program and the other programs that Snowden
disclosed.
This Article does not advocate that Congress enact he regulatory
scheme described below. Instead, the Article explores whether such a
scheme could be constitutional and how such a scheme should be con-
structed. But part of the value of enacting legislation targeted at this new
form of surveillance would flow from the public debate that would take
place. Congress would ensure that the public had the opportunity to voice
its approval, or disapproval, in light of the proposed security benefits.
Today, in the wake of the surprising Snowden disclosures, public support
for authorizing predictive surveillance programs seems highly unlikely.
But developments in both technology and security may change public
perception over time.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE IN
ANTITERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS
A new regulatory framework is necessary to accommodate the
unique needs and risks associated with predictive surveillance. This
framework should recognize that there are multiple stages to Big Data
analysis. A framework to regulate predictive surveillance must recognize
the analytical distinctions between collecting the data, building a predic-
tive model, and using that model to target an investigation. At the same
time, the framework must also recognize and guard against the very real
risks posed by predictive surveillance.
148. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, OBAMA'S NSA SPEECH HAS LITTLE IMPACT ON
SKEPTICAL PUBLIC 1 (2014), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/1-20-
14%20NSA%2ORelease.pdf (reporting Pew Research Center/USA Today poll finding that 53% of
Americans oppose the NSA's bulk telephone and Internet metadata collection programs, while only
40% support them); Adam Gabbatt, Protestors Rally for 'The Day We Fight Back' Against Mass
Surveillance, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2014 1:12 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/ll/day-fight-back-protest-nsa-mass-surveillance (dis-
cussing international protest of mass surveillance programs that involved tens of thousands of calls
and emails to Congress, physical protests planned in fifteen countries, and participation by leading
technology companies such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft).
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A. Deciding Whether the Initial Data Collection Constitutes a Fourth
Amendment Search
1. Data Collected from Third Parties
The NSA could use predictive analytics on data that the government
collects from third parties or on data that the government collects on its
own. 149 For data collected from third parties, the Fourth Amendment may
not apply at all. Currently, under the third-party doctrine, one cannot
expect privacy in information shared with third parties, "even if the in-
formation is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed."',5 0 For example, in Smith v. Maryland,'5 ' police suspected
Smith of robbery and of placing obscene and harassing phone calls to the
robbery victim. 152 The police asked the telephone company to install a
pen register'5 at the company's central offices to record the numbers
dialed from the phone in Smith's home.154 The pen register revealed a
call to the victim's home, and police subsequently obtained a warrant to
search Smith's home.15 5 At trial, Smith moved to suppress all evidence
obtained and derived from the pen register.'56 The trial court denied the
motion and convicted Smith after a bench trial.15 7
The Supreme Court held that Smith had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the numbers that he dialed.'58 The Court reasoned that "[a]ll
telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the
telephone company" when they make a call and that the phone company
records the numbers dialed and uses them for a variety of reasons.5 9
Smith, therefore, "assumed the risk" that the telephone company would
reveal to the police the numbers that he dialed.160
Several courts have considered whether the third-party doctrine ap-
plies to the NSA's bulk collection of telephone metadata from the tele-
149. See supra Part II.B.3.
150. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 752 (1971); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)).
151. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
152. Id. at 737.
153. Id. at 735. The Court noted that "[a] pen register is a mechanical device that records the
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls
are actually completed." Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161
n. 1(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at 737.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 737-38.
158. Id. at 743 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)).
159. Id. at 742.
160. Id. at 745.
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communications companies. In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Leon held
that the third-party doctrine did not apply and that the plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits.16 2 Judge Leon
distinguished Smith v. Maryland because circumstances had changed
since 1979.163 Judge Leon reasoned that "the evolutions in the Govern-
ment's surveillance capabilities, citizens' phone habits, and the relation-
ship between the NSA and telecom companies" justified distinguishing
Smith.16
Judge Leon relied in part on the massive aggregation of data that the
bulk collection program involved.16 5 He drew a parallel to United States
v. Jones,166 where five Justices emphasized the significance of aggregat-
ing GPS data about a target.167 Prior to Jones, the Court had held in Unit-
ed States v. Knotts'68 that tracking the defendant's car on a public high-
way did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no expec-
tation of privacy in one's travels on public roads.169 In Jones, however,
the Court reached the opposite result. 170 Five Justices reasoned that law
enforcement conducted a Fourth Amendment search by using a GPS
tracking device to track the defendant's vehicle twenty-four hours a day
for a month.171 These five Justices relied on the aggregation of data over
a month to find that the tracking violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 172
Judge Leon applied the same aggregation idea to distinguish Klay-
man from Smith v. Maryland. The pen register in Smith only tracked a
single defendant's telephone metadata for a day.173 But the Section 215
bulk collection program built a comprehensive, five-year ecord of
Americans' phone calls.174 For Judge Leon, this was a difference not
merely in degree, but in kind. 175
161. 957 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2013), vacated on other grounds, 800 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (reversing preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate likelihood of
success on standing issue).
162. Id. at 37, 41.
163. Id. at 31-37.
164. Id. at 31.
165. Id. at 32.
166. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
167. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Kagan, JJ.)).
168. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
169. Id. at 281.
170. See 132 S. Ct. at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 958, 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that people do not "reasonably expect that
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascer-
tain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on"); id at 964
(Alito, J., concurring) (stating that society does not expect law enforcement to "secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a very long period").
173. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
174. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
175. Id. at 32-37.
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On the other hand, the Southern District of New York and the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court have held that the third-party doc-
trine shields the bulk metadata collection program from Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny.17 6 In ACLU v. Clapper, Judge Pauley of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held that the bulk metadata collection program was
analogous to the pen register upheld in Smith v. Maryland, which applied
the third-party doctrine to telephone numbers that the defendant dialed.77
Judge Pauley rejected the idea that building a massive database of every
American's telephone records for the past five years changed the analy-
sis: "The collection of breathtaking amounts of information unprotected
by the Fourth Amendment does not transform that sweep into a Fourth
Amendment search."78 Judge Pauley also rejected the ACLU's argument
that the database gave the government a "rich mosaic" of each person's
life.1 79 Judge Pauley reasoned that merely collecting the numbers did not
paint that mosaic because the government cannot query the database
without tying that query to an approved target. so Moreover, the results of
the query simply tell the government who has had telephone calls with
the target-but not who uses those telephone numbers.'8 ' The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court engaged in a very similar analysis of the
issue when it approved a production order under the Section 215 bulk
telephone metadata collection program.182
This Article proposes that the third-party doctrine should not apply
to the type of mass collection necessary for predictive analytics. As I
have argued elsewhere, the third-party doctrine is flawed because it rep-
resents an "all or nothing" approach to privacy that ignores reality in
several significant ways.183 First, the third-party doctrine fails to distin-
guish third parties as ends from third parties as means.184 In the case that
176. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d 787
(2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Section 215 did not authorize bulk collection); In re Application of the
FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013
WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
177. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749-50, 752.
178. Id. at 752. This sentiment, however, ignores the approach of five Justices in United States
v. Jones. For those Justices, short-term tracking of one's public movements did not trigger the Fourth
Amendment, but long-term tracking of those same movements did. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957-58, 964
(Alito, J., concurring joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring) (agreeing with Justice Alito that long-term GPS tracking violates the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable expectation of privacy).
179. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 750-53.
180. Id. at 750-52.
181. Id. at 751.
182. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). The circuit
courts may never reach the Fourth Amendment issue because Section 215 sunset on June 1, 2015,
and was replaced by the USA FREEDOM Act, which prohibits bulk collection and takes effect on
November 28, 2015. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268; In re Applica-
tion ofthe FBI, Bankr. No. 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562, at *4-5 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015).
183. Spencer, supra note 102, at 401.
184. Id. at 401-02.
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first gave rise to the third-party doctrine, United States v. Miller, 1 the
Court relied on its earlier "misplaced trust" cases.186 Under those cases,
the Court warned that people who share information with acquaintances
take risk that those acquaintances may abuse their trust and tell others,
including the police.'87 But by extending that logic to the telephone num-
bers dialed in Smith v. Maryland,8 8 the Court ignored the difference be-
tween ends and means. In the misplaced trust cases, the communication
to an untrustworthy acquaintance is both end and means. But the tele-
phone company's record of the numbers that I dialed are merely the
means to a different end-the communication with an acquaintance.189
Second, the third-party doctrine ignores what I have called the "an-
ti-aggregation norm."1 90 This visceral, societal fear of pervasive surveil-
lance is a common theme in both literature and legal commentary.191 And
it figured prominently in the concurring opinions that rejected long-term,
warrantless GPS tracking in United States v. Jones. Justice Alito rea-
soned that people simply do not expect that the government can "secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a
very long period." 92 And Justice Sotomayor reasoned that people should
not have to "expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregat-
ed in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on." 9 3
The anti-aggregation norm also lies at the heart of Riley v. Califor-
nia, 194 where the Court rejected law enforcement's attempt to subject cell
phone data to the search incident to arrest doctrine.195 Under that doc-
trine, when law enforcement officers arrest a suspect, they may search
personal property on the arrestee's person or within his immediate con-
trol without a warrant.196 This exception to the probable cause require-
ment exists for two reasons: (1) to protect the arresting officers from
185. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
186. Id. at 443-44 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)).
187. White, 401 U.S. at 751-52; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438.
188. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-46 (1979).
189. See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 861-63 (Mass. 2014) (refusing to apply
the third-party doctrine to cell site location information because individuals do not intend to volun-
tarily transmit their location to the cell service provider when making a call and location information
bears no relation to the communicative purpose of the call).
190. Spencer, supra note 102, at 402-03 (discussing privacy themes in George Orwell's Nine-
teen Eighty-Four and Franz Kafka's The Trial).
191. Id.
192. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); accord Augustine, 4 N.E.3d at 862-63 (declining to
apply the third-party doctrine to cell site location data obtained from a cell phone provider and
reasoning that "even CSLI limited to the cell site locations of telephone calls made and received may
yield a treasure trove of very detailed and extensive information about the individual's 'comings and
goings' in both public and private places").
194. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
195. Id. at 2485.
196. Id. at 2482-84.
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harm, and (2) to prevent the destruction of evidence.'97 The Court distin-
guished cell phones for several reasons. First, the Court reasoned that
searching a cell phone would not serve the doctrine's purposes, because a
cell phone neither threatens officer safety nor triggers a need to preserve
evidence.'9 8 Second, the Court reasoned that the vast aggregation of data
found within a cell phone rendered a cell phone search far more intrusive
than a physical search of objects on one's person.'99 As the Court ex-
plained:
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only
contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in
the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never
found in a home in any form-unless the phone is.
200
Finally, the third-party doctrine rests on a flawed assumption that
the third-party disclosure constitutes consent for further use of the infor-
mation disclosed.20' In United States v. Miller, the Court relied on the
notion that bank and telephone customers voluntarily assume the risk that
third parties will disclose their information.202 If this reasoning ever justi-
fied an all-encompassing third-party doctrine, it does not hold true today.
First, consumers do not have a meaningful choice about whether to use
services that involve exchanging data with third parties.203 And second,
even if consumers had a choice, they would lack the information needed
204
to exercise that choice.
Given the risks posed by mass-surveillance programs, Judge Leon's
approach would offer much-needed privacy protection. As described
below, if predictive surveillance programs are subject to Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny, they would likely survive if used for antiterrorism purpos-
205
es, but not if used for ordinary law enforcement purposes.
2. Data Collected in Public Spaces
For information that the government collects on its own, such as
video of license plates or people's faces in public spaces, there is no
third-party doctrine issue. Instead, the initial question would be whether
people enjoy any reasonable expectation of privacy in information ex-
posed to the public. On this issue, the Supreme Court's decision in Unit-
ed States v. Jones would again be instructive.
197. Id. at 2483-84.
198. Id at 2485-87.
199. Id at 2488-91.
200. Id. at 2491.
201. Spencer, supra note 98, at 404-05.
202. 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
203. Spencer, supra note 98, at 404-05.
204. Id at 405-06.
205. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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Proponents of predictive surveillance could rely on the proposition,
tracing back to Katz v. United States,206 that people enjoy no expectation
of privacy in information that they knowingly expose to public view.207
Based on Katz and subsequent cases, these proponents could argue that
one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's license plate or
face, at least when exposed to public view. Opponents of predictive sur-
veillance, however, could emphasize the massive aggregation of data that
such programs require. In United States v. Jones, the thirty-day aggrega-
tion of location data about a single individual was enough to overcome
the general rule that one lacks an expectation of privacy in public spac-
es.208 But the aggregation in Jones would pale in comparison to the mas-
sive aggregation necessary for predictive surveillance. For example, the
Section 215 program collected and stored five years of metadata on
American telephone users' calls.209 Similarly, a national network of au-
tomatic license plate readers could create a catalog of where every car in
the country traveled for as long as the program operated.210 Gathering
these searchable dossiers of location data on all drivers would likely be
enough to trigger a Fourth Amendment search.
As discussed in the next section, finding that the initial data collec-
tion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search does not end the inquiry.
The court must next determine whether the collection of such infor-
mation in an antiterrorism investigation is a reasonable search under the
circumstances.
B. Applying the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Requirement in
Antiterrorism Investigations
1. The Keith Case and Domestic Security Investigations
In the law enforcement context, reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment generally requires that officers obtain a warrant supported
by probable cause that the search will reveal evidence of a particular
crime.211 In the context of domestic security and foreign intelligence in-
vestigations, however, the reasonableness requirement is more nuanced.
The Supreme Court discussed how the Fourth Amendment applies
beyond ordinary law enforcement investigations in United States v. Unit-
ed States District Court (the Keith case).2 12 The government investigated
the defendant, Plamondon, in connection with the bombing of a CIA
206. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
207. Id. at 351.
208. 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concur-
ring).
209. Shane, supra note 43.
210. For a discussion of widespread uses of automatic license plate readers, see generally AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 103, at 7-15.
211. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-15 (1984).
212. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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office in Michigan. During the investigation, the government engaged
in warrantless wiretapping of Plamondon's phone.214 Rather than obtain
court approval, "the Attorney General approved the wiretaps 'to gather
intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing
structure of the Government."'215
On the facts before it, the Court held that the government should
have obtained prior judicial approval for the wiretaps, although the Court
did not specify exactly what form that prior approval had to take.2 16 More
broadly, the Court recognized that domestic security investigations in-
volve different interests than law enforcement investigations.217 In do-
mestic security investigations, targets may be more difficult to identify,
investigations may be less precise, and the emphasis is often on prevent-
218
ing harmful acts or preparing for a future crisis.
In light of those differences, the Court reasoned, the Fourth
Amendment may apply more flexibly in domestic security investigations
than in law enforcement investigations.2 19 The procedures must be "rea-
sonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelli-
gence information and the protected rights of our citizens."220 The "ap-
plication and affidavit showing probable cause need not follow the exact
requirements of [the Wiretap Act] but should allege other circumstances
,,221
more appropriate to domestic security cases. Ultimately, the Court
held that the type of domestic surveillance at issue-wiretaps-required
prior judicial approval "in accordance with such reasonable standards as
the Congress may prescribe."222
Although the Court expressed no pinion on "the scope of the Pres-
ident's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign pow-
ers, within or without this country,"223 lower courts have recognized a
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.224 However,
mass-collection programs would largely involve data about ordinary
213. Id. at 299.
214. Id. at 300-01.
215. Id. at 300.
216. Id. at 323-24.
217. Id. at 322.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 322-23.
220. Id
221. Id. at 323.
222. Id. at 323-24.
223. Id. at 308.
224. See, e.g., In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) ("Applying principles derived
from the special needs cases, we conclude that this type of foreign intelligence surveillance possess-
es characteristics that qualify it for such an exception."); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629
F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign
intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would, follow-
ing Keith, 'unduly frustrate' the President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities.").
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Americans in the United States, rather than individuals overseas or
agents of foreign powers. For example, as the FISC itself has observed,
under the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata program, "the vast major-
ity of the call-detail records provided are expected to concern communi-
cations that are (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly
within the United States, including local telephone calls."225 For that rea-
son, predictive surveillance programs cannot credibly fall within the for-
eign intelligence exception.
No court to date has applied the Keith domestic security approach to
bulk data collection, as opposed to targeted surveillance. Although the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court repeatedly issued Section 215
orders, it appears that the FISC simply relied on the argument that the
third-party doctrine removed the metadata from the Fourth Amendment
entirely. For example, Judge Eagan's opinion in the wake of the Snow-
den disclosure considered only third-party doctrine and held that the col-
lection did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.226 Similarly, alt-
hough both Judge Leon and Judge Pauley assessed the constitutionality
of the bulk telephone metadata program, neither of them considered the
22
Keith case's Fourth Amendment framework.227 Judge Pauley did not
reach the question of how to apply the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement because he held that the metadata were subject to the third-
party doctrine.22 8 And after Judge Leon distinguished Smith v. Maryland
and rejected the third-party doctrine as inapplicable to bulk telephone
metadata collection, he did not consider how the Keith case framework
might apply.229 Instead, Judge Leon relied on cases holding that warrant-
less searches could be authorized in cases of special needs beyond ordi-
230
nary law enforcement. Here, although Judge Leon recognized antiter-
rorist investigations as a special need, he reasoned that there was no need
to collect the metadata in bulk.231 It could achieve the same results by
seeking targeted orders from each of the telecommunications provid-
232ers.
2. Suspicionless Searches and Special Needs Cases
Given the dearth of authority, a court reviewing a predictive surveil-
lance program would have to consider how the Court has treated other
225. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 WL 7137486, at *1 n.I (FISA Ct. Aug. 18, 2006).
226. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
227. See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d
787 (2d Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-42 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d
599 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
228. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749-52.
229. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 30-42.
230. Id. at 38-39.
231. Id. at 39-41.
232. Id. at 40-41.
524 [Vol. 92:3
2015] WHEN TARGETING BECOMES SECONDARY 525
suspicionless surveillance practices. Ordinarily, a search is unreasonable
without particularized suspicion.233 The Court, however, has recognized
that "special needs" beyond ordinary law enforcement can justify excep-
tions to the particularized suspicion requirement.234 The Court's suspi-
cionless checkpoint cases offer a useful analogy to predictive surveil-
lance.235
Although the Court rejected suspicionless checkpoints for ordinary
law enforcement purposes,236 the Court approved checkpoints that served
special government interests such as border enforcement and deterring
drunk driving.2 37 For example, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,238 the
Court considered Fourth Amendment challenges to immigration check-
points on highways less than 100 miles from the Mexican border.239 To
determine whether reasonable suspicion was required before conducting
such a routine checkpoint stop, the Court balanced the interests at
stake.240
The Court recognized the significant governmental interest in polic-
ing the nation's borders against illegal immigration and drug traffick-
ing.241 The Court also noted that it was impractical to require reasonable
suspicion for stops on major routes because the speed and volume of
traffic rendered it impractical to give cars particularized study to discern
233. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
234. For example, the Court's drug testing cases involve suspicionless searches based on
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." E.g., Vemonia School Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (uphold-
ing random drug testing of student-athletes); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665-66 (1989) (upholding drug tests for United States Customs Service employees seeking
transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989) (upholding drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or found
to be in violation of particular safety regulations). Administrative searches are another area where
suspicionless searches are permitted, provided that those searches are appropriately limited. See, e.g.,
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-05 (1987) (upholding warrantless administrative inspection
of premises of "closely regulated" business); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534-39
(1967) (upholding administrative inspection to ensure compliance with city housing code). Neither
drug testing nor administrative searches offer a meaningful analogy to pervasive data collection
because they are targeted at a very limited segment of the population.
235. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745-46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (analo-
gizing to Supreme Court's checkpoint cases to find that USA PATRIOT Act's "significant purpose"
amendment o FISA did not violate Fourth Amendment).
236. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-42 (2000).
237. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-65 (1976) (relying on state's interest
in deterring illegal immigration and cross-border drug trafficking to affirm suspicionless highway
checkpoints); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 455 (1990) (relying on state's
significant interest in deterring drunk driving to affirm brief, suspicionless stops at highway sobriety
checkpoints so that police could detect signs of intoxication and remove impaired drivers from the
road); cf Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979) (suggesting in dicta that a generally
applicable roadblock at which police could check all motorists' license and registration would be
supported by a legitimate interest in roadway safety, rather than a general interest in law enforce-
ment).
238. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
239. Id. at 545.
240. Id. at 556.
241. Id. at 556-57.
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whether they were transporting illegal aliens or drugs.242 Thus, a re-
quirement of reasonable suspicion would frustrate the government's in-
terest.2 43
In contrast, the Court found that the checkpoint stops effected a
"quite limited" intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests because the
stops required only a response to a brief question or two and production
244
of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States. There was
no search of the vehicle's interior beyond what could be seen in plain
view.245 The Court distinguished roving-patrol stops as more intrusive
because roving-patrol stops often took place at night on secluded roads
and had the potential to frighten motorists.246 In addition, routine check-
point stops were less disruptive to traffic than roving-patrol stops be-
cause checkpoint locations are known to motorists and checkpoints in-
volve less discretionary enforcement activity and less potential for abu-
sive or harassing stops.247
Collecting bulk data for predictive surveillance in antiterrorism in-
vestigations presents several parallels to the checkpoint searches in Mar-
tinez-Fuerte. First, the government interest in disrupting terrorist attacks
is more compelling than its interest in deterring illegal immigration and
drug trafficking. And requiring particularized suspicion before collecting
bulk data would make predictive surveillance not merely impracticable,
as was the case in Martinez-Fuerte, but impossible because predictive
surveillance requires collecting all of the data first.
In addition, as long as the program contains the stringent safeguards
described below, 24 8 the government could characterize the interference
with Fourth Amendment interests as relatively minimal. Although the
predictive analytics will search for patterns in all of the metadata, the
only individuals whose data would ultimately be investigated would be
those who match a pattern that correlates with past terrorist activity. In
this regard, the initial data collection may be less intrusive on Fourth
Amendment interests than the routine checkpoint stops in Martinez-
Fuerte, where motorists faced suspicionless detention and questioning.2 49
If, however, the program lacked adequate safeguards, there would
be a real risk that it could be used not merely for antiterrorism purposes,
but for general law enforcement purposes. Such an expansion would
distinguish the predictive surveillance program from the suspicionless
checkpoints that the Court has approved in the past. Accordingly, predic-
242. Id.
243. Id. at 557.
244. Id. at 557-58.
245. Id. at 558.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 559.
248. See infra Part V.
249. 428 U.S. at 561-63.
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tive surveillance must be supported by a strict regulatory system, which
is proposed in the next Part.
V. A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE
IN ANTITERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS
The surveillance scandals of 2013 read like a laundry list of the
public's fears about surveillance: secret surveillance programs, govern-
ment employees abusing their access for personal reasons, and massive
250
breaches of security. Surveillance harms have been catalogued in
many different ways, but they fall into two distinct categories. "Data
harms" flow from the data themselves, through such mechanisms as un-
wanted secondary uses, internal abuses, and security breaches.25 1 In con-
trast, "chilling effects" flow from the mere act of surveillance itself.252 If
the government were to pursue predictive surveillance programs aimed at
deterring terrorism, it would have to create a new regulatory scheme that
accounts for not only the general risks of government surveillance, but
also the unique risks posed by predictive surveillance and the massive
databases that it requires.
A. Regulating Bulk Data Collection and the Use ofPredictive Analytics
As discussed above, the traditional surveillance model requires par-
ticularized suspicion about the target before a neutral magistrate can is-
sue a warrant. Such particularized suspicion is impossible in the case of
predictive surveillance since the analytical techniques require collecting
data about everyone, most of whom will have no connection to the ter-
rorist activity at issue.
Nevertheless, in light of the massive databases required for predic-
tive surveillance, prior judicial approval must be required. That judicial
approval cannot be premised on probable cause that the collection will
reveal evidence of a crime253 or that the target is an agent of a foreign
250. See generally Siobhan Gorman, NSA Officers Spy on Love Interests, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
23, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/23/nsa-officers-sometimes-spy-on-love-
interests/; Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveil-
lance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance;
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order.
251. See, e.g., Justin Brookman & G.S. Hans, Why Collection Matters: Surveillance as a De
Facto Privacy Harm, in BIG DATA & PRIVACY: MAKING ENDS MEET II, 1 1-12 (Future of Privacy
Forum & Stanford Law School Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y eds., 2013), available at
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/Big-Data-and-Privacy-Paper-Collection.pdf;
Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843,
878-90 (2002) (discussing how secondary uses and inadequate security threaten to erode privacy).
252. See, e.g., Brookman & Hans, supra note 251, at 12-13.
253. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion) (describing probable
cause standard).
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power.25 4 Instead, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should not
authorize bulk collection without (1) specific enumeration of the prior
terrorist activities that will be used to find patterns in the data, and (2)
expert testimony establishing a statically valid methodology to search for
those patterns. In addition, the FISC order should prohibit the govern-
ment from conducting any analysis beyond what the FISC explicitly ap-
proved and should prohibit the government from attempting the ap-
proved analysis more than once without FISC approval.
To establish a statistically valid methodology, the government
should be held to the Daubert2 55 standard governing the admissibility of
scientific evidence. That is, the government must persuade the FISC that
the proposed methodology is scientifically valid and can properly be
applied to the data to be collected. To assess scientific validity, the FISC
would consider (1) whether the technique can be tested; (2) whether the
technique has been subjected to peer review and testing; (3) the tech-
nique's known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (5) whether the
technique has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scien-
tific community.2 56 These procedures should be conducted under seal to
the extent necessary to avoid disclosure of information that could harm
efforts at predictive or traditional surveillance of terrorist activity.
Given the successes of predictive analytics in a variety of con-
texts,257 demonstrating a scientifically valid methodology should not
prove onerous.2 58 The purpose of this initial requirement is to prevent the
government from engaging in a fishing expedition.
B. Regulating Subsequent Targeting Based on the Results ofPredictive
Analytics
Once the government has executed its court-approved analysis, it
must report its findings to the FISC-regardless of whether or not the
searches revealed any significant patterns. This follow-up reporting will
ensure that the FISC remains informed as to what techniques do and do
not yield significant results.
If the technique revealed patterns associated with past terrorist ac-
tivity, the government could rely on those patterns to seek an order from
the FISC to conduct targeted surveillance on individuals whose metadata
match those patterns. As in the pre-collection phase, the government
would have to present the FISC with scientifically valid evidence that the
patterns were statistically significant.
254. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012).
255. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993).
256. See id.
257. See supra Part II.B.1-3.
258. SIEGEL, supra note 18, at 4-9 (discussing widespread use of predictive analytics).
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This two-stage approach has some basis in recent NSA history. In
the 1990s, NSA analyst William Binney and his team developed Thin-
Thread, a program that would intercept global phone and Internet data
and analyze it for patterns to help identify terrorists.259 Although the sys-
tem focused on international communications, it inevitably captured do-
mestic communications as well.260 To protect Americans' privacy, Thin-
Thread encrypted the data before conducting pattern analysis.26 1 Once the
system found a strong enough pattern, agents could seek a warrant to
262decrypt the relevant data. Binney, however, was unable to persuade
top NSA officials to deploy the program.26 3 In 2000, the NSA rejected
the system because of constitutional concerns raised by collecting do-
mestic communications, regardless of the encryption.264
Conducting a search based on a statistically significant pattern is
somewhat analogous to relying on profiles to conduct airline passenger
screening. In United States v. Sokolow,265 the Court held that DEA
agents' use of DEA profiles as part of the basis to stop a suspected drug
courier did not render a Terry stop inappropriate.266 This Article's pro-
posed regulatory framework includes more constitutional safeguards than
were imposed on the officer in Sokolow. Because the agents could make
an on-the-spot decision, there was the risk that they might take into ac-
267
count inappropriate characteristics such as race. But this proposed pre-
dictive surveillance framework would involve no such risk since the
FISC would oversee the decision to target an individual based on the
predictive model. In addition, this proposed predictive surveillance
framework would involve judicial oversight of the process used to gener-
ate the predictive model. In contrast, there appeared to be no prior judi-
259. JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN
A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 34 (2014); Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas
Drake an Enemy of the State?, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 46.




264. Id. This objection seems ironic in light of the NSA's post-9/11 I role in warrantless wire-
tapping. Id. Instead of the relatively nimble ThinThread, the NSA implemented a privately built
system called Trailblazer that would have analyzed the NSA's massive data stores without using
encryption. Id.; ANGWIN, supra note 259, at 34. The NSA eventually abandoned Trailblazer after
"massive cost overruns and technical failures." Id.
265. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
266. Id. at 10-11. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court held that the police may conduct brief investiga-
tive stops based on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be
afoot." 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
267. Cf Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that requiring reasonable
suspicion protects innocents from "'overbearing or harassing' police conduct carried out solely on
the basis of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the basis of irrelevant personal
characteristics such as race" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 & n.1 1)).
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cial approval of the drug courier profiles in Sokolow, which the DEA
268
developed on its own.
C. Prohibiting All Secondary Uses of the Comprehensive Database
One of Big Data's primary benefits is that existing data can often be
used to solve new problems.2 69 That benefit, however, can also be a curse
because data holders face constant temptation to use their data for as
many purposes as possible. In one recent example, Ohio residents were
surprised to learn in 2013 that over 26,000 state and federal government
employees had been authorized to run facial recognition searches in the
photos in Ohio's drivers license registry.270 Authorized users included
employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, Pennsylvania State Police, and several Kentucky police depart-
ments. 271 Roughly 1,000 users were outside the state of Ohio. There were
even authorized users in the Department of Defense, the State Depart-
272
ment, and the Department of Education. Most of the authorized users
were employees of Ohio police departments and courts.2 73 Ohio's Attor-
ney General implemented the facial recognition program with no author-
izing legislation, no public warning or input, and no prior review of secu-
rity protocols.2 74
Given the sensitive nature of a single database containing all citi-
zens' phone metadata or location information, any predictive surveil-
lance regulation must prohibit all secondary uses of the underlying data-
base. Otherwise, the public's fear could render a predictive surveillance
program politically infeasible.275 The government would not be permitted
to use the database for any purpose other than to build the predictive
model. This prohibition would hold the government to its representation
that the predictive surveillance program was necessary to prevent terror-
ism, rather than for general law enforcement purposes. Only the infor-
mation gathered after the court-approved targeting phase could be used
in any subsequent investigation or prosecution.
268. See id. at 10 & n.6 (noting that "the DEA has trained narcotics officers to identify drug
smugglers on the basis of the sort of circumstantial evidence at issue here").
269. See Spencer, supra note 251, at 880-85 (discussing how data collected for one use are
inevitably put to secondary uses).
270. Chrissie Thompson & Jessie Balmert, Face-Check Access Goes Beyond Ohio,





275. See, e.g., Gabbatt, supra note 148 (discussing international protest of mass surveillance
programs that involved tens of thousands of calls and emails to Congress, physical protests planned
in fifteen countries, and participation by leading technology companies such as Google, Facebook,
and Microsoft); Susan Page, Poll: Most Americans Now Oppose the NSA Program, USA TODAY
(Jan. 20, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/poll-nsa-
surveillance/4638551/ (citing USA Today/Pew Research Center poll finding that 53% of Americans
oppose the NSA's bulk telephone and Internet metadata collection programs, while only 40% sup-
port them).
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D. Limiting the Time Period That the Data Can Cover
The greater the period of time that the data represent, the greater the
risk of abuse or misuse.276 For example, a database of cell phone records
covering thirty days may pose far less temptation for abuse than the same
database covering a five-year period. This is because the five-year data-
base can paint a far more detailed picture of its subjects. Yet there is a
tension at play because predictive analytics will usually yield better re-
sults from data covering a longer time period. And the necessary reten-
tion period will likely vary depending on the specific issues being ana-
lyzed. Accordingly, legislating a fixed retention period would likely be
unsound policy. Instead, the new regulatory scheme should require the
judge issuing the order to specify the time period that the data may cover,
based on the time period supported in the government's initial Daubert
*277showing.
E. Security Against Internal Misuse and Abuse
Any collection of data is suspect to internal abuse.278 This is not a
new problem. Historians have chronicled how powerful government ac-
tors have abused their access to information.279 J. Edgar Hoover used
government data to intimidate and blackmail from the 1920s through the
early 1970s.280 The Kennedy Administration authorized the House
Committee on Un-American Activities to request individuals' tax re-
tums.281 A military intelligence project in the early 1970s compiled dos-
siers on thousands of U.S. citizens opposed to the Vietnam War.2 82 And
President Nixon habitually abused government resources for personal
political gain.283
Government databases are vulnerable to abuse by relatively low-
level employees. Such low-level abuses often serve personal or voyeuris-
tic urges. For example, an internal IRS audit documented over 1,500
instances from 1994 to 1995 in which employees browsed "the confiden-
tial tax records of friends, relatives, and celebrities."2 84 Similarly, a New
York City police officer was convicted of accessing the National Crimi-
nal Information System to compile dossiers on women as he sought a
276. See generally Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1482 (discussing risks of data retention and recognizing that the mere
existence of a database creates risks from "government investigators, private litigants, data thieves,
and commercial parties").
277. See supra Part V.A.
278. Spencer, supra note 251, at 886-90 (discussing historical abuses of personal information
in government and in the private sector).
279. See id. at 889-90.
280. Id. at 889 & n.264.
281. Id. at 889.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 890.
284. Id.
2015] 531
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
potential victim to kidnap.28 5 That story is one of a number of recent cor-
ruption cases in which NYPD officers were accused of using the NCIC
database to "cyber snoop on co-workers, tip off drug dealers, stage rob-
beries and-most notoriously-scheme to abduct and eat women."2 86
The NSA is not immune from these types of abuses, as evidenced
by the NSA's recent "LOVEINT" scandal. The term LOVEINT is a play
on the NSA's practice of abbreviating different types of intelligence-
SIGINT for signals intelligence and HUMINT for human intelligence.2 87
The NSA revealed in August 2013 that its employees "had violated pri-
vacy rules on nearly 3,000 occasions in a one-year period."28 8 These vio-
lations involved overseas communications. Typically, employees were
289
spying on a partner or spouse.
The Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection program suf-
fered from substantial misuse almost from its inception. FISC Judge
Reggie Walton noted in March 2009 that, for the prior two-and-a-half
years, the NSA had searched all incoming metadata using an "alert list"
of identifiers potentially associated with terrorists.290 But that alert list
had been created for another purpose, and almost 90% of the numbers on
the list did not meet the "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard that
governed the Section 215 collection program.291 In addition, as a result of
inadequate training, "31 NSA analysts had queried the [business records]
metadata during a five day period in April 2008 'without being aware
they were doing so."' 29 2 These "accidental" queries relied on 2,373 for-
eign telephone identifiers for which there had been no prior determina-
tion of reasonable articulable suspicion.293 Judge Walton concluded that
the minimization procedures had been "so frequently and systematically
violated that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the overall
[business records] regime has never functioned effectively."294
In light of these vulnerabilities, any predictive surveillance program
must make security a top priority. The President's Review Group rec-
ommended improvements to the process of vetting personnel for security
clearances and improvements to the security classification system it-
self.2 95 And, perhaps in direct response to the Snowden disclosures, the
285. Tom Hays, NYC Cases Show Crooked Cops' Abuse ofFBI Database, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 7, 2013.
286. Id.
287. Gorman, supra note 250.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 9150913, at *2-
4 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009).
291. Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. Id. at *4.
293. Id
294. Id. at *5.
295. PRESIDENT'S REVIEw GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note
1, at 233-34.
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President's Review Group recommended that "security clearances should
be more highly differentiated, including the creation of 'administrative
access' clearances that allow for support and information technology
personnel to have the access they need without granting them unneces-
sary access to substantive policy or intelligence material."296
F. Security Against Data Breaches
The risk of external data breaches is undeniable.2 97 Governments are
just as vulnerable to breaches as private organizations. Comprehensive
databases like the ones required for predictive surveillance could present
extremely attractive targets for hackers. The harms that can flow from
external breaches include identity theft, financial fraud, and emotional
distress.298 Breaches can occur when external agents hack into databases,
but they can also occur when insiders disclose data unintentionally-as
when an employee loses a laptop computer or USB drive29 9 _OT inten-
tionally-as when a systems analyst downloads top-secret, classified
documents, flees the country, and shares them with the global media.30
Given these risks, no predictive surveillance program should be au-
thorized unless the NSA secures its hardware, software, and procedures
against external threats. The President's Review Group recommended
that networks carrying classified data be equipped with programs that
"record network traffic for real time and subsequent review to detect
anomalous activity, malicious actions, and data breaches."3 0' The group
also recommended that agencies expand their use of procedures that limit
employees' access to data for which they are specifically authorized.302
G. Increased Oversight and Transparency
The prospect of a vast database containing information about every
citizen would raise serious public concerns about misuse and abuse of
power. Given our nation's history of intelligence abuses, the public will
be reluctant to accept such pervasive data collection without strong over-
296. Id at 234.
297. Brookman & Hans, supra note 251, at 2.
298. Id
299. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services offers an online tool allow-
ing the public to find notice of data breaches involving unsecured medical information affecting over
500 people. See Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES OFF. FOR Civ. RTS., https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breachreport.jsf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2015). A search for breaches involving lost or stolen laptops reveals scores of breaches in
2013, the top two of which affected a combined 1.5 million people. For a comprehensive and
searchable chronology of data breaches, see Chronology ofData Breaches Security Breaches 2005-
Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach/ (last updated
Dec. 31, 2013).
300. See, e.g., Greenwald et al., supra note 250.
301. PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note
1, at 247-48.
302. Id. at 248.
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sight by the other branches of government and without enough transpar-
ency to allow the public to know that the program is working properly.
The first step toward both oversight and transparency would be to
introduce a public advocate into the FISA system. Currently, FISA re-
quires that proceedings before the FISC are ex parte so the FISC hears
only from the government.30 3 The President's Review Group found that,
when FISA was first enacted, Congress assumed that the FISC "would
resolve routine and individualized questions of fact, akin to those in-
volved when the government seeks a search warrant."30 Since 1978,
however, changes in law and technology have presented challenging and
novel issues that would benefit from the adversarial system that is the
norm in American courts.305
The President's Review Group recommended, therefore, that Con-
gress amend FISA to include a Public Interest Advocate who would ap-
pear before the FISC.306 Similarly, Congressman Adam Schiff has intro-
duced legislation that would require the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) to appoint attorneys to serve as public interest
advocates before the FISC.307 The proposed legislation would also re-
quire the PCLOB to appoint "technical experts" to advise the advocates
on issues likely to arise in FISA cases, such as "computer networks, tele-
communications, encryption, and cybersecurity."308 And the proposed
legislation would require that the FISC appoint a privacy advocate in
"any matter before a covered court involving a significant interpretation
or construction of a provision of this Act, including any novel legal, fac-
tual, or technological issue or an issue relating to the Fourth Amend-
ment."30 9
Predictive surveillance programs by their nature would pose signifi-
cant risks to privacy and civil liberties. Accordingly, independent advo-
cates should represent the public interest by testing the government's
initial data collection application and proposed methodology, as well as
the government's subsequent petitions to conduct surveillance based on
its findings.
303. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2012) (referencing ex parte orders).
304. PRESIDENT'S REVIEw GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note
I, at 203.
305. Id.
306. Id at 202-03.
307. Ensuring Adversarial Process in the FISA Court Act, H.R. 3159, 113th Cong. (2013).
308. Id. at § 2(a)(1)(D).
309. Id. at § 2(b)(i)(1). There are other proposed solutions as well. For example, Representative
Steven Lynch introduced the Privacy Advocate General Act of 2013, which would establish an
Office of the Privacy Advocate General in the Executive branch and would allow the Chief Justice
and the senior Associate Justice to jointly appoint the Privacy Advocate General for seven-year
terms. H.R. 2849, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2013). For a discussion of potential constitutional issues
surrounding the appointment of a public advocate, see ANDREw NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43260, INTRODUCING A PUBLIC ADVOCATE INTO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT'S COURTS: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES passim (2013).
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Second, the FISC's decisions should be made public so that Con-
gress and the people could consider how the FISC was interpreting a
predictive surveillance program. During the Patriot Act reauthorization
debate in 2011, Senator Ron Wyden tried and failed to attach an amend-
ment forcing the Attorney General to disclose the government's secret
interpretation of Section 215, the business records provision.310 Instead,
the government's broad interpretation of relevance in Section 215 re-
mained secret until the administration's declassification of certain FISC
decisions in the wake of the Snowden disclosures. 3 To avoid such un-
pleasant surprises, FISC opinions should be made public, redacted as
necessary to protect national security.3 12 Obviously there will be highly
sensitive information that must be redacted. Otherwise, the FISC opin-
ions should be released to the public. We have seen the declassification
and public disclosure of over twenty-five FISC orders in the wake of the
Snowden disclosures.313 Some have been heavily redacted, but the redac-
tions appear sensible-such as redacting information about the selectors
that the NSA can use to query the database.314 These releases suggest that
FISC opinions could be routinely redacted as needed and released to the
public.
Third, the program should require frequent and detailed reporting to
Congress. As described above, most members of Congress were not in-
formed of the details of the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata pro-
gram until it became public.3 15 A predictive surveillance program must
never be allowed to operate under Congress's radar. The disclosures
must be sufficiently detailed to enable Congress to balance the program's
benefits against the threat to civil liberties. Relevant details would in-
clude the numbers of individual records collected, the types of predictive
analytics employed, the results of each instance of data analysis,3 16 the
number of targeted searches that were conducted as a result of the data
analysis, the outcomes of investigations in which those targeted searches
were used, and the extent to which the predictive analytics played a role
in those outcomes.
310. Spencer Ackerman, There's a Secret Patriot Act, Senator Says, WIRED (May 25, 2011,
4:56 PM), www.wired.com/2011/05/secret-patriot-act.
311. Ellen Nakashima & Carol D. Leonnig, Declassification ofFISC Document Being Urged,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2013, at A05.
312. The President's Review Group recommended declassification reviews of FISC opinions.
PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 1, at 201.
313. IC on the Record, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/tagged/declassified (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (releasing selected
court documents, testimony, and position papers relating to activities of the intelligence community).
314. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 14-01, slip op. at 8-12 (FISA Ct. Jan. 3, 2014), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/BR%2014-
01%20Redacted%2OPrimary%200rder/o20(Final).pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
315. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
316. Those results would already be reported to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
See supra Part V.B.
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Finally, to maximize the opportunity for legislative oversight and
give the people an ongoing voice in the process, legislation authorizing a
predictive surveillance program should require frequent reauthoriza-
tion.3 17 The prospect of reauthorization would ensure periodic debate and
would give the intelligence community a strong incentive to be as forth-
coming as possible in order to persuade Congress of the merits of reau-
thorization. The most recent authorization of the Section 215 program
was a four-year authorization.318
CONCLUSION
There is nothing new about predictive analytics. The techniques
have been in use for years in the private and public sectors. But the gov-
ernment uses to date have involved data already in the government's
hands. What the NSA's bulk surveillance programs added to the picture
was the government's potential to collect and store pervasive data on a
global scale. Although bulk collection may face technological and politi-
cal obstacles today, those obstacles likely will not last forever. When the
government gains the technological ability and political will, we will
face a new model of predictive surveillance-a model that may have
potential benefits but that poses a tremendous threat to privacy.
To mitigate the privacy threat while still yielding the potential bene-
fits, we will need a new regulatory scheme. Because the first step of pre-
dictive surveillance will be to collect all the data, we cannot rely on the
traditional first step of having the judge assess the justification for the
government's targeting decision. Instead, the judge must ensure that the
data collection and analysis are supported by a scientifically valid theory,
and the people must have their privacy interests represented by a public
advocate during this stage. Beyond these two new features, the remaining
elements of the regulatory scheme are merely very stringent versions of
existing regulatory schemes that involve rigorous independent oversight
and transparency.
If predictive surveillance ever demonstrates real potential to deter
terrorism, it is difficult to imagine the courts holding that predictive sur-
veillance cannot be constitutional under any circumstances. Recognizing
that reality, this Article offers a narrow theory on which predictive sur-
veillance might comply with the Fourth Amendment. Relying on the
Keith case and the special needs cases will allow courts to draw a line
between antiterrorism efforts and the inevitable attempts to expand the
predictive surveillance uses to ordinary law enforcement needs. The spe-
cial needs aspect of this Article's approach would also translate well to
317. For example, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, as modified by the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, will sunset on June 1, 2015. PATRIOT Sunsets
Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, § 2(a), 125 Stat. 216, 216 (2011).
318. Id.
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government data collection efforts on a local scale, rather than a global
one. For example, systems of automated license plate readers might be
constitutional when used for purposes such as collecting tolls and moni-
toring traffic patterns. However, the programs would exceed their consti-
tutional mandate if government sought to expand them to ordinary law
enforcement investigations. Given the reality that courts are unlikely to
strike down suspicionless data collection programs in their entirety, this
Article's narrow and pragmatic approach may offer the best course to
protecting privacy.

SEC V. SHIELDS: FOR INVESTORS, A BAD PRESUMPTION
YIELDS BAD RESULTS
ABSTRACT
Everyone knows the old saying about what happens when you as-
sume. But when you presume, and the presumption is bad, the results are
even worse. Currently, there is a presumption that general partnerships
and joint ventures are not securities. Therefore, if the difficult burden of
rebutting that presumption is not met, an investor who purchases a gen-
eral partnership or joint venture is not protected by federal securities
laws.
This Comment argues the presumption goes against the entire rea-
son federal securities laws were created: to protect inexperienced inves-
tors from fraud in the securities industry. The presumption creates a po-
tential loophole to federal securities laws. A promoter can create a prod-
uct, structure and describe it as a general partnership or joint venture, and
the product is presumably not a security and not subject to federal securi-
ties laws. If something goes wrong, the burden falls on the investor to
rebut the presumption and prove the product is a security. This burden
ranges from extremely difficult to meet to impossible, depending on the
circuit.
A better presumption, and one more consistent with the securities
industry as a whole, is to focus not only on the product being sold, but
also on who is purchasing the product. If the purchaser is an inexperi-
enced investor, the individual should be protected by federal securities
laws. They were specifically designed to protect the inexperienced inves-
tor, so no presumption should take that protection away. The only benefit
of the current presumption is a savvy promoter can get around federal
securities laws simply by naming a product a general partnership or joint
venture. No promoter should have that power.
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INTRODUCTION
In SEC v. Shields,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether particular Joint Venture Agree-
ments (JVAs) soliciting investments in oil and gas exploration and drill-
ing were investment contracts subject to federal securities regulations as
defined by the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) (collectively, the Securities
Acts).2 If not, the JVAs were not securities over which the SEC could
exercise jurisdiction.
The Securities Acts were designed to protect inexperienced inves-
tors from fraud. Currently, a presumption exists that general partnerships
and joint ventures are not securities subject to the Securities Acts. This
presumption creates an extremely difficult burden, which, unless over-
come, denies inexperienced investors the very protection the Securities
Acts were designed to provide, simply because the promoter was savvy
enough to call the product a general partnership or joint venture.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the Securities Acts and two sig-
nificant cases the court relied on in reaching its decision: SEC v. W.J.
1. 744 F.3d 633 (10th Cir. 2014).
2. Id. at 636.
3. See, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. P'ship, 902 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
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Howey Co.,4 and Williamson v. Tucker.5 Part II presents the facts of
Shields, the procedural history, and the majority opinion. Part III dis-
cusses the circuit court split regarding if and how the Williamson test is
applied, as well as the power of the name and structure of an investment
in determining whether the Securities Acts apply, and also examines how
the district court might decide the case on remand.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Securities Acts
After the stock market crash of 1929, which led to the Great De-
pression, two important pieces of federal legislation were passed to regu-
late the securities marketS6: the Securities Act of 19337 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.8 The Securities Act, often called the "truth in
securities" law, "has two basic objectives: [1] requir[ing] that investors
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities
being offered for public sale; and [2] prohibit[ing] deceit, misrepresenta-
tions, and other fraud in the sale of securities."9
Requiring securities to be registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) accomplishes the goal of disclosing im-
portant financial information about a security.1o Although there are cer-
tain exceptions and exemptions, generally securities sold in the United
States must be registered." Registration statements and prospectuses are
filed with the SEC and made publically available on the EDGAR.12 The-
se documents contain "a description of the company's . . . business; a
description of the security to be offered for sale; information about the
management of the company; and financial statements certified by inde-
pendent accountants."3
The Exchange Act created the SEC and gave the agency "broad au-
thority over all aspects of the [U.S.] securities industry." 4 The Exchange
4. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
5. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
6. W. Taylor Marshall, Note, Securities Law-The Securities Exchange Act of 1934-'Round
and 'Round We Go: The Supreme Court Again Limits the Circumstances in which Federal Courts
May Hold Secondary Actors Liable Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5. Stoneridge Invest-
ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008)., 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 197, 200 (2008).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (2012).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-pp (2012).
9. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,




I2. Id (explaining that the EDGAR database allows users to search for companies and view
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Act gives the SEC the power "to require periodic reporting . .. by com-
panies with publically traded securities," to "identifly] and prohibit[]
certain types of conduct," and gives the SEC "disciplinary power[] over
regulated entities and [individuals] associated with [those entities]."
These entities include brokerage firms, transfer agents, clearing agencies,
and securities agencies such as the New York Stock Exchange, the
NASDAQ Stock Market, and the Chicago Board of Options.16
B. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.
In W.J. Howey Co., the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
ran to determine if a particular investment involving a citrus grove was
an investment contract subject o the Securities Acts.17 The Howey Com-
pany owned large tracts of citrus groves in Florida and planted approxi-
mately 500 acres of citrus groves per year. Half of the acreage the
Howey Company kept for itself and the other half was offered to the
public in an effort to finance further development.19 In the offering, each
potential customer was given a land sales contract and a service contract
to tend to the land.20 The Howey Company said it was not feasible to
invest in a grove unless service arrangements were made.21 Although the
service contracts allowed a purchaser to make arrangements with any
service company, the Howey Company stressed the superiority of
Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc., a corporation under the same direct
control and management as the Howey Company.2 2
The land sales contract provided a price per acre and conveyed the
land by warranty deed to the purchaser.2 3 Each purchaser received a tract
of land not separately fenced from the adjacent land owned by other pur-
chasers.24 In fact, "the sole indication of several ownership [was] found
in small land marks intelligible only through a plat book record."25
The service contract gave Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. a lease
interest on each tract of land and "full and complete" possession.26 This
gave the company full discretion to use its skilled personnel and full in-
ventory of equipment to cultivate, harvest, and market the crops.27 The
purchaser had no right to market the crops because there was no right to
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946).








26. Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id.
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specific fruit. 28 Instead, all fruit was pooled together for sale and each
purchaser was entitled to a portion of the profit.29 Most purchasers were
not residents of Florida, and did not possess the "knowledge, skill and
equipment necessary for the care and cultivation of citrus trees.,3 0 In-
stead, they were attracted by the potential for significant profits from
their investments.3 1
There are many different types of investment interests included in
the definition of a security subject to registration with the SEC.32 In an
alleged violation of the Securities Acts, the SEC sought to restrain the
Howey Company "from using the mails and instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce in the offer and sale of unregistered and nonexempt se-
curities."33 The district court denied the injunction and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed on the basis that "an investment contract is necessarily missing
where the enterprise is not speculative or promotional in character and
where the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic value independent
of the success of the enterprise as a whole."34
The Supreme Court held that the land sales contracts were securi-
ties, rejecting the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, and stated:
The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others. If that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise
is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of proper-
ty with or without intrinsic value.35
The Court recognized the need for a broad definition of the term in-
vestment contract to encompass the many different types of instruments
that needed to fall within the scope of a security under the Securities
Acts. That definition, "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle,
one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits."36
The Supreme Court ultimately held the transactions were invest-
ment contracts and reversed the decision of the lower courts. The lower





32. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
33. Howey, 328 U.S. at 294.
34. Id. at 301.
35. Id.
36. Id at 299.
37. Id. at 301.
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separate transactions involving no more than an ordinary real estate sale
and an agreement by the seller to manage the property for the buyer."38
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating they were investment con-
tracts because the Howey Company was offering more than an interest in
land or a farm coupled with management services.39 Rather, it was offer-
ing, to persons who lived in different parts of the country and lacked the
equipment and expertise to successfully operate a citrus farm, an oppor-
tunity to invest in and share the profits of a professionally managed citrus
fruit enterprise.40 These persons had no interest in developing the land
themselves, or even occupying it.41 They were "attracted solely by the
prospects of a return on their investment."42
The Court called it a "profit-seeking business venture . . . . The in-
vestors provide[d] the capital and share[d] in the earnings and profits; the
promoters manage[d], control[led] and operate[d] the enterprise."43 Fi-
nally, the Court made it clear the structure of an offering, not the name,
would determine whether it is an investment contract, and that an in-
vestment contract can take on many forms:
It follows that the arrangements whereby the investors' interests are
made manifest involve investment contracts, regardless of the legal
terminology in which such contracts are clothed. The investment con-
tracts in this instance take the form of land sales contracts, warranty
deeds and service contracts which respondents offer to prospective
investors.44
C. Williamson v. Tucker
In Williamson v. Tucker, the issue before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was whether certain real estate joint venture
interests were securities within the definition of the Securities Acts.45
Between 1969 and 1971, through a series of different transactions, the
land interests were sold to the defendants in three separate but similar
joint ventures.46 Here, the defendants owned a tract of land in Texas near
the site of the newly announced Dallas/Fort Worth airport.47 The transac-
tions were all arranged by Godwin Investments, and the defendants in-
vested in each separate joint venture.48 Each joint venture had approxi-
38. Id at 298.
39. Id at 299.
40. Id. at 299-300.




45. 645 F.2d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 407-08.
47. Id. at 407.
48. Id. at 408.
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mately fifteen investors, including the defendants.49 The purchases were
each financed by a promissory note issued by the respective joint ven-
ture.o
Godwin Investments created marketing materials that analyzed the
development of other major airport areas and suggested this was a simi-
lar opportunity, "[o]f course, an international airport of this immense size
will undoubtedly have a tremendous effect on the values and develop-
ment of nearby land, and its eventual economic contribution might be far
greater than the public's ability to presently comprehend!"5 '
In addition to marketing, Godwin Investments represented it would
"perform all management duties, including efforts to have the land re-
zoned from single-family residential to its best uses."52 Although God-
win Investments performed these activities, the participants in each of
the joint ventures retained substantial control and could vote to remove
Godwin Investments as the property manager.53 Despite maintaining
these joint venture rights, all plaintiffs claimed to have relied entirely on
Godwin Investments until late 1975 when they began to hold joint ven-
ture meetings.54
The court recognized the proper starting point for analysis of in-
vestment contracts is the Howey test and broke it into "three distinct ele-
ments: (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3)
on an expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of indi-
viduals other than the investor."55 The third element, specifically the
word "solely," was the focus of the court's analysiS.56 Relying on a deci-
sion from the Ninth Circuit, the court said a broad definition of "solely"
was appropriate.57 The Ninth Circuit held that, "the word 'solely' should
not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an invest-
ment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if not
form, securities."58 The rationale was that too strict an interpretation of
the word "solely" would provide a loophole to avoid federal securities
laws: by requiring investors to contribute some minimal effort, investors
would not be relying "solely" on the efforts of others, and therefore an
investment contract finding would be automatically precluded.5 9
49. Id
50. Id.
51. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 408-09.
54. Id. at 409.
55. Id. at 417.
56. See id at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973)).
58. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d at 482.
59. Id.
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Williamson further pointed out "the Supreme Court has altogether
omitted the word 'solely' in its most recent formulation of the investment
contract definition." 60 The court referenced United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman,61 which summarized the Howey test as "the presence of
an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expecta-
tion of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial ef-
forts of others."62
The issue in Williamson became whether the powers possessed by
the investors in the joint venture agreements were enough to preclude a
finding that the joint ventures were securities. 63 There is a circuit court
split on this issue-discussed in detail below-and this issue was a mat-
ter of first impression for the Fifth Circuit. 4 After analyzing a plethora of
cases over various circuits,6 5 the court found the Eighth66 and Tenth Cir-
cuits" approach to be most appropriate:
[T]he actual control exercised by the purchaser is irrelevant. So long
as the investor has the right to control the asset he has purchased, he
is not dependent on the promoter or on a third party for "those essen-
tial managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the en-
terprise."68
Accordingly, general partnerships and joint partnerships generally cannot
be investment contracts under the Securities Acts.69 However, "the mere
fact that an investment takes the form of a general partnership or joint
venture does not inevitably insulate it from the reach of the federal secu-
rities laws."70 There is a presumption "that the investor-partner is not in
fact dependent on the promoter or manager for the effective exercise of
his partnership powers."7 In order to rebut that presumption, the inves-
tor-partner must show the partnership powers were "inadequate to pro-
tect him from the dependence on others which is implicit in an invest-
ment contract."
72
An investor who lacks the necessary experience to intelligently ex-
ercise partnership power may be dependent on the manager.7 ' Reliance
60. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 418.
61. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
62. Id. at 852.
63. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 419.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 419-21.
66. Id at 420-21 (analyzing Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978), and Fargo
Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976)).
67. Id. at 421 (analyzing Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir.
1972)).
68. Id. at 421.
69. Id.
70. Id at 422.
71. Id
72. Id. at 423.
73. Id.
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on irreplaceable expertise on the part of the manager may force depend-
ence on the part of the investor.74 Inexperienced members of the general
public who had partnership powers but were led to expect profits derived
from the efforts of others may be able to show dependence. In essence,
"a legal right of control would have little value if the partners were
forced to rely on the manager's unique abilities." 76
However, hiring someone else to manage an investment does not
fulfill the reliance requirement.7 7 "It is not enough, therefore, that part-
ners in fact rely on others for the management of their investment; a
partnership can be an investment contract only when the partners are so
dependent on a particular manager that they cannot replace him or oth-
erwise exercise ultimate control." This makes fulfilling the reliance
requirement very difficult.
The court recognized how difficult this was, saying "an investor
who claims his . . . joint venture interest is an investment contract has a
difficult burden to overcome."79 In order to overcome the presumption
that dependence does not exist because investors in partnership agree-
ments retain control:
An investor must demonstrate that, in spite of the partnership form
which the investment took, he was so dependent on the promoter or
on a third party that he was in fact unable to exercise meaningful
partnership powers. A . . . joint venture interest can be designated a
security if the investor can establish, for example, that (1) an agree-
ment among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the
partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as
would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inex-
perienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapa-
ble of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or
(3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepre-
neurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he can-
not replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise mean-
ingful partnership or venture powers.so
None of those factors were present.8 ' First, the partnership agreements
82
gave the plaintiffs ultimate control over the joint venture. Second, the
plaintiffs were all high level executives at Frito-Lay and had participated
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knowledge to adequately exercise those powers.83 Finally, the plaintiffs
did not allege Godwin Investments was uniquely qualified to manage the
property or that their dependence on Godwin Investments made them
incapable of finding a replacement.8 Without one of those three factors,
"meaningful powers possessed by joint venturers under a joint venture
agreement do indeed preclude a finding that joint venture interests are
securities."
II. SEC V. SHIELDS
Williamson focused on the reliance element of Howey specifically
with respect to joint ventures, but courts continue to look to Howey as the
starting point when examining whether an investment is an investment
contract within the purview of the Securities Acts. Howey is regarded as
"the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case that defined and gave life to the
term 'investment contract."'86 In SEC v. Shields, the Tenth Circuit adopt-
ed the Williamson approach and applied its three-factor test to rebut the
presumption that a general partnership is not a security.87
A. Facts
In September 2009, Mr. Shields formed GeoDynamics, a Colorado
corporation." The SEC alleged Mr. Shields sold over five million dollars
of interests in oil and gas joint ventures between January 2010 and May
2011.89 Marketing the interests involved making thousands of cold calls
to the general public.90 Potential investors were enticed by promises of
annual returns between 256% and 548%.9' At the height of the operation,
Mr. Shields supervised dozens of salespersons who each made over 400
cold calls per day.9 2 As a result, the joint ventures were made up of in-
vestors who had never met, never had contact with one another, and were
spread out across the country.93
Members of the general public with little or no experience in the oil
and gas industry were specifically targeted, and "Mr. Shields and his
staff would specifically emphasize 'the capabilities and unique qualifica-
tions of GeoDynamics as an experienced oil and gas driller and opera-
tor.'94 Anyone who seemed interested was sent offering documents in-
83. Id. at 424-25.
84. Id. at 425.
85. Id.
86. S. Scott Lasher & Eric B. Liebman, The Application of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. in Colo-
rado and Other Jurisdictions, 31 COLO. LAw. 73, 73 (2002).
87. 744 F.3d 633, 644-45 (10th Cir. 2014).






94. Id at 638.
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cluding a memo explaining how the venture would operate, a joint ven-
ture agreement, and a document that outlined the expected profits.
The offering documents state[d] "the Venturers will have all of the
rights and will be subject to all of the liabilities of a General Partner
under" Texas law, and also note[d] that GeoDynamics, as managing
venturer, "takes the position that the joint venture interest[s] are not
securities." Under the agreements, investors "expressly delegate[d]
management of the day-to-day Operations of the Joint Venture[s]" to
GeoDynamics as managing venturer.96
Under the agreements, GeoDynamics had broad powers and no investor
had any binding power.97 Investors had the right to vote, the right to ter-
minate the partnership or amend the partnership agreement, the right to
inspect accounting records and company reports, and the right to call
partnership meetings.98 The SEC alleged that Mr. Shields denied report
requests and lied to investors to "keep them misinformed, raise more
money, and prevent them from challenging his actions."99
According to the offering documents, each venture was to have its
own separate account where each investor's money was deposited to
cover the costs of the oil and gas exploration and drilling associated with
each respective venture.10' Instead, according to the SEC, all investments
were comingled and deposited into accounts controlled by Mr. Shields.'0
Of the five million dollars, Mr. Shields spent two million on general
business expenses, which was much more than the offering documents
allowed, and spent over two million more on personal expenses.102
These expenditures included: $747,685 on a private Learjet;
$236,444 on luxury automobiles; $31,537 on limousine and helicop-
ter rentals; $200,206 on rent for multiple residences; $104,734 on
sporting events; $26,434 on clothing and lingerie; $2,062 on jewelry;
$68,223 on home furnishings; $14,987 on electronics; $39,205 on
travel; and $467,129 to Mr. Shields via "cash withdrawals, checks, or
transfers to his personal bank accounts."
0 3
Of the five million dollars raised, only $613,494 went to actual oil and
gas exploration.'0 GeoDynamics never finished drilling, never produced
95. Id




100. Id at 638-39.
101. Id at 639.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 639 n.5.
104. Id at 639.
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any commercial quantities of oil or gas, and did not make a single pay-
ment to any investor in any of the four joint ventures.105
B. Procedural History
In September 2011, the SEC filed suit alleging violations under sev-
eral provisions of the Securities Acts.1 0 6 The SEC sought injunctions,
disgorgement plus interest, an asset freeze, and recovery of assets trans-
ferred to relieve defendants.0 7 The defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss, which the district court granted without prejudice.0 8 The
district court held that "the SEC's allegations were 'insufficient to state a
plausible claim that the joint venture interests at issue' were secuni-
ties."1 09 The SEC filed an appeal, which argued the district court erred in
granting the motion to dismiss, claiming the joint ventures were invest-
ment contracts, and therefore securities subject to the Securities Acts.o10
C. Majority Opinion
Judge Seymour authored the opinion of the Tenth Circuit, reversing
the district court "[b]ecause it cannot be said as a matter of law that the
investments at issue are not 'investment contracts."'1 1 A motion to dis-
miss is not appropriate if a complaint stated a plausible claim for re-
lief.112 The SEC's allegations were sufficient to defeat a motion to dis-
miss.113 On appeal, the issue was whether the oil interests sold by Mr.
Shields and GeoDynamics were investment contracts subject o federal
securities laws.14
To provide background to the decision, the court described why the
Securities Acts were created:
Congress enacted the Securities Acts in response to "serious abus-
es in a largely unregulated securities market," and for the purpose of
regulating "investments, in whatever form they are made and by
whatever name they are called." Congress "painted with a broad
brush" in defining a "security" in recognition of the "virtually limit-




108. Id. at 639-40.
109. Id. at 640 (quoting SEC v. Shields, No. I 1-CV-02121-REB, 2012 WL 3886883 (D. Colo.
Sept. 6, 2012)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 636.
112. See Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
113. Shields, 744 F.3d at 647.
114. Id. at 641.
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less and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits . . . .115
The court made it clear Congress did not intend for the Securities Acts to
cover all fraud, and it was up to the SEC and the courts to decide which
transactions are covered.'16
Neither side disputed that the first two elements of the Howey test
were satisfied because investors gave money directly to Mr. Shields as a
part of a common investment scheme."'7 The focus of the case was the
third element of the Howey test: "whether the investment was 'premised
on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepre-
neurial or managerial efforts of others." 8
The court noted the JVAs were labeled as general partnerships, and
in the Tenth Circuit there is a strong presumption that a general partner-
ship is not a security because investors retain significant control." 9 The
SEC argued the court should apply the Williamson factors to the third
element of the Howey test to rebut that presumption.120 The court agreed
and noted that the three factors in Williamson were a non-exhaustive
list.121 "[W]e view the Williamson approach as a supplement to control-
ling Supreme Court and circuit precedent in determining if allegations
are sufficient to raise a fact question regarding whether a particular in-
vestment is a security."l22
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting the
motion to dismiss123 because the SEC's allegations were "clearly suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption that the purported general partnerships
here are not securities, and to raise a fact issue concerning whether inves-
tors were relying on the efforts of Mr. Shields and GeoDynamics to sig-
nificantly affect the success or failure of the ventures." 24
The issue became "whether the investors actually had the type of
control reserved under the agreements to obtain access to information
necessary to protect, manage, and control their investments at the time
they purchased their interests."25 From there, each of the three factors
115. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,
60-61 (1990) (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946))).
116. Id. at 642.
117. Id. at 643.
118. Id. (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 644-45.
122. Id. at 645.
123. Id. at 641, 648.
124. Id. at 645.
125. Id.
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from Williamson were analyzed to see if they were sufficiently plead-
ed. 126
First, a joint venture could be a security if the agreement gave the
investor so little power that the agreement operates as a limited partner-
ship.12 7 The SEC alleged the investors lacked the control of general part-
ners and actually had the rights of limited partners.128 The JVAs locked
investors into turnkey contracts solely with GeoDynamics as the contrac-
tor. 12 9 Although the JVAs gave investors voting rights, including the
right to remove GeoDynamics as the managing partner, investors still
had to rely on GeoDynamics as the contractor per the turnkey con-
tracts.130 Therefore, the "turnkey contracts were key to the success of the
enterprise and profits for the investors, regardless of the venturers' pow-
er, because they were the only way these oil and gas investments could
generate money."'31
The SEC also alleged Mr. Shields marketed the investments to indi-
viduals "with little or no experience in the oil and gas industry," and he
served as their only source of information.132 Accordingly, the SEC's
allegations were enough to defeat a motion to dismiss on the issue of
whether the investors here meaningful control.133
Second, the court considered "whether 'the partner or venturer is so
inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapa-
ble of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers."'l
34
Again, the court focused on the allegations of marketing to inexperienced
investors: "The allegations that Mr. Shields marketed these oil and gas
interests nationwide to investors with little, if any, experience in the oil
and gas industry by means of over 400 cold calls a day clearly supports
this conclusion."'3 5
Third, the court considered "whether 'the partner or venturer is so
dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise
or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.'" 36 The
SEC alleged that during his sales pitches Mr. Shields specifically empha-
sized GeoDynamics' unique expertise in the oil and gas industry. He
claimed that GeoDynamics' experience was "so unique that he was able
126. Id. at 645-47.




131. Id. at 646-47.
132. Id at 647.
133. Id
134. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981)).
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
137. Id.
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to offer-and investors depended on him for-estimated annualized
profits between 256% and 548%."'" These allegations, combined with
the fact investors had no experience in the industry and relied solely on
GeoDynamics per the turnkey contracts, sufficiently "raise[d] a fact issue
as to whether the investors had any practical alternative to GeoDynam-
ics."139 The court stated:
The district court focused only on the form of the JVAs themselves
without considering the economic realities of the transactions and the
investors' lack of access to information needed in order to actually
use the powers reserved to them under the JVAs. When the allega-
tions here are instead viewed in their totality, they state a plausible
claim that the powers were illusory, which is sufficient to rebut the
presumption that a general partnership is not a security.140
The court reversed the district court and remanded for further pro-
ceedings because it could not be proved that the oil interests are not in-
vestment contracts.14 1
III. ANALYSIS
The Shields decision answered one question, but several remain.
The Tenth Circuit adopted the full Williamson three-factor test, which
may rebut the presumption that general partnerships and joint ventures
are not securities. However, a circuit court split remains as to whether
and to what extent the Williamson test is applied. Remaining questions
involve the implications of naming and structuring an investment as a
general partnership or joint venture, the effect of the presumption and the
standard that must be met to rebut the presumption, and how the district
court will handle the decision on remand.
A. Circuit Court Split
The Shields decision made one thing clear; the Tenth Circuit agreed
with the Fifth Circuit's approach and adopted the three examples from
Williamson that can be used to rebut the presumption that a general part-
nership is not a security.142 Shields called the examples "non-
exhaustive"43 by pointing to language in Williamson,'" but did not pro-
vide any other examples that may rebut the presumption.
138. Id. at 647-48.
139. Id. at 648.
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Id. at 644-45; see supra notes 68-69, 80 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 644.
144. Id. at 645 ("[N]oting that other factors could 'also give rise to such a dependence on the
promoter or manager that the exercise of partnership powers would be effectively precluded."'
(quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1981))).
2015] 553
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the court neglected to expand that list because of the treat-
ment of the Williamson approach in other circuits. The court cited cases
from the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that followed the
Williamson approach;14 5 however, the Third and Fourth Circuits have
followed different approaches.146
[T]he Third Circuit took a legalistic approach, and established a
bright-line rule (i.e., an irrebuttable presumption) that a general part-
ner's interest cannot qualify as a security "because the role of a gen-
eral partner, by law, extends well beyond the permitted role of a pas-
sive investor." Although the general partner alleged that the partner-
ship agreement distributed control with respect to certain general
partners as though they were limited partners, and therefore that the
interests could be securities under Williamson, the court ruled that the
Uniform Partnership Act "puts its own limitations on the extent to
which a general partner can be so restricted" and that even "the most
draconian restrictions on the rights of non-management partners"
would not eliminate the "quantum of powers and responsibilities"
which would preclude the interest from constituting a security.
[T]he Fourth Circuit embraced the Williamson presumption,
but expressly rejected the second and third Williamson rebuttal fac-
tors. The court stated that a broad application of the Williamson fac-
tors "would undercut the strong presumption that an interest in a gen-
eral partnership is not a security" and "would unduly broaden the
scope of the Supreme Court's instruction that courts must examine
the economic reality of partnership interests."147
Each circuit presumes a general partnership is not a security, but
each takes a different approach to the question of how that presumption
can be rebutted, if at all: the Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits embracing the Fifth Circuit's full three-part Williamson ap-
proach;14 8 the Fourth Circuit limiting the test to the first part of the Wil-
liamson three-part approach;14 9 and the Third Circuit taking the position
the presumption cannot be rebutted.150
145. Id. at 644 n.9 (citing United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2008) (apply-
ing Williamson and finding investment contract notwithstanding documents gave investors powers
of control similar to general partnership); SEC. v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 755-57 (11th
Cir. 2007) (same); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); Koch v. Hankins, 928
F.2d 1471, 1476-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Williamson to analyze whether general partnerships
were investment contracts)).
146. J. William Callison, Changed Circumstances: Eliminating the Williamson Presumption
that General Partnership Interests Are Not Securities, 58 BUs. LAW. 1373, 1376-77 (2003).
147. Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730
F.2d 99, 103, 107 (3d Cir. 1984); and then quoting Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson
Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 241 n.7 (4th Cir. 1988)).
148. Shields, 744 F.3d at 644 n.9.
149. Callison, supra note 146, at 1377.
150. Id. at 1376-77.
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The Third Circuit created a loophole around the Securities Acts by
completely rejecting the Williamson approach holding "that a participant
who holds a general partnership interest in an enterprise . . . does not
possess a security within the meaning of federal securities law."'5 ' This
interpretation gives future promoters the power to decide, depending on
how they structure and what they name their investment, whether it will
be subject to the Securities Acts. No promoter should have this power.
Rather, it is up to the SEC and the federal courts to decide which types of
transactions involve securities and, therefore, have the protection of the
Securities Acts.152
Unless the courts abandon the presumption, it is likely that unscrupu-
lous promoters will create limited liability partnerships in which vul-
nerable and unsophisticated general partners (the so-called "widows
and orphans" that the securities laws were designed to protect) invest
their money in schemes in which they rely on the promoter's efforts
to generate profits. These transactions will be undertaken without he
benefits of securities disclosure rules or regulatory agency oversight.
When the scheme fails, the promoter will argue that there is a strong
presumption that the interest is not a security and that the investor has
the burden of proving on an individual-by-individual basis that he
acquired an investment contract, thereby skirting rescission require-
ments and securities fraud liability.' 5 3
B. What Is in a Name?
The Williamson presumption has been "categorized as the last in-
vestment contract battlefield, i.e., whether or when interests in what are
held out to be a 'general partnership' or 'joint venture' are investment
contract securities."54 However, no cases have said what a general part-
nership or joint venture actually is.' 55 Unlike other business entities, gen-
eral partnerships and joint ventures do not have to file certificates with
the government, and the relationship among the parties to the agreement
can be anything they choose to stipulate in the contract. 156
Surely, naming an investment a general partnership or joint venture
should be able to have as much power as it seems: "A promoter cannot
evade the securities law simply by calling his otherwise obvious invest-
ment contract a 'general partnership' or 'joint venture' interest."'57 Out-
side of the Third Circuit, as stated in Shields, this is not the case, but the
truth is not too far removed. There is a "strong presumption that an inter-
151. Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 1984).
152. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975).
153. Callison, supra note 146, at 1384.
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est in a general partnership is not a security."58 The Fifth Circuit reiter-
ated this principle: "To sum up: . . . . [an investor has] an extremely dif-
ficult factual burden if they are to establish that the joint venture interests
they purchased are securities.",5 9 Therefore, "by simply characterizing an
operation as a 'general partnership' or 'joint venture,' the promoter
seemingly automatically interposes a presumption that investment con-
tracts are not involved, so that anyone claiming they are faces some very
difficult obstacles to overcome it." 60
One argument for this presumption is that sophisticated investors
and institutions are normally the parties in these types of agreements and
have equal bargaining power in creating general partnerships and joint
ventures.161 They understand the risks involved, should be able to trans-
act as they see fit, and should not later be able to claim the protections of
the Securities Acts to recover their loss if the investment does not per-
form as expected.162 It is not against the law to make risky or even bad
investments, and as long as the investor understands the risks, the Securi-
ties Acts cannot be a fallback simply because an investor lost money.
The Securities Acts do not, and should not, afford that type of protec-
tion.163
But the Securities Acts should, and were designed to, protect inex-
perienced investors from fraud.M The courts should not impose such an
extremely difficult burden, which could deny inexperienced investors the
protection of the Securities Acts simply because the investment had a
promoter savvy enough to call it a general partnership or joint venture.
It would not be difficult for the courts to distinguish between a situ-
ation involving sophisticated investors or institutions and one involving
salesmen making hundreds of daily cold calls to thousands of members
of the general public whom they have never met.' 65 Accordingly, based
on the experience of the investor, it would not be difficult to decide
whether the Securities Acts applied. A presumption should exist, but the
presumption should also focus on the investor, not only the name and
structure of the investment. When an inexperienced investor purchases
something that looks and acts like a security, it should be presumed to be
a security protected by the Securities Acts.
158. SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 643 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Banghart v. Hollywood Gen.
P'ship, 902 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir. 1981).




164. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexactl934 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
165. See LONG & FEIGIN, supra note 154.
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The idea of subjecting different types of investors who invest in the
same product to different rules, is not a new idea in the securities indus-
try. The JOBS Act 6 6 recognized the difference between sophisticated
investors and unsophisticated investors and created exemptions to certain
rules if an issuer sells to an investor deemed wealthy and sophisticated
enough to be "accredited." 67 Therefore, there is precedent to apply dif-
ferent rules to investors with different levels of wealth and sophistica-
-168tion.
The reasoning for the exemptions [for sophisticated investors] seems
to be that offerings involving small amounts of money and/or small
numbers of investors pose less of a threat to the investing public, and
the investors involved are more likely to be sophisticated enough to
understand the risks of investment and are better suited to protect
themselves and bear the risk of loss.169
The JOBS Act places the burden on the issuer to prove investors are ac-
credited and, therefore, sophisticated and wealthy enough to invest in a
product not subject to the Securities Acts.170 If an investor is not accred-
ited, the issuer is liable if it sells that type of product to an unaccredited
investor. '7
Similarly, the difficult burden should be on the promoter to prove
the investors, who bought a general partnership, were sophisticated
enough that the Securities Acts need not apply. Reasonable persons
would not argue that inexperienced investors deserve the protection of
the Securities Acts. A presumption focused on the investor, as well as the
investment being sold, would result in a more organic application of the
Securities Acts to the type of persons the Acts were designed to protect.
This is not to suggest investors do not have a duty to protect them-
selves. If an investment sounds too good to be true, it probably is. It
should be a gut feeling, almost instinctual. Similarly, if it feels like the
Securities Acts should apply, they probably should.
C. How Will the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
Decide the Case on Remand?
In Shields, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision
granting the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.172 But the question remains whether the oil
166. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
167. See Joseph E. Richotte & Jennifer E. Consiglio, Benefits, Pitfalls, and Possibilities in the





171. Id. at *4.
172. SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 648 (10th Cir. 2014).
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and gas interests sold by Mr. Shields and GeoDynamics were investment
contracts, and therefore securities, subject to the Securities Acts., 73 The
Tenth Circuit analyzed each part of the Williamson approach and found
the SEC's allegations under each were sufficient to raise an issue of fact
sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss,174 but the decision may have
done more than that.
Through an in-depth analysis of each of the three-part Williamson
test, the Tenth Circuit all but told the district court what its decision
should be on remand. The court said the SEC's allegations were "clearly
sufficient to rebut the presumption that the purported general partner-
ships here are not securities."175 While the allegations were found suffi-
cient to defeat the motion to dismiss, the claim that the oil and gas inter-
ests were investment contracts must still be proved in the district court.
However, the court's in-depth analysis of each part suggests the interests
were, at least in its opinion, conclusively investment contracts.
The first part of the Williamson test provides a joint venture may be
a security if "an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the
hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes
power as would a limited partnership." 76 The court found that even if the
investors had exercised their power to remove GeoDynamics as manag-
ing partner, they still had to rely on GeoDynamics for the success of the
joint venture because "[lt]he turnkey contracts were key to the success of
the enterprise and profits for the investors . . . [and] they were the only
way these oil and gas investments could generate money."1 77 The court
did not explain if this was enough to meet the first part of the Williamson
test, but it is reasonable to so infer.
In regard to the first and third parts of the Williamson test, it held
the SEC's allegations raised issues of fact sufficient to defeat a motion to
dismiss.178 The court was even more transparent in its analysis of part
two of the Williamson test. However, the court's analysis of the second
part was not phrased in terms of sufficiency but of legal conclusion..179
Second, we consider whether "the partner or venturer is so inexpe-
rienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable
of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers." The al-
legations that Mr. Shields marketed these oil and gas interests na-
tionwide to investors with little, if any, experience in the oil and gas
173. Id.
174. Id. at 645-48.
175. Id. at 645.
176. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981).
177. Shields, 744 F.3d at 646-47.
178. Id. at 647-48.
179. Id. at 647.
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industry by means of over 400 cold calls a day clearly supports this
conclusion.180
By making this statement the court reached a conclusion of law, effec-
tively finding that one of the Williamson factors had been met.181 Im-
portantly, the Williamson test is a factors test, not an elements test, so a
joint venture interest can be designated a security if the investor can es-
tablish any one of the Williamson factors.182 The court did not expressly
state this was enough to meet the second part of the Williamson test, but
saying that it clearly supported that conclusion rather than saying it was
sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss, as it did when discussing the
other two parts of the Williamson test, is a powerful message to the dis-
trict court.
The third part of the Williamson test provides a joint venture may be
a security if "the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he
cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise mean-
ingful partnership or venture powers." 83 The court focused on allega-
tions that Mr. Shields emphasized expertise "so unique that he was able
to offer-and investors depended on him for-estimated annualized
profits between 256% and 548%."184 Further, investors had no experi-
ence in the industry and were "totally reliant on GeoDynamics and the
turnkey drilling contracts for a profitable investment."88 The court did
not say this was enough to meet the third part of the Williamson test, but,
as in the analysis of the part one, it is a reasonable inference.
Shields all but wrote the district court's opinion. Only time will tell
if the lower court follows the not-so-subtle guidance of this decision, but
it is difficult to imagine how it could reach a conclusion that the oil and
gas interests were not investment contracts. Likely, determining that the
oil and gas interests were investments contracts subject to the Securities
Acts will be the easy part of the district court's decision. The more diffi-
cult part will be determining which sections of the Securities Acts were
violated. Hopefully, the district court delivers an opinion that punishes
Mr. Shields for what clearly appears to be fraud, assuming the SEC's
allegations are proved, and provides precedent that furthers Congress's
intent behind enacting the Securities Acts in the first place: to protect
inexperienced investors from serious abuses in the securities markets.
180. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
181. Id.
182. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
183. Id
184. Shields, 744 F.3d at 647-48.
185. Id. at 648.
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CONCLUSION
Currently, the presumption that general partnerships and joint ven-
tures are not securities remains. The Williamson test gives investors a
small chance to rebut that presumption if they can overcome, what even
the Supreme Court called, an extremely difficult burden.5 6 Even so,
there is a circuit split on how to apply Williamson, if at all. Unfortunate-
ly, the circuit split is not a simple disagreement as to whether general
partnerships and joint ventures are securities. Perhaps then the circuits
would be divided enough that the Supreme Court would step in and pro-
vide a better presumption to protect inexperienced investors, or at least
provide some certainty. The irrebuttable presumption in the Third Circuit
is the biggest outlier, and likely the only reason the Supreme Court may
address the issue. However, the lower courts, to some degree, agree on
the current presumption. Right or wrong, the Securities Acts currently do
not apply to most transactions involving general partnerships and joint
ventures. For now, buyers beware.
Joshua Eihausen*
186. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
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JURISPRUDENCE VS. JUDICIAL PRACTICE: DIMINISHING
MILLER IN THE STRUGGLE OVER JUVENILE SENTENCING
ABSTRACT
Using a case from the Kansas Supreme Court, State v. Brown, as an
illustrative case, this Comment discusses the incremental dilution of the
Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama and explores the constitu-
tional consequences of this dilution. Juvenile sentencing jurisprudence
reflects a long-standing tradition of treating juveniles differently than
adults, the rationale for which is based on principles of reduced juvenile
culpability. While previous courts imposed categorical bans on particular
sentences as applied to juveniles, Miller v. Alabama combined two lines
of precedent to strike down mandatory life without parole, affecting the
process by which courts may sentence young offenders. Using the exist-
ing Eighth Amendment principle of diminished juvenile culpability and
infusing the analysis with death penalty jurisprudence, the Miller Court
required individualized consideration of a juvenile offender's mitigating
circumstances before imposition of life without parole. Though Miller's
narrow holding is limited to mandatory life without parole, the broader
Miller rationale is applicable to all juvenile sentencing proceedings. Ju-
veniles are categorically less mature, less able to assess risk, and more
capable of reform than adults, warranting individualized consideration of
the mitigating circumstances of youthfulness prior to sentencing. How-
ever, subsequent courts have incrementally diminished Miller's prospec-
tive strength using transfer decisions and declining to extend Miller's
narrow holding to its rational end. State v. Brown illustrates this incre-
mental attack. Affirming the transfer of thirteen-year-old Brown to adult
court and upholding Brown's hard twenty life sentence for felony mur-
der, the Brown court diluted Miller. Representative of post-Miller court
decisions, Brown exemplifies the ways in which subsequent courts limit
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INTRODUCTION
Juveniles are different than adults. They are less capable of as-
sessing risk and consequence, more irrational, more malleable, and there-
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fore less culpable.' Our nation's justice system recognizes this dimin-
ished responsibility and reflects a well-established practice of treating
juveniles differently.2 Based on categorical differences between youth
and adults, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual
punishment,"3 invokes a separate and lower threshold with regard to the
treatment of juvenile offenders and proportionality in juvenile sentencing
practice.4 But how low should the threshold go?
Despite conflicting legislation at the state level,5 modem juvenile
sentencing jurisprudence has not waivered when answering this question;
juveniles, being less culpable than adults, must be sentenced differently.6
While legal treatment of juvenile offenders has evolved to reflect in-
creased scientific insight into the development and maturation of the
human brain,7 these advances only confirm the lessened culpability of
youthful offenders and encourage a system that mitigates, rather than
punishes, the criminal behavior of youth.8 Based on this rationale-that
1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-65 (2012) ("We reasoned that those findings-
of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences-both lessened a
child's 'moral culpability' and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological de-
velopment occurs, his 'deficiencies will be reformed."' (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
68-69 (2010))); see also Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too
Young to Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 118-21 (2013); Nick Straley, Miller s Promise:
Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for Children, 89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 970-76 (2014).
2. Elizabeth S. Scott, "Children Are Different ": Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 72 (2013) ("The Eighth Amendment opinions offer two consistent messag-
es-that juveniles who commit offenses are less culpable than their adult counterparts and that they
are more likely to reform."); see also Straley, supra note 1, at 965 ("[P]hysiological differences
between teenagers and adults carry constitutional significance and require that children be sentenced
differently-a principle firmly rooted in recent science and longstanding legal distinctions between
children and adults."); Andrea Wood, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juve-
niles with Adults After Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445, 1469 (2012) ("The United States
has long recognized that the differences between juveniles and adults require separate processing
and treatment for juvenile offenders.").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
4. Scott, supra note 2, at 72 ("These conclusions are based on a proportionality analysis that
draws on behavioral and neurobiological research to delineate the attributes of adolescence that
distinguish teenage offending from adult criminal activity: these traits include adolescents' propensi-
ty for taking risks without considering future consequences; their vulnerability to external influ-
ences, particularly of peers; and their unformed characters.").
5. Id. at 92-94 ("The hostility and fear that characterized attitudes toward young offenders in
the 1990s resulted in policies and decisions driven primarily by immediate public safety concerns
and the goal of punishing young criminals.").
6. Sean Craig, Note, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road
Towards A Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 386-91 (2013) ("Since the Court decided
Thompson twenty-five years ago, its notions of what it means to be a juvenile have expanded, but the
fundamental message has gone unchanged. Juveniles, by definition, are not adults, and the reality of
their lives and growth make it unfair to treat them exactly as if they were."); see also Straley, supra
note 1, at 966 ("In a trilogy of recent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that juveniles differ
from adults in their psychosocial and neurological makeups and therefore must be sentenced differ-
ently-even when those children have committed heinous crimes.").
7. Scott, supra note 2, at 81-82.
8. Christopher Slobogin, Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and
Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 106 (2013); see also Straley, supra
note 1, at 965-69, 976 ("The Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller relied upon a wealth of relatively
recent neurological and psychosocial research in finding that children must be sentenced differently
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youthfulness translates into lesser culpability-the United States Su-
preme Court has championed the creation of tangible differences be-
tween juveniles and adults in our legal system.9 Accordingly, juvenile
sentencing jurisprudence has led to a shrinking pallet of sentencing op-
tions from which courts may choose in punishing young offenders.10
As part of this long-standing tradition, Miller v. Alabama" widened
the margin between juveniles and adults with regard to sentencing
schemes by invalidating mandatory life without parole as applied to ju-
veniles.12 The Miller holding, however, did more than pick up where the
previous jurisprudence left off. Rather than imposing a flat prohibition
on a particular sentence as applied to juveniles, the Court announced a
new way in which juveniles must be considered in the process of impos-
ing a sentence.'3 In fact, Miller combined and simultaneously extended
two lines of precedent:14 on one hand, Miller relied on existing rationale
that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults; on the other
hand, the Court used adult death penalty jurisprudence as a comparative
springboard to mandate individualized consideration of youthfulness
when imposing the harshest sentences, such as life without the possibility
of parole.'5
While Miller's narrow holding only invalidated mandatory life
without parole as applied to juveniles, the Court's broader rationale is
applicable in most juvenile sentencing hearings.'6 If juveniles are cate-
than adults. . . . And finally, barring a child from ever living outside a prison's walls 'forswears
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.' It reflects 'an irrevocable judgment about [an offender's] value
and place in society, at odds with a child's capacity for change."' (second alteration in original)
(quoting Miller, 132 S Ct. at 2465)).
9. Scott, supra note 2, at 72-73 ("The Court has created a special status for juveniles through
doctrinal moves that had little precedent in its earlier Eighth Amendment cases. In its willingness to
find severe adult sentences to be excessive for juveniles, the Court elevated the prominence of pro-
portionality, setting aside the deference to legislatures that is a strong theme in modem Eighth
Amendment law and molding constitutional doctrine in a new direction.").
10. See Andrew Tunnard, Note, Not-So-Sweet Sixteen: When Minor Convictions Have Major
Consequences Under Career Offender Guidelines, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1309, 1327 (2013).
11. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
12. See Scott, supra note 2, at 76.
13. Recent Case, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1254 (2014).
14. Id. at 1254 n.22 ("Although the Court in Miller relied on two strains of precedent,...
neither dictated the outcome: The first line of precedent-adopting categorical bans on sentencing
practices that were excessively severe for a certain class of offenders-had never before been ex-
tended to include juveniles convicted of murder. The second line of precedent-requiring individual-
ized sentencing in the capital context-had never before been applied beyond the imposition of the
death penalty.").
15. Scott, supra note 2, at 75-76 (discussing the holding that "harsh sentence[s] could only be
imposed on a juvenile after the youth had the opportunity to produce evidence of mitigation," be-
cause of the "constitutional principle announced in Miller-'children are different."' (quoting Mil-
ler, 132 S Ct. at 2470)).
16. Alex Dutton, Comment, The Next Frontier of Juvenile Sentencing Reform: Enforcing
Miller's Individualized Sentencing Requirement Beyond the JL WOP Context, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 173, 197 (2013) ("The notion that juveniles are developmentally different from adults
has no limit. . . . [T]he Court has relied on this doctrine to require that youth be treated differently
than adults by the justice system. The doctrine applied with equal weight to the juvenile death penal-
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gorically less culpable than adults, sentencing structures must reflect this
principle; an offender's youthful status should be used to mitigate on
behalf of the juvenile sentence.
Despite Miller's broad applicability, courts have found numerous
ways to limit the application of Miller's rationale. In any given case,
state and circuit courts will make multiple, incremental decisions that
appear reasonable in-and-of-themselves, but which produce unreasona-
ble, even absurd results in light of Miller's broad rationale. The effect of
this incremental decision making is a slow dilution of Miller's profound
contribution to juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. And the practical out-
come of diminishing Miller is that post-Miller courts will continue to
make juvenile sentencing indistinguishable from that of adults.'8
The tendency of courts to limit Miller's broad rationale is illustrat-
ed, in part, by State v. Brown,'9 a recent Kansas Supreme Court case that
ultimately declined to extend Miller's narrow holding.20 Using charging
decisions (which involve a determination of whether to charge a juvenile
as an adult) and a straight-line reading of Miller's comparison of juvenile
sentences to the harshest adult sentences, the Brown court held a hard
twenty life sentence-an indeterminate life sentence without the possibil-
ity of parole for twenty years-did not violate the Constitution when
imposed on a juvenile offender.21 The court reasoned that a hard twenty
life sentence was not the harshest punishment available for a juvenile
and, therefore, not within Miller's reach.22 Miller used a comparison be-
tween imposing life without parole on juveniles and imposing the death
penalty on adults as a springboard for requiring individualized sentenc-
ing before imposing life without parole on a juvenile. Ironically, the
Brown court employed this same comparison to justify its conclusion that
a hard twenty life sentence was not unduly harsh for a juvenile; this is,
however, in direct opposition to the broader Miller rationale.23
ty as it did to JLWOP and juvenile Miranda rights. The imposition of mandatory sentences on juve-
nile offenders must comply with these entrenched constitutional findings." (footnotes omitted)).
17. Scott, supra note 2, at 74 ("Implicit in this generalization is a broader principle that the
same attributes of adolescence that mitigate the culpability of the youths whose crimes the Court has
reviewed reduce the blameworthiness of juveniles' criminal choices generally.").
18. See loana Tehoukleva, Note, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric
and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 101-02 (2013) (arguing that
through transfer laws and harsh, mandatory sentences "the current system treats [children] as if they
are as culpable as adults.. . .To bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality, the Court needs to take
the reasoning in Miller to its logical conclusion."). But see Scott, supra note 2, at 95 (stating that
there "is a growing tendency among lawmakers and the public to accept (once again) that young
offenders are different from adults").
19. 331 P.3d 781 (Kan. 2014).
20. Id at 797.
21. Id.
22. Id
23. See id ("The parallels between life-without-parole sentences and the death penalty that
made Woodson applicable in Miller are not present in this case. A hard 20 life sentence does not
irrevocably adjudge a juvenile offender unfit for society.").
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This Comment examines the ineffectiveness of Miller in light of a
national tendency to avoid or contain its rationale in juvenile sentencing.
Using the Kansas Supreme Court holding in State v. Brown as an illustra-
tive case, this Comment explores the ways in which courts have diluted
Miller's strength to the detriment of our constitutionally enshrined prin-
ciple that juveniles are different from adults. Part II of this Comment
explores the background of juvenile sentencing that contributed to the
evolution of modem juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. Part III provides
an analysis of the Miller v. Alabama holding and explores the Court's
broader rationale, as applied to all juvenile sentencing. Part IV then re-
views the narrow holding in State v. Brown, installing the case as a
springboard for discussion of juvenile sentencing. Referencing State v.
Brown, Part V analyzes the ways in which the Miller rationale has been
incrementally diluted by transfer mechanisms and subsequent rulings,
which decline to extend Miller. Part VI then discusses the implications of
ignoring Miller, as it diminishes the constitutional line between juveniles
and adults. Ultimately, this Comment explores the ways in which subse-
quent court decisions undermine the Miller rationale and offend the long-
standing tradition of treating juveniles differently.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Juvenile Sentencing and the Eighth Amendment
Since 1899, when the first juvenile court was established in Illinois,
the United States has recognized juveniles as constitutionally different
from adults.24 Before then, "juvenile offenders generally were treated by
the law in the same manner as adults."25 Yet, with rising concerns re-
garding the imposition of adult punishments on juveniles, states invoked
a "parens patriae" role that allowed the state to be a "protector [of juve-
niles] rather than punisher."26 Under this rationale, "a separate court sys-
tem . . . replaced traditional notions of punishment with a 'clinical' ap-
proach emphasizing rehabilitation and treatment."27 That is, although
exclusion from criminal laws did not render juveniles exempt from all
consequences, juvenile proceedings were "civil in nature, rather than
criminal or adversarial."28 This system of separation, in "reject[ing] con-
24. See Sara E. Fiorillo, Note, Mitigating After Miller: Legislative Considerations and Reme-
dies for the Future ofJuvenile Sentencing, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2095, 2098-99 (2013).
25. Laoise King, Colorado Juvenile Court History: The First Hundred Years, 32 COLO. LAW.
63, 63 (2003).
26. Kristina H. Chung, Note, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in
Adult Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999, 1011 (1991) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
27. Id. at 1009.
28. Id. at 1010.
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cepts of criminal responsibility and punishment,"2 9 codified differences
between juveniles and adults with regard to culpability.30
1. Juveniles in the Law: Delinquency vs. Criminal Charges
This approach implicated modem day notions of charging and sen-
tencing where the axis of both concepts turned not on the crime, but ra-
ther on the juvenile.31 This is evidenced by the fact that juvenile cases, no
matter what offense a juvenile committed, were delinquency proceed-
ings-involving determination as to whether a minor required "supervi-
sion of the court"-as opposed to the criminal proceedings imposed on
adult offenders.32 Here, "the purpose of the juvenile court was to focus
on the offender" within the scope of delinquency.3 3 As a result, criminal
courts imposed punitive sentences based on the committed crime while
juvenile courts instituted corrective measures based on the juvenile's
needs.34 This became a powerful distinction, because it saved juveniles
from adult sentences by deliberately placing youth on a rehabilitative,
rather than retributive track.
Though forty-six states, as well as the District of Columbia, institut-
36
ed juvenile courts by 1925, this principle of separation enjoyed little
practical effect as a result of charging decisions and sentencing schemes,
which are inextricably linked. With regard to charging decisions, the law
began recognizing some juveniles were "unfit for such programs, [and]
thus . . . require[ed] adjudication in adult courts."37 As such, juvenile
courts were allowed to transfer juvenile offenders to face charges in
29. Wood, supra note 2, at 1468.
30. Alison Powers, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Mandatory Sentencing ofJuveniles
Tried as Adults Without the Possibility of Youth as a Mitigating Factor, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 241,
246-47 (2009) (exploring rationale for separate juvenile courts, as juveniles had "less than fully
developed moral and cognitive capacities" (quoting HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT, at 94 (2006),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
31. See Jennifer Taylor, Note, California s Proposition 21: A Case ofJuvenile Injustice, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 983, 986 (2002); see also Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine Thai Arrived at the Wrong
Station: How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 420 (1999)
("A hallmark of the juvenile court, however, has always been indeterminate sentencing, which al-
lows a judge to focus on the juvenile instead of the crime." (footnote omitted)).
32. Taylor, supra note 31, at 986.
33. Id. (quoting Sara Raymond, Comment, From Playpens to Prisons: What the Gang Vio-
lence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 Does to California s Juvenile Justice System and
Reasons to Repeal It, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 233, 239 (2000)) (internal quotation mark omit-
ted).
34. Id.
35. See Zierdt, supra note 31, at 407 ("[I]t is evident that over the years the juvenile court
came to be seen as a benevolent institution, designed to help and rehabilitate children instead of to
simply punish them.").
36. Wood, supra note 2, at 1468.
37. Brice Hamack, Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass Juvenile Court, Do Not Collect Due
Process: Why Waiving Juveniles into Adult Court Without a Fitness Hearing Is a Denial of Their
Basic Due Process Rights, 14 Wyo. L. REV. 775, 785 (2014).
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criminal court.38 Although this waiver of juvenile jurisdiction over the
young offender was to be used "only in exceptional cases,"39 the excep-
tion has become the ever-expanding rule as more juveniles are tried as
40adults in the widening net of state transfer mechanisms.
First, states expanded the options available for transferring a juve-
nile to adult criminal court, providing mechanisms for transfer by "either
judicial waiver, legislative waiver, mandatory judicial waiver, or prose-
cutorial waiver."41 This left juvenile offenders more exposed to prosecu-
tion as an adult.4 2 What is more, most states have "once an adult, always
an adult" provisions that "automatically exclude[] minors from juvenile
court adjudication once they have been tried and convicted in criminal
court."4 3 The most common waiver, a judicial waiver, often requires the
juvenile judge to consider particular factors with regard to the transfer
determination, though juvenile judges have considerable discretion in
deciding whether to transfer the juvenile." However, in the aftermath of
a violence scare during the 1980s and 90s, a new "'get tough' mentali-
ty ... spilled over into the juvenile court system,"45 resulting in even
more statutorily prescribed transfers to limit this discretion.46 It is clear
now that "[c]urrent state law favors mandatory transfers over discretion-
ary transfers of serious juvenile offenders to adult criminal court."47
38. Brian J. Fuller, Case Note, Criminal Law-A Small Step Forward in Juvenile Sentencing,
but Is It Enough? The United States Supreme Court Ends Mandatory Juvenile Life Without Parole
Sentences; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 13 Wyo. L. REV. 377, 379-81 (2013).
39. Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile
Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1254, 1261 (1996) (quoting Jeffrey S.
Schwartz, Note, The Youth Offender: Transfer to the Adult Court and Subsequent Sentencing, 6
CRIM. JUST. J. 281, 290 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. David Pimentel, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles as Adults
in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 86-89 (2013); see also Slobogin,
supra note 8, at 103 ("Numerous states increased the types of crimes that trigger transfer and most
also lowered the age at which it could occur. . . .").
41. Hamack, supra note 37, at 778; see Christine Chamberlin, Note, Not Kids Anymore: A
Need for Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 391, 399
(2001) ("Between 1992 and 1997, forty-four states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation
expanding the transfer of jurisdiction over juveniles.").
42. See Zierdt, supra note 31, at 414-22 ("Today, however, we are moving away from the
rehabilitative ideal in juvenile court by making the juvenile court resemble an adult criminal court or
by certifying juveniles to stand trial in adult court.").
43. Andrea Knox, Note, Blakely and Blended Sentencing: A Constitutional Challenge to
Sentencing Child "Criminals," 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1261, 1274 (2009) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) ("Thirty-four states currently have 'once an adult, always an adult' provisions on their books.").
44. Zierdt, supra note 31, at 418.
45. Hamack, supra note 37, at 787-88.
46. Id. at 788; see also Slobogin, supra note 8, at 103 ("A third of the states also enacted
statutes authorizing prosecutorial waiver or 'direct file,' while the number of jurisdictions that
adopted 'automatic' transfer regimes for designated crimes (rather than leaving that decision to the
discretion of the juvenile court or the prosecutor) more than doubled to thirty-one."); Zierdt, supra
note 3 1, at 418 ("[B]ecause the public often views these judges as too lenient, a popular method of
increasing transfers is to limit the judge's discretion in the transfer decision.").
47. Cintron, supra note 39, at 1254; see also Slobogin, supra note 8, at 104 ("While in the
past several years some states have reduced the scope of transfer or have raised the age for criminal
court jurisdiction, the latter number has stayed fairly constant since 2000." (footnote omitted)).
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Second, while most statutes limit transfers "to juveniles of a mini-
mum age who have been charged with specific offenses,"48 states have
consistently lowered this minimum age at which a juvenile may be
charged as an adult, instituting a "trend of lowering rather than raising
the age of juvenile criminal liability." 4 9 For example, in the late 1990's,
Missouri lowered its minimum transfer age to twelve from fourteen; In-
diana lowered its minimum age to ten from sixteen; and twenty-two
states "no longer impose[d] any minimum age requirement for at least
one method of transferring jurisdiction to adult court."50 Many of these
legislative changes were proffered in the wake of a perceived increase in
violence, rising from the sensationalism of press, not from consideration
of long-enduring tenets of the juvenile court or from consideration of the
juveniles themselves.51 As states widened their nets with regard to trans-
fers, increasing numbers of juveniles became ensnared in the adult crim-
* 52inal system.
In effect, "[t]he liberalization of transfer laws . . . seems to reflect
this logic; the fact that someone is a juvenile is not itself a sufficient ba-
sis for granting the leniency afforded by the juvenile criminal justice
system."53 As a result, "many of the transfer statutes are keyed not to the
maturity level of the offender, but to the seriousness of the offense,"54
which not only offends the rehabilitative rationale underlying juvenile
courts, but results in harsher sentences without achieving the hoped-for
deterrence.
2. Juvenile Sentencing and the Eighth Amendment
With state transfer laws funneling more juveniles into adult court,
which changed the sentencing schemes applied to those juveniles,57 the
48. Chamberlin, supra note 41, at 400.
49. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 867 & n.3 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
multiple state laws lowering the applicable waiver age).
50. Chamberlin, supra note 41, at 399.
51. Zierdt, supra note 31, at 419.
52. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 104 ("In New York State alone, this move led to the adult
prosecution of over 45,000 youths aged sixteen and seventeen in 2010. . . . [A]nd the number of
juveniles under eighteen prosecuted as adults skyrocketed from somewhere between 10,000 and
15,000 a year to 250,000 a year." (footnotes omitted)).
53. Pimentel, supra note 40, at 89.
54. Id. at 91.
55. See id. at 86; see also Robert Anthonsen, Note, Furthering the Goal ofJuvenile Rehabili-
tation, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 729, 741 (2010) (discussing numerous studies that show "adult
criminal sentencing and the threat of adult criminal sentencing have proven ineffective in deterring
juvenile crime and recidivism"); Cynthia R. Noon, Comment, "Waiving" Goodbye to Juvenile
Defendants, Getting Smart vs. Getting Tough, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431, 453-54 (1994) (discussing
how legislative waivers are inconsistent with the rehabilitative goals ofjuvenile courts because "they
focus on the offense rather than the individual juvenile's characteristics").
56. See Wendy N. Hess, Kids Can Change: Reforming South Dakota's Juvenile Transfer Law
to Rehabilitate Children and Protect Public Safety, 59 S.D. L. REV. 312, 313 (2014) (stating there
are about "250,000 children under age eighteen who are sent to the U.S. adult criminal system every
year").
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Supreme Court began to consider whether applying certain harsh adult
sentences to juveniles was constitutional.58 Specifically, the Court in-
voked the same rationale used to establish juvenile courts, insisting that
youth were different from adults because "their irresponsible conduct is
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult" due to their lack of expe-
rience, education, and lesser intelligence,5 9 and that such differences car-
ried Eighth Amendment implications with regard to sentencing.60 As a
result of this rationale, the Court proffered a series of decisions, which
incrementally explored the question: to what extent is criminal sentenc-
ing required to treat juveniles differently?
The Court began chipping away at harsh juvenile sentencing in
Thompson v. Oklahoma,6 1 a case in which a fifteen-year-old was con-
victed of homicide and sentenced to death.62 Holding the death penalty
for a juvenile offender under the age of sixteen is unconstitutional, the
Court reasoned that "youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time
and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence
and to psychological damage."63 Accordingly, the Court weighed the
need for "punishment [to] be directly related to . . . personal culpabil-
ity,"16 and assessed the "differences which must be accommodated in
determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of
adults."65 The Court found the death penalty, as applied to a fifteen-year-
old, antithetical to the purpose of the penalty: "the lesser culpability of
the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's
fiduciary obligations to its children" made principles of retribution "in-
applicable" and notions of deterrence unfounded.6 6 Here, the Thompson
Court returned to the bedrock principles of juvenile courts, recognizing
that "the Court ha[d] already endorsed the proposition that less culpabil-
ity should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable
crime committed by an adult."67
Following Thompson, the Court invoked this notion of reduced ju-
venile culpability to further limit juvenile sentencing options. In Roper v.
57. Chamberlin, supra note 41, at 403 ("Naturally, if jurisdiction over a juvenile is transferred
to adult court and the juvenile is found guilty of the offense, the court may impose upon the juvenile
the adult sanction appropriate for the offense.").
58. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824-35 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also id.
at 867-69, 872 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the trend in lowering the age at which juveniles
may be sentenced as adults, while considering whether the death sentence was unconstitutional as
applied to a fifteen year-old).
59. Id at 835 (plurality opinion).
60. Id at 833-35.
61. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 818-19.
63. Id. at 834, 838 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
64. Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
65. Id. at 823 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
66. Id. at 836-37.
67. Id at 835.
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Simmons,68 a seventeen-year-old was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death.69 The Roper Court held the death penalty, as applied to all per-
sons under the age of eighteen, is unconstitutional.70 Here, the Roper
Court extended Thompson's rationale by elaborating on the chasmic dif-
ferences between juveniles and adults. First, the Court noted "[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . in youth
more often than in adults . . . . result[ing] in . . . ill-considered actions
and decisions. Second, the Court reiterated the fact that juveniles are
more "vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pres-
sures."72 Finally, the Court noted the malleability of juvenile character,
explaining that the "personality traits of juveniles are more transitory,
less fixed," and therefore more capable of reform.73 For these reasons,
the Court concluded, "juvenile offenders cannot . . . be classified among
the worst offenders," as to warrant the "most severe punishment."74
In 2010, the Court again leveraged notions of diminished juvenile
culpability to insulate youth from harsh sentences. In Graham v. Flori-
da,'75 the Court reviewed a seventeen-year-old juvenile's sentence of life
without the possibility of parole. The seventeen-year-old had been
charged with robbery, "possessing a firearm, and .. . associating with
persons engaged in criminal activity"-all violations of his 3-year proba-
tion for prior commissions.76 The Graham Court held that life without
the possibility of parole is unconstitutional when imposed on juveniles
for nonhomicidal offenses. In analyzing this "categorical challenge to a
term-of-years sentence"78 as applied to juvenile offenders, the Court con-
tinued the Thompson and Roper rationale that because juveniles possess
"lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punish-
ments."79
However, the Court applied this rationale with specific reference to
and concern for the severity of life without parole sentences as applied to
juveniles convicted of nonhomicidal crimes.80 Finding "[t]he age of the
offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the analysis,"8' the
Court reasoned that life without parole was particularly ill-applied to
68. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
69. Id at 556.
70. Id. at 578.
71. Id at 569 (first alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id at 570.
74. Id at 568-69.
75. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
76. Id. at 55, 57.
77. Id at 74-75.
78. Id. at 61.
79. Id at 68.
80. Id. at 68-75.
81. Id. at 69.
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juveniles, when considering the "penological justifications for the sen-
tencing practice" in light of a juvenile's diminished culpability and the
nonhomicidal nature of the offense.82 Specifically, the Court noted: "Life
without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile," given
the percentage of life a juvenile would spend incarcerated.83 Because life
without parole was the harshest sentence a juvenile offender could re-
ceive at that time, the Court likened this sentence to the most severe pun-
ishment available for adults-the death penalty.8 Recognizing both sen-
tences facilitated the same grave result,85 and failed to satisfy penological
goals of the criminal system, the Court found "the limited culpability of
juvenile nonhomicide offenders" was "not adequate to justify life with-
out parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders."86 In continuation of this
rationale, the Court also concluded that while a state does not have to
assure the ultimate release of juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes,
it must provide those juveniles "some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."87
II. MILLER V. ALABAMA INTRODUCES INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING
The most recent, and perhaps most controversial juvenile sentencing
decision came on the heels of Graham in 2012. In Miller v. Alabama, the
Supreme Court considered two cases on collateral review: two fourteen-
year-olds were "convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole."88 The Court held that mandatory life
without parole for juveniles was unconstitutional.89 In making this de-
termination, the Court relied on "the confluence of . .. two lines of prec-
edent" expressed in Roper and Graham.90 First, the Court reasoned, as it
did in Roper and Graham, that "the distinctive attributes of youth" make
children "constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentenc-
ing."9' The operation of this principle therefore "diminish[ed] the peno-
logical justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile of-
fenders."92 Second, the Court relied on Graham's reasoning-drawing a
parallel between life-without-parole sentences imposed on juveniles to
the death penalty imposed on adults-to extend the rationale for individ-
ualized consideration of a juvenile before imposing life-without-
parole."93 Thus, and in light of this precedent, the Court concluded indi-
82. Id. at 63, 71-73.
83. Id. at 70-71.
84. Id. at 69-70.
85. Id. at 69 ("[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences
that are shared by no other sentences.").
86. Id. at 71-75.
87. Id. at 75.
88. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
89. Id.
90. Id at 2464.
91. Id. at 2458, 2465.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2466.
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vidualized consideration of mitigating factors of youth is required when a
juvenile faces life without possibility of parole.94
In combining the Roper and Graham precedents, the Miller Court
concluded the difference between juveniles and adults is constitutionally
pertinent because youth (1) lack mental maturity and responsibility; (2)
are more susceptible to outside influences; and (3) are more capable of
change, such that they may be rehabilitated.95
The Court held that because "youth matters in determining the ap-
propriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of pa-
role,"96 a "judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider certain
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty
for juveniles."97 These mitigating circumstances, laid down by the Court,
included:
"[C]hronological age and its hallmark features-among them, imma-
turity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,"
his "family and home environment," "the circumstances of the homi-
cide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct
and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him," and
the prospects for rehabilitation while incarcerated.98
A. Miller's Broad Rationale for Individualized Consideration is Appli-
cable to All Juvenile Sentencing Proceedings
Miller's broader rationale, despite its narrow holding, sparked a tug-
of-war between the principles expressed in juvenile sentencing jurispru-
dence, and the actual, subsequent reatment of juvenile offenders in state
and federal courts.99 The Miller Court used a comparison between the
death penalty, imposed on adult criminals, and life-without-parole as
applied to juveniles to arrive at an individualization requirement.'00 This
was a legal springboard catapulting juvenile sentencing jurisprudence
forward into an individualization requirement. However, by making this
comparison, Miller allowed subsequent courts to afford juveniles indi-
vidualized protection only where a similarly situated adult criminal
would receive such. To say, as this Comment does, that Miller's broader
rationale is being incrementally diminished, is to imply that such diminu-
tion is not warranted. It is therefore necessary to establish this founda-
94. Id at 2467-68 ("Graham and Roper and our individualized sentencing cases alike teach
that in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as
an adult.").
95. Id. at 2464; see also Straley, supra note 1, at 968 (footnotes omitted).
96. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
97. Id. at 2475.
98. Id at 2468.
99. See Tehoukleva, supra note 18, at 102 ("The Court's admission that 'children are consti-
tutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing' does not match the experience of juve-
niles in the criminal justice system." (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464)).
100. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
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tional premise-that the broader Miller rationale, rather than the narrow
Miller holding, is an appropriately applicable standard in juvenile sen-
tencing schemes-before exposing the lack of its proper treatment in
subsequent judicial decisions.
1. Individualized Consideration at the Core of Sentencing Juvenile
Offenders
The rationale expressed in Miller, though a continuation of the ra-
tionale used in Thompson, Roper, and Graham, introduced a new princi-
ple for juvenile sentencing: individualized consideration of a juvenile
offender when imposing the harshest sentences.101 Where the Thompson
and Roper Courts focused on a particular sentence as applied to a catego-
ry of offenders (juveniles),10 2 and the Graham Court focused on a partic-
ular crime as disproportionate to a singular sentence with respect to that
category of offenders,103 the Miller Court broke new ground by focusing
on the individual mitigating circumstances of the particular juvenile of-
fender to prohibit mandatory imposition of life without parole.'1" While
each Court imposed a categorical ban on particular sentences with regard
to juvenile offenders, only the Miller Court combined this precedent with
its individualization requirement to strike down the mandatory applica-
tion of a particularly harsh sentence.0 5 The focus on the harshest sen-
tences is indicative of Miller's intent to shape juvenile sentencing juris-
prudence in a way that focuses on the individual and youthful status of a
juvenile offender, rather than the crime committed or sentence applied.06
Though the Miller Court only required individualized consideration
in cases where juveniles face life without parole,107 the rationale, which
justified and mandated the process of individualized sentencing, extends
to all sentences imposed on juvenile offenders for two primary reasons.
First, the Miller Court focused more on the individual circumstances of
the juvenile offender than on the sentence itself, promoting a resurrection
of juvenile-centered juvenile sentencing.0 8 Second, the Court's rationale
in requiring individualization can remain intact upon application to other
mandatory juvenile sentencing schemes.
101. Scott, supra note 2, at 88.
102. Michael Barbee, Comment, Juveniles Are Different: Juvenile Life Without Parole After
Graham v. Florida, 81 Miss. L.J. 299, 303-05, 307 (2011).
103. Id. at 310.
104. See Sonia Mardarewich, Certainty in a World of Uncertainty: Proposing Statutory Guide-
lines in Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without Parole, 16 SCHOLAR 123, 125 (2013) (implying the
revolutionary nature of Miller's holding).
105. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2014).
106. Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 97 (arguing that "the Court in Miller opened the door to a
much more thorough challenge of the current system, namely the argument that all juveniles deserve
individualized justice").
107. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
108. See id. (discussing the rationale behind individualized sentencing for juveniles by saying
"mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances
most suggest it").
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i. Miller's Focus on the Individual Juvenile Offender
Turning to Miller's universally applicable rationale for individual-
ized consideration, the Court's general focus on an offender's juvenile
status is instructive in all juvenile sentencing proceedings. Rather than
categorically banning life without the possibility of parole for all juve-
niles, the Miller Court held that the juvenile status of an offender triggers
individualized consideration of that particular youth's mitigating circum-
stances in the imposition of such a sentence.109 In a lengthy discussion of
the offending juveniles, Miller and Jackson, the Court focused primarily
on the mitigating circumstances attending their crimes rather than focus-
ing on the crime.'10 Discussing Miller, the Court noted, "if ever a patho-
logical background might have contributed to a 14-year-old's commis-
sion of a crime, it is here."" While acknowledging that there is no doubt
he "committed a vicious murder," the Court quickly moved on to discuss
how "Miller's stepfather physically abused him; his alcoholic and drug-
addicted mother neglected him; he had been in and out of foster care as a
result; and he had tried to kill himself four times."11 2
In reference to Jackson, the Court points out that "his age could well
have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as well as his willing-
ness to walk away" when he learned that his friend had a gun.l 13 Noting
that "[b]oth his mother and his grandmother had previously shot other
individuals," the Court pays special attention to the individual "circum-
stances [that went] to Jackson's culpability for the offense."1 4 Ultimate-
ly, the Court applies a great deal of weight to the individual circumstanc-
es of each offender in determining the sentence is too harsh.'15
In turning judicial attention away from the crime and corresponding
sentence towards the juvenile offender himself, the Court discusses the
need for individualized consideration, saying, "At the least, a sentencer
should look at such facts before depriving a 14-year-old of any prospect
of release from prison."' 6 Regardless of whether the Court was actually
exercising "judicial minimalism"ll 7 in making this determination instead
109. Id. at 2469 (saying "[b]ecause that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not
consider Jackson's and Miller's alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categor-
ical bar on life without parole for juveniles," while asserting its expectation that such sentences
would be "uncommon.").
110. Id. at 2468-69.
111. Id at 2469.
112. Id
113. Id. at 2468.
114. Id.
115. Id. (discussing how "[b]oth cases before [the Court] illustrate the problem" that arises
when "imposing a State's harshest penalties [because] a sentencer misses too much if he treats every
child as an adult").
116. Id. at 2469.
117. See Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama
Led the Court's "Kids Are Different" Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down A Blind Alley, 46
AKRON L. REv. 489, 491 (2013).
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of imposing a categorical ban, the door to this particular rationale was
nonetheless opened and left deliberately wide open.m
This is especially true where a categorical ban on life without parole
seems more minimalistic in effect than a lengthy combination of two
precedential lines that so curiously and obviously baits the extension of
individualization requirements in all juvenile sentencing. For example,
had the Court imposed a categorical ban on life without parole as applied
to juveniles, it could have simply extended Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence in light of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society."'"19 While foreclosing all opportunity to im-
pose life without parole on juveniles, which is arguably more immediate-
ly effective,1 2 0 a categorical ban would have left untouched a nationwide
practice of treating juveniles like adults, aside from the small subset of
categorically forbidden sentences. It would not have infused the sentenc-
ing inquiry with an individualization requirement, and courts would not
be obliged to meaningfully consider youthfulness as a mitigating fac-
tor.121 As a result, the door to meaningful consideration of a juvenile of-
fender's youthfulness before the imposition of other sentences would
remain closed.22
However, because the Court chose to build on the jurisprudence re-
quiring individualized sentencing, lower courts should take note and
begin following suit-considering juveniles as juveniles.123 This opened
the door to forward thinking that could-and arguably does-require
individual consideration of juveniles before imposing any sentence.
118. See Piper Waldron, Case Comment, Youth Matters: Miller v. Alabama's Implications for
Individualized Review in Juvenile Sentencing, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 775, 776 (2013) ("Miller ex-
pands the Eighth Amendment as it is applied to juveniles, since its reasoning may challenge other
mandatory laws that negate individualized sentencing.").
119. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
120. Fuller, supra note 38, at 392-93 ("The Court, however, should have engaged fully in the
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis and adopted a categorical rule prohibiting life without
parole sentences for all juveniles. A categorical rule would still give sentencing judges ample discre-
tion to impose a severe punishment that fulfills the penological goals of retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation while properly focusing on the juvenile offender's rehabilitation and taking youth into
account as a mitigating factor." (footnotes omitted)).
121. Id. at 394 (noting that, while Miller did not provide proper guidance for subsequent
courts, "courts are now required to consider youth as a mitigating factor").
122. See id at 393 ("The State could best comply with Miller in one of two ways. First, the
state can require judges to consider mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. Second, the state
can simply eliminate life without parole for juveniles." (footnotes omitted)).
123. See id at 403-04 (discussing that, although, "the Court did not address whether a lengthy
term of years sentence for juvenile offenders would violate the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual," subsequent courts have interpreted Miller to implicate sentences other than mandatory life
without parole).
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ii. Miller's Rationale Applies to Other Mandatory Sentencing
Schemes
In addition to focusing on the individual circumstances of an of-
fender because of his or her juvenile status, the Court's assertion that
youthfulness is a justification for diminished juvenile culpability operates
as a universally mitigating factor in juvenile sentencing.124 This opens
the door to individualized sentencing of all juvenile offenders. While the
Court does state that rendering youth "irrelevant . . . poses too great a
risk of disproportionate punishment," when imposing only the "harshest
prison sentence,"1 25 the Court's rationale is applicable to all mandatory
sentencing schemes, as the mitigating factors of youth are inherently
present in all sentencing considerations with regard to juvenile offend-
ers.126 For example, the Court's discussion of the "flaws [in] imposing
mandatory life-without-parole" on juveniles reveals a transferrable justi-
fication with regard to the disproportionate effects of such sentences on
less culpable, youthful individuals.127 In saying that "[s]uch mandatory
penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an
offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances at-
tendant to it," 28 the Court identifies common reality inherent in all man-
datory sentences applied to juveniles. The Court further expresses dissat-
isfaction that
[u]nder these schemes, every juvenile [would] receive the same sen-
tence as every other-the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shoot-
er and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the
child from a chaotic and abusive one. . . . [E]ach juvenile (including
these two 14-year-olds) will receive the same sentence as the vast
majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses .... 129
The rationale for mitigating all juvenile sentencing with considera-
tion of an individual offender also has an important degree of logical
transferability with regard to the Court's analysis of both punitive goals
and youthfulness. The punitive goals of criminal sentencing and the prin-
ciples of lessened culpability due to an offender's youthfulness are equal-
ly implicated in other mandatory sentencing schemes.130 The Court rec-
124. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
125. Id. at 2469.
126. Id. at 2467 (discussing the application of the mitigating qualities of youth throughout
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and recognizing that "we insisted in these rulings that a sentencer
have the ability to consider the 'mitigating qualities of youth.' Everything we said in Roper and
Graham about that stage of life also appears in these [prior] decisions." (citation omitted) (quoting
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))); id at 2466 (discussing how the "mandatory penalty
schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central considerations").
127. See id
128. Id
129. Id. at 2467-68.
130. See Waldron, supra note 118, at 786-90; see also Powers, supra note 30, at 254
("[M]andatory minimums clearly disserve the best interests of juveniles tried as adults in failing to
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ognized that where "'[t]he heart of the retribution rationale' relates to an
offender's blameworthiness," a mandatory imposition of life without
parole is scarcely useful in sentencing a less culpable offender.131 This
same rationale applies to all mandatory sentencing schemes because such
schemes not only preclude consideration of a juvenile's categorically
lessened culpability, but preclude individualized consideration of that
juvenile as well. 13 2 In addition, the punitive goal of deterrence is not like-
ly achieved by any mandatory sentencing scheme, where the Miller
Court itself asserted, "'the same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable than adults'-their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity-
make them less likely to consider potential punishment."33 This rationale
is applicable to any mandatory sentences, where any potential punish-
ment is likely to have little effect on juvenile actions.134
The second piece of Miller's rationale that applies to all mandatory
juvenile sentencing is the juvenile's youthful characteristics. The Miller
Court's rationale is transferable to other mandatory sentencing schemes
as the same characteristics of youth are inherent in all juveniles. For ex-
ample, the Miller Court leans heavily on the principles expressed in
Thompson, Roper, and Graham: "youth is more than a chronological
fact";135 it is a time when people are "most susceptible to influence and
to psychological damage";13 6 "it is a time of immaturity, irresponsibility,
'impetuousness[,] and recklessness';137 "[a]nd its 'signature qualities'
are all 'transient."' 38 The Court's own rationale for requiring individual-
ized consideration of juveniles when imposing the "[s]tate's harshest
penalties," demands extension, as "a sentencer misses too much if he
treats every child as an adult" in any sentencing scheme.1 39 This is espe-
cially true where "[t]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults ...
put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings."i1 40 Juve-
niles tend not to trust adults and are unable to comprehend the processes
and players associated with the justice system, such that juveniles do not
cooperate in their own defense-this leads to diminished quality of ad-
vocacy on a juvenile's behalf.14 1
consider the distinct needs and developmental level of each child offender, while providing ques-
tionable benefits, if any, to the country as a whole." (footnote omitted)).
131. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
71 (2010)).
132. Feld, supra note 1, at 129.
133. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 72).
134. Dutton, supra note 16, at 200.
135. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115) (internal quotation mark omitted).
137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)).
138. Id. (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368).
139. Id. at 2468.
140. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
141. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
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The Court's rationale, focusing on the juvenile offender, is transfer-
able to mandatory sentences other than a life without parole. In fact, the
Miller Court recognized the inherent transferability of its own rationale,
stating, "[N]one of what is said about children-about their distinctive
(and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities-is
crime-specific." 4 2 The transferability of Miller's rationale to all juvenile
sentencing schemes is critical because the same dangers underlying the
Court's insistence upon individualized sentencing when considering the
imposition of life without parole on a juvenile are present in all other
mandatory juvenile sentencing schemes, including the imposition of un-
deserved and disproportionate sentences.143 Public policy would general-
ly necessitate an extension of the Court's rationale.'44
The Court employs one crime-specific inquiry in Miller. In cases of
mandatory life-without-parole sentences will juveniles serve "a greater
sentence than those adults [convicted of homicide] will serve." 45 Though
this consideration turns on the particular sentence rather than the juve-
nile's individual circumstances, this factor alone is not dispositive in
light of the Court's broader rationale.
Therefore, when determining whether to contain Miller's holding, it
remains critical to focus on the broader rationale to which the Court de-
voted its attention. This requires understanding the difference between
the legal argument the Miller Court used to extend individualized sen-
tencing to juveniles and the overarching rationale the Court employs as
the broader justification for such an extension. The Court first focused on
the harsh nature of mandatory life without parole to bridge two lines of
precedent and legitimize the extension of an individualized sentencing
requirement under death penalty jurisprudence; the Court's subsequent
discussion and stated reasons for extending the individualized sentencing
requirement, however, focused on the lesser culpability and youthful
status of the juveniles themselves. This is wholly transferable to all man-
datory juvenile sentencing schemes and is not foreclosed just because the
Miller Court was not asked to decide the constitutionality of such all
mandatory schemes.146 Subsequent courts must therefore be careful not
to lose sight of the rationale the Miller Court employed in reaching its
narrow outcome. To do so, would be to mistake the means-comparing
142. Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller and Jackson:
Obtaining Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 372 (2013) (quoting
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68 ("Under these [mandatory] schemes, every juvenile will
receive the same sentence as every other-the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the
accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one."); see
also Dutton, supra note 16, at 199-200.
144. Waldron, supra note 118, at 783-90 (recognizing that children are different).
145. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68.
146. See Slobogin, supra note 8, at 110 ("[T]he majority opinion in Miller focused on the
inability of mandatory penalties to reflect individualized desert determinations, not on the absolute
length of the sentence.").
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life without parole and the death penalty to extend individualized sen-
tencing-for the end, which is simply not the case.
2. Standards for Individualized Consideration: Youthfulness a  a
Mitigating Factor
Of course, such individualized consideration is not synonymous
with loose or unbridled discretion; rather, it must be guided by the enu-
merated factors and overall spirit expressed in Miller.147 These factors
buttress, and cannot be divorced from, the Court's holding, and for that
reason, should guide subsequent courts in consideration of juvenile of-
fenders.148 There may be some concern-arguably well-founded concern,
given lower courts' application of Miller-that the Miller decision has
opened the door to unbridled discretion when courts conduct individual
considerations in sentencing juveniles to life without parole.149 However,
correct application of individualized sentencing under Miller limits this
possibility and requires, at least, that the factors of youth mitigate the
severity of the crime on behalf of a juvenile, not provide a basis to ag-
gravate a sentence.150
The Miller Court, echoing jurisprudence, outlines four mitigating
factors: (1) "chronological age and its hallmark features-among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequenc-
es";151 (2) background, including family and home environment; (3)
mental and emotional development; and (4) circumstances of the crime,
"including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way fa-
milial and peer pressures may have affected him." 5 2 It is important to
note, the Miller Court assesses these factors with a careful eye towards
how they advocate on behalf of a juvenile,153 after noting the objective,
scientific fact that youth have a "diminished culpability and heightened
capacity for change."54 Thus, while the Court engages a subjective anal-
ysis of the juvenile offenders' family background and environment and
the particularities of the offenders' crimes, the Court focuses only on the
147. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467; see Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth:
Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 50 (2013) ("[I]ndividual assessments made
without any guidance can lead to arbitrary and capricious decision-making, an issue that has plagued
transfer decisions.").
148. See Waldron, supra note 118, at 775 (noting, in its discussion of Miller that
"[i]ndividualized review is a comprehensive approach to juvenile sentencing, under which a court
must consider mitigating factors such as susceptibility to peer pressure, underdeveloped brains, and
traumatic life stories").
149. Berkheiser, supra note 117, at 510 ("Miller, with its mandate of individualized considera-
tion at sentencing, reopens the door to all of the malignity of subjective decision-making and its
fruits.").
150. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (requiring courts, before imposing sentences of life without
parole, to "take into account how children are different").
151. Straley, supra note 1, at 995 n. 181 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468).
152. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
153. Id. at 2468-69.
154. See id
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mitigating aspects of those factors. For example, the Court observed one
of the offenders, Jackson, had a background of family "immersion in
violence," after noting that a juvenile cannot remove himself from cer-
tain family situations, "no matter how brutal or dysfunctional."15 This
provides guidance as to how these factors should be weighed by subse-
quent courts, as the Miller Court appears to affirm the Roper Court's
mandate that a juvenile offender's youthfulness not be "counted against
him,"156 but instead work on his behalf. There is no reason subsequent
courts should fail to do otherwise,57 and these factors, and their mitigat-
ing purpose, must be strictly employed by courts to mitigate harsh sen-
tences, not exacerbate them.
1II. STATE V. BROWN
While Miller's rationale for individualized consideration of youthful
offenders is applicable to all juvenile sentencing proceedings, a wave of
subsequent decisions reveal the tendency to limit Miller's reach. Illustrat-
ing this trend is State v. Brown.'58 Interpreting Miller, the Kansas Su-
preme Court held that a mandatory hard twenty life sentence was not
unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment principles.159 In Brown, a
juvenile offender appealed her conviction for "felony murder and at-
tempted aggravated robbery."160 The juvenile appealed on multiple
grounds, including: (1) improper "juvenile jurisdiction waiver",;'6 1 and
(2) an unconstitutional sentence in light of the Miller v. Alabama rul-
ing.162
A. Facts
Keaira Brown was thirteen years old when she allegedly shot six-
teen-year-old Scott Sappintgon, Jr. at point-blank range in an attempted
robbery.'63 In light of fingerprints, DNA evidence, and eyewitness ac-
counts connecting her to bloody clothing and to the scene of the crime,
Brown was charged with felony murder based on the offense of attempt-
ed aggravated robbery.1 6 The state sought "authorization to prosecute
Brown as an adult," 65 under a statute that presumed a juvenile to be a
juvenile "unless good cause [was] shown to prosecute the juvenile as an
155. Id at 2468.
156. Berkheiser, supra note 117, at 508 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
157. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
158. 331 P.3d 781 (Kan. 2014).
159. Idat797.
160. Id at 785.
161. Id. at 785-86.
162. Id. at 786.
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adult."1 6 6 The district court waived juvenile jurisdiction using an eight-
factor test that considered the following:
"(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protec-
tion of the community requires prosecution as an adult .. .;
"(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, vi-
olent, premeditated or willful manner;
"(3) whether the offense was against a person or against property[,]
[with] [g]reater weight . . . given to offenses against persons ... ;
"(4) the number of alleged offenses unadjudicated and pending
against the juvenile;
"(5) the previous history of the juvenile, including ... whether [prior]
offenses were against persons or property ... ;
"(6) the sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional atti-
tude, pattern of living or desire to be treated as an adult;
"(7) whether there are facilities or programs available to the court
which are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile prior to the expiration of
the court's jurisdiction . . ; and
"(8) whether the interests of the juvenile or of the community would
be better served by criminal prosecution or extended jurisdiction ju-
venile prosecution.167
In consideration of these factors the court placed emphasis on the
serious nature of the crime, as it was committed against another person
and was particularly violent.168 These conclusions were weighed against
a finding that the evidence "fell short of establishing a likelihood Brown
could be rehabilitated before juvenile jurisdiction expired."1 69 The court
found Brown could not be rehabilitated after testimony from a psycholo-
gist that Brown's numerous behavioral disorders could be rehabilitated in
the seven years the system had left to "work with her,"l70 but that be-
cause she had "become[] aggressive at 13, [she had] a statistically greater
risk of reoffending than one who becomes aggressive at 17." 171 With
specific regard to the maturity factor, however, the court made oral find-
ings that the evidence supported a "wash"; there were "aspects of Miss
Brown that [were] 13 years of age, and there [were] aspects of her that
166. Id. at 789 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(a)(1) (2014) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
167. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e) (2014)).
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[were] an adult age."l72 Here "the court did not find the evidence of
Brown's maturity level was enough to consider that factor in the analy-
sis."l 73 Brown's history also supported waiver of jurisdiction, where she
had fired a gun and thrown rocks at a car in an altercation, hit her aunt
with an iron, and sustained "57 disciplinary infractions" while housed in
the juvenile detention center.174 The court then made a more matter-of-
fact finding that the community would be better protected through waiver
of such jurisdiction.7 5
B. The Kansas Supreme Court's Analysis
On appeal, Brown challenged three basic conclusions proffered by
the lower court with regard to the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. Brown
argued: (1) the court improperly gave her the burden of proof with regard
to showing the ability of rehabilitation; (2) the court erred in considering
the seriousness, violence nature, and against-a-person factors separately,
though their facts substantially overlapped; and (3) the court impermissi-
bly relied on the nature of the crime and her "grooming habits" in deter-
mining that her maturity went "beyond that of juvenile."1 76
While the Kansas Supreme Court did not use Miller in reviewing
the trial court's decision to transfer Brown, this Comment argues the
court's deference to the trial court's runaway discretion, when viewed in
light of the effects of juvenile transfer to adult court, nevertheless war-
rant the use of Miller's individual consideration requirement in all juve-
nile sentencing. First, the Kansas Supreme Court found the district court
did not improperly give Brown the burden of proof by considering
statements made by Brown's psychologist on cross-examination; reliance
on the psychologist's statements indicating various programs "could help
rehabilitate Brown," but that she would be a "challenging case," did not
fall outside the scope of permissible considerations in deciding the reha-
bilitation factor.177 Notably, however, the court took no issue with the
fact that Brown's age worked against her in that analysis.
Second, the court dismissed Brown's argument that separate con-
sideration of the first three factors was "duplicitous," resulting in an un-
reasonable weight in favor of transfer.178 The court framed each factor as
an inquiry that "concem[ed] different subject matter," where the serious-
ness of the crime related to the gravity, and the violence of the crime
172. Id at 790 (quoting the oral ruling of the district court).
173. Id. at 788.
174. Id. at 787.
175. Id. at 788.
176. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Stevens, 975 P.2d 801, 805 (Kan. 1999)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:3
related to the manner in which a grave crime may be committed.19 Here,
the court found no error in focusing a substantial amount of the analysis
on the crime, as long as each factor considered a theoretically different
facet of that crime.
Finally, with regard to Brown's arguments that the lower court im-
properly considered her crime and dress habits in concluding that her
maturity favored transfer, the court found both without merit." First, the
court permitted consideration of Brown's crime in relation to her maturi-
ty, because that factor was not given dispositive treatment by the lower
court. However, four of the eight factors considered in the transfer deci-
sion already involved assessing the nature of Brown's crime. Thus, it is
arguable that allowing one more factor to focus on the crime itself, which
often tipped a particular factor in favor of transfer, was dispositive in
effect, as it then pushed five of the eight factors towards transfer.8' Se-
cond, the court found no abuse in the lower court's memorandum be-
cause the district court had specified that its oral findings, not the memo-
randum, were to control.182 Here, while the memorandum indicated "that
Brown's 'choice at her young age to adopt the grooming habits and
clothing of a boy are . . . indications of a [more] mature attitude,"' the
Kansas Supreme Court focused its review on the oral findings as directed
by the lower court and found no abuse of discretion in those findings,
however sparse the lower court's oral analysis had proved.183 The court
therefore affirmed the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.184
At trial, Brown was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory "hard
20 life sentence for [felony] murder and a concurrent 32-month sentence
for attempted aggravated robbery."'85 After affirming the waiver of juve-
nile jurisdiction, the court considered the constitutionality of Brown's
mandatory hard twenty life sentence in light of Miller.
Brown argued that because she was a minor and the mandatory sen-
tencing scheme failed to consider her age, the imposition of her hard
twenty life sentence was unconstitutional under Miller.186 Nonetheless,
the Kansas Supreme Court held that such a sentence did not fall within
the Miller holding.187 To find "mandatory life-with-parole sentences [as
applied to juveniles] are unconstitutional," it asserted, required an unwar-
ranted extension of the Miller decision.'8 8 Specifically, the court rea-
179. Id.
180. Id. at 790-91.
181. See id. at 789, 791.
182. Id.at788.
183. Id. at 791 (second alteration in original) (quoting memorandum opinion of the district
court).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 786.
186. Id. at 796-97.
187. Id. at 797.
188. Id.
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soned that Miller was premised on notions of lessened juvenile culpabil-
ity and the analogous nature of "juvenile life without parole sentences to
capital punishment."l89 Specifically, the court noted that a mandatory
hard twenty life did not meet the same threshold of severity as to justify
elevating the sentence to life-without-parole status and trigger Miller's
applicability; the "parallels between life-without-parole sentences and
the death penalty" were not present in a life with parole sentence.90
Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized the opportunity to ex-
tend Miller's decision, yet found Miller's rationale "inapplicable," where
"[a] hard 20 life sentence [did] not irrevocably adjudge a juvenile of-
fender unfit for society."'9'
IV. STATES ARE SLOWLY DISMANTLING MILLER
In the aftermath of Miller, twenty-nine state sentencing statutes, im-
posing mandatory life without parole, were invalidated as applied to ju-
veniles.192 This requisite response, however, was not the end-all-be-all
with regard to Miller's reach in juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. Many
courts and state legislatures have grappled, and will continue to grapple,
with other pertinent issues implicated in Miller's broad rationale.193 As
predicted, subsequent decisions by federal circuits, state supreme courts,
and legislatures have created a tug-of-war over both the retroactivity of
Miller,19 4 the extent to which Miller's principles extend, if at all, to pun-
189. Id. at 796-97.
190. Id. at 797.
191. Id.
192. Levick & Schwartz, supra note 142, at 396.
193. See Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming Wave of
Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 38 (2012) ("At some point the Supreme
Court may condescend to clarify whether long prison sentences hould be deemed LWOP for pur-
poses of Graham and Miller.").
194. While retroactivity is a separate, complex legal doctrine, it has been considered among the
ways in which subsequent courts limit Miller's reach by foreclosing all meaningful opportunity for
release for juveniles sentenced to life without parole before Miller. Recent Case, supra note 13, at
1256 (noting the effects of not applying Miller retroactively: "[M]any defendants who were sen-
tenced as juveniles-with all the mitigating propensities of youth-will not be afforded individual-
ized sentencing hearings simply because of the timing of their decisions, rather than because they are
not constitutionally entitled to such protection."); see also Mardarewich, supra note 104, at 125-26
(recognizing that Miller left courts "without guidance when considering whether this ruling should
be applied retroactively").
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana in March 2015 to resolve the
split amongst the states on this issue. State v. Montgomery, 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014) (mem.), cert.
granted, sub nom. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015). Some courts have declared
that Miller applies retroactively. See, e.g., Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 240 (1st Cir.
2014) (finding, in light of the government's concession, a prima facie showing that Miller applies
retroactively); In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding a "prima facie showing
that Miller is retroactive"); Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding,
after the government conceded retroactivity, a primafacie showing that Miller applies retroactively);
Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Conn. 2015) ("We conclude that the rule an-
nounced in Miller is a watershed rule of criminal procedure that must be applied retroactively.");
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 962 (Fla. 2015) (finding Miller applies retroactively); State v.
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (holding Miller applies retroactively); State v. Mantich,
842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014) ("Because the rule announced in Miller is more substantive than
procedural and because the Court has already applied that rule to a case on collateral review, we
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ishments other than mandatory life without parole,195 and even juvenile
transfer decisions.1 96
As a result, the Miller decision has become the pinnacle of contro-
versy and uncertainty regarding juvenile sentencing, not as much by rea-
son of its holding, but rather, by reason of its potentially applicable ra-
tionale to further limit juvenile sentencing options.197 Because "the Su-
preme Court failed to specify what sentencing guidelines should dictate .
states and courts [are] without guidance when determining the appro-
priate sentence for juveniles convicted of violent crimes." 98 Now, three
years after Miller, the instruction of hindsight reveals a wave of state and
federal decisions reluctantly addressing Miller and limiting its reach by
applying only its narrowest holding.
A. Incrementally Avoiding Miller
State courts and legislatures have scrambled to find constitutionally
viable sentencing schemes for juveniles convicted of murder "in place of
mandatory life without parole." 99 Most states, indicative of both uncer-
conclude that the rule announced in Miller applies retroactively . . . ."); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487
(Wyo. 2014) (stating that Miller is, "despite its procedural aspects, a substantive rule"). Other courts
have held that Miller does not apply retroactively. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F.3d 219, 226
(4th Cir. 2015) ("We therefore hold that the Supreme Court has not held the Miller rule retroactively
applicable, and that the Court's holdings do not dictate retroactivity because the rule is neither sub-
stantive nor a watershed rule of criminal procedure."); In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.
2013) (finding Miller did not apply retroactively); People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959, 972 (Colo. 2015)
("Because Miller is procedural in nature, and is not a "watershed" rule of procedure, it does not
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment."); State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829,
831 (La. 2013) ("[W]e find Miller does not apply retroactively in cases on collateral review as it
merely sets forth a new rule of criminal constitutional procedure .... ); Martin v. State, 865 N.W.2d
282, 292 (Minn. 2015) (holding "Miller does not apply retroactively to a juvenile whose LWOR
sentence became final before the Miller rule was announced"); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311,
331 (Minn. 2013) (concluding the defendant was "not entitled to the retroactive benefit of the Miller
rule in a postconviction proceeding); Beach v. State, 348 P.3d 629, 642 (Mont. 2015) (holding Miller
did not apply retroactively).
195. Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De Facto
Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3439, 3457-77 (2014); see also Elisabeth A. Archer, Note, Establishing Principled Interpreta-
tion Standards in Iowa's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Jurisprudence, 100 IOWA L. REV. 323,
325, 338 (2014) (arguing the Iowa Supreme Court failed when it agreed with "[d]efendant Denem
Anthony Null [who] alleged that his 75-year sentence, with parole eligibility after 52.5 years, consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller
v. Alabama").
196. Laura Cohen, Freedom s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama and
Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDoZO L. REV. 1031, 1060 (2014).
197. Scavone, supra note 197, at 3441-42 ("The narrow holding of Miller has left several
residual questions regarding the future ofjuvenile sentencing and how states should incorporate both
the Miller and Graham decisions into their sentencing structure. . . . Responses in state courts to the
issue of virtual LWOP sentences after Miller and Graham have varied significantly." (footnote
omitted)); see also Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What It Is, What It May Be, and What It Is
Not, 78 Mo. L. REV. 1041, 1052 (2013) ("Some courts have refused to apply Miller at all, conclud-
ing that it is not retroactive. Other courts have ignored the decision's broad themes, focusing instead
on its narrow holding and going so far as to reaffirm lengthy sentences for juveniles after an ostensi-
bly 'individualized' determination." (footnote omitted)).
198. See Mardarewich, supra note 104, at 125-26.
199. Levick & Schwartz, supra note 142, at 389.
2015] STATE V. BROWN AND JUVENILE SENTENCING
tainty and a refusal to see juvenile offenders as categorically different
than adult criminals, have simply imposed the "next most severe statuto-
ry sentence available for that offense."20 Under the guise of judicial min-
imalism, courts express an unwillingness to consider the Miller rationale
in juvenile sentencing, making incrementally nominal decisions to avoid
its application. This avoidance is most evident in transfer decisions and
sentencing mechanisms, which have contained Miller to its narrow hold-
ing. This Comment first considers transfer mechanisms.
1. Transfer Mechanisms-Out of Miller's Reach: When Mandatory
Juvenile Sentencing Depends on Charging Juveniles as Adults
"A transfer order is described as the harshest sanction that may be
imposed on a juvenile offender. . . .,,201 At first glance, this may appear
to be an interesting assertion considering the notion that an actual term-
of-years sentence is the traditional notion of a "sanction" imposed on
202criminal offenders2. However, this is only a surprising argument if
charging and sentencing are viewed as two separate decisions, each ex-
isting in a vacuum.203 But this is not the case. Charges dictate sentencing
in the adult criminal system; they focus on the crime of an offender and
trigger certain permissible or mandatory sentences corresponding to that
crime once guilt is determined. Therefore, when a juvenile is transferred
to adult jurisdiction, the effect is this: the focus shifts from the individual
juvenile and their mitigating circumstances to the crime committed.204
And as a result, charging a juvenile as an adult causes "significant adult
sentences" to automatically attach to that youth upon conviction for the
205charged offense, regardless of individual circumstances. For these rea-
200. Id.
201. Cintron, supra note 39, at 1261; see also Hess, supra note 56, at 317 ("The Court [has]
recognized that the question of whether to transfer a child to adult court is 'critically important'
because it involves 'tremendous consequences,' including that the 'child will be deprived of the
special protections and provisions' of the juvenile court." (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 553-54 (1966))).
202. See Samuel Marion Davis, The Criminalization ofJuvenile Justice: Legislative Responses
to "The Phantom Menace, " 70 Miss. L.J. 1, 18 (2000) ("Punitive options are available to criminal
courts . . . .").
203. See Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 93-94, 101-04 (asserting that ransfer mechanisms are
the "processes that allow juveniles to be sentenced to lengthy sentences to begin with," and that
"mandatory sentencing schemes [are invoked] upon transfer"); see also Joseph E. Kennedy, Juries
for Juveniles, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 291, 292-94 (2013) (recognizing the inherent connection be-
tween juvenile transfer or charging decisions and subsequent adult sentences imposed on juveniles).
204. Hamack, supra note 37, at 791 ("Because these waiver schemes trigger transfer based on
the charged offense and the juvenile's age, they fail to focus on the individualized needs of the
juvenile over the offense allegedly committed, thus failing to value rehabilitation over punish-
ment."); see Tunnard, supra note 10, at 1332 ("Transfer decisions often leave the judge a choice
between the light punishment of the juvenile system and the standardized sentencing for adults.
Since a judge making the transfer decision will likely determine that a minor deserves a harsher
sentence than he would receive in juvenile court, the importance of a sentencing judge's considera-
tion of juvenile mitigation becomes paramount." (footnotes omitted)).
205. Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 391 (1998); see also
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sons, transfer mechanisms are determinative of juvenile sentencing.206
Transfer mechanisms not only implicate Miller's rationale, but also serve
to dismantle it by removing juveniles to a system that will not account
for their individual, youthful circumstances.20 7
Though "challenges brought against mandatory transfer laws have
largely failed on the notion that treatment in juvenile court is not a right,"
this does not foreclose application of Miller's Eighth Amendment ra-
tionale where the logic and necessity to do so exist.208 The Miller ra-
tionale should be applied to transfer mechanisms because juvenile trans-
fers are determinative of sentencing:209 The Miller rationale applies to
harsh, mandatory sentencing schemes imposed on youth, and nothing
triggers the harsh mandatory sentencing of a youth like transfer mecha-
210nisms. Such mechanisms therefore fall within the contemplation of the
Miller rationale, because where the "concerns [associated] with mandato-
ry juvenile life without parole are the same as those with transfer," the
need to focus on the youth's age as a mitigating factor in such decisions
is just as critical.2 11 And Miller is the polestar case, providing guidance
for how courts must treat juveniles differently in transfer decisions.212
However, the Miller rationale is categorically undermined by state
transfer mechanisms. Mandatory transfer schemes are the most obvious
in their operation as instruments that are offensive to the Miller rationale
since the lack of meaningful consideration with regard to a juvenile's
status as a juvenile is prescribed in these transfers.2 13 Of course, as the
Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 52 (referring to Miller in stating that "Miller had been transferred from
juvenile court, found guilty, and automatically sentenced to life without parole")
206. But see State v. Mays, 18 N.E.3d 850, 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) ("[M]andatory bindover
does not equate to punishment any more than the mere prosecution of an adult in the common pleas
court constitutes punishment." (quoting State v. Quarterman, No. 26400, 2013 WL 4506970 at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2013) (Carr, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
207. See Mariko K. Shitama, Note, Bringing Our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why
the Eighth Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for Accessorial Felony
Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 813, 831 (2013).
208. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 51, 54 (asserting that the individualization rationale used
in Graham and Miller is applicable to mandatory transfer of juveniles to adult court). But see Knox,
supra note 43, at 1269 ("[S]tatutes in every state create a statutory entitlement to adjudication in
courts specialized to deal with delinquency.").
209. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 51.
210. Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 101 (discussing the effects of transfer mechanisms, saying
that "[o]nce in adult proceedings, juveniles are subject to mandatory sentencing laws and, in some
states, are incarcerated with adults").
211. Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 53 (noting that although the Miller Court was discussing
mandatory sentencing, the same language would apply to juvenile transfer, where the Court finds
"criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed." (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
212. Id. at 30; see Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 32 (arguing for the application of death penalty
jurisprudence to juvenile transfer to provide guidance to judges, where "the evidence is clear that
both judges and prosecutors make arbitrary and capricious decisions").
213. Id. at 50 ("Both methods of mandatory transfer result in a juvenile's case being filed in
adult court without a hearing and without individualized consideration of the juvenile's circumstanc-
es."); see also Shitama, supra note 209, at 830 ("The Supreme Court in Miller noted that of the
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Brown case illustrates, regardless of whether automatic or permissible at
the discretion of a judge or the prosecution,214 all transfer mechanisms
dictate the nature of available sentences to a juvenile offender, as the
Brown court's transfer of Brown to adult court jurisdiction triggered her
hard twenty sentence. Juvenile transfer should therefore trigger the same
meaningful consideration of the mitigating factors of youthfulness refer-
enced in Miller,215 because meaningful individualized consideration is
not guaranteed at the transfer stage, the adult sentencing process is not
itself individualized, and the Miller rationale is equally undermined by
the consequences of the transfer.216 The offensive operation of mandatory
transfers has already been addressed by academics in relation to the Mil-
ler decision.2 17 Therefore, this Comment's discussion of state transfer
mechanisms and their diluting effect on the Miller rationale is limited to
discretion-based judicial waivers. These waivers effectively label juve-
niles as adults and preclude individualized consideration in sentencing.
Even the Miller Court questions whether discretionary transfer laws "ad-
equately address the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders,"218 not-
ing that discretionary transfer "has limited utility, because the deci-
sionmaker typically will have only partial information about the child or
the circumstances of his offense."2 19
Once juvenile jurisdiction has been waived, the already-attached
"adult" label precludes more guided and informed consideration of the
juvenile when it comes to sentencing, because "once [a juvenile is] con-
victed in adult court, mandatory sentencing laws proscribe age and other
mitigating factors from weighing in the determination of a child offend-
er's punishment."220 This occurs even when the transfer decision in-
volves the balancing of various individual-related factors, because the
broad discretion of the court or prosecution is not effectively policed by
clear legislative mandates, creating the risk that courts may make arbi-
twenty-nine jurisdictions that impose mandatory life without parole on juveniles, 'about half' have
mandatory transfer laws that 'place at least some juvenile homicide offenders in adult court automat-
ically, with no apparent opportunity to seek transfer [back] to juvenile court."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474)).
214. Davis, supra note 204, at 6-8 (discussing the circumstances under which "[t]he vast
majority of states . . . provide for waiver by the juvenile court"); see also Tamara L. Reno, Com-
ment, The Rebuttable Presumption for Serious Juvenile Crimes: An Alternative to Determinate
Sentencing in Texas, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1421, 1435 (1995) ("The increase in serious juvenile
crime prompted at least twenty states in 1994 to attempt to reform their juvenile codes to prosecute
more serious juvenile offenders as adults.").
215. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
216. Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 94 ("[I]n order to give full effect to its reasoning in Miller,
the Supreme Court needs to abolish . .. [even] discretion[ary] transfers, and mandatory sentencing
schemes upon transfer."); see also id. at 105 ("Even if a judge deems that transfer is in the interest of
the offender and society, juveniles should be exempt from mandatory sentencing schemes.").
217. See, e.g., Shitama, supra note 209, at 830.
218. Tunnard, supra note 10, at 1332.
219. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
220. Shitama, supra note 209, at 831.
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trary and capricious decisions about who to send to adult court.221 And,
as demonstrated in Brown, review of transfer decisions usually involves
deference to the lower court's analysis of the evidence.222 Even if transfer
decisions were more effectively guided by state law, it is often true that
the "transfer hearing [itself is] an inadequate place for [a] judge to learn
much about the juvenile before him in terms of his ultimate disposition in
the adult system.",2 23 As a result, judges do not effectively consider miti-
224
gating circumstances and are not required, by statute, to do so.
Despite the risks of wrongful transfer even when individualized
consideration is given, a juvenile offender is irreversibly labeled an adult
once transfer determinations are made. This forecloses any chance the
youth may have at considerations of mitigating factors in the sentencing
process, where sentences automatically attach upon conviction for par-
ticular crimes.225 Other than the categorical bans on the death penalty and
life without parole for nonhomicidal offenses, juveniles are adults in
226
every sense of the word after the transfer order is issued. In a system
that ties the charged crime to a sentence and is dedicated to the motto,
"[c]ommit an adult crime, do adult time,227 juvenile transfers have be-
come a means of sentencing youth to the adult fate before they ever re-
ceive a term-of-years at a formal sentencing hearing. Miller's rationale
makes it clear that the harsh consequences of juvenile transfer must be
mitigated by a more guided consideration of the offender's youthful sta-
tus.
i. Transfer Mechanism in State v. Brown
State v. Brown illustrates the need for strict guidance in juvenile
transfer. In Brown, the Kansas Supreme Court undermined Miller's ra-
tionale by affirming the transfer of juvenile jurisdiction despite the argu-
ably misguided use of discretion by the lower court and regardless of the
decision's harsh consequence. The trial court ignored the presumption in
favor of continued juvenile jurisdiction and failed to consider all statuto-
rily prescribed factors in that light. 228 The Kansas Supreme Court, upon
review for such abuse,229 approved this unbridled judgment. As a result
221. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 47.
222. State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 791 (Kan. 2014).
223. Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 60.
224. See id at 56 ("[T]he courts and the states have put almost no work into guiding discretion
in judicial transfer decisions.").
225. Shitama, supra note 209, at 831.
226. See Robert Visca, Comment, An Evolving Society: The Juvenile's Constitutional Right
Against a Mandatory Sentence of Life (and Death) in Prison, 9 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 159, 167
(2013).
227. Klein, supra note 207, at 372.
228. See State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 789 (Kan. 2014) ("The juvenile shall be presumed to be
a juvenile unless good cause is shown to prosecute the juvenile as an adult." (quoting KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-2347(a)(1) (2014))).
229. Id. at 787 ("On appeal, that decision is subject to a dual standard of review. The district
court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial competent evidence. But the district court's
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of these incremental decisions, Brown was charged as an adult for her
crimes and received the corresponding mandatory sentence for those
crimes, with no individual consideration of her youthfulness.230
a. The Lower Court
The Brown trial court did not give proper consideration to the juve-
nile-related statutory factors required in transfer decisions for juve-
231niles. Starting with a presumption of juvenile jurisdiction, the factors
were designed to discourage transfer unless the circumstances, after con-
sidering each factor meaningfully, demanded otherwise.232 However, the
trial court considered each factor in relation to the crime thirteen-year-
old Brown committed and not in light of her youthfulness,233 thus failing
to give the factors proper weight in terms of their mitigating effect and
-234their presumption.
Turning to the statutory factors, only four of the eight factors re-
quired consideration of the individual juvenile offender: the unadjudicat-
ed offenses pending against the youth; the history of the juvenile with
regard to that juvenile's particular crimes; the maturity of the offender
(which still allowed consideration of the committed crime, per the Kan-
sas Supreme Court's ruling in Brown); and the possible rehabilitation of
the offender.235 These factors will be referred to as the "juvenile-related"
factors. For the sake of leniency, one might suggest the final factor con-
sidered the individual juvenile, instructing the court o analyze whether
the "interests of the juvenile or of the community would be better served
by criminal prosecution."236 However, as seen in Brown, this factor re-
ceives only lip service where the court limits its consideration to the in-
terests of the community, not the best interests of Brown.237 The remain-
assessment of the eight statutory factors, which is based upon proved facts, should be reviewed for
an abuse of discretion." (citations omitted)).
230. See id. at 796.
231. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 56-60 (discussing the need for increased guidance within
statutory factors, where such factors have become increasingly empty in light of unbridled judicial
discretion).
232. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(a)(1) (2014).
233. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 788 ("Ruling from the bench, the district court waived juvenile
jurisdiction. It cited the seriousness of the offense; that the offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, and willful manner; that it was a person offense; that the evidence fell short of establishing a
likelihood Brown could be rehabilitated before juvenile jurisdiction expired; and that the interest of
the community, i.e., community protection, would be better served waiving juvenile jurisdiction.").
234. This is arguably a statutory failure and a flawed manner in which to make transfer deter-
minations. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 58-59 (discussing how statutory frameworks and criteria
for determining transfer provide judges with "standardless discretion" (quoting Barry C. Feld, Legis-
lative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFERS OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 90, 90
(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
235. Brown, 331 P.3d at 789.
236. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e)(8) (2014).
237. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
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ing statutory factors considered the crime committed and the criminal
tendencies of the juvenile offender.
Using the four juvenile-related factors, the trial court dismissed sub-
stantial evidence of Brown's mitigating circumstances with regard to
Brown's history, maturity, and potential for rehabilitation, while clinging
to evidence regarding the crime itself.23 8 Where the Miller Court dis-
cussed the history of abuse, family environment, and youthful inability to
spot consequence as mitigating factors,239 the trial court's analysis of the
prior offenses factor was a one-dimensional consideration of Brown's
prior behavioral problems. The analysis ignored possible age-related and
background circumstances that perhaps informed Brown's offenses; her
mother's incarceration and Brown's own "conduct disorder," accompa-
nied by depression and multiple suicide attempts were left completely
out of the analysis, and the court found that Brown's criminal history
weighed in favor of transfer.2 40 This is, at best, a superficial consideration
of Brown's individual, mitigating circumstances,24' and illuminates the
need for strict guidance in juvenile transfer decisions.
The court also failed to give proper mitigating weight to evidence
concerning Brown's maturity by focusing on her crime. Evidence of
Brown's maturity from Brown's father and a psychologist supported
juvenile jurisdiction, where at least some of Brown's behavior-and
most of the evidence the trial court assessed, other than her crimes-was
consistent with a girl her age and "inconsistent with someone trying to
present themselves as equal to adults."242 The court ruled the maturity
factor a "wash." 243 In doing so, the court denied that it considered the
nature of Brown's crime dispositive. However, the court primarily relied
on the circumstances of the crime to determine Brown should be adjudi-
cated as an adult.244 This not only offends the Miller rationale, which
recognizes the general lack of maturity of juvenile offenders,2 45 but re-
238. See id.
239. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468-69 (2012).
240. Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
241. See Shitama, supra note 209, at 850 (explaining, that in light of Miller, "trial courts
should conduct these sentencing hearings with the understanding that 'full consideration' of evi-
dence that mitigates against life without parole should be considered by the sentencing body so that
it may 'give a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime.' (quot-
ing Russell Stetler, The Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned Moral Re-
sponses in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 237, 243 (2007))).
242. Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
243. Id. at 790 (quoting oral ruling of the district court).
244. Id. at 791 (discussing the maturity factor the Brown court asserts that "[lt]he Court is
careful not to rely too heavily on the adult-like nature of the crime charged. While the Court does
believe that it is relevant to the factor, it is clear in a large majority of waiver cases the crime will fit,
by level of violence or planning or some other measure, into adult-type behavior. In this case, it
certainly did. For a person to arm themselves, calmly approach a scene, slay a young man and then
calmly leave the scene and dispose of incriminating evidence all are very adult activities" (quoting
memorandum opinion of the district court) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
245. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 53.
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veals the lack of substantial evidence in favor of transfer when consider-
ing Brown apart from her crime.246
In addition, the court ignored evidence concerning Brown's poten-
tial for rehabilitation. Finding an "absence of evidence" with regard to
the possibility of rehabilitation, the court ruled this factor weighed in
favor of transfer.247 This ruling, however, was contrary to testimony by a
psychologist that "it was possible to change Brown's behavior because
she was still in her formative years and the juvenile system still had al-
most 7 years to work with her."2 48 While additional evidence indicated
Brown would be a "challenging case,"249 this did not substantiate a find-
ing that the rehabilitation factor supported transfer, especially in light of
a presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction. Therefore, the court's
improper consideration of the juvenile-related factors not only offended
the statutory presumption in Brown's favor, but directly undermined
Miller's mandate that individualized consideration mitigate on behalf of
a juvenile offender.250 While transfer orders-discretion-based transfers
by judicial waiver-have the appearance of legitimacy in their individu-
alized determination that a juvenile should not be a youth in the eyes of
the law, such an order hardly embodies the meaningful consideration
contemplated by Miller if it fails to appropriate proper weight to mitigat-
ing circumstances of the juvenile, as was the case in Brown.251
Also, the court committed an abuse of discretion by applying
252Brown's age when convenient to support a waiver. Both the Kansas
statute and common sense mandate that the presumption of youthfulness
and lack of maturity exists with regard to a thirteen-year-old unless the
evidence clearly indicates otherwise; the court, however, appeared to
forego this presumption in favor of an unwarranted evidentiary stalemate
253
with regard to Brown's maturity. Brown was thirteen; she clearly
"looked to her mother for responses during . . . evaluation[,] . . . some-
thing [her psychologist said] a girl her age would do and [something]
inconsistent with someone trying to present themselves as equal to
246. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 791 (using a subsequent written report, to make its only finding as
to Brown's maturity weighing in favor of transfer, where Brown's "choice at her young age to adopt
the grooming habits and clothing of a boy [were] indications of a [more] mature attitude" (alteration
in original) (quoting memorandum opinion of the district court) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
247. Id. at 790.
248. Id. at 788.
249. Id. at 790 (quoting trial testimony of Brown's psychologist) (internal quotation marks
omitted) ("[C]onsidering that this factor weighed in favor of adult prosecution, the district court
relied on Cappo's cross-examination concessions that Brown would be a 'challenging case'.
(quoting trial testimony of Brown's psychologist)).
250. See Feld, supra note 1, at 135-36.
251. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 60 ("Given the stakes, the transfer hearing should, in fact,
allow the judge to learn as much as possible about the juvenile and his potential exposure in the adult
system before making the decision to transfer him.").
252. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
253. See id. at 790.
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adults."254 However, instead of allowing Brown's young age to mitigate
in favor of her lack of maturity, the court struck that factor from its anal-
ysis. 25 5 Should the evidence have actually been a "wash," the presump-
tion in favor of juvenile jurisdiction should have tipped the scales in fa-
vor of that presumed jurisdiction.256
The trial court had no problem reinstituting Brown's age into its
consideration of rehabilitation, however, when Brown's age conveniently
served to aggravate the possibility of rehabilitation. It is logical to con-
clude that the statutory presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction is
based on the rationale that younger children are more likely to undergo
successful rehabilitation, due to the young age at which they enter the
system.257 Thus, where a seventeen-year-old would not have been enti-
tled to the presumption of juvenile jurisdiction because the system had
less time to rehabilitate that juvenile.258 However, the court ignored this
rationale, and instead, afforded a hypothetical seventeen-year-old more
benefit of the doubt with regard to rehabilitation than thirteen-year-old
Brown, concluding that the early age at which Brown began her criminal
activity rendered her incapable of rehabilitation no matter how long the
system had to pursue such efforts.259 Regardless of the statutory pre-
sumption juvenile status afforded Brown as a thirteen-year-old offender,
the court leveraged her youthfulness against her, saying such aggressive-
ness at her young age made the road to rehabilitation harder than if she
would have been seventeen at the time of her crimes.260 Here, the court
inverted the presumption in favor of rehabilitating juveniles under the
age of fourteen. This is indicative of runaway discretion, as the lower
court gave only lip service to the text of the statute and completely ig-
nored its spirit.261 The presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction was
not sufficiently rebutted as to support transfer by the preponderance of
the evidence.
254. Id. at 788.
255. See id at 790-91 ("1 find-frankly that that [sophistication and maturity] factor is a wash.
I think there are reasons to believe that there are-are aspects of Miss Brown that are 13 years of
age, and there are aspects of her that are of an adult age. So I don't believe that is particularly helpful
in this case." (quoting oral ruling of the district court) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
256. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 66.
257. See id at 788, 790; see also Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which
Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-
State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 799 (2000).
258. See Beresford, supra note 261, at 799-800.
259. See Brown, 331 P.3d at 788.
260. See id
261. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 58 ("'[A]pplication of the [statutory] factors that are
considered relevant to the amenability determination is often pretextual'; the judges are much more
interested in culpability and dangerousness." (quoting Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right:
Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 299, 330 (1999))).
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b. The Kansas Supreme Court
In reviewing the lower court's decision, the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision, although the record did not support
transfer by a preponderance of the evidence in light of a statutory pre-
sumption favoring juvenile jurisdiction. First, in reviewing the factual
findings with regard to the statutory factors, the Kansas Supreme Court
ignored "substantial competent evidence [that did] not support a finding
of fact on which the [lower court's] exercise of discretion [was]
based."262 While the lower court's factual findings regarding the crime-
related factors supported transfer, the lower court did not meaningfully
consider material evidence as to the juvenile-related factors, which
should have mitigated transfer.263 Though the Kansas Supreme Court was
not permitted to "reweigh the evidence," it is arguable the lower court
did not weigh the evidence at all, but rather ignored, misinterpreted, or
simply lacked evidence when making factual determinations with regard
to Brown's maturity and ability to be rehabilitated. These failures are
tantamount to substantial competent evidence not supporting the lower
court's use of discretion.26
And without knowing how the lower court weighed certain factors
in its analysis or by how much the evidence overcame the presumption in
favor of juvenile jurisdiction by the preponderance of the evidence,265 the
Kansas Supreme Court could not be sure whether an error in as to any
one factor would undermine the entire transfer determination. Neverthe-
less, the court quickly, and without discussion, disregards any error in the
lower court's findings regarding Brown's maturity as not warranting
reversal.266
Second, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's as-
sessment of the statutory factors, despite the lower court's abuse of dis-
cretion. Abuse of discretion is a deferential standard,267 and while this
Comment does not dispute the standard of review,268 failing to give full
force to statutory factors and evaluating these factors incorrectly is an
abuse no matter how broad the court's discretion. Although the lower
court was "not constrained by the insufficiency of evidence to support
one or more of the factors,"269 the Kansas Supreme Court was silent as to
the lower court's misapplication of factors, overreliance on the nature of
262. Brown, 331 P.3d at 791. ("Substantial competent evidence 'is evidence which possesses
both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues
can reasonably be resolved."' (quoting In re D.D.M., 249 P.3d 5, 11 (Kan. 2011))).
263. See id. at 787.
264. See id. at 787, 789-90.
265. Id. at 789.
266. Id. at 791.
267. Id. at 787.
268. This does, however, raise questions as to whether juvenile transfer decisions should be
afforded a different standard of review, given their sentencing-like consequences.
269. Brown, 331 P.3d at 787.
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the crime for five of the eight factors, and failure to consider the pre-
sumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction.
For example, the Kansas Supreme Court took scant notice of the
lower court's inversion of logic when considering the rehabilitation fac-
tor, which should have favored juvenile jurisdiction based on the statuto-
ry presumption associated with Brown's age. The court also affirmed the
lower court's heavy reliance on Brown's crime to draw conclusions
about her ability to be rehabilitated and to conclude her maturity was a
"wash." When three of the eight factors involve assessing a juvenile's
crime, the statute's failure to address the nature of the crime in the re-
maining factors appears deliberate, meaning courts must consider, at
least, the rehabilitation and maturity factors apart from the crime. Other-
wise, the factors would become so conflated as to render nearly all juve-
nile offenders deserving of transfer to adult court. The Kansas Supreme
Court dismissed the lower court's overreliance on the nature of the
crime, however, by reasoning that any consideration of the crime by the
lower court was not dispositive.270 This is incorrect, where the only evi-
dence in favor of transfer with regard to this factor, was the nature of
Brown's crime. Because this evidence contradicted evidence in Brown's
favor, thus rendering the factor a wash, the nature of Brown's crime was
arguably dispositive.
In addition, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed an abuse of discre-
tion where the lower court improperly concluded Brown's maturity was a
"wash" in the analysis. The lower court found contradictory evidence of
Brown's maturity level, and the factor was effectively stricken from the
balancing process, despite suspicious contradictions between the lower
court's oral findings and after-the-fact written repor This should not
have been the case. The statute mandates consideration of each factor as
the Kansas Supreme Court itself pointed out in rebutting Brown's argu-
ment that the first three factors were repetitive.2 72 While calling the ma-
turity factor a wash is consideration in the most rudimentary sense, it is
arguable that no factor is a wash in light of the statutory presumption
favoring of juvenile jurisdiction. However, the lower court ultimately
ignored the presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction to strike the
factor from the analysis. This was a clear abuse of discretion.
As a result of transferring Brown without meaningful regard to her
mitigating circumstances or the statutory presumption in her favor, the
court effectively imposed a mandatory sentence based on the less-than-
individual consideration she was given at the transfer stage. Where Mil-
270. Id. at 91.
271. Brown, 331 P.3d at 790-91.
272. Id. at 790 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e) (2014)). Arguably, this logic would
lead to the conclusion that certain evidence pertaining to Brown's maturity-looking to her mom for
responses-could also be used to show Brown was capable of being rehabilitated, but neither court
went as far as to draw this conclusion.
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ler insisted on using juvenile status to warrant consideration of individu-
al, mitigating circumstances,273 Brown used only the crime committed to
warrant feigned consideration of juvenile status. Where transfer deci-
sions are nearly tantamount to sentencing, the Brown Court undermined
Miller.
ii. Transfer Mechanisms in Other States
Per Brown's example, the situation repeats itself from state-to-state:
the district court exercises unbridled discretion in weighing factors;274 the
reviewing court rewards this use of discretion by loosely reviewing the
district court analysis for abuse; and the juvenile is transferred to adult
court and receives a mandatory sentence associated with that crime, as
long as it is not life without parole. Post-Miller courts and legislatures
have simply failed to make changes to mandatory or discretionary waiver
mechanisms and processes despite their harsh effect on juvenile sentenc-
es.
Pulling one example out of the many that exist, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals upheld a lower court's extensive focus on the juvenile's
crime and past crimes in deciding to transfer the youth to adult court.275
First, the statutory factors themselves, though requisite safeguards to
such discretionary transfers, made little room for the actual mitigating
circumstances of youth to factor into the analysis.276 Second, the court of
appeals aggravated this imbalanced consideration where it upheld an
analysis of each factor, especially culpability, based on the facts of the
crime rather than the mitigating principle of diminished juvenile culpa-
bility laid out in Miller and juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.277 Here, as
in State v. Brown, the circumstances of youth actually worked against he
juvenile offender.
Post-Miller courts have taken little interest in exercising more scru-
tiny upon review of lower court transfer decisions, allowing lower courts
to disregard, as inapplicable, factors that are statutorily required for con-
273. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).
274. See Shitama, supra note 209, at 826 ("This [judicial waiver] gave judges wide authority to
intervene in the lives of juvenile offenders' in inconsistent and often intrusive ways.").
275. In re Welfare of C.K.R., No. A14-0514, 2014 WL 5507050, at *2-4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov.
3, 2014).
276. See id. at *2 ("(1) [T]he seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protec-
tion, including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines, the
use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim; (2) the culpability of the child in committing the
alleged offense, including the level of the child's participation in planning and carrying out the
offense and the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) the
child's prior record of delinquency; (4) the child's programming history, including the child's past
willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming; (5) the adequacy of the punish-
ment or programming available in the juvenile justice system; and (6) the dispositional options
available for the child." (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 4 (2012))).
277. See id. at *3-4 (ignoring testimony about the mitigating factors of lessened brain devel-
opment in youth by concluding the particular juvenile offender "was not impaired and was not
coerced").
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sideration.278 For example, prior to State v. Brown, the Kansas Supreme
Court recognized the sufficiency of a statement by the trial court ac-
knowledging the requisite factors a judge must consider before transfer-
ring a juvenile to adult court. Stating that a judge need not make a formal
finding regarding each factor, the Kansas Supreme Court abdicated all
meaningful review in allowing the following statement to satisfy the
statutory requirements: "I am aware and did consider all of the statutory
factors in making the decision to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and
find the ones I put on the record outweigh the other factors if they're
even applicable."279 In that case, the only factors put on the record were
conclusory statements that the "juvenile [was] not amenable to being
treated further as a juvenile," and a quick reference to "[t]he seriousness
of these offenses, the fact that this offense occurred ten days to less than
two weeks after he was released from Lamed Correctional Facility, [and]
his long history with the court system."280 In a lackadaisical review, the
Kansas Supreme Court found this to be sufficient consideration of the
evidence to show "he need[ed] to be treated as an adult." 2 8 1
Moreover, post-Miller legislation has not changed as a result of a
codified rationale in favor of more structured individualized considera-
tion. "Currently, every state has at least one form of juvenile transfer,
and most states have multiple ways of imposing adult sanctions on juve-
nile offenders."282 Even worse, "forty-four states impose some form of
mandatory waiver,"283 where discretion is not even afforded a lower
court, regardless of the strength of a particular juvenile offender's miti-
gating circumstances. As a result, Miller has had little effect on transfer
decisions, even though transfer of juveniles to adult court is the neces-
284sary precursor to sentencing.
2. Refusing to Extend Miller: The Narrow Holding Versus the
Broad Rationale
As this Comment has argued, "[b]y mandating individualized sen-
tencing for juveniles facing [life without parole], the Court in Miller
opened the door to a much more thorough challenge of the current sys-
tem, namely the argument that all juveniles deserve individualized jus-
278. See, e.g., State v. Washington, No. C-130213, 2014 WL 4724684, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 14, 2014) ("Where there is no statutory requirement that the juvenile court separately identify
factors that are not applicable, it does not err if it fails to do so, as long as it has indicated, in the
record, the factors that it weighed in favor of or against transfer.").
279. Makthepharak v. State, 314 P.3d 876, 882 (Kan. 2013) (emphasis omitted) (quoting oral
ruling of the district court) (internal quotation mark omitted).
280. Id. (quoting oral ruling of the district court).
281. See id.
282. Shitama, supra note 209, at 830.
283. Id.
284. Dutton, supra note 16, at 204 ("In Miller, the Court rejected the argument that transfer
determinations-by judge, prosecutor, or legislature-are sufficient to cool the mandatory nature of
the JLWOP sentences that were before the Court.").
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tice."285 The broader rationale of Miller is, "[i]n other words, [that] no
sentencing scheme that ignores age and its attendant circumstances
should determine the outcome of a juvenile case."286 Yet, this is not the
reach of Miller's narrow holding, which struck down mandatory life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles.287 As a result, courts and legisla-
tures have struggled with the vital correlation between Miller's broader
rationale and its narrow holding.288 Of course, in an attempt to avoid the
wide range of ramifications that ensue from the broader Miller rationale,
subsequent decisions have effectively served to contain Miller to its most
narrow application, however constitutionally questionable such contain-
ment may prove to be.289
Having already discussed the argument for extending Miller's ra-
tionale to some of the more severe juvenile sentences, much of that ar-
gument rooted in the original rehabilitative cry of juvenile courts them-
selves,290 it is necessary to discuss the well-crafted box courts and legis-
latures have used to enjoin Miller from expansion-focusing on courts
and subsequent litigation of issues related to Miller.291 The four sides of
this box are representative of the primary ways courts decline to extend
and undermine the Miller rationale: Side one will be discussed as the
"one-step-down but still mandatory" approach; side two will be ad-
dressed as the "non-mandatory out" approach; side three will cover the
"aggregated sentence" approach; and side four will discuss the other cre-
ative ways courts have withheld the Miller rationale from even its most
narrow application. However, it is important to note that even while the
narrow application of Miller undermines the Miller rationale in its own
right, many "new" sentencing schemes go a step further: many ensure a
functional equivalent of life without parole, revealing an insistence not
only upon containing Miller, but demolishing it as well. 2 92
In the wake of Miller, there was no doubt mandatory life without
parole was barred, and more than twenty state laws imposing such a sen-
285. Tchoukleva, supra note 18, at 97.
286. Id; see also Courtney Amelung, Endnote, Responding to the Ambiguity ofMiller v. Ala-
bama: The Time Has Come for States to Legislate for a Juvenile Restorative Justice Sentencing
Regime, 72 MD. L. REv. ENDNOTES 21, 50 (2013) ("The Court's decision in Miller has given states
the opportunity to legislate for restorative justice within the juvenile justice system.").
287. Lauren Kinell, Note and Comment, Answering the Unanswered Questions: How States
Can Comport with Miller v. Alabama, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 145, 148-49 (2013).
288. See Mardarewich, supra note 104, at 125-26.
289. See Alexander L. Nostro, Comment, The Importance of an Expansive Deference to Miller
v. Alabama, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167, 179-83 (2013).
290. See Fuller, supra note 38, at 379-81; see also supra Part 1.
291. See David Siegel, What Hath Miller Wrought: Effective Representation of Juveniles in
Capital-Equivalent Proceedings, 39 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 363, 368-69
(2013) (discussing how "the scope of the procedural protections-such as whether they are retroac-
tive, whether they extend to sentences for which there is a theoretical but not meaningful possibility
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tence were subsequently invalidated as applied to juveniles.293 In re
sponse, and without the immediate enactment of new legislation, many
courts are left to "remand . .. case[s] for further sentencing proceedings
to permit the factfinder to assess [an] applicant's sentence at (1) life with
the possibility of parole . . . or (2) life without parole after consideration
of applicant's individual conduct, circumstances, and character."2 94
While this posed minimal problems of interpretation within Miller's nar-
row scope, questions arise as to the reach of Miller's broad rationale
when various mandatory and non-mandatory life-with-parole sentences
are functionally equivalent to life without parole.295
B. One-Step-Down-But-Still-Mandatory Schemes
In light of such questions, courts and legislatures have nevertheless
contained Miller by allowing the imposition of other, albeit lesser, man-
datory sentences-the "one-step-down" approach. For example, in the
absence of legislation that is compliant with Miller's holding, courts
have allowed prosecutors to simply "sever the unconstitutional language
in [the sentencing codes] as applied to juveniles convicted of [a particu-
lar crime]" that originally called for mandatory life without parole.296
Courts may simply "remand the case for [a juvenile offender] to be re-
sentenced on his conviction under the sentencing range provided for [the
same class felony], in accordance with the remaining language in [the]
subsection,"297 or sentence the juvenile in accordance with some other
mandatory scheme supplied by the legislature after Miller.
2 9 8
Depending on the statute, this approach may lead to the imposition
of a mandatory term of years sentence or a sentence with a mandatory
293. Amelung, supra note 290, at 32; see also Fuller, supra note 38, at 401.
294. Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
295. See, e.g., State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1213 (2015) (discussing that an aggregate sen-
tence, imposed in the court's discretion and which was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life
without the possibility of release,was unconstitutional under Miller, after reading Miller "as impact-
ing two aspects of sentencing: (1) that a lesser sentence than life without parole must be available for
a juvenile offender; and (2) that the sentencer must consider age related evidence as mitigation when
deciding whether to irrevocably sentence juvenile offenders to a lifetime in prison"); see also Ame-
lung, supra note 290, at 34.
296. Whiteside v. State, 426 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Ark. 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att'y for Suf-
folk Dist., I N.E.3d 270, 286 (Mass. 2013).
297. Whiteside, 426 S.W.3d at 920; see also Commonwealth v. Brown, I N.E.3d 259, 268
(Mass. 2013) (excising the portion of the sentencing statute prohibiting parole eligibility when
applied to a juvenile). But see People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959, 965 (Colo. 2015) ("[W]e hold that the
proper remedy after Miller is to vacate a defendant's LWOP and to remand the case to the trial court
to determine whether LWOP is an appropriate sentence given the defendant's 'youth and attendant
circumstances."' (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012)).
298. St. Val v. State, 174 So. 3d 447, 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (finding a mandatory min-
imum sentence of twenty-five years did not violate Miller); People v. Banks, 36 N.E.3d 432, 437 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015) (finding a mandatory minimum of forty-five years did not violate Miller); Common-
wealth v. Lawrence, 99 A.3d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 416 (Pa.
2015) (holding a mandatory minimum of thirty-five years did not violate Miller, where an "argument
against a mandatory minimum of 35 years presents the same concerns as would a mandatory mini-
mum of 35 days' imprisonment," such that it would prohibit any mandatory scheme).
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minimum and a discretionary range. For example, the Arkansas Supreme
Court held the applicable sentencing range, after severing the unconstitu-
tional language and remanding the case, was ten to forty years or life.299
Even in cases where courts remand the case for consideration of an indi-
vidual defendant's youthfulness to determine the appropriateness of life
without parole, these courts may still apply a one-step-down approach if,
on remand, it is determined that life without parole is inappropriate.3
This raises questions as to whether one-step-down mandatory sen-
tencing schemes are unconstitutional under Miller, since all mandatory
sentencing processes are implicated by the same rationale Miller em-
ployed to strike down mandatory life without parole.301 However, many
courts, like the Brown court, were not inclined to extend Miller's holding
to mandatory sentences other than mandatory life without parole. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that life with the possibility of parole is an
appropriate and constitutional sentence under Miller once a court deter-
mines, after individual consideration, that life without the possibility of
parole is inappropriate.302 Noting that Miller did not expressly address
life with the possibility of parole, the Colorado Supreme Court declined
to read Miller so broadly as to render the mandatory imposition of life
with the possibility of parole unconstitutional.303
In making this determination, however, the court did not impose or
suggest a constitutional limit on the mandatory term of years a juvenile
offender may be required to serve before parole eligibility in a life with-
out parole sentence.304 In the absence of guidance, state courts may im-
pose a sentence that teeters, arguably, on the side of the functional equiv-
alent of life without parole.30s
299. Whiteside, 426 S.W.3d at 921 (holding that "this discretionary sentencing range is ac-
ceptable under Miller, as long as on remand the jury is given the opportunity to take into account the
offender's 'age, age-related characteristics, and the nature of his crime').
300. Tate, 352 P.3d at 965 (holding that "if the trial court determines LWOP is not warranted
after considering the defendant's 'youth and attendant characteristics,' the proper sentence is
LWPP"); see also State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253, 271 (Mo. 2013) ("In that event, the trial court
must set aside the jury's verdict finding Nathan guilty of first-degree murder and enter a finding that
Nathan is guilty of second-degree murder. Nathan then should be sentenced for second-degree
murder within the statutorily authorized range of punishments for that crime."); Lewis v. State, 448
S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 52 (2015) (holding that a mandatory life
sentence for with the possibility of parole after forty years did not violate Miller).
301. See Straley, supra note 1, at 994 & n. 180 (explaining how, in response to Miller, Washing-
ton's legislation, "requir[es] court[s] to consider Miller factors when setting minimum term for
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds").
302. Tate, 352 P.3d at 970.
303. Id.; see also Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 40, 334 P.3d 132, 145 (Wyo. 2014)
(recognizing "there is merit in the proposition that a mandatory life sentence for a juvenile is contra-
ry to the rationale underlying the Roper/Graham/Miller trilogy, we will not find a phantom constitu-
tional restriction that the United States Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to recognize").
304. Tate, 352 P.3d at 970.
305. But see Springer v. Dooley, No. 3:15-CV-03008-RAL, 2015 WL 6550876, at *5 (D.S.D.
Oct. 28, 2015) (holding a 26 1-year sentence with the possibility of parole after thirty-three years was
not a de facto life without parole sentence and did not violate Miller).
601
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
This imposition of a life sentence with a mandatory term-of-years
before parole eligibility,306appears to be a comfortable place for post-
Miller sentencing schemes:30 7
Miller [only] stands for the proposition that a sentence of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole may not be mandatorily im-
posed upon a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the crime
without individual consideration of the mitigating circumstances.
That did not occur in [a] case. . . . [where] the defendant received a
sentence of life with the possibility of parole, albeit with considera-
tion coming after fifty-one years.308
As such, states split Miller many different and unpredictable ways in
determining the constitutional limits on mandatory life with parole sen-
tences or mandatory term-of-year sentences.
C. Non-Mandatory Out: Unbridled Discretion Fails Miller and Amounts
to De Facto Life Sentences Without Parole
Some courts and legislatures have employed semantics to contain
Miller, extracting the word "mandatory" to impose sentencing schemes
that are the functional equivalent to mandatory life without parole.309
This allows courts to comply310 with Miller in a literal sense, while un-
dermining the Miller rationale. First, by simply "[s]evering the mandato-
ry nature of a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile to provide for
the ameliorative possibility of parole because of characteristics attendant
to youth,"311 courts have nonetheless kept their sentencing statutes in
place, by simply infusing discretion into the sentencing process or pre-
scribing enumerated factors courts may use to guide the sentencing, yet
allowing unfettered discretion that often amounts to the same sentences.
306. See Banks v. People, No. 12SC1022, 2013 WL 3168752, at *1 (Colo. June 24, 2013).
307. See, e.g., Ellmaker v. State, No. 108,728, 2014 WL 3843076, at *10 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug.
1, 2014) ("Considering the explicit way in which the United States Supreme Court has distinguished
life without parole sentences and the death penalty and set them apart from all other sentences, we
decline Ellmaker's invitation to extend this category to include a hard 50 sentence when imposed on
juveniles. Thus, we reject Ellmaker's assertion that a hard 50 sentence on a juvenile offender is the
functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole."); see also Ouk v. State, 847 N.W.2d 698,
701-02 (Minn. 2014) ("[T]he mandatory sentencing scheme at issue in Ouk's case does not violate
the rule announced in Miller because it does not require the imposition of the harshest term of im-
prisonment: life imprisonment without he possibility of release."); People v. Aponte, 981 N.Y.S.2d
902, 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) ("Although both Miller and Graham held it was unconstitutional to
impose life without parole on a person under the age of eighteen, the defendant received no such
sentence. In fact, he is parole eligible. No doubt he is unhappy over the prospect that the aggregate
mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment may preclude him from ever being paroled, he never-
theless remains eligible for it.").
308. Perry v. State, No. W2013-00901-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 1377579, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Apr. 7, 2014), appeal denied, Sept. 18, 2014.
309. But see Scavone, supra note 197, at 3477 (noting that the post-Miller "bill was aimed at
comprehensive sentencing reform that takes virtual LWOP into account").
310. Amelung, supra note 290, at 34-35.
311. Exparte Henderson, 144 So. 3d 1262, 1281 (Ala. 2013).
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This is noticeable in Ex parte Henderson,3 12 where the Alabama Su-
preme Court allowed juveniles to be charged for capital offenses under a
statutory scheme calling for either death or life without parole.3 13 The
court upheld the statutory scheme by replacing its mandatory nature with
a consideration of certain enumerated factors to put juveniles on "actual
notice that, if convicted, they face a sentence of life without the possibil-
ity of parole as a 'ceiling."' 3 14 The court goes on to say that "juveniles
[then] have [additional] notice of the 'floor' as well, because Miller re-
quires that a juvenile convicted of capital murder is entitled to have his
life sentence reviewed for the possibility of parole."
The California Supreme Court followed suit by validating its own
statute that allowed a "juvenile convicted of special circumstance mur-
der" to receive "life without parole or [twenty-five] years to life." 1 6 The
California Supreme Court overruled the lower courts' interpretation of
the statute, which originally "creat[ed] a presumption in favor of life
without parole," holding that it satisfied Miller's ban on mandatory life
without parole.3 17 Here, the court made its statute Miller-compliant by
shifting semantics, insisting that it be "understood to not impose a pre-
sumption in favor of life without parole."318 This, while technically com-
plying with Miller, does not provide any meaningful consideration of
youthfulness per the Miller Court's rationale.
In a similar effort to avoid Miller's broad rationale, many state leg-
islatures have simply added an option that allows a non-mandatory range
of equally harsh sentences to be imposed on juveniles without instituting
Miller's particularized individual consideration test.3 19 Here, courts and
legislatures have taken advantage of the "uncertainty of what [was]
meant by 'individualized sentencing,"' in Miller, though Miller's ra-
tionale alone provides guidance.3 20 For example, Pennsylvania, one of
the first states to respond to Miller with legislation, infused its statutory
scheme with allowable ranges, of course still including life without pa-
role as an option.3 21 As such, a juvenile may still receive a sentence of
life without parole, but the judge or jury may choose an alternative sen-
312. Id
313. Id
314. Id at 1281, 1284.
315. Id at 1281.
316. People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 249 (Cal. 2014).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 145 So. 3d 545, 548 (La. App. 2014) (appearing satisfied by
Louisiana's post-Miller laws, which state that "a hearing shall be conducted prior to sentencing to
determine whether the sentence shall be imposed with or without parole eligibility," though this
sentence scheme simply allows the prosecution and defense to present mitigating and aggravating
factors to support requested sentences; there is no requirement that he judge consider the enumerat-
ed factors in Miller).
320. See Lemer, supra note 195, at 27.
321. Amelung, supra note 290, at 33.
603
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tence of either thirty-five years to life for juveniles at least fifteen years
old, or a twenty-five years to life for juveniles under age fifteen.322 There
is, however, no requirement that youthfulness mitigate on behalf of the
juvenile during the discretionary sentencing, which reeks of the possibil-
ity of discretionary abuses.
Applying this approach, courts avoid triggering the narrow Miller
holding by asserting, "Miller is distinguishable because [a juvenile's]
sentence of life without parole [is] discretionary, not mandatory."323 Yet
this approach fails to provide meaningful limits on sentencing discretion,
as it lacks mandatory consideration of the mitigating factors of youth set
out in Miller. Because judges have broad discretion when imposing a
sentence and such decisions only are reviewed de novo for abuse of dis-
cretion324 it cannot be guaranteed that Miller's underlying principles-
lessened culpability of juveniles requiring consideration of the mitigating
circumstances of a juvenile offender-will be advanced.325 As noted in
State v. Riley, where the Connecticut Supreme Court held the trial court
did not consider the mitigating factors in Miller:
[T]he dictates set forth in Miller may be violated even when
the sentencing authority has discretion to impose a lesser sen-
tence than life without parole if it fails to give due weight to
evidence that Miller deemed constitutionally significant before
determining that such a severe punishment is appropriate.326
Where courts do consider mitigating factors, in imposing either life
without parole or other functional equivalents, they are not required to
contemplate any particular combination of mitigating circumstances
enumerated by Miller, or afford such circumstances any specific
weight.32 7 As a result, courts may find that any individual consideration
of a juvenile satisfies Miller's mandate."328 Here, a juvenile may receive
322. Id.
323. State v. Lane, No. 2013-G-3144, 2014 WL 1900459 at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12,
2014).
324. Commonwealth v. Batts, 125 A.3d 33, 43, 50 (Penn. 2015) (refusing to "impose a height-
ened burden of proof, and a corresponding more stringent appellate review, in juvenile life without
parole cases").
325. Berkheiser, supra note 117, at 508-10 (discussing how Miller, "with its mandate of indi-
vidualized consideration at sentencing, reopens the door to all of the malignity of subjective deci-
sion-making and its fruits"); see also Fuller, supra note 38, at 402 (discussing how even when re-
quiring consideration of mitigating circumstances, "state courts did not elaborate as to what must be
included in this consideration").
326. State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1213 (2015) (overruling appellate court's affirmation of an
effective one hundred year sentence, where the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to
not consider the Miller factors).
327. But see State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555-57 (Iowa 2015) (starting from a presumption
that the imposition of life without parole should be uncommon and mandating the consideration of
specific factors rooted in Miller's rationale before imposing a sentence of life without parole).
328. Jones v. State, 769 S.E.2d 901, 905 (Ga. 2015) (affirming, on alternative grounds, the trial
court's imposition of "two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus [eighty-five] years," because
"the trial court explicitly considered Appellant's relatively young age"); see also State v. Williams,
862 N.W.2d 701, 703-04 (Minn. 2015) (affirming the district court's discretionary imposition of
604 [Vol. 92:3
2015] STATE V. BROWN AND JUVENILE SENTENCING 605
a sentence that is functionally equivalent to a sentence of life without the
possibility of release, without any assurance that their sentence embodies
the mitigating purpose of Miller.329
D. Aggregated Sentences
Although not an issue in Brown, courts have also dismantled Mil-
ler's rationale by allowing mandatory sentences to accumulate and effec-
tively amount to life without parole.330 While at least two state supreme
courts have ruled an aggregate sentence that constitutes a de facto life
sentence violates the Constitution under Miller, 33  other courts have
found such aggregate sentences fall outside the scope of Miller.3 3 2 These
courts have declared that egregious term-of-years sentences do not quali-
fy for Miller protection, despite the relatively same effect of mandatory
sentences when applied in the aggregate. While this scenario is not
offensive to the literal Miller holding, it is certainly offensive to the
broader rationale that should "trigger the protections afforded under Mil-
ler-namely, an individualized sentence hearing to determine the issue
of parole eligibility" when imposing a "lengthy term-of-years sen-
tence."334 At least one state supreme court, Iowa, has concluded, albeit
under Iowa's constitution, "all mandatory minimum sentences of impris-
onment for youthful offenders are unconstitutional."335 In any case, the
consecutive sentences, after the district court considered the aggravating circumstances of the juve-
niles' crimes in addition to the mitigation circumstances).
329. See Molly F. Martinson, Comment, Negotiating Miller Madness: Why North Carolina
Gets Juvenile Resentencing Right While Other States Drop the Ball, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2179, 2198
(2013).
330. E.g., State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701, 702 (Minn. 2015) (affirming imposition of an
"aggregate sentence of at least 74 years in prison").
331. Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 144 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that the process of individu-
alized consideration in Miller "must be applied to the entire sentencing package, when the sentence
is life without parole, or when aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of life without
parole"); see also Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 654 (Ind. 2014) ("[W]e exercised our constitutional
authority and revised the 150-year sentence received by sixteen-year-old Martez Brown for two
counts of murder and one count of robbery.").
332. See, e.g., Nostro, supra note 293, at 176 ("In the immediate aftermath of the Miller deci-
sion, the Sixth Circuit held that an eighty-nine-year sentence created from multiple convictions was
not the same as a life sentence for purposes of requiring consideration of a juvenile offender's age
and mitigating factors of youth. In reaching its decision, the Circuit prioritized the Miller Court's
focus on single-conviction sentencing practices to conclude that the Court did not intend for the
punishment to apply to all forms of LWOP sentences." (footnote omitted)); see also Walle v. State,
99 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that sentences imposed by two different
courts creating a ninety-two-year aggregate sentence was not the functional equivalent of a life
sentence without the possibility of release); State v. Zuber, 442 N.J. Super. 611, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2015) (rejecting the argument that an aggregate sentence of fifty-five years without parole
eligibility was the functional equivalent of life without parole).
333. People v. Reyes, 2015 Ill. App. 2d 120471, T 25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (finding juvenile
offender's ninety-seven-year aggregate sentence did not offend Miller); Scavone, supra note 197, at
3463; see also People v. Lucero, I ICA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *24 (Colo. App. 2013) (citing
Miller and Graham in finding aggregate sentence of eighty-four years did not violate the Constitu-
tion), cert. granted, 13SC624, 2014 WL 7331018 (Colo. Dec. 22, 2014).
334. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 70-71 (Iowa 2013).
335. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014).
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next question always becomes "how [the] court should proceed in cor-
recting [a defendant's] sentence[?]"3 3 6 Without guidance, courts are free
to work within vague perimeters.
E. Other Ways: Felony Murder
The last common approach that undermines the Miller rationale is
the quiet operation of unfortunate doctrines such as felony murder. As an
initial matter, there is little reason for this doctrine in the context of juve-
nile sentencing.337 While those in favor of the felony-murder doctrine
claim it deters the commission of the underlying crime, it is hard to justi-
fy as applied to juveniles, who are less able to foresee the consequences
of their actions.33 8 Miller recognized lower juvenile culpability based on
factors that include "'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,' leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-
taking." 339 This rational creates the possibility that the Court may later
prohibit sentencing juveniles to life without parole based on felony mur-
der principles of transferred intent.340
Miller recognizes that "defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or
foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most
serious forms of punishment than are murderers."341 The State v. Brown
ruling offends this rationale in its imposition of a hard twenty life sen-
tence for thirteen-year-old Brown's felony murder conviction. The Miller
Court recognized that "the criminal responsibility of juveniles who did
not murder was doubly diminished,"342 and "the rationale underlying
felony murder is [therefore] utterly incompatible with our modem under-
standing of juveniles" especially when imposing such harsh sentences.3 43
This Comment does not take immediate issue with the concept of
felony murder, though, by principle of transferred intent, it stands on
shaky ground.344 However, it must be argued that sentencing juveniles on
the basis of felony murder convictions is contrary to the Miller rationale,
where the application of this doctrine to youth reveals the most offensive
ignorance of the critical differences between juvenile and adult ability to
assess the spectrum of consequences associated with their actions.345
336. Whiteside v. State, 426 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Ark. 2013).
337. Erin H. Flynn, Comment, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence and
Retribution Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1071 (2008).
338. Id
339. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005)).
340. Mardarewich, supra note 104, at 130.
341. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 43, 50 (2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
342. Feld, supra note 1, at 125-26.
343. Shitama, supra note 209, at 845.
344. See id at 842-48.
345. See id at 846.
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In Brown, the court took no issue with the application of the felony
murder charge to thirteen-year-old Keaira Brown. The court simply not-
ed that "[a]t the time of Brown's crimes, first-degree murder was defined
as the killing of a human being committed, '(b) in the commission of,
attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony' . . . ."
and that "[a]ggravated robbery is an 'inherently dangerous felony."'
346
While simplistic definition may be appropriate as applied to an adult
criminal who is less impulsive and better able to understand the conse-
quences of his or her actions, it is wholly inappropriate when considering
both the goals of felony murder doctrine and the reduced culpability of
juveniles.
The goals of the felony murder doctrine are deterrence and retribu-
tion.347 Where "unforeseen acts . . . cannot logically be deterred," and
"culpability should be based on an individual defendant's criminal in-
tent ... and not simply on harm caused in the commission of a crime,"
the justifications for the doctrine are unsubstantiated.348 Consequently,
the doctrine is even less warranted as applied to juveniles. It assumes,
wrongfully so, that juvenile felons, who are less culpable because they
inherently possess a "proclivity for risk, and inability to assess conse-
quences,"349 can "reasonably anticipate any resulting injury and should
therefore be held liable when such injury in fact occurs."350
Miller stands for the proposition "that a juvenile is much less likely
than an adult to recognize that his participation in a robbery or other fel-
ony could potentially result in death or injury," and is therefore "less
likely to be deterred by the specter of even the most severe punish-
ment."35 ' Keaira Brown's felony murder conviction is therefore unwar-
ranted based on this rationale. Here, while it is clear that "[t]he serious
theoretical shortcomings of felony murder liability apply with exponen-
tially greater force to juveniles,"352 it must be noted, "almost every state
prosecutes both children and adults for felony murder,"353 contrary to
Miller's rationale.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IGNORING MILLER
Extending the Miller rationale to forbid mandatory sentencing in all
juvenile cases, or at least in cases that implicate the most severe sentenc-
ing schemes, would create a splash in the modem adult criminal system,
even as it could be extended to warrant the resurrection of a more "re-
346. State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 792 (Kan. 2014) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3401,
21-3436(4) (repealed 2010)).
347. Shitama, supra note 209, at 843.
348. Id. at 844.
349. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
350. Shitama, supra note 209, at 843.
351. Id. at 845-46.
352. Id. at 845.
353. Id. at 844.
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storative justice" scheme for juveniles.354 Perhaps this is why state courts
have taken to containing the Miller decision in the numerous ways previ-
ously discussed. The inherent effects of each decision to contain Miller
are clear; however, it is necessary to take a step back to see the cumula-
tive and detrimental effect of these decisions; "the practical result is at
odds with the Supreme Court's clear trajectory toward [affording juve-
niles] greater [constitutional] protection and greater leniency . . . in the
criminal context."355 Operating together, every juvenile waiver, and eve-
ry declination to extend Miller form the context in which the constitu-
tional line between juveniles and adults slowly evaporates.
The first incremental step is transfer mechanisms. Of course, juve-
nile transfer decisions, at first glance, do not appear to implicate Miller,
because the Miller holding addresses a mandatory sentence. However,
mandatory and discretionary transfers operate in such a way that they
precede imposition of the harshest adult sentences on youth; "a decision
to send a juvenile to adult court is a decision to end his childhood."356
Transfers effectuate a juvenile's transition, in the eyes of the law, from
child to adult, and carry with them the "profound consequences" of doing
"adult time," among other catastrophic effects.357
Tantamount to sentencing, juvenile transfer undercuts Miller's con-
templation of juveniles as different, where a youth may be transferred
without ever "hav[ing] the opportunity to tell the juvenile court judge
about his background, his mental health, or any other fact that might
make him worthy of an opportunity to take advantage of what the juve-
nile court may have to offer." 358 Here, it is necessary to apply Miller's
broader rationale to transfer proceedings to properly defend the legal
notion that juveniles are different than adults.359
The second incremental step in the dilution of Miller's rationale of-
ten involves juvenile sentencing decisions, which are often nuanced and
chip away at Miller in piecemeal fashion, making it difficult to identify
any single sentencing scheme as the culprit. Despite Miller's broader
rationale with regard to reduced juvenile culpability, a literal interpreta-
tion of Miller's narrow holding is not irrational per se.360 Such decisions
are sound from a purely legal standpoint: a non-mandatory life without
354. See Amelung, supra note 290, at 35 (stating, in response to Miller, "[t]he appropriate
response for these-and all-states is to incorporate restorative justice sentences into the juvenile
sentencing structure").
355. Recent Case, supra note 13, at 1252.
356. Id. at 30.
357. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
358. Id. at 54.
359. See id. (arguing for the application of Miller to transfer decisions because "[w]hile the
Eighth Amendment itself might not apply directly to transfer proceedings, Graham and Miller indi-
cate that juveniles are different and deserve a heightened due process akin to the kind of process that
death penalty litigants have been given through the Eighth Amendment" (footnote omitted)).
360. See Nostro, supra note 293, at 181.
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parole sentence without proper individualized consideration, "an eighty-
nine-year prison sentence without parole," and a mandatory consecutive
fixed-term sentence that is functionally equivalent to life without parole
are all beyond the literal Miller holding.36 ' It is only when recognizing
Miller's broader notion-that a juvenile's youthfulness warrants individ-
ualized consideration of that youth's mitigating circumstances-does
"the reckless danger of a strict interpretation of Miller" reveal itself.362
Simply put, "[a] sentencing scheme that fails to consider a juvenile
offender's potential for rehabilitation is at odds with the Supreme Court's
stance on juvenile culpability." 363 And while Miller may or may not have
ushered in the revitalization of restorative juvenile justice 3  by infusing
our current process of juvenile sentencing with the individualization re-
quirement, "the narrow application of Miller's holding could . .. result in
sentences that run afoul of the concerns over proportionality that are cen-
tral to . . . Miller." 365 In the incremental dilution of Miller, our constitu-
tional concept of juvenile is growing, where post-Miller courts make
sentencing decisions in a legal vacuum, rather than considering the
broader constitutional meaning and effect of Miller.366 The ultimate ef-
fect is a dissipated line between juveniles and adults, where juveniles are
transferred to adult court and sentenced as adults based on their crime
without the court ever needing to assess their juvenile status.3 67 The re-
sult? Juveniles are adults in the eyes of the law.
These effects and their attendant results are demonstrated by exam-
ple. State v. Brown illustrates the unbridled discretion of judges in trans-
ferring a thirteen-year-old offender to adult court despite the presumption
of juvenile jurisdiction. Per typical state transfer mechanisms, juvenile
jurisdiction over Brown was waived "with little or no consideration of
[her] child status or the mitigating circumstances surrounding [her] of-
fense."368 The broad discretion of the district court at the transfer stage,
as it impeded a meaningful consideration of Brown's youth, is incremen-
tal step number one. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed this unguid-
ed and potentially hostile consideration, reviewing the decision with the
deferential lens of abuse of discretion, while ignoring the presumption
triggered by Brown's youthfulness.369
361. Id. at 180-83.
362. Id. at 181-82.
363. Id. at 189-90.
364. See Amelung, supra note 290, at 31-32 ("[T]he appropriate response for all states, includ-
ing those not affected by the Miller decision, is to incorporate a restorative justice sentencing regime
into the juvenile justice system.").
365. Nostro, supra note 293, at 180.
366. See id at 179-86.
367. See Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 53-54.
368. See Shitama, supra note 209, at 830-31.
369. See supra Part I.
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After being transferred to adult court, Brown was then charged with
particular crimes (felony murder and robbery), which were attached to a
specific, mandatory sentence-a sentence the court held did not violate
Miller's narrow holding, although it foreclosed any meaningful consider-
ation of Brown's youthfulness.370 Thus, immediately upon conviction "in
adult court, [the] mandatory sentencing laws proscribe[d] age and other
mitigating factors from weighing in the determination of [her] punish-
ment .. . ."3 Here, Brown's juvenile status not only failed to mitigate on
her behalf during transfer, it could not even mitigate on her behalf after
transfer.
In light of these incremental steps, it is now imperative to take a
step back. The Court's reasoning, in the Roper, Graham, and Miller tril-
ogy is this: juvenile offenders are less culpable and therefore less deserv-
ing of harsh adult sentences.372 Allowing juveniles to undergo little or no
consideration of mitigating factors at the transfer level, only then to be
subjected to mandatory prison terms at the sentencing level is an ex-
pressway to "adulthood" the Supreme Court has slowly tried to fore-
close.373 Miller sought to distance juveniles from adult treatment by
mandating individualized consideration when imposing the harshest sen-
tences. The means chosen, however-the individual consideration man-
date-indicate a return to the principles of the juvenile court.374 That is,
the Court recognizes that focusing on the crime in making a juvenile do
adult time does not comport with the known scientific fact that juveniles
are less able to asses risk, comprehend consequence, and resist peer pres-
sure.375 As such, where it is apparent that "[a]n offender's age has no
bearing on the amount of harm caused-children and adults can inflict
the same injuries. But youths' inability fully to appreciate wrongfulness
or to control their behavior may reduce culpability and lessen blamewor-
thiness for the harms they cause."376
CONCLUSION
Juveniles are not adults, and "[t]he Court has explicitly stated that
the Constitution may apply differently to juveniles and adults."377 How-
ever, there is tension where juvenile sentencing jurisprudence recognizes
the "culpability differences between juveniles and adults, and [courts]
370. Shitama, supra note 209, at 796.
371. Id. at 831.
372. See Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 142 (Wyo. 2014); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
373. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458-60, 2463-69.
374. See Amelung, supra note 290, at 24 ("While the Court's decision does not provide guid-
ance for its implementation, it does provide a significant impetus to change the manner in which the
legal system holds juvenile criminals accountable for their crimes.").
375. See Feld, supra note 1, at 113-21.
376. Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
377. Wood, supra note 2, at 1467.
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nonetheless subject[] them to the same sentencing schemes."3 78 Thomp-
son, Roper, Graham, and Miller established a tradition of treating juve-
niles differently using a common thread of reduced juvenile culpability
to limit the availability of particular sentences as applied juvenile offend-
ers.379 Miller, in particular, introduced individualized consideration of an
offender's youthful status before imposing life without parole, and the
broader Miller rationale supports an individualization requirement in all
-380juvenile sentencing proceedings.
Post-Miller courts have effectively undermined this broad rationale,
using loosely considered transfer decisions to trigger a myriad of manda-
tory sentences and severely limiting the application of Miller.38 1 The
Miller Court sought to re-establish the line between young offenders and
adult criminals, barring sentencing schemes that impose mandatory life-
382without-parole on juveniles. In announcing this new rule, the Court
contemplated, or perhaps hoped, that "appropriate occasions for sentenc-
ing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty w[ould] be uncommon."383
However, this has not been the case; where juveniles are continuously
subjected to a sentence of functional equivalence, life without parole, as
subsequent courts incrementally dismantle Miller's rationale. This phe-
nomenon is demonstrated effectively by the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Brown.
In Brown, an ill-considered transfer mechanism equalized a thir-
teen-year-old offender and adult criminals, undermining Miller's con-
templation of juveniles as less culpable than adults and warranting indi-
vidualized consideration. With extreme deference afforded to lower
courts, reviewing courts rarely reverse transfer decisions, even when an
abuse is present. This is in spite of a constitutional principle of lessened
culpability, the harsh consequences of transfer, and even a statutory pre-
sumption against ransfer. As Brown also demonstrates, the most pro-
nounced manner in which courts foreclose the operation f Miller's ra-
tionale in juvenile sentencing jurisprudence is denying extension of Mil-
ler through a myriad of creative sentencing schemes that avoid Miller's
holding but offend its rationale. Courts may refuse to apply Miller in
contexts other than mandatory life without parole. In minimally comply-
ing with Miller's narrow holding, courts and legislatures employ a varie-
ty of creative strategies: some legislatures sever the mandatory nature of
378. Flynn, supra note 342, at 1073.
379. See Kelli E. Antes, Case Comment, Taking a Life Without Taking a Life: State v. Ninham
Violates the Eighth Amendment by Sentencing a Fourteen-Year-Old Juvenile to Life in Prison With-
out Parole, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 215, 241 (2013).
380. Hoeffel, supra note 148, at 53.
381. See e.g., Nostro, supra note 293, at 176.
382. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) ("We therefore hold that the Eighth
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life without parole while giving little effect to individual consideration
before imposing life without parole; other courts impose the next most
severe punishment that may operate as the equivalent to life without pa-
role.
Our current legal system therefore suffers a bifurcation of juvenile
sentencing philosophies. Juvenile jurisprudence insists youthfulness is a
unique status with regard to legal treatment of criminal offenders, as seen
most potently in Miller. A variety of states, however, dismantle Miller's
broad rationale; they "lump" juveniles into the adult criminal system and
charge accordingly, with little or no regard for youthfulness as a categor-
ically distinct status.3 84 As a result of diminishing Miller's reach, the
constitutional line between juveniles and adults originating in the juve-
nile courts and advanced by Miller is inevitably and incrementally
erased.
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384. Flynn, supra note 342, at 1072.
* J.D. Candidate, 2014. 1 want to extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Rebecca Aviel, who
spent invaluable time providing such meaningful comments and insight on this Comment. In addi-
tion, I thank the Denver University Law Review Board, particularly Lindsey Dunn and Brittany
Limes, for their helpful input throughout the editing process and in making this Comment publisha-
ble. Most importantly, I thank my remarkable husband, Zach Huston, for his enduring support and
unwavering belief in my dream. Thank you for sharing this dream with me and for being my team-
mate through it all.
612 [ Vol. 92:3
LUSTER V. STATE AND STARKEY V. OKLAHOMA: MODERN
SCARLET LETTER REGULATIONS AND THE COURTS' COLD
SHOULDER
ABSTRACT
Sex offenders face a unique set of consequences that extend beyond
their pronounced sentence. These consequences carry heavy social im-
plications and inflict public humiliation. The malleability of sex offender
registration laws, and the legislature's ability to extend the consequences
as it sees fit, creates a difficult and potentially unfair situation for past
offenders. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution
does not allow retroactive punishment. However, this only applies to
punitive law. The Supreme Court has provided a test, often called the
"intent-effect" test, to determine if retroactive consequences are punitive.
In Luster v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections and Starkey v. Okla-
homa Department of Corrections, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the punitive intent and effect of Oklahoma's retroactive registra-
tion laws and concluded that the laws were in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. No other state in the Tenth Circuit has yet provided an
adequate analysis of the punitive effect of its registration requirements.
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit states should follow the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's example by carefully examining the punitive
effect of each state's respective sex offender registration requirements.
Luster and Starkey have shown that these laws may be unconstitutional.
The rule of law under the Constitution favors predictability, and if legis-
latures are allowed to retroactively change the registration requirements,
offenders will be kept in lifelong fear that their sentence may be extend-
ed at any time on the whim of the legislature. Therefore, each state court
must be vigilant to ensure that the punitive effect of its laws is not exces-
sive in relation to the nonpunitive intent of its legislature.
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone makes mistakes. Each mistake comes with consequences.
Craig Reynolds, a Texas resident, has learned that some mistakes lead to
unrelenting consequences.' Reynolds was convicted of a sex crime in
1990, before Texas had a requirement for sex offender registration.2 One
year later, Texas passed S.B. No. 259 establishing a registration require-
ment and consequences for failing to apply. This amendment only ap-
plied to those convicted after September 1991.4 Just six years later, after
Reynolds had already served his five-year sentence, Texas enacted S.B.
875 requiring all sexual offenders convicted after 1970 to register if they
were incarcerated or under supervision at the time the amendment was
1. Emily DePrang, Criminal Court Punts on 'Retroactive Punishment' Question, TEX.
OBSERVER (Mar. 31, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.texasobserver.org/texas-court-criminal-appeals-
retroactive-civil-penalties.
2. Id.
3. Sexual Offender Registration Program, S. 259, 72d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1991).
4. Id.
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passed.5 Reynolds narrowly escaped this statute as he was no longer in-
carcerated, on probation, or on parole.6 The striking blow, however,
came in 2005 in the form of H.B. No. 867 requiring all sex offenders
convicted after 1970, regardless of incarceration or supervision, to apply
for sex offender registration.7 Reynolds had been a free man for a dec-
ade, lived a clean life, and now he would be required to apply for public
registration and endure its accompanying humiliation.8 Is it fair to keep
sex offenders, like Reynolds, in fear that the legislature may increase
their registration requirements as it sees fit?
The United States Constitution explicitly prohibits ex post facto
laws.9 An ex post facto law is "one which imposes a punishment for an
act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed."o At first glance, it would
seem that an amendment like that affecting Reynolds would clearly be
retroactive and in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, "it has
long been recognized . . . that the constitutional prohibition on ex post
facto laws applies only to penal statutes ..... "" The question then is
what can properly be considered a penal law? The majority of courts,
when hearing the issue of sex offender registration amendments and their
retroactive application, have held the laws are civil and nonpunitive.12
However, after Smith v. Doe,'3 a recent landmark Supreme Court case
addressing this question, many courts have held sex offender registration
laws invalid as punitive and in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14
This Comment examines the Tenth Circuit states' varying interpretations
of this question. Nearly all of the Tenth Circuit states have found the law
to be nonpunitive; however, Oklahoma did the most thorough analysis
and held that the law did have a punitive effect. Following Oklahoma's
lead, this Comment argues that each state's offenders should only be held
to the registration requirements in effect at the time he or she pled or was
found guilty.
5. Sex Offender Registration Program, TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 62.02(d), amended by S.
875, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); DePrang, supra note 1.
6. DePrang, supra note 1.
7. Sex Offender Registration Requirements, TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 62.002(a), enacted by
H. 867, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); DePrang supra note 1.
8. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1913 (1991) (explaining the shaming techniques used to punish offenders in the late 1600s includ-
ing: forcing the accused to wear degrading signs, forcing the accused to confess in public, or brand-
ing the accused as permanent labeling); DePrang, supra note 1.
9. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
10. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325-26 (1866).
11. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990).
12. See William M. Howard, Annotation, Validity of State Sex Offender Registration Laws
Under Ex Post Facto Prohibitions, 63 A.L.R. 6th 351 (2011).
13. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
14. Howard, supra note 12, §§ 3-4; see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (describing the proper
analysis to determine if a law is civil and nonpunitive, or punitive either in intent or effect).
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Part I of this Comment provides a summary of the U.S. Supreme
Court's ex post facto analysis of sex offender registration statutes. It then
explains how the various state courts in the Tenth Circuit have applied
this analysis and come to varying conclusions. Part II explores the analy-
sis of two recent Oklahoma Supreme Court cases: Starkey v. Oklahoma
Department of Corrections15 and Luster v. State ex rel. Department of
Corrections. This Part shows how the Oklahoma Supreme Court ap-
plied the same test from Smith but came to a different conclusion. Part III
describes the failure of the Tenth Circuit states to give a consistent and
reliable answer to past sex offenders seeking relief This part also shows
the various consequences of sex offender registration in each state. Since
law should be predictable,17 Part III concludes by providing an argument
for what the Tenth Circuit states should do to avoid the injustice of leav-
ing offenders in fear of the legislature increasing their sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
To clarify the reason for the courts' confusion as to the punitive na-
ture of sex offender registration laws, Subpart A will summarize the
analysis given in the landmark Supreme Court case Smith v. Doe. Sub-
parts B through E will give a detailed description of the subsequent con-
fusion put upon the state courts in applying the proper test. Specifically,
these Subparts will address Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyo-
ming's varying interpretations and applications of the Smith case. Kansas
has not yet addressed this question in any published opinion.'8
A. Smith v. Doe: Determining Punitive Intent and Effect
In 1994, Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl in New Jersey, was
assaulted and murdered by her neighbor, Jesse Timmedequas.'9 Un-
known to the family, the neighbor had been previously convicted of sex
crimes against children.2 0 Megan's parents explained that if they had
known their neighbor was a sex offender, their daughter would not have
died.2 1 This event stirred politicians and public activists to support "a
change in the laws that [previously] allowed sex offenders and child mo-
lesters to live in secrecy amongst their potential victims."22 In 1994, New
15. 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013).
16. 315 P.3d 386 (Okla. 2013).
17. EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: A
MULTILATERALIST METHOD 52 (2001) (explaining that "any choice of law system should be as
predictable as possible" so that citizens "know how the law governs their behavior so that they can
conform their behavior to the law").
18. See State v. Donaldson, 331 P.3d 833 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished
table decision).
19. Mary K. Evans, Megan's Law: Citizens' Perceptions of Sex Offender Community Notifi-
cation in Nebraska 5-7 (Aug., 2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Graduate College of the University
of Nebraska) (on file with the University of Nebraska Library system).
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Jersey passed a law, nicknamed "Megan's Law," meant to inform the
public about the presence of convicted sex offenders.23 By 1996, every
state had enacted its own version of Megan's Law, creating several dif-
ferent registration programs across the nation.24 Alaska's version, the
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act), was the Supreme
Court's main concern in the Smith case.
Smith involved two anonymous respondents (Doe I and Doe 11).25
Doe I and Doe II were both convicted of sexual abuse of a minor.26 After
being released from prison in 1990, they entered rehabilitative programs,
which they both completed.27 Aggravated sex offenders in Alaska, such
as the respondents in Smith, were required to register for life under Alas-
ka Statute 12.63.010.28 Even though the statute was passed after Doe I
and Doe II were convicted, it applied to them both retroactively.29 The
parties brought this action seeking for the Act to be held void under the
Ex Post Facto Clause.30
The Supreme Court separated its analysis into two parts: (1) to "as-
certain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' pro-
ceedings," and if so (2) to "examine whether the statutory scheme is 'so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to
deem it 'civil."' 31 If the Court had found that the legislature meant the
statute to be punitive, there would be no need for further analysis.3 2 The
Court "ordinarily defer[s] to the legislature's stated intent,"33 and "'only
the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."
34
The Court easily determined that the legislature intended the Act to
be nonpunitive by reading directly from its language: "'[S]ex offenders
pose a high risk of reoffending,' and . . . 'protecting the public from sex
offenders' [is] the 'primary governmental interest' 35 Likewise, the Court
explained that "[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests that the legis-
lature sought to create anything other than a civil . . . scheme designed to
23. Id.
24. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003).
25. Id. at 91.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010(d)(2) (2008), invalidated as applied by Doe v. State, 189 P.3d
999 (Alaska 2008).
29. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91.
30. Id. at 91-92.
31. Id. at 92 (alteration in original) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
35. Id. at 93 (quoting Act of May 12, 1994, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, §§ 1(l)-(2)).
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protect the public from harm."36 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majori-
ty, struggled to show how the statute was meant to be nonpunitive when
it accomplished the same goals as Alaska's criminal law, and it was par-
tially codified within Alaska's criminal procedure.3  With the issue hasti-
ly disposed of, the Court quickly moved on from the legislature's intent
to the actual punitive effect of the statute.3 8
The Court analyzed the punitive effect of the Alaska statute using
seven factors established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.39 These fac-
tors include:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and de-
terrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connect-
ed is assignable for it, [and] whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned .... 40
Justice Kennedy started by explaining that registration is "of fairly
recent origin," and thus cannot have historically or traditionally been
regarded as punishment.41 Even so, Justice Kennedy again struggled to
clearly separate the consequences of online public disclosure from the
public shaming historically cast upon those committing the same sexual
crimes.42 Next, Justice Kennedy refused to accept the Ninth Circuit's
logical argument that offender registration created an affirmative disabil-
ity and restraint both in employment and housing.4 3 Justice Kennedy
conceded that the court of appeal's argument had force, but he argued
that offenders are "free to move where they wish and to live and work as
other citizens."4" A closer look at housing and employment consequences
in more recent times suggests this statement from 2003 may no longer be
accurate.45
36. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 97; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
40. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
41. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub
nom. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
42. Id. at 97-99 (describing registration online as simply an easier way to search criminal
history, and humorously adding that the "[w]eb site does not provide the public with means to shame
the offender by, say, posting comments undemeath his record").
43. Id. at 100.
44. Id. at 101.
45. See infra Part III.A (discussing housing and employment issues arising from offender
registration).
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The Court continued by admitting that offender registration deters
future crime, which is a purpose of punishment.4 6 However, Justice Ken-
nedy felt that labeling a law as criminal just because it shared a similar
purpose with criminal law-deterrence-would "undermine the Gov-
ernment's ability to engage in effective regulation."4 7 The Court quickly
transitioned into explaining that the court of appeals was wrong to say
the Act's obligations were retributive.48 The Ninth Circuit argued that the
Act imposed a requirement based on "the extent of the wrongdoing, not
by the extent of the risk posed."49 However, Justice Kennedy rejected
this reasoning, explaining that the length of reporting requirements was
"reasonably related to the danger of recidivism" and therefore consistent
with the regulatory and nonpunitive goals.50 It seems that Justice Kenne-
dy focused on the intent of the Act's requirements while avoiding the
question of whether the effect of the registration requirements fulfilled
retributive goals.
The Court considered the registration requirements' connection to a
nonpunitive purpose to be one of the most significant factors.5' It con-
cluded that the registration served the purpose of public safety, and the
court of appeals readily agreed.52 The court of appeals alternatively ar-
gued that the requirement was overly broad because it applies "to all
convicted sex offenders without regard to their future dangerousness."
However, Justice Kennedy felt this was unpersuasive in that sex offend-
ers are dangerous "as a class."54 The Court then explained that the dan-
gers of recidivism justified the length of the reporting requirement, mak-
ing it not excessive in relation to the nonpunitive goal of public safety.55
Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion, writes that for him "this is a
close case, for I not only agree with the Court that there is evidence
pointing to an intended civil characterization of the Act, but also see con-
siderable evidence pointing the other way." 56 Justice Souter conceded
that public safety should be given serious weight in the analysis, but then
stated, "[I]t would be naive to look no further, given pervasive attitudes
toward sex offenders."5  He goes on to explain how widespread dissemi-
nation of offenders' names humiliates and ostracizes offenders and
46. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
47. Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 990 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'dsub nom. Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84) (internal quotation mark omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Id. at 103.
53. Id. (citing Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d at 991-92, rev'd sub nom., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84).
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring).
57. Id at 108-09.
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"bears some resemblance to shaming punishments that were used earlier
in our history." 8 He finally concludes, "What tips the scale for me is the
presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State's law."59
Lastly, Justice Stevens in a strong dissent states, "No matter how often
the Court may repeat and manipulate multifactor tests . . . it will never
persuade me that the registration and reporting obligations that are im-
posed on convicted sex offenders and no one else as a result of their con-
victions are not part of their punishment."60
Importantly, the Smith case only applied specifically to Alaska's
registration requirement. Therefore, state supreme courts were given
discretion to apply the Court's standards to their respective state registra-
tion statutes. Many states took this opportunity to discontinue the retro-
active application of sex offender registrations in their jurisdiction.6 1
B. Colorado's Interpretation
Colorado's reaction to challenges of sex offender registration laws
can be summarized with four seminal cases: Jamison v. People,6 2 People
v. Tuffo,63 People v. Sowell,6 and People v. Durapau.65 These cases are
all from the Colorado Court of Appeals; the Colorado Supreme Court has
not yet taken the opportunity to clarify the issue. These cases show that
Colorado, like the United States Supreme- Court, has based its decisions
66on fear of recidivism rather than what would be just and fair. In fact,
studies have shown that sexual criminals tend to have the lowest recidi-
vism rates amongst other criminals.67 Still, stories like Megan Kanka's
cause lawmakers to fear dangerous recidivists. While reading these sub-
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id. at I10.
60. Id. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. See Howard, supra note 12, § 4 (citing cases that have held offender registrations invalid
under ex post facto analyses).
62. 988 P.2d 177 (Colo. App. 1999).
63. 209 P.3d 1226 (Colo. App. 2009).
64. 327 P.3d 273 (Colo. App. 2011).
65. 280 P.3d 42 (Colo. App. 2011).
66. See Kelsey Eagan, Casenote, Forfeiting Sex Offenders' Constitutional Rights Due to the
Stigma of Their Crimes?: State v. Trosclair, 59 LOY. L. REV. 267, 267 (2013) (explaining how social
stigma and fear of recidivism have caused the courts to turn a blind eye to offenders' constitutional
rights).
67. See Johnna Preble, The Shame Game: Montana s Right to Privacy for Level I Sex Offend-
ers, 75 MONT. L. REV. 297, 308-09 (2014) ("[S]ex offenders really do not recidivate more than
other types of criminals. In 2002, researchers Langan and Levin found that within a three-year peri-
od recidivism rates were as follows: burglary, 76%; robbery, 70.2%; drug offenses, 66.7%; and rape,
46%." (footnote omitted)); see also Stephanie N.K. Robbins, Comment, Homelessness Among Sex
Offenders: A Case for Restricted Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 205, 216 (2010) ("Sex offender registration and notification laws are based on the
faulty assumption that sex offenders are more likely to recidivate than other offenders."). But see
Roger Przybylski, Chapter 5: Adult Sex Offender Recidivism, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS,
http://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec I /ch5_recidivism.html#top (last visited Jan. 31, 2015) (acknowl-
edging that many sex offenses go underreported).
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parts, it is helpful to consider whether all criminals should have to regis-
ter.
In Jamison, Mark Jamison had been convicted of sexual assault and
sentenced to twenty-five years in 1988, six years before Colorado's Me-
gan's Law became effective.68 In 1994, C.R.S. § 18-3-412.5(1) was
passed, requiring all convicted sex offenders released after 1991 to regis-
ter with local law enforcement.69 The Colorado Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "the intent of the statute is remedial and not punitive."o The
court did not consider whether the effect of the statute is in any way pu-
nitive.7 ' In fact, the court merely concluded, with no supporting evi-
dence, that the statute "does not disadvantage [the] plaintiff." 72 Being
that his twenty-five years would have been fulfilled in 2013, Mr. Jamison
is certainly disadvantaged now.73 However, the court analyzed the consti-
tutionality of a potentially ex post facto law merely by guessing at the
legislature's implied intent.
Around a decade later, the court came out with its decision in Tuffo.
Jason Tuffo pled guilty to a misdemeanor sexual assault, and if the court
were to consider him a sexually violent predator, he would have had to
register for life.74 The court again simply concluded, with no analysis,
that the law in no way disadvantaged Mr. Tuffo after the fact.75 The court
stated, "the registration and notification requirements established in the
SVP statute are intended to protect the community rather than punish the
offender."76 Once again, the court remained silent as to the actual puni-
tive, retroactive effect of these laws.
Two years later, the Colorado Court of Appeals heard People v.
Sowell. Monty Sowell pled guilty to sexual assault on a child by one in a
position of trust.77 The plea agreement contained nothing regarding regis-
tration, and offenders were allowed at the time to "petition after a wait-
ing period to discontinue the [registration] requirement." Mr. Sowell
did his time on probation, registered as a sex offender, and then peti-
tioned in 2009 to discontinue registration.7 9 Unfortunately, in 2001 (two
years after he was completely released from supervision), the General
Assembly changed the statute precluding these petitions and requiring
68. Jamison v. People, 988 P.2d 177, 179 (Colo. App. 1999).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 180.
71. See id. at 179.
72. Id. at 180.
73. Id.; see discussion infra Part lI1.A regarding the negative consequences of sex offender
registration on employment and housing.
74. People v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Colo. App. 2009).
75. Id. at 1230.
76. Id.
77. People v. Sowell, 327 P.3d 273, 274 (Colo. App. 2011).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Sowell to register for life.8 0 This statute was applied to Sowell retroac-
tively, and as such, was at least potentially in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Even so, eight years after the Supreme Court released its
holding in Smith, the court of appeals still made no findings regarding
the punitive effects of the registration statute. In fact, this court simply
stated that the statute was constitutional under the holdings of Jamison
and Tuffo, cases decided with no reference to the Supreme Court's analy-
*81
sis. 8
Finally, the most recent Colorado case to address retroactive regis-
tration laws is People v. Durapau. Damon Durapau was charged with
sexual assault but found not guilty by reason of insanity.82 When Dura-
pau was charged, there was no requirement that the court order the De-
fendant to register as an offender.8 3 This changed with the addition of the
word "shall" to C.R.S. 16-8-118(2)(a) in 2005, which required the court
to order that Durapau register as a sex offender upon his release.8 4 Final-
ly, this court looked to the Supreme Court's analysis in Smith to deter-
mine if the 2005 amendment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.5 The
court quoted the General Assembly, Smith, and the three cases discussed
above as evidence that he legislature intended the statute to be a nonpu-
nitive law geared toward public safety.86 The court then concluded that
the statute's amendment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause without
any reference to its punitive effect.
In these cases, the Colorado courts' analyses have been incomplete
because they have failed to consider the punitive effect of retributive
registration requirements. These retroactive laws share common goals of
punishment: deterrence and retribution. Likewise, it is conceivable that
each state's registration procedures would historically have been consid-
ered punishment. Without considering these factors, the Colorado courts
leave this constitutional interpretation to speculation about the legisla-
ture's intent.
C. New Mexico's Interpretation
New Mexico's application of the Smith analysis can be summed up
under two landmark cases from the Court of Appeals of New Mexico:
State v. Druktenis88 and A CL U of New Mexico v. City of Albuquerque.8 9
New Mexico, unlike Colorado, eventually applied the Smith test's puni-
80. Id.
81. Id. at 277.
82. People v. Durapau, 280 P.3d 42, 45 (Colo. App. 2011).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 48.
86. Id. at 48-49.
87. Id. at 49.
88. 86 P.3d 1050 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
89. 137 P.3d 1215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
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tive intent and effect factors. The tone of the conclusions and opinions in
Druktenis, however, suggests the court may have felt conflicted about its
conclusion.
Druktenis was the first case to properly apply the Smith analysis in
New Mexico. Sean Druktenis pled guilty in 1998 to sex offenses that did
not require him to register with local authorities at the time.0 One year
later, New Mexico amended its law, the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), to retroactively apply to Druktenis.9 1
Druktenis filed a motion to avoid applying for an exemption because it
was in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.92 The court laid out the
Smith and Mendoza-Martinez factors and applied the Supreme Court's
intent/effect test.93
The court of appeals first proclaimed that they "have no doubt that
our Legislature's intent in enacting SORNA was to enact a civil, remedi-
al, regulatory, nonpunitive law." 94 The court arrived at this conclusion by
making cursory statements about six of the seven Smith factors without
applying any facts to their analysis:
[T]hese conclusions are obvious: the provisions of SORNA do not
involve affirmative disability or restraint; have not historically been
regarded as punishment; do not come into play only on a finding of
scienter; only incidentally, if at all, promote traditional aims of retri-
bution and deterrence; and have a rationally connected, nonpunitive
purpose. In our view, that SORNA applies only to behavior that is al-
ready criminal is not a significant factor.95
The court then struggled with whether SORNA's requirements were ex-
cessive as they relate to the purpose of public safety.96 The court cited
E.B. v. Verniero97 and Russell v. Gregoire98 to show that offender regis-
tration has extreme consequences regarding employment and housing
*99opportunities.
After wading through the consequences of offender registration, the
court came to the final conclusion that "[v]irtually all federal circuits and
state jurisdictions considering this issue have rejected the argument that
retroactive application of sex offender statute registration and notifica-
90. Druktenis, 86 P.3d at 1054.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1055.
93. Id. at 1059-61.
94. Id. at 1060.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1060-62.
97. 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the harsh realities of the consequences ex
offenders suffer with family, housing, and employment); see discussion infra Part III.A.
98. 124 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (conceding that registration requirements can have
serious consequences through "humiliation, public opprobrium, ostracism, and the loss of job oppor-
tunities").
99. Druktenis, 86 P.3d at 1061.
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tion requirements violates constitutional ex post facto prohibitions."00
The court seemed unwilling to disavow precedent despite reservations
about the potential injustice of retroactive application.
ACLU of New Mexico was a similar case brought by a civil rights
group challenging the constitutionality of New Mexico's SORNA.'o' The
various claims included violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, double
jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment.102 The court did not exam-
ine the effect factors from Mendoza-Martinez. Rather, the court merely
concluded that because Smith and Druktenis found these laws to be non-
punitive, it would follow suit and find SORNA constitutional under all
claims.103 Like Colorado, New Mexico has yet to properly apply the con-
stitutionality of its Megan's Law under the Supreme Court's analysis.
Therefore, sex offenders are left with an unpredictable answer and no
protection from retroactive punishments.
D. Utah Application
The Utah Court of Appeals has not yet decided a case using the
Smith analysis. Even so, it is helpful to examine how the court has treat-
ed claims of unconstitutionality of Utah's Megan's Law. Utah's views
can be seen through a summary of its most recent case in this matter,
State v. Trotter.' Trotter remains Utah's guiding authority for this issue.
Kenneth Trotter pled guilty to having unlawful sexual conduct with
a minor.05 Later, he attempted to withdraw this plea because he was not
advised or informed that he would be required to register as a sex of-
fender. Because this is the closest case on the matter to reach the Utah
Supreme Court, it is clear that it has yet to hear an issue of ex post facto
concern. Even so, the court used Smith to conclude, "[T]he registration
requirement is intended to act not as a criminal punishment but as a
prophylactic civil remedy."'0 7 Like other states in the Tenth Circuit, the
Utah Supreme Court gave no analysis of whether the punitive effect of
the registration statute negates the legislature's intent to deem it civil.
E. Wyoming Application
Wyoming has only had opportunity to hear one case on the issue of
retroactive sex offender registration requirements. Kammerer v. State08
involved an offender with a second-degree sexual assault charge from
100. Druktenis, 86 P.3d at 1062.
101. ACLU ofN.M. v. City ofAlbuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1220 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
102. Id. at 1221.
103. Id. at 1222.
104. 330 P.3d 1267 (Utah 2014).
105. Id at 1269.
106. Id
107. Id. at 1276. The court only used the Smith case in passing in a "see, e.g." citation.
108. 322 P.3d 827 (Wyo. 2014).
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1993 in New Jersey.'1 Ronald Kammerer subsequently moved to Wyo-
ming, and he was charged with failing to register in 2012.110 Kammerer
filed a motion to dismiss complaining that the registration laws were in
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Like most state courts, the Su-
preme Court of Wyoming quickly determined that the legislature intend-
ed the registration requirements to be nonpunitive."' Despite this quick
conclusion, the court's opinion has a separate heading for "Punitive Ef-
fect" and gives a detailed analysis of the potentially punitive effects of
Wyoming's registration requirements, concluding that the law was non-
punitive. 112
Despite an analysis of the punitive effects, the Wyoming Supreme
Court's opinion remained overly conclusive. For example, when discuss-
ing the "traditional aims of punishment," the court provides no further
analysis than a direct quotation from the Smith opinion: "As in Smith, we
find that the classification of offenders based on their crimes is not indic-
ative of retributive intent."113 In analyzing the "historically regarded as
punishment" factor, the court deferred to the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and concluded: "We are in agreement with the analysis of these
courts."'1 4 These conclusions would be acceptable only if identical stat-
utes were in question. No progress can be gained by merely agreeing to
another court's analysis when the law in question in those courts bares no
relation to the law currently at issue in each state.
II. OKLAHOMA APPLICATION
The Oklahoma application of the Smith analysis is the most detailed
and thoughtful of any Tenth Circuit state. This is illustrated in two Okla-
homa Supreme Court cases: Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Correc-
tions and Luster v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections. Both cases
were split decisions, but they ultimately concluded that Oklahoma's Me-
gan's Law was excessive and unconstitutional as ex post facto punish-
ment. 5
A. Luster v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections
Christopher Luster pled guilty to sexual assault in April 1992 in
Texas. Luster then moved to Oklahoma and began registering with
Oklahoma authorities in 2003."' At that time, Oklahoma's Megan's Law
109. Id. at 830.
110. Id
111. Id at 834.
112. Id. at 834-39.
113. Id. at 837-38.
114. Id. at 834-36.
115. Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1030 (Okla. 2013) 2013; Luster v. State
ex rel. Dep't of Corr., 315 P.3d 386, 391 (Okla. 2013).
116. Luster, 315 P.3d at 387.
117. Id.
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would have required Luster to register for ten years.'18 In 2007, Oklaho-
ma's Megan's Law was amended, requiring offenders like Luster to reg-
ister for life.1 19 In 2011, Luster petitioned the court and asked that he
either be taken off the registry or, alternatively, that he only be required
to register for the previously applicable ten years.1 20 This case was then
consolidated with several other plaintiffs who had filed similar actions.12 1
"Luster requested the court issue an order finding . . . each consolidated
plaintiff be required to register under the provisions of [SORNA] in ef-
fect at the time he or she pled guilty or was convicted ....
Eventually, the petition was granted and the Oklahoma Department
of Corrections appealed.12 3 In the interim, the Starkey case had been de-
cided.124 The court referred to Starkey saying that the requirements
"which were enacted after Starkey entered Oklahoma were to be applied
prospectively and not retroactively."'25 Interestingly, the same Justices,
Justice Winchester and Justice Taylor, dissented in both cases. In Lus-
ter, the dissent merely stated that they dissent for the same reasons each
dissented in Starkey.127 For this purpose, this Comment will focus on the
analysis given in Starkey as it applies in both cases.
B. Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections
James Starkey's sex offender registration period was increased ret-
roactively by a statute similar to those previously mentioned.128 Starkey
was charged with sexual assault upon a minor in Texas for an act that
occurred in 1997.129 Starkey moved to Oklahoma in 1998, and under the
law at the time should have only been required to register for ten years.130
This time was extended from an amendment to Oklahoma's Megan's
Law in 1998.131
One of the most prominent differences in Oklahoma's Megan's Law
from that of other states like Colorado is the existence of level designa-
tions, which create registration requirements dependent on the level of
118. Id.
119. Id
120. Id at 388.
121. Id at 387.
122. Id. at 389.
123. Id. at 388-89.
124. Id. at 390-91.
125. Id. at 390.
126. Id. at 391 (Winchester & Taylor, JJ., dissenting); Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305
P.3d 1004, 1032 (Okla. 2013) (Taylor & Winchester, JJ., dissenting).
127. Luster, 315 P.3d at 387 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
128. Starkey, 305 P.3d at 1008.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1009.
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future risk each offender poses to the public.1 32 The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma explained those designations as follows:
1. Level one (low): a designated range of points on the sex offender
screening tool indicating that the person poses a low danger to the
community and will not likely engage in criminal sexual conduct;
2. Level two (moderate): a designated range of points on the sex of-
fender screening tool indicating that the person poses a moderate
danger to the community and may continue to engage in criminal
sexual conduct; and
3. Level three (high): a designated range of points on the sex offender
screening tool indicating that the person poses a serious danger to the
community and will continue to engage in criminal sexual con-
duct.133
Level 3 offenders were required to register for life.1 3 4 One year before
Starkey's registration period would have expired, he was assigned a level
3 risk assessment and required to register for life.135 The trial court held
that the retroactive application of the law was unconstitutional, and the
Department of Corrections appealed the judgment.'36
The court first explained that he Ex Post Facto Clause was included
in the body of the U.S. Constitution adopted in 1787 rather than putting it
through the amendment process.137 The court contended that this sug-
gests the clause was "fundamental to the protection of individual liber-
ty."l38 Additionally, the court quoted Justice Marshall saying "the Ex
Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have 'fair warning'
about the effect of criminal statutes, but also 'restricts governmental
power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation."'
1 39
The court then transitioned into a deep analysis of the Smith and Mendo-
za-Martinez factors, which they call the "intent-effects" test.140 The court
added, "How we apply the 'intent-effects' test is not governed by how
the federal courts have independently applied the same test under the
United States Constitution as long as our interpretation is at least as pro-
tective as the federal interpretation."1 41
132. Id. at 1010.
133. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 582.5(C)(1)-(3) (2014)).
134. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 583(C)D) (2014)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1013.
137. Id. at 1018.
138. Id. at 1018-19.
139. Id. at 1019 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266-67 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (examining Justice Stevens's analysis of the Ex Post Facto Clause, which
quotes Justice Marshall's opinion in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981)).
140. Id. at 1021.
141. Id.
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The court found that, like the Alaska version of Megan's Law in
Smith, the legislative purpose in enacting Oklahoma's SORNA was civil:
to identify sex offenders and alert the public when necessary.14 2 It then
went on to argue, "Although there is evidence pointing to a civil intent,
there is considerable evidence of a punitive effect." 43 Finally, a state
court realized the potential for the actual effect of these laws to be un-
constitutional. The court then proceeded to analyze the seven Mendoza-
Martinez factors to determine if there was enough proof to override the
legislative intent, which deemed the law civil in order to transform it into
a penalty.144
1. Affirmative Disability or Restraint
Unlike Alaska's version of SORNA, Oklahoma's SORNA requires
registrants to apply "in person."45 The court explained that the Smith
Court had emphasized the lack of an "in-person" requirement as the rea-
son Alaska's SORNA did not create an affirmative restraint.14 6 The court
also mentioned that Oklahoma has restrictions on where sex offenders
may live.147 In addition, Oklahoma sex offenders are required to renew
their license or identification every year when normal residents do so
every four years.148 Lastly, the court discussed the "profound humiliation
and community-wide ostracism" these afflicted registrants face, which
was acknowledged in the dissents of Smith and E.B. Verniero. 14 Thus,
the court found that SORNA "impose[d] substantial disabilities on regis-
trants."
2. Historically Regarded as a Punishment
Unlike Smith, the Oklahoma court looked to the historical practice
of public shaming to show registration was traditionally a punishment.'5 '
The court compared the branding of "Sex Offender" on each registrants
drivers license as their "scarlet letter" since they have to show this ID in
day-to-day transactions. 152 The court also discussed how the state's hous-
ing restrictions closely resembled the community ousting that was tradi-
tionally practiced upon sexual offenders.153 In sum, the court found that





147. Id at 1023 (providing the many housing restraints on sex offenders in Oklahoma).
148. Id
149. Id. at 1024 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation mark omitted); see also E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997).
150. Starkey, 305 P.3d at 1025.
151. Id.
152. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 1026 (concluding that housing restrictions are "regarded in our history and traditions
as punishment" (quoting Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Ky. 2009)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
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these consequences were "at least analogous . . . . to the traditional pun-
ishment of banishment."'54
3. Comes Into Play Only on a Finding of Scienter
Some SORNA crimes, like statutory rape, do not require a finding
of scienter.'55 This is because "it is not a defense that a defendant did not
know the victim was under the age of consent." 5 6 Even so, because
courts have considered this to be little proof of punitive effect, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court, like in Smith, found that this factor "should be
given little weight in our analysis."57
4. Traditional Aims of Punishment: Retribution and Deterrence
Here, the court again discussed how humiliation and housing re-
strictions assist in deterrence.'58 The court additionally explained that the
registration times are based on the statute the offender was convicted of
rather than their individual risk of recidivism.15 9 The court maintained
that this designation is retributive in nature, focusing on past actions ra-
ther than future risk, which supported the conclusion that SORNA has a
punitive effect.160
5. The Behavior is Already a Crime
Like Smith, the Oklahoma court struggled with the awkward appli-
cation of this factor because SORNA is only triggered when a crime is
committed.161 However, this is exactly the punitive characteristic the
factor was created to prevent, and the court rightly concluded: "[T]he
fact that [SORNA] applies only to behavior that is already a crime sup-
ports the conclusion this ... factor has a punitive effect." 62
6. Rational Connection to a Nonpunitive Purpose
Concededly, there is an obvious nonpunitive purpose behind sex of-
fender registration, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court admitted this.'63
The goal of identifying dangerous sexual predators and alerting the pub-
lic to avoid dangers of recidivism advances the civil purpose of public
154. Id.
155. Id
156. Id at 1026-27.
157. Id. at 1027.
158. Id.
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safety.'1 While this factor weighed in favor of constitutionality, the five
factors favoring a punitive effect persuaded the court.165
7. Excessiveness
The court admitted yet again the importance of protecting the public
from the risk of recidivism.166 Even so, "[t]his non-punitive objective,
while undeniably important, will not serve to render a statute so broad
and sweeping as to be non-punitive."l67 The court described how, with-
out any individual determination of Starkey's danger to the community,
he was required to remain on the registry for life.168 This was done leav-
ing no chance of petitioning to be removed from the registry, a life sen-
tence, no matter how rehabilitated Starkey may become.169 The court
then concluded with Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Smith, "What ultimate-
ly tips the balance for me is the Act's excessiveness in relation to its
nonpunitive purpose. . . . The Act applies to all convicted sex offenders,
without regard to their future dangerousness." In sum, the court found
that this factor suggests the law has a punitive effect.171
The court concluded that "there is clear proof that the effect of the
retroactive application of [SORNA's] registration is punitive and out-
weighs its non-punitive purpose." 72 The court did not attempt to say that
all sex offender registry laws were unconstitutional, but it limited its
finding to retroactive applications of these Megan's Laws in unfairly
humiliating and ousting past offenders.173
C. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Taylor wrote a dissenting opinion in Starkey suggesting that
registration is merely "one of the many, many unpleasant lifetime civil
consequences of being convicted of a felony."1 74 What he failed to con-
sider is that none of those other felonies require offender registration.
Therefore, it is different in practice and effect and should be analyzed
differently.
Justice Winchester then gave a detailed overview of his agreement
with the Smith case in a dissenting opinion.75 He explained that registra-
tion could not be historically regarded as punishment because it is of
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1030.
166. Id. at 1028.
167. Id. at 1028-29.
168. Id. at 1029.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1029-30 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116-17 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
171. Id. at 1030.
172. Id.
173. See id
174. Id at 1032 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
175. Id (Winchester, J., dissenting).
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recent origin.176 Still, the majority clearly explained that registration
closely resembles the "scarlet letter" punishments in the seventeenth
century.177 Justice Winchester further argued that there is no affirmative
disability or restraint because a routine background check would provide
the same information as the registry.' Even so, the additional effects of
the registry were explained by the majority saying, "Anyone at any time
and for any reason can find the address and picture of a registered sdx
offender along with the statute under which the offender was convict-
ed . . . ."179 Does this fit the bill of a routine background check, or is the
registry a new common place for future homeowners to gossip over their
potential neighbors?
Justice Winchester admitted that offender registration promotes the
traditional aims of punishment, but like the Smith Court explained, this
factor alone does not make a statute punitive.80 Justice Winchester
agreed with Smith that a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is
one of the most significant factors.'8 ' The majority admits that this factor
weighs in favor of a non-punitive effect; however, the Justices explain
that this is not dispositive of the issue.'82 Lastly, Justice Winchester de-
scribes the Supreme Court's analysis of excessiveness in relation to a
non-punitive purpose providing that the state can regulate convicted sex
offenders as a class without individual determinations of dangerous-
ness. 1 The majority explains, in an effort to show the constitution pro-
tects individuals, that an individual determination is necessary to allow
non-dangerous individuals their constitutional protections. '8 While Jus-
tice Winchester's arguments were rebutted by the majority opinion, it is
notable that he gave victims of this status the just opportunity of a thor-
ough analysis under Smith. The Starkey opinion, and the dissenting and
concurring Justices in the Smith case, suggests that when this level of
analysis is performed, it may result in a closer case than presented by
other state courts in the Tenth Circuit.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The intent of this Part is to persuade the Tenth Circuit states that
now is the time to provide predictability in the law. There will be no
shortage of opportunities to hear these issues as the registry continues to
176. Id. at 1034.
177. Id. at 1025 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 1035 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1024 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 1035 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1036.
182. Id. at 1028 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at 1036 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 1028-29 (majority opinion).
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grow.185 Subpart A provides a detailed analysis of the awful consequenc-
es that draconian registration requirements have placed upon their vic-
tims. Subpart B describes the importance of predictability in the law.
Last, Subpart C is a call to action for the states of the Tenth Circuit to
provide victims of retroactive offender registry a constitutionally proper
analysis of ex post facto laws.
A. Severe Consequences: Housing and Employment
Wendy Whitaker engaged in oral sex with a fifteen-year-old when
she was seventeen.186 Ten years after her sodomy conviction, she was
forced out of her home because it was too close to a child daycare cen-
ter. Even though she owned her home, a church nearby happened to
have a child care system, and she was forced to leave within seventy-two
hours.'" Housing restrictions are a very serious penalty inflicted upon
sex offenders who are forced to register. For example, the New York
Times explains that defense lawyers have put together maps of Manhat-
tan to show that nearly the whole city is off limits to sex offenders.'89
Many of these offenders seek accommodation in homeless shelters be-
cause they are unable to find adequate housing.190 Unfortunately, even
homeless shelters have been unable to receive sex offenders because of
their proximity to childcare.191 Many offenders end up as transients or
living in encampments of trailers.'92 Carlos Bonilla, a sixty-five year old
who has already completed his sentence, like many others in New York,
has been kept in the custody of the corrections department because all
potential housing arrangements would be in violation of statutory hous-
ing restrictions.'93
Colorado likewise explained the issue with sex offenders and home-
lessness in a statement in the Denver Post.19 4 "Rob McCallum, spokes-
man for the Colorado Judicial Branch, says probation first tries to find
housing in the county where the defendant is sentenced, but it is not al-
ways possible considering that housing for sex offenders is difficult to
185. See Gary Taylor, Number ofSex Offenders Soars-Experts Unsure ofReasons, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 2012, at Al ("The numbers are growing across the nation .... [T]he U.S. has
seen a 23 percent overall increase in the number of registered sex offenders . . . .").
186. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism Through
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 25 (2012).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Joseph Goldstein, Housing Rules Keep Sex Offenders in Prison Beyond Release Dates,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2014, at A18.
190. Id.




194. Felisa Cardona, Supervising Sex Offenders: Array of Rules Tests Officials: An Adams on
Denver Streets Offers an Example of Challenges Faced by Authorities, DENVER POST, Nov. 20,
2011, at B-09.
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find." 95 The question then arises: is it difficult, or is it impossible? The
article continues by saying that registration doesn't accomplish its goal
of protecting the public because the "people don't know if [homeless]
sex offenders are truly living in the city where they register." 96
Another Colorado reporter described a recent court order invalidat-
ing a 2006 ordinance passed by the city of Englewood, Colorado, re-
stricting living arrangements for sex offenders.'9 7 "The order states that
restrictive 'not in my backyard ordinances' can have a domino effect,
eventually forbidding any sex offenders from living anywhere in Colora-
do." 98 The restriction kept Colorado sex offenders from living within
2,000 feet of any public school or park and within 1,000 feet of any day-
care center.199 Stephen Ryals, a Colorado resident and registered sex of-
fender, and his wife bought a house in Englewood, CO, and were later
told Stephen did not have the right to live there.200 Is this really the civil
remedy these past cases were suggesting?
Several southern states have also shown an increase in homeless-
ness of sex offenders. "In 2009, nine homeless sex offenders, who had
been ordered to live in the woods near an Atlanta office park after they
could not find housing, were then forced to try to find somewhere else to
live." 20 ' A makeshift camp in Miami houses as many as seventy of these
offenders.202 Additionally, some distance markers restricting residency
500 to 2,500 feet from schools "can effectively zone out sex offend-
ers."203 What's worse, studies how that there is "no correlation" between
these restrictions and lowered recidivism.204 Rather, these infected indi-
viduals are left without any chance of rehabilitation.205
In New Mexico, reporters explain that "changes will tighten regis-
tration requirements and close a loophole for out-of-state sex offend-
ers. . . . [S]ome sex offenders registered in another state did not have to
register upon moving to New Mexico."206 One reporter quoted Regina
Chacon of the State Department of Public Safety who said she under-
stands the conflicting feelings about retroactive laws, "You have some-
195. Id.
196. Id




201. Brian Griggs, Note, Homeless Is Not an Address: States Need to Explore Housing Options
for Sex Offenders, 79 UMKC L. REV. 757, 767 (2011).
202. Id. at 767-68 (joking that this community may soon need its own governor).
203. Cassie Dallas, Comment, Not in My Backyard: The Implications of Sex Offender Residen-
cy Ordinances in Texas and Beyond, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1235, 1246 (2009).
204. Id at 1245-46 (citing a Colorado and a Minnesota study showing that there is "no correla-
tion between residential proximity to schools or parks and sex offender recidivism").
205. See id. at 1244 ("[R]esidency restrictions limit the ability of offenders to reintegrate into
society.").
206. NM Tightens Sex Offender Registration Laws, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 28, 2013, 7:11
AM), http://www.abqjoumal.corn/215689/news/nm-tightens-sex-offender-registration-laws.htmi.
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one who committed a sex crime 30-some years ago and hasn't been in
trouble since. Is that fair, to register them now?"2 07 Chacon went on,
however, to put this off as a collateral consequence of a useful tool. 208
In 2012, a Utah reporter discussed the State's willingness to allow a
sex offender to escape the ill effects of registration.20 9 The article quotes
Representative Jack Draxler saying, "I am trying to bring some oppor-
tunity for redemption from someone who's really paid the price and tried
to get their life back in order."210 IS the jail sentence and corresponding
probation time not paying the price enough? Another Utah reporter de-
scribed the lack of a housing requirement in 2006.211 He quotes Jeremy
Shaw, a supervisor from the Department of Corrections, explaining that
"an offender's residence proximity to places where children congregate
has no correlation to reoffending. . . . A person can't live next to a
school, but a pedophile can go stand in front of a school."212 The difficul-
ty in finding adequate housing has changed drastically "from 2003 when
the Smith v. Doe Court commented, 'The Act does not restrain activities
sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or resi-
dences."'
2 13
Lack of housing is not the only negative effect from registration.
Many sex offenders also suffer from a lack of employment opportuni-
214ties2. 9News in Colorado followed a story of an anonymous sex offend-
215
er they called Brent. Brent was a highly paid employee of Lockheed
Martin when an undercover police officer contacted him pretending to be
a thirteen-year-old and thereafter arrested him for "criminal intent of
sexual assault."2 16 Brent was fired from Lockheed after he was arrest-
207. Julia M. Dendinger, New Mexico Explains Sex Offender Registration Guidelines,
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATOR (Feb. 2009),
http://icioffshore.com/news/fulltext/News.asp?FTID=963&Title=New%2OMexico%20Explains%20
Sex%200ffender%20Registration%20Guidelines (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. See id.
209. Ladd Brubaker, Bill Allowing Some Sex Offender Off Register Early Approved, DESERET
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700218666/Bill-allowing-some-sex-
offender-off-register-early-approved.htm1.
210. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Alan Choate, Housing Restrictions for Sex Offenders, DAILY HERALD (Sept. 20, 2006),
http://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/housing-restrictions-for-sex-offenders/article dd2ba95-
b6f9-53d9-8926-998b69d296ce.html.
212. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jeremy Shaw, a supervisor in the Utah Department of
Corrections adult probation and parole division) (internal quotation mark omitted).
213. Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1115 (2012) ("Changing jobs or relocating
residences at will is no longer an option under super-registration schemes.").
214. Jacob Frumkin, Note and Comment, Perennial Punishment? Why the Sex Offender Regis-
tration and Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 321 (2008) (considering
the Catch-22 of requiring registration of employment and housing when it is "difficult, if not impos-
sible, for sex offenders to find a home or an employer.").
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ed.217 The article explains, "Employers wouldn't consider Brent, neigh-
bors turned on him and bills piled up." 2 18 It goes on to explain that
Brent's actual sentence "pales in comparison to the personal sentence he
deals with every day."2 19 This sentence isn't imposed on any other crimi-
nals: not murderers, not thieves, and not domestic abusers.
In Utah, a reporter for the Deseret News quoted a defense attorney
describing registration as "the modern-day scarlet letter." 220 The reporter
added that it inhibits past offenders from trying to assimilate into society
as it "hinders their ability to find housing and jobs."22 1 Indeed, the article
concludes that the excessive requirements "force offenders to go under-
ground."222 An Oklahoma news station describes the enormous relief felt
by a past offender when he was told he would no longer have to regis-
223ter. The report called the man Dave, and explained that he slept with a
fourteen-year-old girl he thought was seventeen when he was also seven-
teen.224 Dave served diligently on the registry for nineteen years, he lived
with his mother upon release from prison because of housing restrictions,
and he struggled to find a good job.225 Dave also "has never been able to
take his kids to the park or attend their activities at school."226 When
Dave started his time on the registry, he was told he would have to be
registered for ten years, but in year seven he received a letter saying he
227would have to register for life. Dave cried with joy when Oklahoma
laws were amended and he learned he would be freed from his scarlet
letter.
228
The consequences facing these "habitual offenders" far exceed the
civil, nonpunitive purpose the courts say these laws serve. Each offender
deserves an opportunity to be assessed for individual danger of recidi-
vism before enduring these penalties. Likewise, each offender has a right
to live free of the undying fear that they may be retroactively restrained




220. Dennis Romboy & Lucinda Dillon Kinkead, Does Sex Offender Registry Really Work?
DESERET NEWS (Mar. 19, 2008, 12:22 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695262647/Does-
sex-offender-registry-really-work.htmi (internal quotation mark omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Lori Fullbright, Oklahoma Removes 2,400 Registered Sex Offenders After Supreme Court








B. Predictability in the Law
"If individuals can predict what the law will require of them, then,
in principle, they are on notice and have the opportunity to conform their
behavior to the law's demands."2 29 Individual sex offenders are discour-
aged from attempting rehabilitation if at any point in the process they
could be required to remove themselves from safe housing and comfort-
able jobs as a class. "Individuals need to know how the law governs their
behavior so that they can conform their behavior to the law." 2 30 In order
to provide an incentive for offenders to obtain counseling, avoid recidi-
vism, and assimilate back into society, they must be given a predictable
alternative to pursue.
Thomas Lundmark, Professor of Law at the University of Munster,
Germany, writes that predictability may be in direct opposition to indi-
vidual liberty.2 31 He explains, "Opponents of predictability would say
that it comes at the cost of individual justice."2 32 The critics' problem
with predictability is that unbending law applies commonly to all regard-
less of individual guilt. However, sex offenders suffer the opposite di-
lemma in retroactively applied registration regimes. After serving a sen-
tence properly applied by a court of the United States, the unpredictabil-
ity of registry laws leaves offenders in lifelong fear of a prolonged sen-
tence.233 The state can increase registration periods, create new housing
restrictions, and impose more harsh employment limitations. Applying
laws in a predictable manner need not be rigid. The courts can provide a
predictable method of analysis that can be applied individually to avoid
the cost of giving up individual justice.
"Among the many values that [the law] can secure, none is more
important than legal certainty. . . 234 Predictability allows offenders to
"know where they stand . . . free to plan and lead their lives as they
please . . . [w]ithin the confines of their established duties to others."235
The ability for individuals in society to know where they stand and what
they can do while avoiding government intervention is "a signal virtue of
civilized societies."236 Therefore, the only way to create a fair and just
229. Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 479, 487 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010) (quoting Jules L. Coleman & Brian
Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, andAuthority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 582 (1993)) (internal quota-
tion mark omitted).
230. FRUEHWALD, supra note 17, at 52.
231. THOMAS LUNDMARK, CHARTING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN COMMON AND CIVIL LAW 122
(2012).
232. Id.
233. See supra Part III.A.
234. NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL
REASONING 16 (2005).
235. THOMAS SCHULTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LEGALITY: STATELESS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 20 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF
LEGAL POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS 41 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. MACCORMICK, supra note 234, at 12.
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rule of law is to provide predictability and security and stand by it. Most
importantly, "[i]n order for governmental actions and judicial decisions
to be predictable so as to enable citizens to plan and lead their lives in
accordance with the law, the law must be prospective. It must not impose
a posteriori or ex post facto legal consequences."237 Society teaches this
value early on: we cannot change the rules in the middle of a game. The
Government's ability to change the law to retroactively apply to sex of-
fenders who have successfully assimilated back into normal life is pre-
cisely the unpredictability that these authors and theorists have criticized.
While flexibility in the law may be important, "the more flexibility we
permit, the less predictability we enjoy." 2 38
C. A Call to Action in the Tenth Circuit
The purpose of judicial review is "to take vague constitutional gen-
eralities and give them a specific content appropriate to the times and
circumstances by balancing the different considerations of social welfare
involved." 2 39 The goal of the judiciary is to interpret the laws. "The goal
of interpretation is to achieve the social goal of law."240 It is not this
Comment's purpose to persuade the Tenth Circuit that sex offender reg-
istries are per se unconstitutional. Rather, its purpose is to persuade the
Tenth Circuit states that it is a closer call than can be determined through
seven unsubstantiated and cursory conclusions.241 Specifically, this
comment asks courts to apply the Smith factors in a substantive analyti-
cal method that accounts for the realities of the lives of registered sex
offenders. The effect of each state's Megan's Law must be given its in-
dividual and substantive constitutional analysis to determine if its actual
retroactive effect is overtly punitive. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's
analysis may not hold true for all states' statutory schemes, but it certain-
ly showed the level of analysis that should occur. The negative conse-
quences described above suggest it is time to balance the considerations
of social welfare with the constitutional rights of sex offenders that me
be violated by each Tenth Circuit state's SORNA laws.
The most important social concern voiced by the courts in the Tenth
242
Circuit is public safety. The concern is that sex offenders are more
likely than other criminals to commit similar crimes: the fear of recidi-
vism. This fear, however, is unwarranted.243 First, these statistics are run
237. Luc B. TREMBLAY, THE RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE, AND INTERPRETATION 150 (1997).
238. JEFFREY F. BEATTY & SUSAN S. SAMUELSON, ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS LAW 78 (2d ed.
2005).
239. CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 276 (Rev. ed. 1994).
240. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW, at xv (Sari Bashi, trans., 2005).
241. See supra Part I.C (discussing New Mexico's fact-empty conclusions in analyzing the
punitive effect of its SORNA laws).
242. See, e.g., Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1028-30 (Okla. 2013).
243. See CBI Sex Offender Registry Facts, COLO. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.colorado.gov/apps/cdps/sor/faq.jsf (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (stating that most sex
offenders have no documented criminal history); see also Sex and Kidnap Offender Notif ication and
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with sex offenders as a class without accounting for what specific crime
was committed or what individual level of risk the offender poses to so-
244
ciety. One study of sex offenders shows "that while 36.2% of the sex-
ual offenders generally recidivated, only 13.7% sexually recidivated and
14.3% violently recidivated."24 5 Another study found that other crimes
had significantly higher recidivism rates, as rapists were rearrested for
general recidivism (within three years) at a much lower rate (46%) than
those convicted of burglary (76%), robbery (70.2%), and drug offenses
(66.7%).246 Yet none of these other crimes require offenders to register.
While public safety is a valid nonpunitive purpose, the only way to justi-
fy its registration requirement is to apply it to all criminal activity as all
recidivate. Still, some sex offenders pose more of a threat of recidivism
than others. This leads to the next suggestion: a detailed level designa-
tion, like Oklahoma's system, to give some separation between violent
and habitual offenders, and one-time offenders who can be rehabilitated.
Oklahoma divides its offenders into three categories: low, moderate,
and high risk.24 7 These levels are not based solely on the crime commit-
ted, but rather on the individual risk each offender poses to the communi-
ty. 248 The length of time that a person is required to remain on the regis-
try increases according to individual risk of recidivism.249 This system
addresses Justice Ginsburg's worries in the Smith dissent that SORNA
applies to offenders without an individualized determination of their fu-
ture dangerousness.250 Rather, each individual would be designated a
level according to several factors: the crime committed, the number and
seriousness of past offenses, and the mental state of the defendant. Addi-
tionally, offenders who have proven they can assimilate back into society
should be allowed a chance to petition to lower their level designation
after some specified period of time.251
Compare this to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, which sets
the duration of its registry requirements according to the statute violat-
252ed. For example, a Class 1, 2, or 3 felony requires twenty years of reg-
Registration, UTAH DEP'T CORR.,
http://www.communitynotification.com/cap_office disclaimer.php?office=54438 (last visited Nov.
9, 2014) (explaining that being on the registry list "does not imply listed individuals will commit a
specific type of crime in the future").
244. See Eagan, supra note 66, at 267-68.
245. LISA WILLIAMS-TAYLOR, INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF SEX OFFENDERS: IMPACTS ON
RECIDIVISM 54 (2012).
246. See id at 53-81.
247. See Starkey, 305 P.3d at 1010.
248. See id
249. Id.
250. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116-17 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
251. See Starkey, 305 P.3d at 1010 (Starkey made an attempt to decrease his level 3 designa-
tion to a level 1 upon completion of his sentence).
252. See CBI Sex Offender Registry Requirements, COLO. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.colorado.gov/apps/cdps/sor/information.jsf (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
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istration, and a Class 4, 5, or 6 felony requires ten years of registration.253
Colorado does not automatically remove offenders from the list, but re-
quires them to petition to discontinue registration.254 Each offender lives
in fear that the legislature may increase this sentence as it sees fit. Is this
predictability in the rule of law, or does it more closely resemble the ex
post facto concerns that the founding fathers had in mind?
As in Colorado, Utah sets the registration time period according to
the crime committed.255 For instance: kidnapping, incest, and forcible
sexual abuse require ten years; child kidnapping, rape, and aggravated
sexual assault require registration for life.256 This is done without any
determination of individual risk of recidivism. The Utah DOC website
admits that many of these time periods will extend beyond the supervi-
sion legally allowed to the Utah Department of Corrections.2 57
"Once a convict, always a convict" does not comply with the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Tenth Circuit
states can and should take the time to at least give proper scrutiny to the-
se issues. It is fundamentally unfair to enact a civil registration regime
that has punitive effects but is not subject to the same constitutional safe-
guards as other punitive laws. As such, the Tenth Circuit states must not
remain silent on this issue. It is the duty of the courts, with a special re-
sponsibility for the quality of justice, to ensure that the legislature does
not unconstitutionally deny its citizens their individual liberty.
CONCLUSION
The Ex Post Facto Clause was written with individual liberty as its
fundamental purpose.258 It was designed to protect the country's citizens
from unfair and excessive punishment applied retroactively. Modern sex
offender registry requirements applied retroactively cannot be justified as
constitutional merely because of the legislature's perceived intent. Even
if the legislature did intend for registration to be civil and nonpunitive,
the effect of each state's Megan's Law is at least potentially punitive in
effect. Therefore, refusing to give these laws a proper analysis as laid out
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Utah Laws Regulating Registered Sex Offenders, UTAH DEP'T CORR.,
http://corrections.utah.gov/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=1062:utah-laws-
regulating-registered-sex-offenders&catid=26:sex-offender-registry&Itemid=191 (last visited Nov.
9,2014).
256. Id.
257. Frequently Asked Questions, UTAH DEP'T CORR.,
http://corrections.utah.gov/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=888:faqs&catid=2:unc
ategorised&Itemid=1 19 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (accessed by searching for "registry FAQ" on the
Utah DOC website).
258. State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 13-14 (Me. 2009) (explaining that the Ex Post Facto Clause
was "included in the original Constitution and [was] intended by the framers of the Constitution to
protect individual liberty").
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by the Supreme Court in Smith is a contravention of the courts' duties
under the common law.
This Comment is not meant to suggest that Oklahoma was correct in
its final conclusion that Oklahoma SORNA laws were punitive in effect.
Instead, this Comment suggests that the Oklahoma Supreme Court must
be applauded for its detailed and just application of the Smith in-
tent/effects test. The Tenth Circuit state courts can and should follow suit
by giving each SORNA law a fair analysis to determine if denying the
individual rights of these offenders is truly nonpunitive in effect. If the
laws are upheld, each state must consider the social implications and
lessen the punitive effect of these laws through fair level designations.
"The stigma gone, Hester heaved a long, deep sigh, in which the
burden of shame and anguish departed from her spirit. 0 exquisite relief.
She had not known the weight, until she felt the freedom!"2 59 May those
that have offended be given a chance at redemption and an opportunity to
feel this peace.
Colton Johnston*
259. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 158 (Brian Harding, ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2007) (1850).
* J.D. Candidate, 2016. I want to express my appreciation to all of those who have helped me polish
this piece for publication. I want to thank my father, Coy Johnston (Arizona State Professor of
Criminology and Criminal Justice), for his support and guidance. I would also like to thank Profes-
sor Alan Chen and Professor David Thomson for their patience and sound advice. Last, I would like
to sincerely thank the Denver University Law Review Board and editorial staff for their contributions
and friendship.
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PRISTINE SOLITUDE OR EQUAL FOOTING? SAN JUAN
COUNTY V. UNITED STATES AND UTAH'S LARGER BID TO
ASSERT CONTROL OVER PUBLIC LANDS IN THE WESTERN
UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT
Within the Mining Act of 1866 there is a brief provision known as
Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477) that has reignited the anti-federal fer-
vor of western citizens and states' rights advocates demanding a return of
federal public lands to more localized management. R.S. 2477 granted
counties and states a right-of-way across federal and through the pub-
lic's use of a particular route. R.S. 2477 was repealed in 1976, but rights-
of-way that vested prior to this date remain valid if claimants can provide
proof of the route's historic use. Federal courts and land management
agencies have struggled to decipher this statutory relic in a modem con-
text. Of the states attempting to use R.S. 2477 as part of a broader effort
to balance out the long-standing inequity over control of public lands
within western states, Utah has been the most aggressive. In San Juan
County v. United States, a controversy involving the National Park Ser-
vice's decision to close a nine-mile trail along a riverbed in Canyonlands
National Park to motor vehicles, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah and San
Juan County failed to establish the requisite ten years of continuous pub-
lic use of the Salt Creek road as a "public thoroughfare" prior to the res-
ervation of Canyonlands in 1964. The court recognized that frequency is
an important factor when analyzing the public's use and that use under a
private right is not sufficient in determining whether a public highway
has been established.
This Comment starts by looking at the larger dispute at play over
the vast amounts of federally controlled public lands in the western Unit-
ed States. It then explores the history of R.S. 2477 and the Tenth Cir-
cuit's prior treatment of this old frontier law. The San Juan decision rais-
es the bar for R.S. 2477 claimants by recognizing a more stringent test
for demonstrating continuous use by the public-filling a much needed
gap in R.S. 2477 jurisprudence. However, the heavy emphasis on evalu-
ating historic evidence and uniqueness of every R.S. 2477 road is a reali-
ty that limits the reach of any one particular court decision. Nevertheless,
the San Juan decision will have a significant effect on how litigants and
other western states approach the thousands of R.S. 2477 disputes certain
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INTRODUCTION
In Edward Abbey's renowned book, Desert Solitaire, he asserted
"No more cars in national parks. Let the people walk."' Abbey's 1968
autobiographical work about his various encounters as a park ranger in
the Colorado Plateau region of the southwestern United States describes
his philosophy of the desert ecosystem, and in particular, his view that
vehicles traversing through the canyons disturb the harmony struck be-
tween nature and nothingness.2 There are many Americans who share
Abbey's perspective that motorized tourists are a fundamental threat to
the national park idea, while many others believe road access through
these spectacular landscapes is a right that is often unjustly curtailed by
regulations imposed by federal land management agencies. Recently, in
1. EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE: A SEASON IN THE WILDERNESS 65 (Ballantine
Books ed., 1968).
2. Id. (proclaiming that "desert canyons are holier than our churches," and since we do not
drive cars into cathedrals and "other sanctums of our culture," we should keep automobiles out of
national parks as well).
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San Juan, the Tenth Circuit decided a longstanding dispute over access
to a historic route that cuts through Canyonlands National Park on its
way to the iconic natural rock formation known as Angel Arch.3 The
legal issue centers on a brief provision of the Lode Mining Act of 1866,
known as Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477).4
R.S. 2477 drew little attention for almost a century, but it has been
thrust into the forefront of a contentious battle over access to "roads"
within public land managed by federal government agencies, as well as
western citizens' larger bid to assert claims over federal lands in favor of
more localized management. R.S. 2477 provides that "the right of way
for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for pub-
lic uses, is hereby granted."5 This single clause, enacted without any leg-
islative history, is only one sentence long and on its face appears to be
rather straightforward.6 Nevertheless, it has been a headache for lower
courts, federal land agencies, and private property owners attempting to
flesh out exactly how to apply the nineteenth century statute in the mod-
7ern era.
R.S. 2477 was passed during a time when the federal government
sought to encourage western expansion by granting easements over unre-
served public lands.8 These rights-of-way were "subject only to state law
and did not require specific federal approval."9 In 1976, Congress re-
pealed this statutory relic though the enactment of the Federal Land Poli-
cy Management Act (FLPMA), but it did not extinguish valid preexisting
rights-of-way, which may exist "if claimants can prove an R.S. 2477
claim predating 1976."Io As part of the broader anti-federal fervor that
arose when public land management policy shifted "from expansion to
preservation," conflicting issues over the 150-year-old mining law's ap-
plication began to arise." Now, state and local governments see R.S.
3. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 2014).
4. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (repealed 1976).
5. Id.
6. Jacob Macfarlane, Note, How Many Cooks Does It Take to Spoil a Soup? San Juan Coun-
ty v. U.S. and Interventions in R.S. 2477 Land Disputes, 29 J. LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 227,
228 (2009).
7. See Heidi McIntosh, New Highways Under an Old Law? R.S. 2477 and its Implications
for the Future of Utah's Federal Public Lands, 18 UTAH B.J., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 16. ("Little did
Congress know when it enacted this little-known provision that it had sown the seeds for a contro-
versy that would take us from the hoop skirts of the mid-19th century to the computer age.").
8. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 229-30 (2009) (explaining the policies behind R.S. 2477 at
the time of its enactment in 1866).
9. JAN, G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 324 (2d ed. 2012).
10. Id.
11. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 227; see also Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793. Before the 1960s, development of natural
resources on public land followed the principals of wise use and sustained yield management, but a
new conservation ethic began to emerge that emphasized preservation over use. R. McGREGGOR
CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 11 (1993).
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2477 as part of their arsenal in a larger effort to balance out the long-
standing inequity over management of public lands within their borders
that is currently dominated by the federal government.12 State and local
officials argue that these rights-of-way are "crucial to economic pro-
spects and quality of life" for rural citizens across the West who depend
on access for their livelihoods.13 Environmentalists, on the other hand,
"view R.S. 2477 as an illegitimate means of defeating designation of
wilderness areas, which must be roadless" and other non-economic val-
ues of public land.14 Wilderness proponents and preservationists point
out that many of these old routes claimed to be "highways" are really just
"dirt tracks, stream bottoms, livestock trails, and other faint paths" that
do not lead to any established anthropogenic destination.'5 After several
legislative and administrative attempts failed to resolve the uncertainty
surrounding R.S. 2477 ultimately failed, the federal courts became re-
sponsible for deciding the validity of R.S. 2477 claims.16 Over the last
fifty years federal courts have teased out various elements to provide
guidance in R.S. 2477 disputes, but the effect of any court opinion is
limited due to the unique history of every road, so resolving an R.S. 2477
dispute must still be determined on a road-by-road basis.'7
In April of 2014, after decades of litigation and furious debate over
the National Park Service's decision to close a nine-mile trail along a
riverbed in Canyonlands National Park to motor vehicles, the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided San Juan County v. United States.' In a unanimous deci-
sion, the court held that Utah and San Juan County failed to establish
"ten years of continuous public use of the Salt Creek Road as a public
thoroughfare prior to the reservation of Canyonlands National Park in
1964" based on historical evidence of cattle grazing, mining operations,
and exploratory travel along the route.19 The court confirmed that fre-
12. William F. Jasper, Feds vs. the West, NEW AM. (May 3, 2014),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/item/18177-feds-vs-the-west ("[M]any of the Western
states are demanding their 'equal footing' as sovereign states, free from the shackles of an oppres-
sive federal 'landlord."').
13. Brian Maffly, Ruling Sticks: Salt Creek Not a County Highway, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept.
9, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/58389383-90/amp-court-roads-
salt.html.csp?page=2 (reporting the Tenth Circuit's decision to deny an en banc rehearing and the
dismay of Utah officials with the April 2014 decision).
14. 2 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 15:19 (2d ed. 2014).
15. See LAITOS, supra note 9, at 325.
16. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 227; see also COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, at
§ 15:19 (discussing the fact that "[t]here is no formal administrative process by which persons claim-
ing R.S. 2477 rights-of-way can solicit binding determinations from the Interior Department as to
their existence and validity").
17. For a sampling of R.S. 2477 cases, see Kane Cnty. v. Salazar, 562 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir.
2009); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v. Hodel,
848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988) overruled in part on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ranchos De
Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992); Kane Cnty. v. United States, No. 2:08-CV-
00315, 2011 WL 2489819 (D. Utah June 21, 2011).
18. 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014).
19. Id. at 801.
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quency of public use is an important factor and that use under a private
right is not sufficient in determining whether a public highway has been
established.20
By looking at the San Juan decision, the aim of this Comment is to
provide guidance for this murky body of law and to highlight the broader
issues at play in the controversial debate over control and management of
western public lands. Part I explores the larger debate over the vast
amounts of federally controlled land concentrated in western states, and
Utah's use of R.S. 2477 as a mechanism to retain control of roadways
within the state's borders. Part II reviews the history of R.S. 2477, ad-
dresses prior Tenth Circuit cases, and provides context for the San Juan
decision. Part III summarizes San Juan's facts, procedural history, and
the Tenth Circuit's unanimous decision. Part IV examines San Juan's
precedential value and its effect on R.S. 2477 cases going forward, ex-
plores potential nonlitigation alternatives for land management agencies
looking for a more efficient way to resolve issues surrounding this old
frontier law, and discusses San Juan's potential implications for other
western states looking to jump on the R.S. 2477 bandwagon.
I. WESTERN STATES' HOSTILITY TOWARDS FEDERAL LAND
MANAGEMENT
It is difficult to grasp the modem fallout and possible ramifications
of R.S. 2477 without first understanding the political backdrop that
drives such fierce debate on both sides of the controversy. The dispute
over R.S. 2477 can easily be framed into larger arguments about federal-
ism. and the long-standing imbalance of federal land ownership that ex-
ists in the western United States. During the nineteenth century, when
territory was added to the United States by purchase, treaty, or conquest,
almost all of it became part of the unappropriated public domain.2 1 Pro-
spective western states, in exchange for land grants, relinquished claims
to large swaths of unappropriated lands within their boundaries.2 In a
2012 study, the Congressional Research Service reported that the federal
government owns nearly 30% of the land in the United States, mostly in
the West and Alaska.2 3 With most of this federal ownership concentrated
20. See id at 796.
21. Louis Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 818 (1980) ("In admitting new states, however, Congress retained 'unap-
propriated lands' within their borders and continued its policy of encouraging settlement and devel-
opment.").
22. MICHAEL P. DOMBECK ET AL., FROM CONQUEST TO CONSERVATION: OUR PUBLIC LANDS
LEGACY 10 (2003).
23. Ross W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP:
OVERVIEW AND DATA, at summary (2012) ("62% of Alaska is federally owned, as is 47% of the II
coterminous western states. By contrast, the federal government owns only 4% of lands in the other
states.").
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24in the eleven coterminous western states, controversies over land own-
ership and demands for more localized management are inevitable.25
For more than a century the federal government sought to dispose
much of the public land in order to encourage settlement of the West, but
eventually emphasis shifted to retention and preservation.2 6 By the end of
the nineteenth century, a conservation ethic began to emerge-sparked
by the public's concern over federal land management practices.27 Feder-
al rangelands were greatly overgrazed, much of the prime hardwood for-
ests had been clearcut without efforts to regenerate the timber supply,
and "[c]oncerns continued to grow that mining, timber, and grazing in-
terests had monopolized the frontier." 2 8 The passage of FLPMA in 1976,
with its fundamental emphasis on public land conservation, was the first
concrete recognition by Congress that the public domain should remain
under federal control unless otherwise provided by agency planning.29
However, the idea of permanent reservations was hard for many [Ameri-
cans] to accept, and the concept was at odds with the entrenched ideal of
Manifest Destiny that Americans had a right to conquer the land without
government interference.30 The conservation ethic was greeted with es-
pecially little fanfare in western states where large amounts of public
land remained under federal control.31 Constituents within these states
came to view the federal government's reservation policy as "retarding
their development, slowing down their progress, and keeping them in
thralldom to a remote government not capable of understanding their
needs."32 From the perspective of local residents, environmentalists from
far away had carved a dominant position of influence in federal land pol-
icy decisions, creating "an underlying bias in favor of preservation over
development."33
24. Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming,
Nevada, and New Mexico. Id.
25. For a comprehensive history of public land law, see PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC
LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 30 (1968) (explaining that many western representatives in Congress are
very critical about the large proportion of the natural resources within their states which are still held
by the Federal government).
26. See GORTE ET AL., supra note 23, at 2.
27. DOMBECK ET AL., supra note 22, at 16-17.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 26-27. Other relevant environmental statutes passed prior to FLPMA include the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 and National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which requires
federal agencies to perform environmental impact statements (EIS) for all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Patrick Austin Perry, Comment, Law
West of the Pecos: The Growth of the Wise-Use Movement and the Challenge to Federal Public
Land-Use Policy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 292 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
30. See GATES, supra note 25, at 771.
31. Id. at 772.
32. Id.
33. See CAWLEY, supra note 11, at 9.
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Western states demanding that the federal government hand over
public land within their borders is not a new occurrence,34 but when the
emphasis shifted to retention and preservation, land rights advocates be-
came more assertive in their hostility towards federal land manage-
ment.35 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, land rights advocates who be-
lieved federal management policies had become overly responsive to
environmental preservation concerns began to mobilize and organize a
protest in what came to be known as the Sagebrush Rebellion. In the
early 1990s, a similar grass-roots effort, known as the County Supremacy
Movement, sought to protect property rights and return governmental
power to local officials. 37
Part of this federalism-infused debate is rooted in arguments impli-
cated by the "equal footing" doctrine.3 ' The doctrine was upheld by sev-
eral Supreme Court cases, most notably the Court's 1845 decision in
Pollard v. Hagan,39 and it stands for the principle that "each
state ... entered the Union on an equal constitutional footing with the
original thirteen."40 Because the equal footing doctrine establishes that
states admitted to the United States are given the same legal rights as
preexisting states, many western land rights advocates view the federal
dominance of land ownership in their states as a violation of this consti-
tutional principle.41 However, equal footing only guarantees that states
have "equal authority" within the federal system, and Congress may use
its power to adapt legislation according to "diverse local needs" unique
to each state.42 Hence, without more than "purely economic considera-
tions or unequal treatment, the equal footing doctrine provides no judi-
cially enforceable remedy" to western states wishing to invoke it in an
effort to divest the federal government of public lands within their bor-
ders.43 Thus, the notion of public land belonging to all U.S. citizens has
remained "a concept basic to the formation of the Union itself."" None-
theless, anti-federal fervor still invokes passion among western officials
and local land rights advocates, and as their efforts have increased in
34. "At the Western Governors' Conference in 1913 and 1914 a demand was voiced for the
cession of all remaining public lands" to be given back to "states in which they were located."
GATES, supra note 25, at 30.
35. See GATES, supra note 25, at 8.
36. See CAWLEY, supra note I1, at 14.
37. Alexander H. Southwell, Comment, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism
Implications ofa 1990s States'Rights Battle, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1996-97).
38. See generally Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New
Federalism and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557 (1995) (explaining that R.S.
2477 arguments lend themselves to easy extrapolation into larger arguments about federalism).
39. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
40. Touton, supra note 21, at 833; see also Pollard, 44 U.S. at 228-29.
41. See Jasper, supra note 12.
42. Touton, supra note 21, at 834-35.
43. Id. at 835 (footnote omitted).
44. DOMBECK ET AL., supra note 22, at 10 ("The public lands belong to all the people.").
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recent decades, they have looked for other mechanisms to pursue their
objectives."
In Utah, 66% of the land acreage is federally owned.46 While other
western states have been aggressive in their efforts to gain control over
federally managed public land within their borders, Utah has relied most
heavily on R.S. 2477 as a mechanism to fulfill this objective.47 To ana-
lyze the controversy it is helpful to understand the geological makeup of
the region and view the situation from the perspective of those who call
the "Canyon Country"48 home. The R.S. 2477 debate has been most in-
tense in the southern part of the state, where the land is mostly arid de-
sert, characterized by deep winding canyons and unique erosional forms
in the colorful sedimentary rock.49 As early settlers quickly found out,
the landscape is much less hospitable to eastern farming practices and
large community development than other parts of the country.50 In fact,
the 1.5 million acres within the Greater Canyonlands "makes up 'the
largest remaining block of undeveloped land in the lower 48.'"51 There
has been historical grazing and a few oil and mineral booms in the re-
gion, but most residents today see tourism and recreation as the most
promising economic venture in the region.52 In 2012, "41 percent of all
jobs in Canyon Country [where four of Utah's five national parks are
located] were in the leisure and hospitality sector."53 The red rock wil-
45. For example, on April 18, 2014, more than fifty political leaders and officials from nine
Western states attended the Legislative Summit on the Transfer of Public Lands in Salt Lake City to
discuss ways of retaining control of federal lands they consider to be poorly managed. Kristen
Moulton, Western Lawmakers Gather in Utah to Talk Federal Land Takeover, SALT LAKE TRIB.
(Apr. 19, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/57836973-90/utah-lands-lawmakers-
federal.html.csp.
46. GORTE ET AL., supra note 23, at 5.
47. In 2012, Utah enacted a statute authorizing the use of taxpayers to claim around 25,000 of
these historical rights-of-way on federal land. Hillary Hoffmann & Sara Imperiale, Recent Surge in
"Ghost Roads" Litigation Threatens National Parks and Other Federally Protected Lands, VT. J.
ENVTL. L., http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/topten/recent-surge-in-ghost-roads-litigation-threatens-
national-parks-and-other-federally-protected-lands/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
48. Jennifer Leaver, The State of Utah 's Tourism, Travel and Recreation Industry, 73 UTAH
ECON. & BUS. REV. 1 (2014), available at
https://bebr.business.utah.edu/sites/default/files/uebr20l3no4.pdf.
49. San Juan County, UTAH DIv. OF STATE HISTORY,
http://ilovehistory.utah.gov/place/counties/sanjuan.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
50. DOMBECK ET AL., supra note 22, at 15.
51. RANDY T. SIMMONS & RYAN M. YONK, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SOUTHERN UTAH
WILDERNESS ALLIANCE LITIGATION ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES 19 (2013), available at
http://www.strata.org/wp-content/uploads/ipePublications/Economic-Impacts-of-Southern-Utah-
Wilderness-Alliance-on-Lcoal-Comminities.pdf (quoting Brian Maffly, Utah Democrats Call for
Greater Canyonlands Protections, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:20 PM),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/55771848-90/canyonlands-county-greater-landscape.html.csp).
52. UTAH DIV. OF STATE HISTORY, supra note 49.
53. See Leaver, supra note 48, at 5. Employment data based on detailed tourism-orientated
NAICS codes are often unavailable at the county level, but one way to determine a region's depend-
ence on the tourism industry is to calculate the area's share of leisure and hospitality jobs compared
to total jobs.
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derness is particularly valuable for recreational off-highway vehicle
(OHV) use, and it is an important part of local economies.54
If OHV is limited by wilderness designation or other agency deci-
sions, many local residents fear that tourism will decline, imposing an
adverse economic effect on those communities.5 A majority of residents
in southern Utah are politically conservative, and agency decisions based
on non-economic values of public lands (such as wilderness designation)
often encounter fierce animosity from local residents. In 2012 and
2013, the Utah state legislature passed several laws to petition the federal
government to surrender control of the vast amounts of territory it con-
trolled within the state.57 One of the provisions authorized the use of tax-
payer money and appropriated nearly $8 million from the state's Consti-
tutional Defense Fund to assert thousands of R.S. 2477 claims on federal
land.58 Around the same time, the state of Utah and twenty-two counties
began filing lawsuits against federal land management agencies, seeking
rights-of-way over thousands of miles of old, pre-existing routes they
claimed were historically in regular public use.59 Other western states are
watching how Utah's aggressive strategy fares in the courts,60 which is
54. In the Mountain West, OHV recreation is common, "with a higher than average OHV
participation rate of 28% of the population." SIMMONS & YONK, supra note 51, at 19.
55. Id. at 21. Wilderness designation can also eradicate the potential extraction of energy or
developing recreational facilities. Brian C. Steed et al., The Economic Costs of Wilderness, ENVTL.
TRENDS, June 2011, at 1, available at
http://www.environmentaltrends.org/fileadmin/pri/documents/2011/brief062011.pdf (finding that
"federally designated Wilderness negatively impacts local economic conditions," and that counties
with wilderness experience lower household income, total payroll, and county tax receipts than
counties without a wilderness presence).
56. Ed Quillen, RS-2477: Old Roads and New Controversies, COLO. CENT. MAG. (Mar.
2001), http://cozine.com/2001-march/rs-2477-old-roads-and-new-controversies. In Clinton's 1996
designation of Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, local residents and politicians com-
plained they weren't consulted about the designation, which "closed off that land to any develop-
ment of coal reserves." Michelle L. Price, Herbert Hopeful for Utah Public Lands Deal, WASH.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/17/herbert-hopeful-for-
utah-public-lands-deal/?page=all.
57. Cheryl K. Chumley, Western States Seek Control of Federal Lands, NEWSMAX (Apr. 21,
2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Cliven-Bundy-Westem-federal-
lands/2014/04/21/id/566804. On March 23, 2012, Utah Governor Gary R. Herbert signed House Bill
148, which demands the federal government make good on the promises made in Utah's 1894 Ena-
bling Act (UEA) to extinguish title to federal lands in Utah. Kirk Johnson, Utah Asks US to Return
20 Million Acres of Land, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/us/utah-bill-asks-govemment-to-give-back-more-than-20-
million-acres-of-land.html.
58. Gail Binkly, Costly Claims: The Fight Over RS 2477 Roads, FOUR CORNERS FREE PRESS
(Sept. 2011), http://fourcomersfreepress.com/news/2011/091101.htm (explaining that HB 76 "estab-
lishes a federalism subcommittee of the Constitutional Defense Council to review federal laws
applying to Utah, and encourages state officials to attack 'unconstitutional' laws and mandates,
providing up to $1.2 million a year for them to do so").
59. Jodi Peterson, Utah Denied Claim to Road in Canyonlands National Park, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (May 13, 2014), http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/utah-denied-claim-to-road-in-
canyonlands-national-park.
60. See Hoffmann & Imperiale, supra note 47 (explaining that other western states "have
earmarked funds for the study of 'potential"' 2477 claims and will likely increase funding if the Utah
lawsuits prevail).
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why cases reaching the Tenth Circuit will have ramifications for states
looking for creative ways to assert control over federal public lands.
II. R.S. 2477 FRAMEWORK
Passed just one year after the Civil War ended, R.S. 2477 provides:
"[T]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands,
not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.""1 Like other land grant
statutes passed during the post-Civil War era,6 2 the purpose of the act
was to encourage settlement and development of unreserved public lands
in the American West.63 Therefore, R.S. 2477 essentially provided west-
ern pioneers with an implied license to construct roads in order to divest
the government's ownership of vast amounts of federal lands.4 In 1976,
the enactment of FLPMA marked an express "180-degree shift" in the
federal government's attitude to managing public lands, and the empha-
sis drifted away from encouraging expansion and towards federal reten-
tion using a conservation-based approach.65 However, Congress also
specified that FLPMA was subject to valid existing rights; thus, an R.S.
2477 right-of-way may be valid today if it vested prior to 1976.66 With
this change in the federal government's stance towards public land man-
agement, issues over R.S. 2477 have crept back into the debate over the
future of western landscapes, and federal land agencies and lower district
courts have struggled to agree on a consistent modern interpretation due
to the "cryptic language and sparse legislative history" of this old mining
law provision.67 Much of the focus has been on federally managed lands,
but R.S. 2477 also affects private property owners that took title from the
federal government subject to preexisting rights-of-way.68 For many, the
61. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and
for Other Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (repealed 1976).
62. See DOMBECK ET AL., supra note 22, at 13, 15 ("The Homestead Act was passed in 1862
and provided free land" for up to 160 acres to settlers who "lived on the land and cultivated it for
five years." "The Desert Land Act of 1877 enabled settlers to buy 640 acres of desert land for $1.25
per acre if they constructed irrigation systems.").
63. See McIntosh, supra note 7, at 18 (explaining that in the Homestead Act, the Desert Lands
Act, and the Mining Act of 1872, Congress put forth a simple proposition to prospective landowners:
"Work the land, and we will reward you with a property interest .... but specifically conditioned on
the exertion of effort to create a lasting kind of development . . . that would contribute to the settle-
ment of the west's open territory").
64. Lindsay Houseal, Comment, Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah: A Welcome
Change for the Tenth Circuit and Environmental Groups, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 725, 726 (2010).
65. Hillary M. Hoffmann, Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs: The Wilderness Society v. Kane
County Leaves Everyone Confused About Navigating a Right-of- Way Claim Under Revised Statute
2477, 18 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 3, 8-9 (2012) ("Instead of allowing and encour-
aging citizens to settle upon federal land . . .. FLPMA . .. required federal agencies to begin manag-
ing federal public lands using a conservation-based approach called 'sustained yield,' which con-
templated planning around environmental values and objectives.").
66. LAITOS, supra note 9, at 324.
67. Bret C. Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibility
for Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 527 (2005).
68. See McIntosh, supra note 7, at 17 (explaining private landowners have dealt with county
officials claiming "routes that did not appear on title searches . .. were 'highways' established when
the land was once owned by the federal government").
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prospect of having the public traverse through their backyard destroys
the attributes of isolation that make such land valuable to the owner in
the first place.69
At the center of the dispute are conflicting views concerning the ex-
istence, extent, duration, and scope of these preexisting rights-of-way.
Parties with vastly different interests and objectives disagree on how to
define the statute's ambiguous terms such as "highway" or "construc-
tion" and to what degree state law should determine the scope of "ac-
ceptance" through "sufficient public use." Public-access advocates, state
and local governments, and off-road vehicle enthusiasts prefer a broad
interpretation of what actions are necessary in order to establish a public
highway.70 They argue for a more relaxed standard of what constitutes
"continuous public use" because the roadways are often in sparsely pop-
ulated rural communities.7' Thus, even if the roadways' use may not
have been considered continuous "according to an urban point of refer-
ence," the roads were still used as often as the local residents found nec-
essary.72 These state and local officials assert that road access through
federal lands is especially important for economic prosperity in rural
areas where R.S. 2477 roads support recreation activities, in addition to
ranching and mining.73  At the opposite end of the spectrum are envi-
ronmentalists, who support stricter application of R.S. 2477 terminology,
such as requiring extensive frequency of use by the pubic or mechanical
construction of the roadway.74 They dismiss the other side's economic-
livelihood argument and suggest the hidden objective is to use R.S. 2477
as an illegitimate way to circumvent environmental aws and disqualify
large spreads of land from wilderness designation, which must be road-
less.75
A. Ambiguous Terms: Congressional nd Executive Attempts to Shape
R.S. 2477's Application
The Department of the Interior (DOI) controls nearly 640 million
acres of federally owned land, most of which is managed by three agen-
69. For a list of 2477 claims on private lands, see RS 2477: Impacts on Private Property, S.
UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.suwa.org/wp-
content/uploads/PrivatePropertyFactSheet.pdf.
70. See Houseal, supra note 64, at 727.
71. See Phil Taylor, Utah, County Denied Rehearing in Canyonlands Roads Case,
GREENWIRE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060005472 (quoting Utah
Association of Counties that "[s]parsely-populated landscape connected by seemingly empty roads
are the geographic rule, not the exception, of the American West").
72. Id. ("Utah counties took exception to the 10th Circuit's frequency finding, calling it an
'urban-centric dismissal' of the rural West, where roads are less frequented . . . but are no less im-
portant to local residents.")
73. Alison Suthers, Note, A Separate Peace?: Utah's R.S. 2477 Memorandum of Understand-
ing, Disclaimers of Interest, and the Future of R.S. 2477 Rights-of- Way in the West, 26 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 11l, 111 (2005).
74. See Houseal, supra note 64, at 727-28.
75. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, § 15:19.
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cies-the National Park Service (NPS), Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).76 These agencies must
conduct periodic planning "pursuant to their statutory mandates," and
they are also charged with addressing issues that come up when conflicts
erupt between competing land uses.77
For these federal land management agencies, the absence of any
legislative history concerning R.S. 2477 makes the need for congression-
al and executive guidance crucial. Without consistent federal guidelines
for interpreting and applying the statute, the ambiguity disrupts land use
planning efforts, wilderness area designation, and private property titles
are "clouded by potential [R.S. 2477] claims."7 8 Unfortunately, past at-
tempts to create an agency process for evaluating these preexisting
claims have failed to provide any meaningful assistance.
In 1994, the DOI proposed regulations to create a formal adminis-
trative process by which persons claiming R.S. 2477 rights-of-way could
solicit binding determinations as to the claim's existence and validity. 79
The regulations also put forth a timeframe for resolving such claims and
provided more detailed definitions for statuory terms such as "construc-
tion" and "highway."80 However, the DOI's efforts were ultimately
blocked by Congress, and the polarizing politics surrounding the R.S.
2477 debate have prevented subsequent administrative efforts from
providing much clarity to the controversy.81
In 2003, the DOI signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the State of Utah, which provided a streamlined application process
where the BLM would acknowledge the existence of an R.S. 2477 claim
by issuing a "disclaimer of interest" if the application satisfied the terms
of the MOU.82 However, the MOU failed to garner widespread support
since it was signed without involving input from the public and excluded
claims involving "sensitive areas like national parks" or wilderness study
areas.83 Because the MOU was negotiated in a setting that included only
parties from one side of the debate and incorporated an overly broad in-
terpretation of what qualifies as a public highway, it is frequently at-
76. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 16-17 (describing the confusion surrounding application of
R.S. 2477 for federal land management agencies).
77. Id.
78. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 252.
79. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, § 15:19.
80. Michael S. Freeman & Lusanna J. Ro, RS 2477: The Battle Over Rights-of-Way on Fed-
eral Land, 32 COLO. LAW. 105, 106 (2003).
81. Id. (describing how the 1996 Congressional Moratorium stated that "without express
Congressional approval, no final rule or regulation of any agency . . . pertaining to . . . 2477 shall
take effect").
82. Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Utah and the Dep't of the Interior
on State & Cnty. Roadl Acknowledgment (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/archive/03_NewsReleases/mours2477.htm.
83. McIntosh, supra note 7, at 20.
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tacked as an insufficient basis for asserting R.S. 2477 claims.84 Conse-
quently, costly and drawn-out litigation in federal courts has become the
primary mechanism for resolving the more controversial R.S. 2477
claims like those within national parks or designated wilderness areas.85
B. Judicial Attempts to Resolve the Controversy
Land-access proponents and states attempting to establish routes
through public lands use the Quiet Title Act (QTA) in conjunction with
R.S. 2477 to sue the federal government.86 "The QTA is a limited waiver
of the United State's [sic] sovereign immunity which would otherwise
protect the federal government from suit" where the claimant asserts an
interest in real property against the United States.
One of the first cases to reach the Tenth Circuit, and the leading
opinion on R.S. 2477, was Sierra Club v. Hodel,88 in which several envi-
ronmental organizations sued the federal government and Garfield Coun-
ty, Utah, after the latter announced plans to widen portions of the Burr
Trail.89 Specifically, the county had proposed upgrading a former cattle
trail into a two-lane gravel road that would provide access to a federal
marina.9 0 The Sierra Club sought an injunction against the road im-
provements because of the adverse effects the expansion would have on
several adjacent wilderness study areas.91 The Tenth Circuit majority
decided that an R.S. 2477 right-of-way may be valid today if it vested
prior to 1976, but that the scope of the preexisting right was to be meas-
ured by state law in effect at the time of repeal.92
A more recent case that helped define the requirements and scope of
agency determination regarding R.S. 2477 was Southern Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management (SUWA).93 The case was
decided following the aftermath of President Clinton's establishment of
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in 1996.94 Soon after the
monument was dedicated tensions grew, and road crews from several
southern Utah counties started grading various dirt trails in the monu-
ment without notifying the BLM.95 When the BLM did nothing to stop
84. See id
85. Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 243.
86. McIntosh, supra note 7, at 18-19.
87. Id. at 18.
88. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ran-
chos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 1068 (concluding that state law should control the scope of the right-of-way).
90. Id. at 1073.
91. Id. at 1074.
92. Id. at 1083-84.
93. 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cit. 2005).
94. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 13-14 ("In September 1996, President Clinton ... exacerbat-
ed the tensions by establishing the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, pursuant to his
authority under the American Antiquities Act, reserving almost two million acres . . . under BLM
management." (footnote omitted)).
95. Id at 14.
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these activities, the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), a non-
profit conservation group, filed an action in federal court against the
BLM and several Utah counties.96 After the district court held the coun-
ties did not require the BLM's permission to undertake routine mainte-
nance on the roads, the Tenth Circuit reversed, and held that "the holder
of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way across federal land must consult with the
appropriate federal land management agency before it undertakes any
improvements . . . beyond routine maintenance."9 7 In essence, this clari-
fied that counties could not simply drive bulldozers and other construc-
tion machines onto BLM land to conduct significant improvements with-
out federal authorization.98
More importantly, elaborating on Hodel, the SUWA decision held
that where the existence of the right-of-way is at issue, the BLM does not
have primary jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 claims and that both perfection
and scope of the preexisting right-of-way are determined by looking to
state law.99 However, the Tenth Circuit's ruling allowed the agency to
make initial "administrative determinations" on the validity of an R.S.
2477 roadway for planning purposes only.100 This meant the agency
could issue its opinion as to the validity-but without carrying the force
of law, the agency's determination "could be taken with a proverbial
grain of salt." 0 1
The court also briefly discussed the burdens of proof in an R.S.
2477 dispute. The court held that the party "seeking to enforce rights-of-
way against the federal government" bears the burden of proof. 02 Thus,
while the SUWA decision clarified which party bears the burden of proof,
it did nothing to define what standard of evidence is used to satisfy the
burden.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit created the "public use standard" for de-
termining when and if an R.S. 2477 right-of-way had vested.10 3 The court
explained that under the common law, the establishment of a public
right-of-way required two components: "the landowner's objectively
manifested intent to dedicate property to the public use as a right of way,
96. Id.
97. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 745.
98. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 15-16.
99. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 757. This holding lies in contrast to the Ninth Circuit approach "which
has overlooked state law . . . regarding the [validity] of R.S. 2477 claims." Macfarlane, supra note 6,
at 233.
100. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 757-58.
101. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 17.
102. SUWA, 425 F.3d at 768-69 (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 147 F. Supp.
2d 1130, 1136 (D. Utah 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the allocation of the
burden of proof is consistent with "the established rule . . . that land grants are construed favorably
to the Government" (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1136) (inter-
nal quotation mark omitted)).
103. Id.
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and acceptance by the public."""' The first requirement-intent to dedi-
cate-could manifest "by express statement or [be] presumed from con-
duct." 05 Public acceptance has been more difficult to determine, but un-
der Utah law, "[a] highway shall be deemed and taken as dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the Public when it has been continuously and
uninterruptedly used as a Public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years."'06 The SUWA decision provided clarity on issues such as how to
measure public use, which party bears the burden of proof, and defined
several terms such as highway and construction.'07 However, the Tenth
Circuit's decision still left much to be desired for lower courts attempting
to flesh out this vexing frontier law and determine the merits of R.S.
2477 disputes. In 2014, the Tenth Circuit got another opportunity in a
decade-long dispute over an old route winding its way through a
streambed in the heart of Canyonlands National Park.
III. SAN JUAN V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
1. History of Use Along the Salt Creek Road
Salt Creek Canyon is considered as "one of the crown jewels of
Canyonlands National Park,"10 with its perennial stream providing an
extensive riparian habitat for wildlife, as well as being the area with the
highest recorded density of archeological sites in the park.109 An old pio-
neer route located fifty miles from the nearest city winds its way through
the canyon and "generally follows the course of Salt Creek."o10 Historical
evidence gathered from maps, aerial photographs, geological surveys, the
area's scant written history, and testimony from witnesses who visited
the relevant landscape characterize the history of travel along the Salt
Creek road."' Starting in the 1890s, a homesteader named Lee Kirk set-
tled in an area south of the Salt Creek road, and it was supposed that he
and his successors traversed the path to move supplies for farming activi-
104. Id. at 769.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 771 (quoting Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah
1929)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 18.
108. Stephen Bloch & Heidi McIntosh, Tenth Circuit Denies State and San Juan County Peti-
tions for Rehearing, S. UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE (Sept. 8, 2014), http://suwa.org/tenth-circuit-
denies-state-san-juan-county-petitions-rehearing-2/.
109. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 7, San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d
787 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), 2012 WL 1074408, at *7 (explaining that "[s]urface
and groundwater associated with the creek support the most extensive riparian ecosystem in Can-
yonlands, other than the Green and Colorado Rivers. Surface water and riparian habitat are among
the rarest habitat ypes in the arid Canyonlands environment." (citation omitted)).
110. Id. at 9.
111. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief at 6, San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d 787 (Nos. II-
4146, 11-4149), 2011 WL 6179568, at *6.
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ties.112 Around the same period, ranchers began moving cattle along the
Salt Creek road between winter and summer grazing seasons and contin-
ued to do so through the 1940s."3 Most of the cattle-herding activities
were conducted by the Scorup-Somerville Cattle Company, which car-
ried out its operations pursuant to a grazing permit issued by the DOI.1 14
There was also some evidence that uranium mining and oil drilling were
conducted in the area, but there was very little, if any, evidence that the
prospectors used the Salt Creek road for these extraction activities.115
With the discovery of Angel Arch,'l6 nascent uses by the general public
along the claimed right-of-way began in the early 1950s.11 7 Characterized
as "exploration trips," these groups of tourists (boy scouts and curious
travelers on horseback and in jeeps) ventured down the Salt Creek route
for recreational purposes."8 It was not until the latter half of the 1950s
that the area saw a significant uptick in the number of visitors."9
2. Modem Use of Salt Creek Road and Events Leading to the
Route's Closure
On September 12, 1964, Congress established Canyonlands Nation-
al Park and reserved the lands within, including the Needles District
where the Salt Creek road is located.120 However, the reservation was
"subject to valid existing rights," which included claims to R.S. 2477
rights-of-way.121 Today, the nine-mile trail known as Salt Creek road "is
the primary way for tourists to reach several scenic sites . . . including
Angel Arch." 22 As it carves its way through the desert landscape, the
unimproved road crosses the streambed many times, and for a long time
jeep travel along the route was a popular choice for visitors not wishing
to make the arduous trek by foot.123 From 1980 to 2012, Canyonlands
experienced the fastest growth in visitation among the state's national
parks.124 As the number of park visitors dramatically increased in the
112. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 20-21.
113. Id.at28.
114. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 10; Answering Brief of
Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 20.
115. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 22.
116. Angel Arch is a natural geological feature within Canyonlands National Park and is "con-
sidered by many people to be the most beautiful and spectacular arch in the park if not in the entire
canyon country." S.W. LOHMAN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY BULLETIN
1327, THE GEOLOGIC STORY OF CANYONLANDS NATIONAL PARK (1974), available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online books/geology/publications/bul/1327/sec8.htm.
117. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 23.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 16 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
121. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 5.
122. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 2014).
123. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 9 ("As the claimed Salt
Creek road winds its way through [the] Canyon ... it generally follows the course of Salt Creek . . .
weaving in and out of the streambed and crossing the channel about 60 times.").
124. Canyonlands saw a 702% increase in visitation, followed by Arches (269%), Zion
(165%), Bryce (142%) and Capitol Reef (96%). Leaver, supra note 48, at 6-7.
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early 1990s, NPS officials began to notice that mounting jeep use was
polluting the stream with engine fluids and degrading wildlife habitat in
the Salt Creek ecosystem.125
In 1992, the NPS started developing its Back Country Management
Plan (BMP) for Canyonlands, and there was considerable debate over
how to balance the public's competing demands for vehicular access and
preservation of Salt Creek's unique natural and cultural resources.126
Upon the official release of the BMP in 1995, the NPS placed a permit
gate on the Salt Creek road and limited the number of vehicles traveling
on the route to twelve per day.127
The gate and permit system was not challenged by San Juan County
or the state, but a complaint filed by SUWA against the NPS in earlier
litigation resulted in an injunction that kept portions of the Salt Creek
road closed to vehicular use.128 Several off-road vehicle user groups suc-
cessfully appealed the decision, and the Tenth Circuit vacated the injunc-
tion in 2000,129 but the NPS decided to keep the road closed while it es-
tablished a new policy regarding motor vehicle traffic on the Salt Creek
road.13 0 After conducting its environmental assessment in 2002, the NPS
concluded that continuing to allow vehicle traffic would result in "ad-
verse impacts to Salt Creek's ecosystem that would impair park re-
sources and values."'3 ' This decision led the NPS to issue a final rule on
June 14, 2004 that prohibited motor vehicles in Salt Creek Canyon above
Peekaboo Spring, as well as the Park Service's administrative determina-
tion that an R.S. 2477 right-of-way did not exist.132 That same day, San
Juan County filed a suit to quiet title, claiming an alleged R.S. 2477
right-of-way along the Salt Creek road.1
33
3. Procedural History (SUWA Intervention and District Court
Decision)
After the county filed its complaint asserting title to the alleged
right-of-way, several environmental groups-SUWA, The Wilderness
Society (TWS), and Grand Canyon Trust (GCT)-moved to intervene in
the district court claiming that a decision to grant the R.S. 2477 right-of-
125. See Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 108 (discussing the Park Service's decision to close
Salt Creek Canyon to vehicular use in 2004).
126. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 15.
127. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note Il l, at 2 ("From historically
open travel that exceeded 60 vehicles per day . . . the BMP's permit gate reduced the number of
vehicles ... to no more than 10 private vehicles and 2 commercial tour vehicles per day.").
128. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F. 3d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 2000).
129. Id. at 830.
130. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 3.
131. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 19-20.
132. Canyonlands National Park-Salt Creek Canyon, 69 Fed. Reg. 32,871, 32,876 (June 14,
2004) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 7.44(a)).
133. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 20.
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way would seriously threaten their conservation interests.134 The district
court denied the intervention sought by the environmental advocacy
groups, and the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the decision.' The
court reasoned that while the conservation groups have an interest that
may be impaired in the outcome of a title dispute involving an R.S. 2477
right-of-way, the federal government adequately represented those inter-
ests in the Salt Creek matter.136 The environmental groups then moved
for amicus status, and subsequently participated in litigation as "friends
of the court," but not as parties.1 37 This appeal only considered the inter-
vention issue and did not consider the merits of the case.
Upon remand, the district court, after weighing all the historical ev-
idence of use presented by both parties, ruled in favor of the United
States.138 Following R.S. 2477 precedent, the court looked to state com-
mon law to guide its determination of whether the public use amounts to
acceptance as a public highway, and under Utah law, "[a] highway shall
be deemed and taken as dedicated and abandoned to the use of the Public
when it has been continuously and uninterruptedly used as a Public thor-
oughfare for a period of ten years."l39 According to the district court,
"the evidence was not sufficient" to demonstrate that "the road had been
in continuous public use as a public thoroughfare throughout a ten year
period prior to the reservation of Canyonlands" in 1964.140
The district court disregarded the homesteading activities in the late
nineteenth century, as there was "[v]ery little direct evidence" to the du-
ration and extent of travel by these early pioneers along the claimed
route.14 1 The court also found it would strain the language of R.S. 2477
to characterize the cattle-grazing activities as public use because any
evidence of sufficient use was conducted under a proprietary interest,
pursuant to federal grazing permits.142 As for the recreational activities
that commenced in the 1950s, the court explained that the scenic tourism
was "still in its embryonic stage" and "the sporadic trips along Salt Creek
to Angel Arch . . . were still exploratory in nature."1 43 Therefore, the dis-
134. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc). This
earlier opinion dealt only with the issue of intervention and did not discuss the merits of the case.
135. Id.atll67,1207.
136. Id. at 1167-68.
137. Brief of Amici Curiae Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, et al. in Opposition to the
Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1-2, San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d
787 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), 2014 WL 3795351, at *1-2 [hereinafter Amici Brief
for Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance]. The court may consider amicus filings but the extent and
weight of such consideration is discretionary.
138. San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d at 791.
139. Id at 791-92 (quoting Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah
1929)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id.
141. San Juan Cnty v. United States, No. 2:04-CV-0552BSJ, 2011 WL 2144762, at *33 (D.
Utah May 27, 2007).
142. Id. at *34.
143. Id. at *35.
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trict court ruled in favor of the United States, explaining that while the
state and county demonstrated a variety of historical uses, during the
relevant period before 1954, "a visit to Salt Creek Canyon . . . was an
experience marked by pristine solitude."
4. Tenth Circuit Unanimously Affirms the District Court
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
considered (1) whether the state and county's claims under the QTA
were timely, and (2) and whether the state and county demonstrated ac-
ceptance through ten years of continuous public use prior to Can-
yonlands' reservation in 1964.145
a. Quiet Title Act/Sovereign Immunity
The United States contended that sovereign immunity deprived the
district court of jurisdiction by claiming the limitation periods in the
QTA had expired before the state and county could take advantage of the
statute's limited waiver.146 Because the sovereign immunity issue was
jurisdictional, the Tenth Circuit addressed it first and held that the claims
of both the state and county were timely. 14 7 The QTA establishes two
different limitation periods for property claims brought against the feder-
al government: "[A] general limitation period and a limitation period
applicable only to claims brought by states."l48
For claimants other than states, a claim needs to be filed within
twelve years of the date of accrual, which means the statute of limitations
started to run when the federal government gave San Juan County notice
that it did not recognize the legitimacy of the county's use of the Salt
Creek road.149 The United States argued that several mid-1970s road
closures south of the claimed road constituted sufficient notice to start
the limitations period; by closing certain segments that connected to the
Salt Creek Road, the U.S. gave notice by limiting the avenues of access
to the claimed right-of-way.5 0 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, explaining
that despite the more restrictive management activities conducted by the
federal agency, these earlier closures did not constitute an exclusive
claim because "the public continued to have access to Salt Creek road
consistent with the claimed right-of-way."' 5 ' Thus, San Juan's claim was
timely.
144. Id.
145. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2014).
146. Id. at 792.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 793.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 793-94.
151. Id. at 794.
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The Tenth Circuit then went on to address the timeliness of Utah's
claim. For states, the notice requirement is different because "the trig-
ger . . . requires more than fair notice; it requires substantial activity by
the United States."'52 The court acknowledged that the United States had
conducted "substantial activities" with respect to the right-of-way, but it
nonetheless held that Utah's claim was timely since the limitation period
applied to states only starts to run when the state "receive[s] notice" of
the federal claims.53 Because the route remained "fully accessible to the
public" throughout all of the federal government's activities, and the first
attempt to limit the public's access occurred after 1995 when the NPS
proposed the permit system via the backcountry management plan,
Utah's claim was not barred by the limitation period.154
b. "Continuous Use" (Acceptance of the Salt Creek Road as a
Public Right-of-Way)
The state and county argued that the district judge erred in several
ways by (1) requiring them to demonstrate greater f equency of public
use than that which "the public finds . . . convenient or necessary," (2)
disregarding evidence of cattle-grazing uses under a private right, (3)
requiring a showing of a constructed or "discernible" road, and (4) con-
cluding the burden of proof must be satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence. 155
The Tenth Circuit addressed the frequency of use argument first.
The court held that "frequency or intensity of use is probative of the ex-
istence of a 'public thoroughfare,' and, to the extent recent changes to
Utah law minimize the importance of this factor, it . . . remains pertinent
under federal law."1 56 The state and county were of the opinion that no
particular frequency of use is required and the public use standard is ful-
filled when the route's use "is as often as the public finds convenient or
necessary during the ten-year period."157 They based their argument on
two cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 2008 that proclaimed a
new interpretation of the public use standard where frequency of use is
not a relevant consideration.158 The Tenth Circuit reminded the parties
that while federal courts may "borrow" from state law to aid in their de-
termination of whether an R.S. 2477 right-of-way has been accepted, it
"ceases to provide 'convenient and appropriate principles' when it con-
152. Id. at 795.
153. Id (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(i)).
154. Id. at 796.
155. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra
note 111, at 26, 30) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 797.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 798 (discussing Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 179 P.3d 768 (Utah 2008), and Utah
County v. Butler, 179 P.3d 775 (Utah 2008), which held that a roadway becomes dedicated, and
therefore accepted by the public, when it is created by a public user and held open for such use as is
convenient or necessary for an uninterrupted ten year period).
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travenes congressional intent."l59 The court explained that frequency and
variety of use were both "critical common-law inquiries" when deciding
whether a claimed right-of-way had been accepted by the public.'60 In
addition, the relevant state law in this determination was the law in effect
when the statute was repealed in 1976.161 The court concluded that the
Utah Supreme Court could not "retroactively broaden" the public use
standard by applying a more lenient standard beyond what Congress in-
tended when it preserved rights-of-way existing on the date of repeal.162
Next, the Tenth Circuit addressed the state and county's argument
that cattle-grazing uses under a private right should have been given
more weight in considering the existence of a public highway. The Tenth
Circuit sided with the district court on this issue, explaining that these
activities carried little probative value "because the users had 'proprie-
tary interests in the upper Salt Creek' pursuant to federal grazing per-
mits and a deed to land in the adjacent area.163 Therefore, the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld Utah court decisions holding that use under private right is
not sufficient to meet the public use standard.
The state and county also argued that the district court erred by re-
quiring them to prove that a discernible jeep road had been "construct-
ed."' The Tenth Circuit did not agree that an error had been committed
and confirmed that although "mechanical construction is not necessary to
prove a R.S. 2477 right-of-way[,] . . . 'evidence of actual construc-
tion ... or lack thereof'" can be probative in determining what satisfies
the requisite public use.165
Finally, the state and county argued that the district judge erred by
applying the more stringent burden of proving acceptance by requiring a
showing of clear and convincing evidence. They believed the correct
standard needed to show the existence of a public thoroughfare should
have been the more lenient preponderance of the evidence standard.166
The Tenth Circuit declined to rule on this issue, stating that a resolution
as to the proper evidentiary standard was unnecessary since the evidence
failed to satisfy either standard. 167 Even so, the San Juan decision went
further in reaching the merits of an R.S. 2477 claim than any Tenth Cir-
159. Id.
160. Id. at 799.
161. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1083 & n.14 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled
in part on other grounds by Vill. of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir.
1992), which held that scope is determined with respect to state law as of date of repeal of statute).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 799-800.
164. Id. at 800.
165. Id. at 800 (citation omitted) (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735,
777-78 (10th Cir. 2005), which held the presence of a discernible road can be considered when
determining whether a public thoroughfare existed).
166. Appellant San Juan County's Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 21.
167. San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d at 801.
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cuit decision before it. Yet, despite its historic outcome, the full prece-
dential thrust of the decision remains to be seen.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. San Juan's Effect and Precedential Value
On September 8, 2014, the Tenth Circuit denied San Juan County's
and the state of Utah's petitions for a rehearing en banc, settling the issue
for Salt Creek Canyon once and for all. 168 However, there are still thou-
sands of potential R.S. 2477 claims that could have a profound impact on
the future of the West's wild landscapes. It may take decades for courts
to settle the many vexing questions surrounding R.S. 2477, but the San
Juan decision did help to flesh out the meaning of continuous use and
frequency when interpreting this frontier law in the modem era.
San Juan signals a victory for those sympathetic to federal retention
and preservation of western landscapes, but the reach of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision and its precedential value moving forward is less clear.
The decision provides clarity on some issues such as the statute of limita-
tions and the different types of notice the federal government must give
to potential claimants in order to start the limited waiver period. 169 It also
reaffirmed that while evidence of a discernible road is neither a neces-
sary nor sufficient element, it may be probative when determining
whether the required extent of public use has been satisfied.70 Because
the Salt Creek road is regularly washed out by storms and seasonal run-
off,17 ' the decision might signal that establishing a discernible road re-
quires more than temporary seasonal use. The Tenth Circuit did not pro-
nounce any sort of bright-line rule regarding seasonal use, but by reaf-
firming the probative value of proving a discernible road, the decision
might handicap parties attempting to establish the validity of other poten-
tial R.S. 2477 claims in the Colorado Plateau, where spring runoff and
winter snow prevent year-round access.
Perhaps the most important result of this decision was the court's
finding that frequency of use is still a probative consideration when eval-
uating the public use standard. It raises the bar for assembling the requi-
site historical evidence needed to prove an R.S. 2477 route was in con-
tinuous public use. Claimants relying on little more than ephemeral pro-
168. Order of Sept. 8, 2014, San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014)
(Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), available at http://suwa.org/wp-content/uploads/San-Juan-County-and-
Utah-v-US-9-8-14-order-denying-rehearing-en-banc.pdf.
169. See generally San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d 787.
170. Id. at 800.
171. State of Utah's Reply Brief on Appeal of Findings of Fact, Memorandum Opinion and
Order of the U.S. District Court, for the District of Utah, the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Presiding
at 35, San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), 2012
WL 1151679, at *35 [hereinafter Utah's Reply Brief] (explaining the topography of Canyonlands'
"sedimentary and igneous formations" can make a road's seasonal use less discernible after periodic
flooding and rechanneling of the riverbed).
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Spector use or cattle grazing pursuant to a federal permit may think twice
before filing a claim. By disqualifying these cattle ranching activities as
serving proprietary and not public uses, the San Juan decision will likely
prevent a substantial number of old roads from being recognized as R.S.
2477 rights-of-way.172
The Tenth Circuit sent an important message when it proclaimed
that state law cannot retroactively attempt to broaden the scope of con-
tinuous public use beyond that which was intended by Congress when it
repealed R.S. 2477 in 1976.'17 The court properly followed circuit prece-
dent by retaining the frequency of use requirement74 and refusing to
allow state courts to circumvent what Congress intended when it grand-
fathered preexisting rights-of-way over three decades ago.75 Quoting
SUWA, the court explained that frequency or intensity of use "has always
been pertinent to establishing sufficient 'passing or travel' 'by the pub-
lic."'l 76 Therefore, the frequency component remains relevant in deter-
mining whether a public thoroughfare existed, and recent Utah judicial
precedents cannot alter that consideration. '7
For other states and counties wishing to assert R.S. 2477 claims
against the federal government, this decision will dictate how they move
forward strategically.78 Some believe the decision will have serious ad-
verse consequences for local residents across the West who depend on
access to public roads for their livelihoods.'7 9 However, it would be a
mistake to think states like Utah will back down after the Tenth Circuit's
ruling.'80 Many public access advocates disregarded the decision as an
"urban-centric dismissal" of the views of rural western citizens, which
172. San Juan County was worried about the effect of dismissing the cattle-grazing operations
as "proprietary interests" because "the logical extension of the concept . . . will set the stage to
eliminate pretty much every public use of a road under R.S. 2477. What would qualify as public use
if personal intent matters?" Appellant San Juan County's Reply Brief at 21-22, San Juan Cnty. v.
United States, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-4146, 11-4149), 2012 WL 2510472, at *2 1 -
22 (citation omitted).
173. San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d at 799.
174. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 762 (10th Cir. 2005) ("The laws
of the United States alone control the disposition of title to its lands. The states are powerless to
place any limitation . .. on that control." (quoting United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1935)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
175. Amici Brief for Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, supra note 137, at 11-12.
176. San Juan Cnty., 754 F.3d at 798.
177. See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, § 15:19.
178. Soon after the decision, the state of Utah began developing evidence of "frequency of
use" in order to meet the proper standard reaffirmed by the Tenth Circuit. See Amy Joi O'Donoghue,
Courtroom Defeat Fails to Back Utah Off Roads Fight, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 29, 2014, 9:15 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865601968/Courtroom-defeat-fails-to-back-Utah-off-roads-
fight.html.
179. See Appellant San Juan County's Reply Brief, supra note 172, at 22.
180. The Utah attorney general's office and county officials "say they intend to keep battling
for local control over another 14,000 roads" within the state. Jodi Peterson, Utah Denied Claim to




may only fuel their growing hostile attitudes toward the federal govern-
ment."'
One issue the Tenth Circuit did not resolve was the dispute over the
proper evidentiary standard for proving the existence of a public thor-
oughfare. While the Tenth Circuit's earlier decision in SUWA v. BLM
discussed which party bears the burden of proof, clarifying the proper
evidentiary standard for an R.S. 2477 claim under the QTA was an issue
of first impression before the court.' 82 Because the outcome of an R.S.
2477 claim depends so much on weighing the evidence of historical pub-
lic use, a ruling on the correct standard would have provided much-
needed precedent. The district court believed the more stringent clear and
convincing evidentiary standard was proper since that is the standard
applied by Utah common law and because of the long-standing notion
that federal land grant statutes are construed in favor of the United
States. The state of Utah argued for a "preponderance of the evidence
standard," a more liberal construction in support of the policies behind
R.S. 2477's enactment that encouraged private parties to settle the West
and divest the federal government of public lands in the name of eco-
nomic progress.184 In other words, because the "condition of the country"
in 1866 favored rapid western expansion and the creation of rights-of-
way across public lands to facilitate that process, Congress intended a
less restrictive standard of proof in establishing R.S. 2477 rights-of-
way.185 Although the San Juan decision went further in fleshing out R.S.
2477 jurisprudence at the circuit level than any case before it, the Tenth
Circuit should have settled this issue. Perhaps the court thought it would
be issuing an advisory opinion if it elaborated on the proper standard of
proof, since it agreed with the district court judge that the evidence failed
to satisfy either standard. However, it would not have merely been advi-
sory because the decision would directly affect the rights and obligations
of the county and state in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of other cases it
was currently gathering evidence for.' 86 In addition, appellate courts have
a responsibility to guide lower courts and administrative agencies in their
181. See Taylor, supra note 71. Utah residents explain that "empty roads are the geographic
rule, not exception, of the American West," and they take issue to dictating frequency of use accord-
ing to an "urban point of reference." Id.
182. Appellant San Juan County's Reply Brief, supra note 172, at 16-17.
183. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 109, at 32 ("[T]he clear and con-
vincing evidence standard . . . . is compelled by the canon of construction that federal land-grant
statutes are strictly construed in favor of the United States.").
184. Utah's Reply Brief, supra note 171, at 18-19, 21-22.
185. Id. at 21-22 ("[Se]ttlement was the sole interest of the federal government in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, and allowing individual access was such a given factor that is seldom
discussed." (internal quotation mark omitted)).
186. Appellant San Juan County's Reply Brief, supra note 172, at 16-17 ("[L]egal predicate
for further actions are not advisory.") (citing 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION
AND RELATED MATTERS § 3529.1 (3d ed. 2011)).
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application of legal principles to future cases or controversies., The
lower courts rely on appellate decisions as persuasive authority and
would have benefitted from a simple determination of the correct stand-
ard to apply. With thousands of other potential claims lurking on millions
of acres of public lands, the Tenth Circuit did a disservice to land man-
agement agencies trying to plan around this "very murky body of law." 88
Nevertheless, the higher standard of proving a public thoroughfare exist-
ed by clear and convincing evidence is probably the correct one. In Utah,
this is the standard applied by the courts, and it is also consistent with the
broad principle of sovereign immunity that doubts surrounding land
grant issues are resolved in favor of the federal government.189 Neverthe-
less, a circuit decision on this issue would be helpful to lower courts,
land management agencies, and individuals deciding whether the pursuit
of gathering vast amounts of historical evidence is worth the effort.
Assembling the requisite evidence to convince a court that an old
pioneer trail is an R.S. 2477 public highway is no simple task. Because
"rights-of-way were self-executing and required no formal approval from
the federal government" under R.S. 2477, most antique routes are not
recorded in public records.90 It requires significant historical research,
including an analysis of old land records, geological surveys, maps, aeri-
al images produced from Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), and mining
and grazing document assessments.1 9  Many of these claims exist in
memory only, and proving an R.S. 2477 right-of-way existed prior to
1976 typically involves an army of lawyers touring the state and taking
depositions of elderly witnesses attesting to the route's use.192 This
makes pursuing an R.S. 2477 claim a costly endeavor.'93 While the San
Juan case certainly set the bar higher, the fact that each R.S. 2477 route
is unique and requires its own road-by-road analysis might limit the ef-
fect of the Salt Creek decision to some extent. The Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that "[i]n the end, whether the public used the claimed road contin-
uously . . . is a factual issue," alluding to the notion that any R.S. 2477
decision is difficult to predict until all the evidence unique to that par-
187. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 20, 32 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's failure to decide on the
merits of another contentious R.S. 2477 case involving four large parcels of federally managed land
in Kane County, Utah).
188. Id. at 31.
189. Amici Brief for Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, supra note 137, at 5 (explaining the
state is wrong to suggest he policies behind R.S. 2477 require a more liberal construction).
190. Suthers, supra note 73, at 113.
191. Hoffmann, supra note 65, at 9.
192. See Maffly, supra note 13.
193. See id. (explaining that the state's R.S. 2477 effort "is among the costliest legal undertak-
ings ever pursued by Utah officials").
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ticular road is laid out before the court.194 This might minimize the prec-
edential value of any individual case.'95
The next R.S. 2477 case decided by the Tenth Circuit was Kane
County v. United States,19 6 an appeal from a district court judge's 2013
ruling in favor of Kane County and Utah in their efforts to claim R.S.
2477 rights-of-way in the Bald Knoll area.97 The district court awarded
Kane County title to twelve of the fifteen claimed roads, four of which
are located inside the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.198
The Tenth Circuit then awarded the state and county title to six of the
twelve roads and held the court had no jurisdiction to hear claims regard-
ing the remaining six because there was no dispute as to legal title.1 9 9
Like the Salt Creek road, several of the routes are unimproved jeep trails
and one is inside a wilderness study area.200 However, the roads at issue
in Kane connect to other roads and their historic use by the public was
less disputed.2 0 1 As the previous paragraph hypothesized, the merits of
the San Juan case did not come into play, and the Kane case illustrates
the limited effect of any individual case on the outcome involving roads
that are have different characteristics and their own unique history of
202use.
B. Prevailing Uncertainty (and Potential Nonlitigation Alternatives)
Despite the recent clarity provided by the Tenth Circuit on R.S.
2477 jurisprudence, the depth of evidentiary analysis in San Juan deci-
sion is the exception, not the rule. There still exists considerable uncer-
tainty for federal land agencies attempting to establish wilderness man-
agement plans, private property owners struggling to sort out potential
clouds on title, and local government officials planning for road use and
203
development strategies. 2 Several DOI agencies attempted to provide a
formal adjudication process in 1994, but Congress blocked the at-
194. San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754 F.3d 787, 801 (10th Cir. 2014).
195. Id. (acknowledging that "[t]he state and county put on a strong case, but so did the United
States. In the end .... [i]t is the role of the judge to weigh the evidence presented at a bench trial").
196. 772 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2014).
197. Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 108; Tenth Circuit Denies SUWA 's Intervention in Kane
R.S. 2477 Bald Knoll Appeal, UTAH'S PUB. LANDS POLICY COORDINATING OFFICE (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://publiclands.utah.gov/tenth-circuit-denies-suwas-intervention-in-kane-r-s-2477-bald-knoll-
appeal/.
198. Phil Taylor, Judges Seem Skeptical of U.S. in High-Stakes Utah Road Dispute,
GREENWIRE (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060006616.
199. See Kane Cnty., 772 F.3d at 1212-13, 1222-23.
200. Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 108. The argument that use of a route by ranchers does not
meet the law's requirement that the route be used by the broader public was also at issue in the
appeal. See id.
201. See Taylor, supra note 198.
202. Conservationists had hoped the San Juan ruling that proprietary use doesn't count for
determining the validity would come into play, but it did not. Taylor, supra note 198.
203. See Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 252.
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tempt.204 Utah's 2003 MOU has been discredited for its failure to include
a provision for public involvement in the acknowledgement process, and
some critics have questioned its legality.205 Perhaps the San Juan deci-
sion provides a more thorough roadmap for agencies, but there are still
other non-litigation approaches that could establish a more consistent
framework to predict the validity and resolve future R.S. 2477 claims.
One potential method that has been suggested is the use of agency arbi-
tration using a tiered approach where agencies have the authority to re-
solve less controversial R.S. 2477 claims through a simple application
process.206 The DOI has used alternative dispute resolution before, which
it credited with a "43 percent reduction in formal case filings between
,2071992 and 1993." However, more controversial claims, such as those
impacting wilderness designation, the need for public input, and judicial
resolution would still require case-by-case litigation in federal courts.208
This tiered approach would result in more efficient resolution of claims
that are less disputed, while still allowing for input from public interest
groups and government transparency in claims that are more politically
controversial.209 Using a nonlitigation alternative will not solve all the
problems that make up the legal quagmire presented by this old frontier
law, and agency arbitration might not find enough support in a polarized
Congress, but it is worth considering its implementation as a mechanism
to ease the burden on federal land management agencies trying to sort
out the validity of future R.S. 2477 claims.
C. The Battle Over Control ofPublic Lands and R.S. 2477 Moving
Forward
In the case of Salt Creek, local governments spent over $1 million
battling for this single dirt road.210 It is unlikely the state of Utah has
spent millions of taxpayer dollars simply to assist local residents wanting
to drive their Jeeps to scenic sites like Angel Arch. It is more likely part
of an experiment by the state to use R.S. 2477 as a mechanism to put its
204. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 14, § 15:19 ("The BLM, the NPS, and the FWS in
1994 jointly issued proposed regulations to clarify the application of R.S. 2477 and provide a formal
adjudication process by which validly acquired rights-of-way may be recognized and regulated.
Congress thereafter prohibited the Department from finalizing the regulations . . . and the regulations
were not issued." (footnotes omitted)).
205. See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 14
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 400 (2004) (describing the MOU as a "sweetheart deal[]" and
charging that "reliance on the recordable disclaimer regulations to provide the substantive criteria for
what qualifies as a valid existing right under FLPMA, in the absence of the explicit authorization
required by section 108, is probably illegal").
206. See Macfarlane, supra note 6, at 249-50 ("[M]any claims ... lie at the ends of the spec-
trum and are either clearly valid or are clearly not valid. These outlying claims could be easily re-
solved through a simple application process, allowing those seeking to establish a right-of-way ... to
petition for an agency designation.").
207. Id at 249.
208. Id. at 251.
209. Id. at 228.
210. Binkly, supra note 58.
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hostility toward federal land management into legal action. Yet, despite
the massive amounts of money poured into Utah's land grab efforts, state
victories have been few thus far, especially regarding routes like Salt
Creek that do not connect to other roads used by the general public. 211
Still, other western states are watching Utah's aggressive R.S. 2477 at-
tempts, especially in New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming where many
preexisting rights-of-way likely exist and where Tenth Circuit decisions
are binding authority on federal courts in those states. In Colorado, po-
tential R.S. 2477 claims threaten more than 300,000 acres of land in
212Moffat County alone. The resolution of each case decided by the Tenth
Circuit may deter or encourage these other states to pursue their own
claims of routes on public lands depending on the outcome. However, to
determine what constitutes a highway under the statute, courts look to
state law and standards can vary from state to state.213 For example, Col-
orado has no specific time frame for proving continuous use, while Utah
214does. Even in other western states where Tenth Circuit decisions pro-
vide persuasive authority, many officials are eagerly waiting to "jump on
the R.S. 2477 bandwagon" if the courts validate even a fraction of Utah's
claims.215 Several states have already allotted funds for the purpose of
studying potential R.S. 2477 "highways," and it would not be a surprise
if funding increased following any successful litigation involving Utah's
1 - 216claims.
For this reason, environmentalists worry that a threat to one protect-
ed region presents risks to the environmental integrity of all wild land-
scapes burdened by adjacent pioneer routes with R.S. 2477 potential.217
Some worry the hidden goal is to open up these protected areas to natural
resource extraction after validated R.S. 2477 claims disqualify them from
permanent preservation designations, since a road cannot bisect potential
reserves such as wilderness study areas.2 18 Regardless of the motives
behind R.S. 2477's resurrection, these roads are sure to generate funda-
mental disagreements between the values of access and preservation.
CONCLUSION
Besides marking a victory for federal control and environmental
preservation advocates, the San Juan decision fills a much needed gap in
R.S. 2477 case law and helps pave the way for other similar claims that
211. See id
212. R.S. 2477, WILDERNESS SoC'Y, http://wilderness.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Complete-
Congressional-Briefing-Book-09.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
213. Binkly, supra note 58.
214. Id. ("In Utah ... a route must have been used for 10 years continuously.").
215. Hoffmann & Imperiale, supra note 47.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. (explaining that once courts validate the claims, the state might be able to open up
the land to oil and gas exploration and other extractive industries).
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are sure to come before federal courts. While the Tenth Circuit helped to
establish a working framework for determining the validity of such
preexisting rights-of-way, the more recent Kane County case demon-
strates the heavy emphasis on evaluating historical evidence and the
uniqueness of each R.S. 2477 road is a potential obstacle that limits the
reach of any one particular decision. It might take decades for courts to
sort out questions relevant to evaluating the existence, scope, duration,
and extent of use of the many preexisting frontier highways across the
western United States. The use of agency arbitration in noncontroversial
cases provides one mechanism that could ease the burden of land agen-
cies and private property owners attempting to sort out these issues.
Future litigation will be determined by a careful analysis of the
meaning and intent of R.S. 2477 and the evaluation of historical evidence
of a route's use in each case, but it is hard to ignore the passionate feel-
ings generated by "the magnificence of the natural wonders" at the end
of each road, as well as the broader political ramifications at play.2 19 De-
spite the uncertainty surrounding this vexing frontier law, one thing is
certain: other western states wishing to retake federally owned lands
within their borders are eagerly watching the battle taking place in
Utah's federal courts. The outcome there may dictate how aggressively
these other states decide to use R.S. 2477 as a mechanism to assert their
hostility against federal land management.
Lucas Satterlee*
219. Utah's Reply Brief, supra note 171, at 36.
* J.D. Candidate 2016. 1 would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Denver Universi-
ty Law Review for making this article possible; to Professor Fred Cheever for all his assistance
throughout the publishing process; and to my good friend Sam Little for making the arduous trek to
camp with me along the Salt Creek. Journeying deep into the red rock wilderness helped ne to
appreciate why this desert creek instills such passion among those wishing to access its treasures.
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GRAHAM V. SHERIFF OF LOGAN COUNTY: COERCION IN
RAPE AND THE PLIGHT OF WOMEN PRISONERS
ABSTRACT
Sex between a prison guard and a prison inmate is usually consid-
ered rape, and is thus adjudicated as an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim. When the Tenth Circuit heard Graham v. Sheriff of Logan
County, it was tasked with determining whether sex between a prison
inmate and two guards constituted excessive force, but instead, the court
ignored the issue of force and improperly held that the female inmate
consented to intercourse.
This Comment utilizes feminist dominance theory as a backdrop for
analyzing the Tenth Circuit's discussion of whether Stacey Graham was
raped by two prison guards. Dominance theory argues that, in criminal
rape, gender inequality is a form of coercion. However, gender inequality
is also greatly relevant when evaluating rape as an Eighth Amendment
violation. Instead of recognizing the extreme inequality and gender
asymmetry that exists between male guards and female inmates in pris-
on, the Tenth Circuit bestowed the power of consent upon the inmate-
plaintiff in Graham and insisted that she had the voluntary right and abil-
ity to consent to intercourse with a male guard. By disregarding the pow-
er imbalance the prison created and discounting the role of both gender
and social inequality, the Tenth Circuit's decision subordinates female
prisoners who seek justice as victims of rape.
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INTRODUCTION
Under law, rape is a sex crime that is not regarded as a crime
when it looks like sex.
-Catherine MacKinnon'
Under the traditional view of rape, criminal law requires inter-
course, coercion, and nonconsent. This three-pronged requirement as-
sumes that women can consent to forced sex.3 What traditional rape law
neglects to consider, however, is that force can transcend physical ag-
gression; a woman's failure to display physical resistance to force is not
indicative of consent.4
1. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172 (1989).
2. Id.
3. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 131 (2005); see also infra
Part I.B.
4. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985), in which a jury questioned
whether rape could occur post-penetration, to which the judge affirmed that "intercourse by compul-
sion" constitutes rape. The trial court continued, stating that "[t]he critical element there is the con-
tinuation under compulsion." Id. Thus, rape occurs based on compulsion, not necessarily based on a
victim's physical displays of resistance to the offense. Id.
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Feminist legal scholars find the deficiencies of rape law indicative
of social inequality between men and women.' Gender asymmetry is
exacerbated in prison where male guards have complete control over
female inmates.6 Under such circumstances, when rape occurs between a
male guard and female inmate, the inmate is subordinated and powerless
not only based on her gender, but further by her status as a prisoner.
In Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, Stacey Graham was a pris-
oner who claimed her male guards raped her in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, which protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punish-
8ment. The Tenth Circuit focused on the evidence of her consent to sex,
holding that rape did not occur.9 Though federal courts are split as to
what constitutes consent to sex between prisoners and their guards, and
whether consent may exist at all,'0 the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the
matter disregarded both the power dynamic and gender asymmetry be-
tween female inmates and male guards, and the issue of evaluating force
in rape. This Comment discusses how inequality is a form of coercion in
rape and how the Tenth Circuit's decision in Graham subordinates wom-
5. Many consider traditional rape law, as with other laws, a reflection of patriarchal society.
See infra notes 51-52 (describing patriarchy and its impact). The legal system is among the institu-
tions in society affected by patriarchy. Additionally, when the legal system must evaluate allegations
of rape, its evaluation of consent exemplifies the social inequality embedded in our society:
In determining "consent," as in making judgments about force, fear, intimidation, and
"reasonableness," law's vague, abstract standards are especially troubling in this respect.
Law has not simply opted for a neutral solution to these socially contested issues. In each
instance, law has chosen sides. The law gives priority to the interest (the predominantly
male interest) in seeking sexual gratification through advances backed by physical
strength and social power. And the law gives priority to protecting sexually assertive in-
dividuals (predominantly men) from the risk of conviction without clear warning in ad-
vance.
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF
LAw 67 (1998); see also NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 10
(2006) (noting that "[d]ominance theorists cite the lack of legal controls on pornography and sexual
harassment, excessive restrictions on abortion, and inadequate responses to violence against women
as examples of the ways laws contribute to the oppression of women").
6. "Gender asymmetry" refers to the disproportional imbalance of equality between genders.
7. 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013).
8. Id. at 1124. The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that sexual abuse of
an inmate by an officer is an Eighth Amendment violation); Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., No.
CIV-10-1048-F, 2012 WL 9509373, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2012) (noting that "[b]ecause Gra-
ham was incarcerated at the time of the alleged events . . . her claim is properly analyzed as an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim"); Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 172 (W.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Sexual abuse may violate contemporary standards of decency and can cause severe physical
and psychological harm. For this reason . . . sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison official can ...
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation."); infra notes 47-48, 120-21 and accompanying text; cf
Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 665 (D.D.C.
1994) (stating that rape is "simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offens-
es against society" (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
9. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124.
10. See infra Part II.C.
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en prisoners in the justice system by misapplying the law and failing to
recognize the social constructs of gender in prison.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a background
of postmodern dominance theory to explain how rape is a byproduct of
institutionalized gender inequality. Further, by discussing how gender
inequality is coupled with severe power dynamics in a restricted envi-
ronment, Part I also demonstrates how the power imbalance is manifest-
ed in prison. Part II outlines the facts, procedural history, and unanimous
majority opinion of Graham. Finally, Part III draws on the concepts of
dominance theory to show how the Tenth Circuit improperly reviewed
the issue of consent and to analyze how inequality between Graham and
two guards functioned as a form of coercion to sex. Part III concludes by
expanding the concepts of gender inequality to consider how Graham
commoditized her sexuality in prison as a result of her extreme power-
lessness.
I. BACKGROUND
Knowledge of the social environment that a prison creates is critical
to understanding whether an inmate can consent to sexual behavior in
prison. Thus, this Part begins by establishing how prisons create a
framework in which inmates have little control over their lives, and con-
siders the ways in which inmates respond to that lack of control. This
Part continues with a background to distinguish rape law as a constitu-
tional violation from rape law in the criminal context and concludes with
a brief introduction of feminist legal theory to analyze how existing rape
law is grounded in patriarchy, a social structure that is exacerbated in
prison.
A. The Social Framework ofPrison and the Inmate Response
When an inmate is admitted to prison, she must adjust to an envi-
ronment where she faces high threat but lacks control." Such an adjust-
ment can result in severe psychological damage.12 Prisoners respond to
the lack of control in several ways, one of which is to suppress emotions
and vulnerabilities to convince others that they are violent.' 3 Despite
suppressing emotion outwardly, one study revealed that internally, wom-
11. Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in
Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 499, 535 (1997).
12. Id.; Barbara H. Zaitzow, Pastel Fascism: Reflections of Social Control Techniques Used
with Women in Prison, 32 WOMEN'S STUD. Q. 33, 40 (2004) ("A woman inmate's feeling of inade-
quacy is heightened by the constant surveillance under which she is kept. The prisoner is confronted
daily with the fact that she has been stripped of her membership in society at large, and then stands
condemned as an outcast and outlaw such that she must be kept closely guarded and watched day
and night. She loses the privilege of being trusted and her every act is viewed with suspicion by the
guards.").
13. Haney, supra note 11, at 536-37 (citing prisoner research).
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en inmates experience stages of grief comparable to those experienced by
terminally ill patients.14
Beginning with denial, both patients and prisoners experience anger
when they realize that they are no longer in control of their lives.'5 Be-
cause of the lack of control, the anger women experience during this
stage is expressed through an increased need for self-assertion.16 One
way prisoners attempt to exercise control is by playing a game known as
"being sneaky" in which they deceive guards to make them believe the
women are doing what the guards want them to do.'7 Making a decision
is deemed a luxury in prison; thus, the mere ability to decide when to
play this game itself serves as an exercise of control.'8 As this Comment
will show, the plaintiff in Graham often determined the amount and ex-
tent of inappropriate contact with her guards, which is reflective of her
struggle for control as an inmate.'9
While prisoners must cope to adapt to the psychological struggles of
incarceration, prison guards present a separate but related challenge.
Guards have nearly complete control within prisons, which allows them
to exploit the power imbalance with inmates.20 While in a free society, a
woman can respond to harassment or abuse, in prison, inmates are forced
to tolerate their guards' abuse because they depend on the guards for
safety.21 For example, inmates rely on guards for basic needs,22 and
14. Christina Jose-Kampfner, Coming to Terms with Existential Death: An Analysis of Wom-
en's Adaptation to Life in Prison, 17 SOc. JUST. 110, I12-13 (1990).
15. Id at 115.
16. Id. at 115-16 (quoting a study in which a researcher notes that, similar to the ways in
which a dying patient yearns for control over their medication and food, an inmate searches for ways
to assert control over basic facets of her own life).
17. Id at 116-17 (explaining that inmates play the game of "being sneaky" in how they
respond to officers' orders; for example, if an officer punishes an inmate by forcing her to eat food
in her cell, the inmate seeks to make the officer believe she prefers eating in her cell instead of the
dining room).
18. Id.
19. The game is not more than a response to complete powerlessness. It is not necessarily
indicative of an inmate's desires or wants; rather, it is a mind game by which the prisoner experienc-
es some level of control over her own acts and, in turn, the acts of others. By "being sneaky," wom-
en deceive guards and encounter a minute fraction of control in an environment that otherwise re-
stricts their behavior. See id.
20. See Danielle Dirks, Sexual Revictimization and Retraumatization of Women in Prison, 32
WOMEN'S STUD. Q. 102, 107 (2004) (citing AMNESTY INT'L, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE":
VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY 7 (1999), available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr51/019/1999/en/; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too
FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS 43, 75 (1996), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/12/01/all-too-familiar) ("Correctional officers' absolute power
over giving warnings, infractions, and punitive measures may provide opportunities for the devel-
opment of exploitative relationships that hinge on 'favor-giving' and avoiding punishment.");
Anthea Dinos, Note, Custodial Sexual Abuse: Enforcing Long-Awaited Policies Designed to Protect
Female Prisoners, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 281, 282 (2001).
21. Katherine C. Parker, Note, Female Inmates Living in Fear: Sexual Abuse by Correctional
Officers in the District of Columbia, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 443, 444 (2002).
22. Zaitzow, supra note 12, at 39-40 ("The most obvious fact of life in women's prisons is
that women are dependent on the officers for virtually every daily necessity, including food, show-
ers, medical care, feminine hygiene products, and for receiving 'privileges' such as phone calls,
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guards take advantage of that by often withholding goods and privileges
to punish or compel behavior.23
Regardless of whether a guard actually withholds a prisoner's privi-
leges, a guard's mere power to do so presents the same threat. Women
inmates face both implicit and explicit threats if they disobey a guard's
sexual advances.24 Moreover, inmates may become emotionally attached
to guards and find that sex with a guard is an opportunity to experience
power and control.25 Because a woman inmate faces complete power-
lessness in prison, the decision to use her body as a commodity or trade
sex for favors is an opportunity to exercise control.2 6 In addition, because
prisoners tend to have experienced physical or sexual abuse in past rela-
tionships, the power imbalance between inmates and guards often feels
familiar and normal.27 Prior victimization increases the likelihood that an
inmate is influenced by a guard's control.28
In defining what constitutes legal and illegal force in sex, existing
criminal rape law has established what is considered a "normal level of
force." 29 By placing value on a male defendant's view of what consti-
tutes rape, criminal law reflects the inequality between men and women,
the role of patriarchy, and the legal subordination of women. The Tenth
Circuit's analysis in Graham exemplifies this view, while reflecting the
legal system's disregard for both the powerlessness of women prisoners
and the social environment prison creates, where gender inequality is
treated as an irrelevant factor to inmates.
B. The Criminal and Constitutional Violation ofRape
The crime of rape in the United States was originally adopted from
English common law, which required use of force and lack of consent.
30
mail, visits, and attending programs. To ask another adult for permission to do things or to obtain
items of a personal nature is demeaning and humiliating.... The women prisoners, like children, are
told when to get up, how to dress, what to eat, where to go, how to spend their time-in short, what
to do and what not to do.").
23. Dinos, supra note 20, at 283.
24. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Note, Impunity. Sexual Abuse in Women's Prisons, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45, 56 (2007).
25. Id. at 67 (discussing a Rathbone study that discussed a prisoner who had sex with guards
and reported that it gave her a sense of power).
26. Id. at 57 (noting that power dynamics in prison are based on the dichotomy between those
in power (the prison guards) and those without power (the inmates)). Such powerlessness "serves as
a constant reminder to women in prison that they do not have autonomy over their own bodies or
well-being in prison," and that power and gender imbalance in prison is exacerbated by the control
male correctional officers have "as women must rely on men for basic necessities, phone privileges,
and visiting privileges." Dirks, supra note 20, at 106-07; see also supra notes 21-23.
27. Buchanan, supra note 24, at 56; Dirks, supra note 20, at 110 ("Women who have had
previous experiences of victimization in their lifetimes are more likely to have repeated experiences
of trauma in their lives.").
28. Dinos, supra note 20, at 283.
29. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 173.
30. Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal
for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 401 (1988). Rape was initially
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However, in determining what constitutes rape, different courts applied
varied standards for the amount of force required and the necessary
amount of resistance by the victim. 31 As rape law in the United States
developed, state legislatures defined rape differently; while some focused
on the element of nonconsent, others focused on requisite force.32
The traditional, criminal law view that rape requires intercourse,
force, and nonconsent assumes that if sexual behavior involves two of
the three elements, it would not constitute rape. For example, force dur-
ing intercourse could be considered consensual, or nonconsensual inter-
course could be acceptable absent force or coercion. 33 The existing laws
imply that women may consent to forced sex.34 By assuming this per-
spective, criminal law reveals the value of male dominance and the de-
graded status of both women themselves and their social worth. While
the law seeks to treat men and women equally, it arguably fails to realize
social inequality between genders.
When requiring both physical force and nonconsent, the legal sys-
tem suggests that nonconsensual sex is not rape or that forced sex may be
consensual.36 The Model Penal Code, which is among the leading rape
reforms, defines rape as sexual intercourse that is compelled by either
force, the threat of force, serious bodily injury, or extreme pain.7 The
Model Penal Code eliminates nonconsent as long as there is coercion.38
While some states have followed the Model Penal Code's example by
including coercion in their definition of force, the meaning of coercion
has varied among jurisdictions.39
While the crime of rape is often adjudicated as a criminal offense,
rape that occurs in prison may amount to a constitutional violation. A
prisoner's treatment and the conditions of a prisoner's confinement must
conform with the Eighth Amendment,40 which states, "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
defined as "the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will." Id. at 401 n.16 (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *210).
31. Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19,
19-20 (1996).
32. Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape as
Sexual Abuse ofPower, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 150 (2011); see also Ann T. Spence, Note, A
Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 57, 58-59 (2003) (discussing the various approaches states u e to evaluate rape claims).
33. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 172.
34. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 131.
35. Id. at 129 ("Availability for aggressive intimate intrusion and use at will for pleasure by
another defines who one is socially taken to be and constitutes an index of social worth.").
36. Spence, supra note 32, at 62 (citing examples).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(a).
38. Murphy, supra note 31, at 20.
39. Spence, supra note 32, at 64-65.
40. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
31 (1993)).
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punishments inflicted."4 1 Asserting that rape in prison violates the Eighth
Amendment is an allegation of cruel and unusual punishment.
For sexual misconduct in prison, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Farmer v. Brennan42 defines the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.4 3 In Farmer, the transsexual plaintiff claimed prison offi-
cials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by placing him in a male
prison where he was beaten and raped." The Court reasoned that while
the Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from using excessive
physical force against prisoners, it also imposes a duty on officials to
ensure the safety of prisoners and that they are treated humanely.45 To
that end, the Supreme Court held that sexual abuse of a prison inmate by
a prison official constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation.46
However, to distinguish any injury a prisoner may sustain in prison
from being a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court has determined
that an offense must meet both an objective and subjective element to
amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.47 To satisfy the objective
element, a court must first decide whether the alleged harm was objec-
tively serious enough to establish a violation.4 8 For the subjective ele-
ment, a court must find that the prison official had a culpable state of
mind, defined as a "'deliberate indifference' to inmate safety."4 9 While a
rape allegation under the Eighth Amendment must satisfy the elements
required under a criminal rape claim, i.e., sexual contact, nonconsent,
and force, it is evaluated narrowly to also meet the requirements of a
constitutional violation.
C. Gender Inequality and Existing Rape Law
Some feminist theories hold that, because so much of our legal sys-
tem and rules of civilization have been written by men, men exercise
more control in society than women.5 0 Postmodern feminist legal theory
41. U.S. CONST. amend. ViII.
42. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
43. Cheryl Bell et al., Recent Developments, Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison
System: Analyzing America's Most "Open" Secret, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 195, 211 (1999).
44. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830; see also Cheryl Bell et al., supra note 43.
45. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
46. Id. at 834 ("Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not 'part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."' (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981))); see also Giron v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
47. Bell et al., supra note 43, at 212.
48. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
49. Id. at 834-35 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)).
50. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 15-16 ("All feminist theories share two things . ...
First, feminists recognize that the world has been shaped by men, particularly white men, who for
this reason possess larger shares of power and privilege. All feminist legal scholars emphasize the
rather obvious (but unspoken) point that nearly all public laws in the history of existing civilization
were written by men.. . . Second, all feminists believe that women and men should have political,
social, and economic equality. But while feminists agree on the goal of equality, they disagree about
its meaning and on how to achieve it."). Levit and Verchick continue to describe various feminist
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considers men's legacy of control as the basis for our society's patriar-
chal structure-which is manifested in the law's subordinate treatment of
women who have been sexually violated through male dominance.5'
Dominance theory finds that sexual violation is made possible by
gender inequality.52 Gender inequality is socially institutionalized and
demonstrates the subordination of women. For example, Catharine
MacKinnon, a prominent feminist legal theorist, postulates that sexual
assault occurs because of a hierarchy between the parties to the assault-
in other words, the power of one gender over another.54 A hierarchy ex-
isted in Graham not only because the plaintiff was a woman, but also
because she was a prisoner, and the perpetrators were her male guards.
Nevertheless, awareness of a social hierarchy is seemingly absent in
rape law where force is characterized by male dominance.5 The defense
of consent, for example, is focused on the defendant's belief of what a
woman wanted, as opposed to the woman's understanding of the inci-
dent, which demonstrates the hierarchy between genders.56 By discredit-
ing the experience of the woman victim, rape law reflects how women
legal theories, including equal treatment theory, which is "based on the principle of formal equality.
. . namely, that women are entitled to the same rights as men," id at 16; cultural feminism, which
"argues that formal equality does not always result in substantive equality," id. at 18; dominance
theory, which "focuses on the power relations between men and women," id at 22; critical race
feminism, which "argue[s] that legal doctrines in various areas, such as rape, sexual harassment, and
domestic violence, do not adequately address discrimination based on the intersections of these
categories," id. at 26; and additional theories, including lesbian feminism, ecofeminism, pragmatic
feminism, and postmodem feminism, id. at 29-36.
51. Id. at 23 ("Patriarchy means the rule or 'power of the fathers.' It is a system of social and
political practices in which men subordinate and exploit women. The subordination occurs through
complex patterns of force, social pressures, and traditions, rituals, and customs. This domination
does not just occur in individual relationships, but is supported by the major institutions in society.").
52. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, 127-29. Catharine MacKinnon first introduced this par-
ticular postmodem view in 1979. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 22. Dominance theory argues
that women are subordinated due to "patterns of male domination" that have resulted from our
culture and social institutions, thus reinforcing patriarchy. Id. at 22-23.
53. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 22-23.
54. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 246. For this reason, MacKinnon writes that rape is "a
crime of sexualized dominance on the basis of sex." Id.
55. Id at 244.
56. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 842 (1990).
In her article, Bartlett describes "the woman question," which is a method of exposing how the law
subordinates women by "examining how the law fails to take into account the experiences and
values that seem more typical of women than of men . .. or how existing legal standards and con-
cepts might disadvantage women." Id at 837 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bartlett points out
that asking the woman question reveals that "the defense of consent focuses on the perspective of the
defendant and what he 'reasonably' thought the woman wanted, rather than the perspective of the
woman and the intentions she 'reasonably' thought she conveyed to the defendant," and such
scrutiny reveals how the legal system subordinates women; thus, "the woman question helps to
demonstrate how social structures embody norms that implicitly render women different and thereby
subordinate." Id. at 842-43. In Graham, the court emphasized the defendants' impressions of con-
sent rather than scrutinizing the intent of the victim. See Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d
1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013).
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are devalued in society.57 Dominance theory adopts the view that force
sufficient to overcome consent may transcend physical acts and include
both nonphysical domination and psychological abuse.8 The evidence
presented in Graham exemplifies the need for courts to consider the
dominance theory view that coercion can exist absent physical force.
II. GRAHAM V. SHERIFF OF LOGAN COUNTY
A. Facts
While Stacey Graham was imprisoned in solitary confinement at the
Logan County Jail in Oklahoma, Rahmel Jefferies and Alexander Men-
dez, who were both prison guards, engaged in sexual intercourse with
her.59 While the intercourse was an isolated occurrence, both Jefferies
and Mendez had separately associated with Graham beyond what is typi-
cal of a prison guard and an inmate.so
The relationship between Graham and Jefferies evolved over time.6 1
The jail intercom system allowed a guard in a control tower to communi-
cate with a prisoner in her cell, and Jefferies used the intercom system to
have ongoing conversations with Graham.62 Their conversations devel-
oped from discussing their families and interests to discussing sexual
intercourse; eventually, the two also exchanged sexual notes.63 At one
point, Graham flashed her breasts at Jefferies; and on other occasions,
Jefferies provided Graham with a candy bar and a blanket at her re-
quest.M
Graham's relationship with Mendez, on the other hand, was much
more brief-it was limited to a matter of days before their sexual en-
counter.65 A few weeks after Graham and Jefferies began communicating
over the intercom, Mendez used the same intercom to initiate a conversa-
tion with Graham; he began to discuss his sexual fantasies and inquire
66about hers. It was during that conversation that Graham told Mendez
she wanted to "be with two men at the same time." 67 During that conver-
sation, Mendez asked if he could look at Graham naked through the win-
dow of her cell, and she complied.68
57. Bartlett, supra note 56, 842-43 ("[Rape law] reveals how the position of women reflects
the organization of society," thereby exposing "how social structures embody norms that implicitly
render women different and thereby subordinate.").
58. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 180.
59. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1120.
60. Id. at 1120-21.
61. See id.





67. Id. (quoting Graham in the record).
68. Id.
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That night, Mendez brought Jefferies to Graham's cell and the three
engaged in sexual conduct.69 Graham and Jefferies had intercourse while
Graham "simultaneously performed oral sex on Mendez."70 Jefferies and
Mendez then switched positions.71 While Mendez was trying to have sex
with her, he dropped his radio.72 Graham attempted to stand up when the
radio dropped, but Mendez pushed her head back down toward Jefferies
as he muttered a profanity toward Graham. When Graham heard anoth-
er female inmate get up and a coughing noise, Jefferies and Mendez im-
mediately left Graham's cell.74
The next day a jail administrator questioned Graham, Mendez, and
Jefferies, but all three denied inappropriate contact. A few weeks later,
however, Graham confessed about the incident to the jail administrator,
though she stated that intercourse was consensual. During the resulting
investigation, Jefferies and Mendez both admitted to the incident and
were terminated from their positions.77 Thereafter, Graham was trans-
ferred to another prison, where she displayed signs of depression, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and received psychological care, noting to a
psychologist that "she had been raped by two jailers."78
B. Procedural History
On September 24, 2010, Graham filed suit for relief under 42
U.S.C. § 198379 claiming that Jefferies and Mendez's acts violated both
her Eighth8o and Fourteenth81 Amendment rights, and that the Sheriff of
Logan County "fail[ed] to discipline, supervise, and train" both Jefferies
and Mendez.82 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Okla-




72. Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., No. CIV-10-1048-F, 2012 WL 9509373, at *4 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 1, 2012), affd741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013).
73. Id.
74. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1121.
75. Id at 1121-22.
76. Id at 1122.
77. Id
78. Id; Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, Graham, 741 F.3d 1118 (No. 12-6302).
79. See Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. 1058, 1059 (2011) (describing how 42 U.S.C. § 1983 enables a prisoner to "seek re-
dress when a person acting under color of state law deprives the prisoner of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution" (footnote omitted)).
80. For a brief overview of the Eighth Amendment, see supra note 8 and accompanying text;
see also Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner Interests in
Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1818-21 (2012) (describing
that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment as a means for prisoners to challenge
their confinement while in custody, and to do so they must establish both the objective and subjec-
tive prong of an excessive force claim).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that a State shall not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of the law").
82. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1122.
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Eighth Amendment.8 3 The District Court granted summary judgment for
the defendants, stating there was no Eighth Amendment violation be-
cause the sexual activity was consensual.84
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision.85 The court found that summary
judgment was proper because there was no dispute as to any material
fact, since Graham was not forced to have sex.86 While the court stated
that "Graham's focus on appeal is . . . whether a prisoner can legally
consent to sex" with a guard, the opinion notes that some form of coer-
cion is required.87 However, based on "the overwhelming evidence of
consent," the court held that there was no Eighth Amendment violation.88
C. Majority Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the Tenth Circuit was convinced that Gra-
ham had consented to sexual activity and that her consent negated the
claim of an Eighth Amendment violation.89 When the court considered
whether Graham presented a question of fact, it weighed the issue of
consent against what would constitute an excessive force violation of the
Eighth Amendment.90
First, the court briefly reviewed the two prongs of an excessive
force claim-one objective, the other subjective.9 1 The objective prong
looks at whether the "alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation," focusing on the nature of
force used.92 The subjective prong looks at the mens rea of the offender,
under which Graham would need to show that the guards acted with a
culpable state of mind, used force "maliciously and sadistically," and
intended to cause the harm.93 Without applying facts to either prong, the
court quickly assessed that because Graham was not forced to have sex,
"all other issues [are] irrelevant."94
83. Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., No. CIV-10-1048-F, 2012 WL 9509373, at *6 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 1, 2012) ("Because Graham was incarcerated at the time of the alleged events, the court
concludes that her claim is properly analyzed as an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim."
(discussing Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1210 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003))), affd741 F.3d 1118 (10th
Cir. 2013).
84. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1122; see also Graham, 2012 WL 9509373, at *9 (noting "the con-
sensual sexual activity at issue in this case does not give rise to a violation of Graham's Eighth
Amendment rights"). The court reasoned that pushing Graham's head down did not amount to ex-
cessive force. Id. at *9 n.4 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992)).
85. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1122.
86. Id. at 1123.
87. Id. at 1124-25.
88. Id. at 1126.
89. Id.
90. See id at 1123.
91. Id.
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While Graham relied heavily on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Lo-
bozzo v. Colorado Department of Corrections, the court refused to ap-
ply the case, stating that its unpublished opinion was not binding prece-
dent.96 Nonetheless, the court clarified, "we read [Lobozzo] as saying at
most that the parties agreed that consent was not a defense, a moot point
since the defendants prevailed anyway."97
Because the court neglected the Lobozzo decision, Graham's case
was declared to be a matter of first impression for the Tenth Circuit.98
The court quickly summarized the approaches other courts have taken to
the issue, but greatly emphasized the evidence of Graham's consent
when coming to its holding.99
The Tenth Circuit cited Hall v. Beavin00 and Freitas v. Aultio' when
mentioning that the Sixth and Eighth Circuits held consensual inter-
course could not be an Eighth Amendment violation.102 The Graham
court then noted that lower courts have found "a prison guard has no
consent defense in an Eighth Amendment civil-rights case alleging sexu-
al relations"'03 because any form of sexual activity "serves no legitimate
penalogical [sic] purpose" and is therefore "contrary to the goals of law
enforcement."'04 The court's analysis closed by citing three remaining
cases lower court that found prison guards have no consent defense.'0 5
Before declaring that there is no consensus on whether an inmate
can consent to intercourse, the Tenth Circuit visited the Ninth Circuit's
"middle ground" approach reached in Wood v. Beauclair,106 by which the
Ninth Circuit created "a rebuttable presumption of nonconsent."07
Though the "middle ground" approach offers a presumption of noncon-
sent, the Tenth Circuit's opinion focused on the instances suggesting
Graham's consent. The court reasoned that, even if it adopted the Ninth
Circuit's approach, "the presumption against consent would be overcome
by the overwhelming evidence of consent," and concluded that there was
no Eighth Amendment violation. os
95. 429 F. App'x 707 (10th Cir. 2011). Lobozzo also involved a female inmate who alleged an
Eighth Amendment violation after sexual contact with a male prison guard. See infra Part III.A.2.
96. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124.
97. Id.
98. Id (noting that, because Lobozzo is not binding, "it is a matter of first impression in this
circuit whether consent can be a defense to an Eighth Amendment claim based on sexual acts"),
99. Id. at 1124-26.
100. No. 98-3803, 1999 WL 1045694 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).
101. 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997).
102. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124. See infra Part lI.A.3.
103. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1125 (citing Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, No. 04-CV-0182-JTC(JJM),
2009 WL 3199558, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009)).
104. Id. at 1125 (quoting Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (D. Del. 1999)).
105. Id. See infra Part 11I.A.3.
106. 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012).
107. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1125 (reviewing Wood, 692 F.3d 1041). See infra Part Il.A.3
108. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1126.
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To explain its decision, the court summarized the instances of Gra-
ham's consent reflected in the record: that she did not contest the prior
sexual conversations; that she told Mendez she desired being with two
men; that she allowed Mendez to look at her naked; and that she did not
resist engaging in the sexual activity.109 The court pointed out that Gra-
ham "stated repeatedly and consistently that almost all of the sexual acts
that occurred were consensual."o10 In fact, because the court found so
many instances of consent, it chose not to explore other potential factors
of the violation,"' noting that they "cannot undermine the other over-
whelming evidence of consent."1 2
The Graham court issued a unanimous decision. Finding that Gra-
ham consented to sexual activity, the court determined that he sexual
incident was not rape.11 3 The court ultimately held that Graham's consent
negated the possibility of an Eighth Amendment violation; thus, it con-
cluded that if there is evidence that an inmate consented to sexual inter-
course, the court will not find a constitutional violation.114
III. ANALYSIS
In Graham, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff did not
have an Eighth Amendment claim because she consented to intercourse
with two prison guards..'15 Consent, however, implies a voluntary per-
mission; therefore, to give consent, a person must have free will and be
treated with equality.116 The Graham court disregarded that as a prisoner,
Graham lacked both those things. When the court held that intercourse
was consensual and there was no excessive force, it evaluated the cir-
cumstances of this case based on the laws of a society where all parties
have equal rights, which is contrary to the prison environment.
When evaluating consent to sex, the Graham court did not consider
whether the parties were social equals. As a result, the Tenth Circuit's
decision manifests the ways in which the legal system affirms gender
inequality and limits access to justice for female prisoners. By failing to
review the power dynamic in prison, the court failed to consider the ways
109. Id. at 1123.
110. Id.
111. For example, the court did not discuss whether excessive force occurred, or whether
Graham was coerced.




116. See M. Jackson Jones, Power, Control, Cigarettes, and Gum: Whether an Inmate's Con-
sent to Engage in a Relationship with a Correctional Officer Can be a Defense to the Inmate's
Allegation of a Civil Rights Violation Under the Eighth Amendment, 19 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 275, 306 (2014). Because guards and inmates are in fundamentally unequal positions, where
a guard typically holds most of the power, inmates lack the ability to consent to a sexual relation-
ship. See id. (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL
ABUSE OF FEDERAL INMATES 4 (2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0504/final.pdf).
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in which inequality may function as coercion. As this Part will show, the
Graham court thereby contributed to the legal system's subordination of
women and disregard for female inmates."7
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Graham was ill-considered in three
respects. Because the Tenth Circuit was so focused on whether there was
consent, it failed to consider force. First, this Part begins by reviewing
how the Tenth Circuit misapplied the case law dealing with sexual activi-
ty between prisoners and guards. Second, this Part will discuss how the
Tenth Circuit's decision reflected the legal system's treatment of coer-
cion in rape law. Because it employed a patriarchal definition of consent,
the court ignored how Graham may have been coerced by the inequality
and powerlessness he experienced as a female inmate. Third and finally,
the court's decision treated the parties as equal and disregarded the gen-
der asymmetry between a male prison guard and female prison inmate.
Thus, this section ends by reviewing the power imbalance between male
prison guards and female inmates and discussing how sex is commodi-
tized in prison to postulate why sexual misconduct so frequently occurs.
A. The Tenth Circuit Misapplied the Law in Graham
As it evaluated Graham's excessive force claim, the Tenth Circuit
cursorily examined the legal precedent and improperly focused on con-
sent rather than force. This Subpart argues that Tenth Circuit was so
overwhelmed by the indication of Graham's consent to sex that it misap-
plied the law. First, this Subpart considers how the Tenth Circuit wrong-
ly emphasized what it believed to demonstrate consent. Second, this sub-
part analyzes how the issue of consent drove the Tenth Circuit's disre-
gard for its earlier ruling in Lobozzo. Finally, it concludes by discussing
how the Tenth Circuit's review of existing case law was deficient.
1. The Tenth Circuit's Focus on Consent
Unlike most crimes, rape is one in which the credibility of the vic-
tim is a decisive factor in determining whether any injury occurred."8 In
Graham, the Tenth Circuit focused much of its analysis on Graham's
behavior as evidence of her consent to the sexual activity with Jefferies
and Mendez rather than giving attention to whether any force or coercion
occurred.119 However, rather than focusing on her consent to the act of
sex itself, the court emphasized her behavior before the sexual inci-
dent.120 The court outlined Graham's behavior as evidence of her consent
to sex, and by focusing on her behavior the court both undermined Gra-
ham's credibility as a victim and demonstrated the court's view that she
117. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 242.
118. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 131.
119. See Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d I 18, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2013).
120. See id.at 1120-21, 1123.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
invited the sexual encounter.121 By doing so, the court essentially sug-
gested that Graham did not experience coercion, but instead invited the
crime she alleged.122
The court began by describing the relationship between Graham and
Jefferies over the intercom system; yet instead of looking at what Jeffer-
ies may have told her, the court focused on what Graham said to him:
"Ms. Graham told Jefferies that she would like a man to make love to
her." 2 3 The opinion continued to explain that Graham and Jefferies ex-
changed sexually explicit notes; yet instead of reviewing what Jefferies
wrote to Graham, the court quoted a note that Graham wrote, but never
gave, to Jefferies.124 The court made a point to state that "[a]lthough the
notes she had previously delivered to Jefferies were less explicit, they
had suggested that she wished to have sexual intercourse with him." 12 5
The court's opinion failed to discuss Graham's interest in the other
guard, Mendez.
Nonetheless, the court continued to justify both Jefferies and Men-
dez's acts by undermining Graham's position as a victim and establish-
ing her consent. The court pointed out that Graham testified "that she
enjoyed the conversations and note-writing," and that it gave her "some-
thing to do." 26 The court also stated that Graham once "flashed her
breasts at Jefferies, although he did not ask her to do so."l27 By high-
lighting that Graham engaged in behavior that was not prompted by Jef-
feries, the court called attention to Graham's responsibility for her ac-
tions and failed to consider how Jefferies may have invited that behav-
ior. 12 8 While the court mentioned Jefferies and Mendez's interaction with
Graham, it failed to acknowledge whether they did anything to compel
Graham's behavior or coerce her to act, except to mention that Jefferies
once gave Graham "a candy bar and a blanket." 29 As a result of disre-
garding any wrongdoing by Mendez or Jefferies, the court allocated re-
sponsibility for any misconduct to Graham.
As the court discussed its reasoning for affirming the lower court, it
shifted from its focus on Graham's behavior before the sexual encounter
and concentrated on her indications of consent at the time of the incident:
"She never told either [Jefferies or Mendez] that she did not want to have
121. See id. at H123-24.
122. Seeid.at1123.
123. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1120.
124. Id. at 1120-21. Both the Circuit Court and the District Court note that Graham and Jef-
fries exchanged notes, but neither court mentions what Jefferies may have written; the courts high-
light only that, in her notes to Jefferies, Graham suggested having sex. See id; Graham v. Sheriff of
Logan Cnty., No. CIV-10-1048-F, 2012 WL 9509373, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2012).
125. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1121.
126. Id. at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 1120-21.
129. Id.atil21.
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sex;',130 "Although she has said that she did not want to have sex with
Mendez[,] ... she has not suggested that she indicated any reluctance to
Jefferies or Mendez;"1'3 "She did nothing to indicate lack of consent
when the guards entered her cell, when they removed her clothing, or
when they touched her. She never told either of them that she did not
want to have sex."l32 Though the court briefly mentioned that Graham
did not want to have sex with Mendez, it continued to hold that Graham
consented because she did not say or do anything to indicate other-
-133
wise.
By first focusing on Graham's earlier behavior, the court justified
Jefferies and Mendez's understanding that the act was consensual. Rather
than analyze Jefferies or Mendez's behavior and the ways in which such
behavior may have coerced Graham, the court discussed Graham's be-
havior prior to the encounter to show that her consent was freely given
during the encounter. After establishing what it found to be evidence of
consent, the Tenth Circuit's quick review of case law shows its eagerness
to conclude there was no violation.
2. The Tenth Circuit's Decision to Ignore Lobozzo
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Lobozzo established that an inmate
could not legally consent to sex with a guard,134 but the Graham court
dismisses that holding by stating, "[U]npublished opinions are not bind-
ing precedent."'3 5 While the court is correct that unpublished opinions
are not binding,136 the failure to consider an unpublished opinion in an in
an area of law that lacks any other precedent is contrary to the doctrine of
precedent. By allowing a judge to review a case with similar facts to a
130. Id. at 1123.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. "Although she has said that she did not want to have sex with Mendez and that Mendez
pushed her head own just before the encounter ended, she has not suggested that she indicated any
reluctance to Jefferies or Mendez." Id.
134. Lobozzo v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 429 F. App'x 707, 711 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Gra-
ham, 741 F.3d at 1124.
135. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124; see also Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, Unpublished Opinions: A
Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 623 (2009) ("Unpublished opin-
ions are opinions that a court has designated as having non-binding precedential effect. They are
written resolutions to specific cases, prepared exclusively for the involved parties, and they are
intended to have no binding precedential effect-or even persuasive effect, for some jurisdictions-
on future cases." (footnote omitted)).
136. Weisgerber, supra note 135, at 632 ("Even if litigants may now cite to unpublished opin-
ions in their briefs, judges need not accord unpublished cases the same precedential treatment as
published cases, or any precedential treatment at all.").
137. Id. at 632-33 ("This inferior treatment of unpublished opinions is contrary to the role and
understanding of precedent in America's constitutional and legal history."); see also id. at 644 ("[11f
an area of law is unsettled, future cases dealing with the same area of law will surely arise in the
future. If these future cases deal with the same material facts and same legal issues, the prior case
will be on all fours with the subsequent case; in such an instance, the doctrine of precedent demands
that the prior case be binding on the subsequent one.").
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prior decision yet arrive at a separate and distinct conclusion, the judge
may essentially determine which holding becomes law.'38
In Lobozzo, a female inmate had sexual contact with her male pris-
on guard and later alleged an Eighth Amendment violation claiming she
had not been protected against exual assault.13 9 Under the objective el-
ement of an excessive force claim, courts must determine if the wrongdo-
ing was harmful enough to amount to a constitutional violation.14 0 The
Tenth Circuit found that the objective element was satisfied because "[ilt
[was] uncontested that Lobozzo, an inmate, could not legally consent to
sexual activity with . . . a guard" and "rape is sufficiently serious to con-
stitute a constitutional violation."' 4 1 However, while the Tenth Circuit
found that the objective element of the excessive force claim was met, it
did not find the subjective element was satisfied.142
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Graham neglected to elaborate on
the similarities between Graham's circumstances and those of Loboz-
zo.143 Because Lobozzo held that an inmate cannot consent to sex with a
guard, relying on Lobozzo would have shown that, as a prisoner, Graham
could not consent to intercourse. Just as the objective element of the ex-
cessive force claim was met in Lobozzo, because the inmate and guard
had sexual contact, so too would the same claim be satisfied in Graham,
simply based on Graham's status as a prisoner.
When it disregarded Lobozzo, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated its
struggle in accepting Graham's behavior as a prisoner reacting to a so-
cialized power imbalance;'" instead, the court perceived Graham to be a
woman asking for sex. The Tenth Circuit saw consent based on what it
believed consent to look like-in a free environment with gender equali-
ty, consent means voluntary permission. Based on Graham's behavior,
the court understood that she voluntarily granted permission to Jefferies
and Mendez. However, in prison, behavior that looks like consent is not
the product of free will; rather, it is the result of a situational power im-
138. Id. at 632-33.
139. Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at 708-09.
140. M. Jackson Jones, Power, Control, Cigarettes, and Gum: Whether an Inmate's Consent o
Engage in a Relationship with a Correctional Officer Can be a Defense to the Inmate's Allegation of
a Civil Rights Violation Under the Eighth Amendment, 19 SUFFOLK 1. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 275,
283 (2014).
141. Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at 711.
142. Jones, supra note 116, at 288. To establish the subjective element was met, Lobozzo
presented statistics on rapes that occur at Colorado Department of Corrections facilities, claiming
that those statistics provided notice of the danger prisoners face. Id. (citing Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at
711). The court reasoned that the statistics did not provide the officials with notice that Lobozzo's
constitutional rights had been violated and stated "[tihe record simply does not support her allega-
tions that the CDOC Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk that she would be sex-
ually victimized." Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at 713.
143. See Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at 711.
144. See infra Part II.B.
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balance.145 Unlike the Lobozzo court, the Graham court disregarded this
fact because Graham's behavior satisfied its understanding of what con-
sent looks like. As a result, the Graham court declared that Lobozzo did
not apply and took Graham as an opportunity to revisit this contentious
subject.
3. The Tenth Circuit's Dismissal of Cases Involving Sexual Con-
duct in Prison
While reaching its conclusion in Graham, the Tenth Circuit con-
ducted a brief and cursory survey of case law from various jurisdictions.
Though the court mentioned the Sixth and Eighth Circuits' holdings in
Hall and Freitas that consensual intercourse could not constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation, neither case explicitly involved inter-
course.146 The court then moved to a brief discussion of two district court
cases, Cash and Carrigan, which held that consent is not a defense for
guards having sexual contact with inmates. 147
Both Hall 48 and Freitasl49 held that consensual intercourse was not
a constitutional violation.15 0  While the Eighth Circuit in Freitas ex-
plained in dicta that "welcome and voluntary sexual interac-
tions . . . cannot as a matter of law constitute 'pain' as contemplated by
the Eighth Amendment,"5 1 the Tenth Circuit's reliance on both Hall and
Freitas is misplaced, as neither decision explicitly discussed inter-
course.152 Instead, both cases deal with romantic relationships between
guards and inmates-while the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hall refer-
ences a "sexual relationship,"l53 the Freitas opinion discusses a nonsexu-
al relationship. 154 Though the Tenth Circuit cited both opinions as in-
stances in which other circuits reviewed consensual intercourse between
prison guards and inmates, neither case involved a claim that rose be-
yond sexual harassment.5 5
The Graham decision also cited three lower court cases that found
prison guards have no consent defense. 5 6 The court began by citing Cash
145. See infra Part I.C for a discussion on how the social hierarchy in prison impacts inmate
behavior.
146. See notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
147. See notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
148. No. 98-3803, 1999 WL 1045694 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).
149. 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997).
150. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124.
151. Id. at 1124 (quoting Freitas, 109 F.3d at 1339) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Eighth Amend-
ment forbids excessive punishment that involves "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or
is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime").
152. Jones, supra note 116, at 285-88.
153. Hall v. Beavin, No. 98-3803, 1999 WL 1045694, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).
154. See id. at 285.
155. Id. at 285-87.
156. Id.
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v. County of Erie,'5 7 in which the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York relied on state law to determine that an
inmate lacked the ability to consent to intercourse.'58 Similarly, the Gra-
ham court then turned to Carrigan v. Davis,159 in which the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware looked to state law to deter-
mine that any sexual act between an inmate and a prison guard is a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment, regardless of consent.'60
While the Tenth Circuit rightfully considered cases that found in-
mates cannot provide consent, the problem with both Cash and Carrigan
is that the courts' decision in each is reflective of local, state laws. In
citing these two cases with little analysis, the Tenth Circuit failed to clar-
ify how these two cases that were based in state laws applied to Gra-
ham's constitutional claim. Because the Graham court saw evidence of
consent in Graham's behavior, it declined to seriously consider any case
law that held that prisoners are not able to consent to sexual activity.161
Moreover, the court failed to consider why other courts, such as the
Ninth Circuit, deem consent between a guard and inmate virtually im-
possible to distinguish from coercion.'6 2
The Tenth Circuit finally reviewed the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Wood v. Beauclairl63 for creating "a rebuttable presumption of noncon-
sent."'1" In Wood, the plaintiff was a male inmate who engaged in a ro-
mantic but nonsexual relationship with Martin, a female guard, and later
filed a claim alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for sexual harass-
ment.165 In determining whether Wood could consent to his relationship
with Martin, the Ninth Circuit thoroughly addressed whether prisoners
are capable of giving consent, citing the lack of control prisoners have
over most aspects of their life' and the resulting power dynamics.
157. Cash is a district court case in which the plaintiff claimed she was assaulted and raped as
a pretrial detainee. Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, No. 04-CV-0182-JTC(JJM), 2009 WL 3199558, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009).
158. "Because plaintiff was incarcerated, she lacked the ability to consent to engage in sexual
intercourse with Hamilton as a matter of law. Thus, even if Hamilton's defense was that the sexual
intercourse with plaintiff was physically consensual, this may also constitute a constitutional viola-
tion." Id at *2 (citation omitted) (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05(3)(f)).
159. Carrigan is another district court case in which the plaintiff was an inmate and alleged
that the defendant, Davis, sexually assaulted her in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Carrigan v.
Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (D. Del. 1999).
I60. Id. at 453.
161. See supra Part Ill.A.2.
162. See Graham v. Sheriffof Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2013); Wood v.
Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012).
163. 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012).
164. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1125 (reviewing Wood, 692 F.3d 1041).
165. Jones, supra note I16, at 289-90.
166. "They cannot choose what or when to eat, whether to turn the lights on or off, where to
go, and what to do. They depend on prison employees for basic necessities, contact with their chil-
dren, health care, and protection from other inmates." Wood, 692 F.3d at 1047.
167. A prisoner's ability to exercise free consent is inherently hindered by the power imbalance
in prison. Id. ("The power dynamics between prisoners and guards make it difficult to discern con-
sent from coercion. Even if the prisoner concedes that the sexual relationship is 'voluntary,' because
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The Ninth Circuit therefore held a presumption of nonconsent for prison-
ers alleging sexual abuse by a guard.16 8
Though the Tenth Circuit mentioned the Ninth Circuit's "middle
ground approach" in Wood, it failed to analyze the effect of the Wood
holding in Graham. Had the Tenth Circuit relied on Wood, it would have
given more consideration to whether Graham could actually consent as a
prisoner, rather than focusing on how she gave consent as a woman.
Moreover, the Graham court did not reconcile Graham's behavior as an
inmate lacking basic freedoms and control over her life, and their im-
pression of Graham as a woman, exercising control over her wants and
desires by flirting and writing notes. Beyond the court's shallow consid-
eration of related cases, the Tenth Circuit's focus on consent detracted
from its consideration of the use of force in Graham's claim.
By failing to adequately consider related case law, the Tenth Circuit
improperly neglected legal precedent. In reviewing Graham's claim, the
court concentrated on whether Graham consented to sex, rather than
scrutinizing if or how she experienced coercion. As the next section will
show, gender inequality can function as coercion, and though traditional
rape law often overlooks it, it is crucial to consider in the prison setting.
B. The Court's Misguided Understanding of "Coercion" in Rape Law
When considering rape in a criminal context, most courts require
proof that there was coercion-that the threat of force or force itself re-
sulted in penetration.169 In adjudicating whether coercion occurred, sev-
eral courts look to the victim's behavior and the extent to which the vic-
tim resisted the force, maintaining that the victim ought to have dis-
played physical resistance.170 By requiring physical resistance, certain
types of coercion are not evaluated in criminal rape cases.
Very rarely have courts acknowledged that rape victims may be so
overcome with fear, that their actions failed to resist the use of force
against them or that there may be other explanations for a failure to
struggle against the offender.172 This Subpart begins by scrutinizing how
the Graham decision examined the question of coercion when evaluating
the excessive force claim and continues to consider dominance theory's
sex is often traded for favors (more phone privileges or increased contact with children) or 'luxuries'
(shampoo, gum, cigarettes), it is difficult to characterize sexual relationships in prison as truly the
product of free choice.")
168. Id. at 1049.
169. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 182; see, e.g., United States v. Youngman, 481 F.3d
1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2007); Miles v. Yates, No. CV 05-5459 DOC(JC), 2010 WL 2569190, at *7
(C.D. Cal. May 6, 2010); Leyja v. Oklahoma, No. ClV-09-265-W, 2010 WL 1881462, at *15
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 7, 2010); Williams v. State, 10 So. 3d 1083, 1086 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); State v.
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
170. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 183.
171. Id at 182.
172. Id at 183.
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arguments of how coercion occurs beyond what criminal rape law de-
fines.173 While reflecting on Graham's testimony and trial court records,
this Subpart shows that, regardless of a cognizable criminal or constitu-
tional claim, Graham experienced coercion based on the view that ine-
quality constitutes force.
In reviewing a rape claim and the issue of a woman's consent, the
legal system will often categorize a woman based on her relationship
with the offender.1 74 For instance, if a woman claims nonconsensual sex
with a stranger, the law puts her into a category in which the lack of a
relationship to the stranger means that, most likely, she was raped. For
Graham, the court considered evidence of her prior interactions with
Jefferies to indicate that she had consented to the sexual activity with
both Jefferies and Mendez.175 Yet when a court assumes that a woman's
relationship to a man can evidence her consent, it overlooks the reasons
why she may not display resistance during intercourse or rape.
The Tenth Circuit's discussion of coercion in the crime of rape is
limited at best in the Graham opinion. Instead of discussing how Graham
may have been coerced, the court only stated that some form of coercion
is required to constitute an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
176
The court simply focused on what it believed to evidence Graham's con-
sent and relied on her admission that she was not "forced or given any
promises." By mainly focusing on Graham's behavior and lack of re-
sistance, the court concluded that the sexual activity was not coercive,
and ended its analysis.
When a court only asks whether consent occurred, it fails to consid-
er that inequality between the parties may prevent a woman from dis-
playing her nonconsent.178 When inequality is a reflection of power dy-
namics, its existence between the offender and the victim can constitute
coercion because such inequality prevents the victim from displaying
nonconsent.179 A woman may be "too surprised or too terrified or too
learned in passivity or wants to get it over with too badly" to resist
force. 180
173. This analysis will rely on Catharine MacKinnon's analysis, as her writings and research
have brought the concerns of dominance theory into discussions of legal reform.
174. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 175.
175. In the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) interview with Graham, she stated
that the sex was consensual with Jefferies; "I didn't really want Mendez there." Graham v. Sheriff of
Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013).
176. See Graham, 741 F.3d at 1123.
177. Id. at 1122.
178. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 247 ("[S]ex under conditions of inequality can look con-
sensual when it is not wanted .... Men in positions of power over women can thus secure sex that
looks, even is, consensual without that sex ever being wanted, without it being freely chosen ....
179. Id.
180. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 35.
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There is no doubt that the inherent power imbalance of the prison
environment fostered the inequality between Graham, Jefferies, and
Mendez. Graham was a prisoner; she had very little agency, with no con-
trol over what she ate for dinner, what time she went to bed at night, or
any other basic need. Both Jefferies and Mendez were prison guards. The
severe inequality was undoubtedly apparent to all parties, evidenced by
the lack of control Graham had over basic aspects of her life and the
complete control Jefferies and Mendez, as prison guards, retained over
her life.18' Graham was clearly cognizant of her unequal status, as she
testified "her rights were taken from her when she was incarcerated" and
"[s]he had no control over [the sexual activity]." 82 Had the court recog-
nized that power inequality is a form of coercion, it would have found
that coercion occurred because a lack of power prevented Graham from
displaying her nonconsent.
Moreover, Graham's medical records and notes from her counseling
sessions show that Graham had been in a similar position before-a posi-
tion where she was made unequal to her offender and subjected to sexual
acts. As Graham's medical records reflect, "She was molested as a child
by older cousins and an uncle" and "[s]he lived with a very abusive
mother."'83 An expert witness also confirmed "important considerations
for her vulnerability," which included a "mental health history," a diag-
nosis of bipolar disorder, and at least two suicide attempts.184 As a victim
of child molestation, Graham had experienced nonconsensual sexual
contact in her personal relationships. Had it closely considered Graham's
history, the court could evaluate the reasons for her failure to resist and
physically struggle against Jefferies and Mendez. Such a review may
have shown that, to Graham, "force" was not only limited to physical
violence, but also included the exercise of sexual dominance over her.185
As dominance theorists note, most existing criminal laws treat pas-
sive silence, acquiescence, or resigning to sex as consent.'86 Both crimi-
nal and constitutional laws regarding rape fail to recognize reasons why
Graham did not fight against Mendez or Jefferies, and fail to consider
that the power imbalance between them may have been one of those rea-
sons.187 Among the reasons Graham may have submitted to the sexual
181. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra, note 78, at 23-24 (discussing DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989), which stated: "[W]hen the State by the affirm-
ative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shel-
ter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by
the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause").
182. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 78, at 3.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 13.
185. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 52.
186. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 243.
187. There may be speculation that Graham and Jefferies's behavior indicated a genuine inter-
est and connection between them. Unfortunately, a genuine connection amidst the institutionalized
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activity, there may have been intimidation or pressure associated with
Jefferies and Mendez's status and authority.'88 Yet criminal rape law ig-
nores power relationships that may influence the sexual encounter, just
as it ignores nonviolent coercion.189 Evaluations of rape in prison as ex-
cessive force take the same approach, likewise ignoring nonviolent coer-
cion.
By failing to consider if or why Graham did not verbalize or show
her nonconsent, the court implicitly decided that Graham's lack of physi-
cal resistance meant there was no coercion on the part of Jefferies and
Mendez. According to most courts, intercourse is not a crime unless it
includes force that amounts to physical injury.' 9 0 As dominance theory
seeks to show, sex is often nonconsensual, but the narrow requirements
of rape hide the reality of many factors that prevent a victim from exhib-
iting nonconsent.
C. Commoditizing Sexuality in Prison: How and Why
In prison, a guard's extreme control contributes to his power over
inmates and leaves inmates to control just one tangible good: their bod-
ies.191 As a result, women in prison use their bodies and sex as a com-
modity to exert some level of power, and evidence of Graham's behavior
suggests she may have done the same. In addition, having received no
"special treatment" from Jefferies or Mendez, Graham may exemplify
non-tangible benefits inmates may receive for sexual contact with
guards.'
92
It is possible that women prisoners are so used to being oppressed in
past relationships and are so desperate for attention and love, that they
hierarchy is illusory, and an inmate's romance puts her at risk for exploitation. Dirks, supra note 20,
at 110 (citing Agnes L. Baro, Spheres of Consent: An Analysis of the Sexual Abuse and Sexual
Exploitation of Women Incarcerated in the State ofHawaii, 8 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 61, 78 (1997);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20) ("Arguing that cases of sexual misconduct that involve
'romance' or some level of consensual contact are too difficult to prosecute, those in the legal arena
choose to do nothing to aid women who have been exploited or abused by male prison staff.").
"These legal standards also attempt to jeopardize women's victim status by stigmatizing them as
'inmates' or 'bad girls,' thus occluding any opportunity for their experiences to fall under the pur-
view of 'real rape."' Id. (citing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES
WOMEN WHO SAY NO (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the
State. Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE BLOODY FOOTPRINTS
201 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen Geil Moran eds., 1993)).
188. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 52.
189. Id. at 59.
190. Id. at 71; see also MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 247 ("If force were defined to include
inequalities of power, meaning social hierarchies, and consent were replaced with a welcomeness
standard, the law of rape would begin to approximate the reality of forced and unwanted sex.").
191. Amy Laderberg, Note, The "Dirty Little Secret": Why Class Actions Have Emerged as
the Only Viable Option for Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the Subjective Prong of the Eighth
Amendment in Suits for Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 323, 340-41 (1998).
192. While Graham received a candy bar and a blanket, the Tenth Circuit stated she did not get
"special treatment." See Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (10th Cir.
2013).
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are used to exchanging their bodies for attention.'93 While in prison,
women tend to respond to male authority the same way they did before
their incarceration.194 A review of Graham's medical records shows that
this may have been her own circumstance; not only was she molested
and abused as a child, but she also married at fifteen years old.' 95 This
suggests she experienced oppression and abuse in her past relationships
and may have believed that she needed to exchange her body for a sense
of protection or attention.
Another explanation of why sex is commoditized in prison is be-
cause of the prisoner's own self-esteem.196 Some inmates seek relation-
ships with guards because of loneliness or as a way to pass time. 197 In
Graham, the plaintiff testified that she felt "wanted and appreciated"
when the defendant asked to see her naked.'98 She also testified that ex-
changing flirtatious notes with the guards was enjoyable and gave her
something to do.199 This demonstrates that, despite the circumstances,
Graham found a way to get something else she needed through sex: self-
200esteem. Women inmates are often unable to envision positive out-
comes for themselves because of their powerlessness and the hopeless-
ness of their situation;201 thus, receiving attention from a guard can make
202
a prisoner feel some self-worth.
When a woman inmate uses her body to get what she needs-
whether it is protection, safety, a piece of candy, or a fraction of confi-
dence-she has not consented to sex. Prison creates an environment of
coercion, and women are objectified not only because they are women,
but further by virtue of their role as powerless inmates. Prisoners are
deemed to lack entitlement to the rights accorded to ordinary citizens;
they are deprived of their freedom to make choices or grant permis-
203
sion. A lack of these basic freedoms includes lacking the capability to
consent to intercourse.
193. See Laderberg, supra note 189, at 339-40.
194. Id
195. Appellant's Appendix at 68, Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir.
2013) (No 12-6302) (reproducing Stacey Graham's medical records).
196. Buchanan, supra note 28, at 56.
197. Id ("For some women, 'it seems as if sex is the only thing that keeps time clicking by."'
(quoting CRISTINA RATHBONE, A WORLD APART: WOMEN, PRISON, AND LIFE BEHIND BARS 49
(2005)).
198. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1121.
199. Id.
200. Interacting with the guards likely contributed to Graham's sense of self-worth because she
was engaged and received attention from them. Note that acts to build self-esteem are not synony-
mous to consenting to a particular sexual act, though Graham may have ngaged in sexual contact
because self-worth depended on a need to feel desired.
201. Laderberg, supra note 191, at 339-40.
202. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20.
203. Deborah Labelle, Bringing Human Rights Home to the World of Detention, 40 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 79, 83 (2008).
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CONCLUSION
When it determined that Graham consented to sex, the Tenth Circuit
failed on several counts. First, the court misapplied the law. The Tenth
Circuit was charged with evaluating an excessive force claim; but in re-
viewing Graham's claim the court neglected to evaluate excessive force;
instead, it concentrated on Graham's consent.
Second, the court's review of Graham's consent was improper be-
cause the court focused only on Graham's behavior rather than consider-
ing her circumstances as a prisoner and the coercion she faced. As domi-
nance theory reveals, the court used a patriarchal view of rape and con-
sent. Its opinion overlooks how gender inequality results in coercion,
especially in prison where women inmates are utterly powerless and in-
capable of consenting at all, and suggests that Graham invited the sexual
conduct that was the basis of her claim.
Third, the court demonstrated the common disregard for both gen-
der and social inequality when it placed the blame on Graham. The court
did not give her status as a woman equal consideration or acknowledge
how her status as a prisoner affected her behavior. Both existing criminal
rape laws and courts evaluating rape as an excessive force claim ignore
the power relationships that influence sexual encounters in prison. As a
result of the power imbalance, inmates use their bodies as a commodity
to experience control.Graham presents several challenges women pris-
oners face in the justice system-the limited definition of rape in crimi-
nal law, the inability to overcome institutionalized male dominance, and
the struggle to assert control when all other personal rights have been
restricted. Courts reviewing rape in prison under the Eighth Amendment
must take a holistic and concentrated approach to the unique circum-
stances of the parties. A vital component to justice for prisoners depends
on a comprehensive understanding of their plight. In order for women
prisoners to gain autonomy and justice in the legal system, courts must
come to terms with how prisons create an environment that interrupts
how relationships are constructed. If a court tailors its analysis and opin-
ion to fully acknowledge the experience of prisoners, women like Stacey
Graham will have an opportunity for equality and justice in the legal
system.
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